Curriculum Vitae Dr. Norma Burow (née Schmitt) Current Position: Post-Doc Research Assistant, Gender Studies at the DIW Berlin Contact: Mohrenstr. 58, 10117 Berlin, +49 30.897 89 381, nburow@diw.de Research Interest: Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Labor Market and Family Economics, (Gender-) Stereotypes & Social Norms, Gender Economics, individual and intra-family economic decision-making, Social Policy Academic Career since 05.2014 DIW Berlin (German Institute for Economic Research), Berlin Post-Doc, Gender Studies 10.2011 12.2013 Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)/Germany Project Leader and Coordinator of a Research Project funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research and the ESF of the European Union. Titel: Gender Stereotypes as Reasons for Gender Disparities [German: Geschlechterstereotype als Ursache persistenter Geschlechterdisparitäten -- Potenziale der Familienund Arbeitsmarktpolitik zur Durchsetzung von Chancengleichheit]. 09.2005 03.2013 Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)/Germany Research Assistent at the Chair of Economics, esp. Economic and Social Policy, Prof. Dr. H. Ribhegge. 08.2004 07.2005 Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)/Germany Student Research Assistent at the Chair of Economics, esp. Economic and Social Policy, Prof. Dr. H. Ribhegge. University Education 04.2008 12.2014 Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)/Germany Ph. D. in Economics (Dr. rer. pol), Title of Dissertation: Gender Stereotypes and Individual Economic Decision-Making. 10.2000 07.2005 Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder) Business Administration and Economics focus: Labor Market and Social Policy, Diploma Thesis: An Analysis of East- Germany s Rents An Alternative Exposition of the Linear Regression Model [German: Eine empirische Analyse ostdeutscher Mieten Alternative Darstellung des Regressionsmodells] with the SOEP, Graduation as: Diplom Kauffrau
Third Party Funding/Grants & Teaching Experience Third Party Funding/Grants: (2011) Invitation for a full proposal for a research project within the BMBF call Frauen an die Spitze and approval (482.450,10 EUR), (2010) Approval short-term scholarship for research abroad of Europa-Universität Viadrina, (2009) Approval of Seed Money of the Economics Faculty (6.000 EUR). Teaching: Behind the Household Decision-Making (2009/10), Seminar on the Economics of the Family (2010) and Family Policy from an Economics Perspective (2010/11), Seminar on the European Economic and Social Policy: The German Labor Market (2012); tutorials in: Principles of Economics, Microeconomics, European Economic and Social Policy, Labor Market and Labor Market Policy (2015/16, teaching assignment at HTW Berlin, Master of Labor and Personnel Management Scientific Experience Presentations at International Conferences and Workshops: (2016) International Association of Research in Economic Psychology (IAREP), French Experimental Economics Association (ASFEE); (2015) Economic Science Association (ESA), International Association for Feminist Economics (IAFFE), ASFEE, International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences (IMEBESS), European Society for Population Economics (ESPE), European Association for Labor Economics (EALE), Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS), European Association for Labor Economics (EALE), European Economic Association (EEA), Social Norms and Institutions (SNI); (2014) Symposium on Attitudes and Preferences in Konstanz, ESPE, EEA, EALE, VfS; (2013) Florence Workshop on Behavioural and Experimental Economics, ESPE, VfS, EALE, efas Netzwerk deutschsprachiger Ökonominnen; (2012) 7th Alhambra Workshop on Experimental Economics, Psychologisches Kolloqiuum Universität Greifswald; (2011) Workshop Familie im Trend ; (2010) Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie; (2009) ESA, IAREP, Subjective Probability Utility Decision Making (SPUDM), efas Organization of conferences: (2015) Organizer of the scientific workshop Behavioral Economics and Gender at DIW Berlin (BEgender@DIW 2015) Awards: (2015) efas-nachwuchsförderpreis (in Memoriam Angela Fiedler) Applied Research Methods: Quantitative and qualitative empirical social science methods; design and conduct of economics experiments Membership: efas (Scientific Advisory Board), IAFFE, VfS, ESA
Papers An Experiment on the Influence of Stereotypes on Economic Decision-Making Although recent economics studies have found significant gender differences between men and women when decisions involve competition, research on what role stereotypes play in determining why women avoid competitive environments is rather scarce. This paper reports on an economics experiment that examines people's decision-making by means of priming a stereotypical association within a participant's sex and the performance in solving analytical maze tasks prior to deciding on a compensation scheme. The compensation scheme is dependent on either absolute or relative performance in solving maze tasks. While the task suggests no gender differences in performance in the control group, in cases where the experimental design assigns a positive associated prime to women, I find a troubling discrepancy between their increased willingness to compete and their low performance. (part of my dissertation) Couple's Labor Supply, Taxes, and the Division of Housework in a Gender-Neutral Lab We use a lab-in-the-field experiment to investigate intra-couple labor supply decisions and the division of housework under individual and joint income taxation systems. In order to eliminate problems of endogenous intra-couple time use decisions, we exogenously varied not only the taxation system but also the intra-couple roles of primary and secondary earners. Using work effort as a proxy for labor supply, 62 established couples, both cohabiting and married (124 participants), performed real effort tasks under a piece rate payment system within a given time. Prior to this paid task, couples had to decide upon the allocation of an unpaid task serving as our proxy for housework. In our gender neutral lab, we find tax-effects only on men's labor supply but