Wan Ki Yoon, Jong Soo Kim, Jung So Kim Eun Ho Kwack, Jin Soo An Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute P.O. Box 105, Yusong, Taejon , Korea

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1 IAEA-SM-367/16/04 REMOTE MONITORING AND ITS IMPLICATION IN KOREA Wan Ki Yoon, Jong Soo Kim, Jung So Kim Eun Ho Kwack, Jin Soo An Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute P.O. Box 105, Yusong, Taejon , Korea Abstract Remote monitoring was introduced to safeguards as a new technology under the IAEA Programe Since then, through field trials of the IAEA and the IRMP (International Remote Monitoring Program), remote monitoring is gaining acceptance in real use of implementation. An inspection regime with containment and surveillance working in remote data transfer mode was recommended by the working group with the IAEA to seek more efficient and effective ways of safeguards implementation on PWRs as enhanced cooperation. It was implemented to combine existing digital surveillance and seals with a connection of a transmission line without much additional cost which is born by Korea. It can reduce inspection efforts and cost maintaining current inspection quality. Three reactors are under operation as trial run for nation wide application with satisfactory results so far with incurrence of transmission cost. A virtual private network (VPN) which uses a public network is under consideration as an alternative to current telephone lines to optimize cost effectiveness of transmission. Remote monitoring is the backbone for enhanced cooperation to share safeguards efforts of the IAEA and Korea. The future of remote monitoring is closely dependent of Integrated Safeguards (IS). The current scheme of IS for LWRs without MOX is to relax current criteria, especially surveillance. As one of the nations with an active nuclear program, it is expected to maintain a skeleton of remote monitoring under IS with a closer relationship of the IAEA. Introduction It is the goal of Korea to strengthen efficiency while maintaining effectiveness for inspections at PWRs through the enhanced cooperation between the IAEA and Korea. Such a system would enhance the IAEA s and State Authority s ability to improve safeguards and inspection activities at PWRs while reducing on-site inspector presence. During the 8 th IAEA-ROK Joint Review Meeting on Safeguards Implementation in 1999, both sides agreed to establish a working Group which prepares a draft describing options for the enhanced use of the SSAC at LWRs. All relevant entities of the government, utility, and technical body participated in the working group to seek more efficient and effective ways of safeguards implementation by enhancing cooperation between the IAEA and SSAC in Korea. The Working group proposed that an option of inspection regime with C/S working in remote data transfer mode is the most appropriate scheme for the moment while the integrated safeguards inspection regime is considered as a possible approach in the future under integrated safeguards. It is one of the major turning points in the Korean safeguards history as summarized in table 1, since Korea ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in April Another includes the introduction of national inspection to the legal framework of the Atomic Energy Act. It

2 was undertaken by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) with technical support of the Technology Center of Nuclear Control (TCNC) in Remote monitoring is playing an important role in Korean safeguards. It started to conduct field trial at a PWR in 1998 with the installation of a remote monitoring system that consists of one digital camera and communication server at the spent fuel pond of one of PWRs in Oct as phase 1, and one seal at canal gate, another seal at the equipment hatch and a digital camera for overhaul inside the containment vessel as phase 2 in June It was extended to six other PWRs as both IAEA support program and enhanced cooperation. It will be expanded to all PWRs in 2001 depending on results of the rehearsal. It is expected that remote monitoring will reduce inspection efforts of the IAEA and Korea through the sharing of remote data and some inspections. Table 1. Milestones of Korean Non-proliferation o 1975 NPT ratified o 1991 Declaration of Denuclearization in Korean Peninsula o 1994 TCNC (Technology Center for Nuclear Control) Established o 1995 Atomic Energy Act incorporated National Safeguards Inspection o 1996 TCNC authorized to support National Safeguards Inspection o 1997 National Safeguards Inspection Started o 2000 Working group of the IAEA and Korea recommended remote monitoring based on enhanced cooperation on PWRs. Three reactors are under trial run. National Safeguards System In the beginning of the 1990s, nuclear issues in Iraq and North Korea became prime concerns for international and national safeguards. In 1994, it led the government to establish the TCNC in the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute to effectively deal with nuclear safeguards issues. And sequentially the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act to provide the legal basis for the national inspections was made in December 1994 and went into effect in January As consequent subsidiary legislation, the Presidential Decree of the Atomic Energy Act and the Prime Ministerial Ordinance of the Act were revised in 1995 to Four Ministerial Notices of the MOST to implement provisions of the Atomic Energy Laws and to provide detailed requirements and guidelines went into effect in July According to the Notice, the scope of national inspection is (a)measurement of the records coupled with nuclear material accountancy kept by the operator, (b)measurement of all nuclear material subject to safeguards, (c)verification of the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment at the facility, (d) application and utilization of C/S measures, and (e)other necessary measures for safeguards implementation including sample taking for destructive analysis. In November 1996, the MOST authorized TCNC at KAERI as the formal technical body for national safeguards implementation. After legal amendment finished, national inspection started in It is carried out by officials of the MOST

