Moral judgments and Human nature

Transcription

1 IPW, Metropolia Business School, Vantaa University May 13-17, 2013 Moral judgments and Human nature Juan Perote-Peña Faculty of Economics and Business University of Zaragoza

2 4.1. Neuroscience: The Moral brain Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies (Greene & Haidt (2002): 1. medial frontal gyrus (9/10); 2. posterior cingulate, precuneus, retrosplenial cortex (31/7); 3. superior temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobe (39); 4. orbitofrontal, ventromedial frontal cortex (10/11); 5. temporal pole (38); 6. Amygdala; 7. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (9/10/46); 8. parietal lobe (7/40).

3 4.1. Neuroscience: The Moral brain Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies: 1. medial frontal gyrus (9/10); 2. Likely posterior functions: cingulate, precuneus, retrosplenial cortex (31/7); Integration of emotion into 3. decision-making superior temporal and planning, sulcus, inferior especially parietal for conscious lobe (39); processes 4. orbitofrontal, ventromedial frontal Associated cortex moral (10/11); tasks: 5. Personal temporal moral pole judgments (38); 6. Impersonal Amygdala; moral judgments 7. Simple dorsolateral moral judgments prefrontal cortex (9/10/46); Forgivability judgments (also 8. lateral parietal frontopolar) lobe (7/40). Viewing moral pictures

4 4.1. Neuroscience: The Moral brain Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies: 1. medial frontal gyrus (9/10); 2. posterior cingulate, precuneus, retrosplenial cortex (31/7); 3. superior temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobe (39); 4. orbitofrontal, ventromedial frontal cortex (10/11); 5. temporal pole (38); 6. Amygdala; 7. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (9/10/46); 8. parietal lobe (7/40). Likely functions: Integration of emotion, imagery (especially precuneus and memory, Especially for coherent social narratives Associated moral tasks: Associated moral tasks: Personal moral judgments Impersonal moral judgments Simple moral judgments Forgivability judgments Moral pictures

5 4.1. Neuroscience: The Moral brain Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies: Likely functions: Supporting representations of socially significant movements, and possibly 1. medial frontal gyrus (9/10); 2. posterior cingulate, precuneus, complex representations retrosplenial of cortex (31/7); personhood 3. superior temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobe (39); 4. orbitofrontal, ventromedial frontal cortex (10/11); Associated moral tasks: 5. temporal pole (38); 6. Personal Amygdala; moral judgments 7. Simple dorsolateral moral judgments prefrontal cortex (9/10/46); Moral pictures 8. parietal lobe (7/40).

6 4.1. Neuroscience: The Moral brain Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies: Likely functions: 1. medial frontal gyrus (9/10); 2. Representation posterior cingulate, of reward/ precuneus, punishment value retrosplenial cortex (31/7); 3. Control superior of inappropriate/ temporal sulcus, inferior disadvantageous parietal lobe behavior (39); 4. orbitofrontal, ventromedial frontal cortex (10/11); 5. temporal pole (38); Associated 6. Amygdala; moral tasks: 7. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (9/10/46); Simple moral judgments Moral pictures 8. parietal lobe (7/40).

7 4.1. Neuroscience: The Moral brain Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies: 1. medial frontal gyrus (9/10); Likely 2. posterior functions: cingulate, imparting precuneus, affective retrosplenial cortex tone (31/7); to experience and memory 3. superior temporal sulcus, Associated inferior parietal moral lobe tasks: (39); Simple moral judgments 4. orbitofrontal, ventromedial frontal cortex (10/11); 5. temporal pole (38); 6. Amygdala; 7. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (9/10/46); 8. parietal lobe (7/40).

8 4.1. Neuroscience: The Moral brain Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies: 1. medial frontal gyrus (9/10); 2. Likely posterior functions: cingulate, precuneus, Rapid assessment retrosplenial of reward/ cortex (31/7); punishment value, especially 3. visual superior and negative temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobe (39); Associated moral tasks: 4. orbitofrontal, ventromedial Moral pictures frontal cortex (10/11); 5. temporal pole (38); 6. Amygdala; 7. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (9/10/46); 8. parietal lobe (7/40).

9 4.1. Neuroscience: The Moral brain Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies: 1. medial frontal gyrus (9/10); Likely 2. posterior functions: cingulate, Working precuneus, memory retrosplenial and other cortex cognitive (31/7); functions 3. superior temporal sulcus, Associated inferior parietal moral lobe tasks: (39); Impersonal 4. orbitofrontal, moral judgments ventromedial frontal cortex (10/11); 5. temporal pole (38); 6. Amygdala; 7. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (9/10/46); 8. parietal lobe (7/40).