not on women's and no gender differences in the allocation of housework. Instead, the allocation of housework follows a purely economic rationale with the majority of secondary earners taking responsibility. This is even confirmed by a shift to a more egalitarian allocation when individual taxation is applied. However, one result replicates real world findings with married male participants providing more labor supply than cohabiting men and married women less than cohabiting women. This result hinges on the stability of specialization in married couples, which seems to overcome the gender neutral lab. (together with Melanie Schröder; DIW Discussion Paper Nr. 1593; original title Social Norms or Income Taxation - What Drives Couple's Labor Supply? Experimental Evidence part of my dissertation) Do Women Favor In-group Competition? Evidence from an Online Experiment This paper identifies how socially constructed conventions can be made responsible for gender differences observed in competitive situations. Empirical research suggests that women tend to avoid competition in mixed-gender environments, but are more likely to compete against other women. We conduct an online choice experiment with 883 non-standard subjects, 442 of them female, and employ a priming technique to activate gender identity as an exogenous variation. Our results show that indeed the participating women are more eager to engage ingroup competition than in mixed-gender competition. Gender priming enforces this difference, though only at high risk and difficulty levels. We interpret this as a manifestation of stereotypical thinking as well as women's potential competition ability. (joint with Miriam Beblo, Denis Beninger und Melanie Schröder; part of my dissertation, replaced by paper titled Why Do women prefer )
Why Do Women Favor In-group Competition? Evidence from an Online Experiment This paper is an attempt to disentangle the mechanisms that drive women s typically ob-served higher competition willingness in same-gender compared to mixed-gender settings. We conduct an incentivized online choice experiment with 883 non-standard subjects, 442 of them female, with varying compensation schemes that ruled inter alia the gender-mix of the competitors group. Our framed field experiment replicates the finding that women are on average more eager to engage in same-gender than mixed-gender competition. We can show that, while the mechanisms discussed in the literature (such as self-confidence, risk aversion, ability) are related to a woman s general willingness to compete, they do not contribute to explaining the preference for same-gender competition. We therefore advocate this preference to women s stereotypical beliefs about their own gender group s abilities.. (joint with Miriam Beblo, Denis Beninger and Melanie Schröder; new aspects compared to the one in the dissertation) Gender Stereotypes and Gender Differences-- Theory and Policy -- Policy requests the elimination of gender stereotypes since it expects stereotyping to affect individual decision-making and thus to be key to reaching gender equality. According to social-psychological empiricism and theory, gender stereotypes affect men and women equally, thus permitting freely chosen roles and identities for both. While economics also recently provides empirical advances on the stereotypes' effects, it still lacks a specific full theory that explains the linkages between stereotypes and gender gaps. However, in order to provide sound scientific policy advice there is a need to theorize. I discuss theoretical explanations on the effects of stereotypes inspired by and derived from identity economics. I then identify gender stereotypes, despite the omnipresent gender mainstreaming stipulation, within the information brochure on the German federal Paid Parental Leave, selected as an exemplary policy measure. (part of my dissertation) Zum Potential einer festen Geschlechterquote Ab dem Jahr 2016 wird in Deutschland eine feste Geschlechterquote für die Aufsichtsräte von paritätisch mitbestimmungspflichtigen und gleichzeitig börsennotierten Unternehmen gelten. Die Festlegung einer selbstverpflichtenden Quote für die weiteren oberen Führungsebenen verlangt der Gesetzgeber bereits bis zum 30. September 2015 auch für die Unternehmen, bei denen nur eines der beiden Kriterien erfüllt ist. Im Zuge der Implementierung dieses Gesetzes wurden vielfach Befürchtungen geäußert, die von einer Einschränkung der Unternehmensperformance über die Diskriminierung von Männern, einer Einschränkung der Qualität des Talentpools bis hin zu einer Stigmatisierung von Frauen durch die Quote reichten. Der vorliegende Bericht prüft auf der Basis von wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen diese zentralen Kritikpunkte. Im Ergebnis dürften die Vorteile einer Geschlechterquote die Befürchtungen entkräften, da die Quote langfristig zum Abbau von Geschlechterstereotypen beiträgt und sich somit deren negativer Einfluss bei der Auswahl der Besten für Führungspositionen reduzieren lässt. (erschienen als DIW Wochenbericht, 40, 2015, S. 887-897) Towards a Gender Quota In 2016, a fixed gender quota will come into force in Germany, affecting the supervisory boards of listed companies that also have employee representation (full codetermination). By as early as September 30, 2015, however, all companies will be obliged to set a self-imposed target quota even companies that meet just one of these criteria; i.e., either listed or subject to codetermination. A variety of concerns have been expressed about the implementation of this law,
including fears that the quota will impair company performance and the quality of the talent pool, or the belief that it discriminates against men and stigmatizes women. The present article examines these key criticisms on the basis of research findings to date. In conclusion, the advantages of a gender quota should allay these concerns since, in the long term, it contributes to dismantling gender stereotypes and consequently also mitigates the negative impact these stereotypes have on the selection of the best candidates for senior management positions. (erschienen als DIW Economic Bulletin, 40, 2015, S. 527-536)