10 4.1. Neuroscience: The Moral brain Brain areas implicated in moral cognition by neuroimaging studies: 1. medial frontal gyrus (9/10); Likely 2. posterior functions: cingulate, Integration precuneus, of emotion retrosplenial into decision- cortex making (31/7); and planning, especially for conscious processes 3. superior temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobe (39); Associated moral tasks: 4. orbitofrontal, ventromedial frontal cortex (10/11); Simple 5. temporal moral judgments pole (38); Viewing 6. Amygdala; moral pictures Forgivability 7. dorsolateral judgments prefrontal cortex (9/10/46); 8. parietal lobe (7/40). Personal moral judgments (footbridge) Impersonal moral judgments (trolley)

11 Neuroscience: The Moral brain Fig. 1. Brain areas (indicated by Brodmann s area (BA)) exhibiting differences in activity in response to personal moral dilemmas as compared with impersonal and non-moral dilemmas [32]. Areas exhibiting greater activity for personal moral dilemmas (as compared with impersonal and nonmoral): medial frontal gyrus (BA 9/10); posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31); superior temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobe (BA 39). Areas exhibiting greater activity for impersonal moral dilemmas (as compared with personal): dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 46); parietal lobe (BA 7/40). Images are reversed left to right according to radiologic convention. (Reprinted with permission from Greene et al. [32]. Copyright 2001 American Association for the Advancement of Science.)

12 4.2. Exercise on trolley-like moral dilemma 1 Fernando is in charge of re-structuring and making as profitable as possible a business within the group (a privately owned group). The economic crisis that started in 2008 has hit the Spanish economy and due to the heavy reliance on public sector nacional and regional TV (now cutting spending), the Broadcast production companies are experiencing a sharp decline in sales and profits. A lot of workers of different categories (journalists, cameramen, writers, technicians, etc.) must be laid off to save the business and avoid heavy losses. This month Fernando s boss in Madrid has informed him that 5 additional cameramen have to be fired to reduce the long term spending in this particular business. All the workers that were less productive and/or had lower past performance have already been made redundant. The current staff is equally good and productive in Fernando s view (Fernando hired most of them in the past and know them well). Fernando thinks that it could be possible to convince the boss to fire just two assistant cameramen (who in principle were not at risk now) but for other reasons are relatively more cheaper to fire.

13 4.2. Exercise on trolley-like moral dilemma 2 Fernando is in charge of re-structuring and making as profitable as possible a business within the group (a privately owned group). The economic crisis that started in 2008 has hit the Spanish economy and due to the heavy reliance on public sector nacional and regional TV (now cutting spending), the Broadcast production companies are experiencing a sharp decline in sales and profits. A lot of workers of different categories (journalists, cameramen, writers, technicians, etc.) must be laid off to save the business and avoid heavy losses. This month Fernando s boss in Madrid has informed him that 5 additional cameramen have to be fired to reduce the long term spending in this particular business. All the workers that were less productive and/or had lower past performance have already been made redundant. The current staff are equally good and productive (Fernando hired most of them in the past and know them well. Actually, he is a friend of the cameramen). Fernando thinks that it could be possible to convince the boss to fire just two assistant cameramen (who in principle were not at risk now) but for other reasons are relatively more cheaper to fire.

14 4.2. Exercise on trolley-like moral dilemma Questions to answer: 1. Is it morally permissible for Fernando to defend his proposal before his boss given that the firm s final profits would be the same with both decisions? 2. Which are the relevant deontological and consequentialists reasons that affect this particular moral judgment? 3. Is Fernando s intention relevant for the moral judgment? 4. If Fernando had a different personal relationship with the five cameramen, would you change the moral judgment of the situation? 5. If Fernando had discovered that the two assistant cameramen mentioned had been plugged by a chief executive in the past and are probably untouchable, should this change his decision in some way? 6. Imagine that Fernando decides to follow the original order of his boss and nominate five cameras to be fired. Imagine that there are currently a total of 15 cameras working in this business. How would you decide which 5 will be laid off? Do you think that deciding randomly is a fair method or not? Why? Also in Sophie s decision?

15 4.2. Trolley moral dilemmas : Philosophy Deontological principles: Harm made to others for the greater good is more permissible if: It was unintentional vs intentionally caused (Aquinas double effect ): An action that causes some good effect to someone but harms another person is more permissible if the greater good offsets the harm AND the harm was unintended (a collateral damage ). It was caused by an action rather than by an omission It was not the necessary means to the greater good but, rather, merely a forseen side effect Consequential principles: Harm made to others for the greater good is more permissible if: It saves a greater harm to others (to more people) = Utilitarian consequentialism

16 4.2. Trolley moral dilemmas? The Switch dilemma (1) and the bridgefoot dilemma (2) Taken from Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin and Mikhail (2007) A dissociation between moral judgements and Justifications Mind and Language 22, pp 1-21?

17 4.2. Trolley moral dilemmas The Switch dilemma (1) and the bridgefoot dilemma (2) Taken from Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin and Mikhail (2007) A dissociation between moral judgements and Justifications Mind and Language 22, pp 1-21

18 4.2. Recent related Literature on trolley problems Greene & Haidt (2002), How (and where) does moral judgment work?, TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 6-12, pp Greene et al. (2009), Pushing moral buttons: the interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment, Cognition, doi: /j.cognition Paxton & Greene (2010), Moral reasoning: hints and allegations, Topics in cognitive science Pyysiäinen & Hauser (2009): The origins of religion: evolved adaptation or by-product?, TRENDS is Cognitive Sciences 14-3, Mikhail (2007), Universal Moral Grammar: theory, evidence and the future, TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences11-4, pp Greene at al. (2008), Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitariuan moral judgment, Cognition 107, pp doi: /j.cognition Waldmann & Dieterich (2007), Throwing a bomb on a person versus throwing a person on a bomb, Psychological Science 18-3, pp

19 4.2. Moral psychology Haidt s theory of moral judgments: Social Intuitionist model (SIM) Reasoned Judgment Eliciting Situation A s Intuition A s Judgment A s Reasoning Social Persuasion B s Intuition B s Judgment B s Reasoning A great many people think they are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices William James.

20 Greene at al. (2008), Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment, Cognition 107, pp A cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment, so controlled cognitive processes influence (utilitarian) moral judgment

21 Greene et al. (2009): Pushing Moral buttons: the interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment, Cognition Moral acceptability ratings for four footbridge dilemmas In which the proposed harmful actions vary in their involvement of physical contact, spatial proximity, and personal force. Numbers within graph bars indicate mean and standard errors

22 4.2. Moral psychology Greene s theory of moral judgments: Dual process model (DPM) Deontological judgments A s Intuition? B s Judgment Eliciting Situation Conflict Monitor A s Judgment B s Reasoning A s Reasoning Social Persuasion Utilitarian moral judgments Rule-based cognitive control

23 Koenigs et al. (2007): Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements, Nature 446 Patients with damage in the VMPC produce an abnormally utilitarian pattern of judgments on high-conflict trolley-like moral dilemmas and only on these. Diminished social emotion + Direct personal frustration? VMPC is critical and judgments emotionally driven They also have an abnormally high rate of rejection of unfair monetary offers in the Ultimatum game

24 Rai & Holyoak (2010): Moral principles or Consumer Preferences? Alternative Framings of the Trolley Problem, Cognitive Science 34, Moral psychologists assume Domain- specific moral judgment mechanisms BUT Are domain-general biases in decision-making also prevalent in moral judgment?

25 4.2. Evolutionary Psychology Durban, DeScioli & Fein (2012): Hamilton vs. Kant: piytting adaptations for altruism against adaptations for moral judgment, Evolution and Human Behavior The burying beetle kills some offspring in order to feed the bodies of other offspring. Evolutionary theory would predict that trolley-like moral dilemmas where the affected people are all strangers (or alternatively they are all brothers or all friends), the actor should behave in a pure consequentialist (utilitarian fashion), attaching equal weight to all persons affected. The difference between the judgments of the trolley and the footbridge dilemmas in humans poses a problem. Why evolution could favor a nonconsequentialist norm of behavior? Burnstein et al. (1994) found that people s tradeoffs among kin maximize inclusive fitness: people prefer to help large numbers and more closely related relatives.

26 4.2. Evolutionary Psychology Durban, DeScioli & Fein (2012): Hamilton vs. Kant: pitting adaptations for altruism against adaptations for moral judgment, Evolution and Human Behavior Table 1: Descriptive statistics, Study 1 FOOTBRIDGE SWITCH Stranger Friend Brothers Stranger Friend Brothers Number of observations Would you push/switch? 27.9% 41.4% 47.4% 77.1% 88.5% 88.7% Is it wrong to push/switch? 85.6% 88.0% 84.5% 45.8% 40.6% 38.1% Is it wrong not to push/switch? 60.4% 62.0% 64.7% 77.1% 67.7% 81.4% How wrong is pushing/switching?