3 with technical assistance by TCNC. It is performed in accordance with the national inspection criteria and procedures, which are similar to the IAEA's Safeguards Criteria. In 2000, national inspection activity was as follows, 315 PDIs on 32 facilities : IAEA inspection support 73 PDIs : Goal attainment in % : Remote Monitoring Remote monitoring is becoming a vital component of safeguards. Technical advances in hardware and software for remote monitoring as well as international efforts to strengthen safeguards have prompted the application of remote monitoring to nuclear safeguards. Remote monitoring has been identified as a realistic technique to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation throughout the field trials. It provides several advantages. It is expected that it can achieve substantial reductions in inspection labor hours and exposures in hazardous environments such as radiation and pollution, as well as minimizes intrusiveness to facility operators, while maintaining a continuity of knowledge through timely inspection and cost effectiveness. However, it also has potential drawbacks such as possible loss of information surety, and heavy initial investment and transmission cost. And it can cause unnecessary disputes between facility operators and regulators for their acceptance of remote monitoring, and may lead to potential unemployment of the safeguards workforce. Field trials on remote monitoring were initiated by the IRMP, which was organized by the U.S. Department of Energy through bilateral cooperation with foreign counterparts since Its technical and institutional feasibility was studied through a series of field trials at many sites worldwide. In the IAEA, the use of remote monitoring for strengthening IAEA safeguards was studied by the SAGSI (Standing Advisory Group for Safeguards Implementation) under the Programme 93+2 as new technologies for safeguards as well as satellite imagery and environmental monitoring. The difference between remote monitoring and others are that the former focuses on declared activities and the latter undeclared. IAEA formed a task force for remote monitoring and started its field trials in 1997, and continued to expand them in a variety of nuclear facilities on South Africa, U.S.A., Switzerland, Japan, Canada, Sweden, Belarus, Ukraine and Korea 1. The IAEA disbanded the task force. Still, field trials are going on at several facilities and at some facilities they are being used as a part of safeguards implementation. Initial targets for remote monitoring implementation are light water reactors (LWRs) and storage facilities that are considered easy due to their safeguards nature of item counting, and next will be CANDU type reactors. LWRs occupy a major portion of inspection efforts because of many installations worldwide. It is expected that remote monitoring will be used for routine use because it was proved that remote monitoring technology reached maturity especially in LWRs mainly due to their simplicity of inspection as well as advance in digital technology through field trials for the last several years.

4 Korean Remote Monitoring Korea launched an extensive program to use a remote monitoring system on PWRs, according to both the recommendation of the working group between Korea and the IAEA for enhanced cooperation of integrated safeguards and a task of MSSP. All PWRs were equipped with digital surveillances and seals as a part of digitization of C/S which enables an RM inspection regime. With a start of installation of a remote monitoring system at Younggwang #3 in Oct. 1998, currently 13 reactors are operating remote monitoring systems. TCNC established the Central Monitoring Station (CMS) for evaluation, and reception and relay of remote data. It houses a hub station which was supplied by the IAEA. Remote data from surveillances and seals of reactors are transmitted to the hub station through a public telephone, and to the IAEA via frame relay from the hub station. Three PWRs were selected for rehearsal and being tested for evaluation for nation wide application. If the rehearsal of the three reactors succeeds, remote monitoring will be expanded to all PWRs in Korea. And IAEA will reduce inspection efforts that Korean inspection will cover as an enhanced cooperation. One of disadvantages is transmission cost which comes from the telephone. Virtual Private Network (VPN) which uses public internet is planned for a test to replace the current telephone transmission to minimize transmission cost while maintaining quality 2. Remote Monitoring Based Enhanced Cooperation It is the goal of the IAEA and the SSAC to strengthen efficiency while maintaining effectiveness for inspections at LWRs through the enhanced cooperation between the IAEA and ROK. Such a system would enhance the IAEA s and State Authority s ability to improve safeguards inspection activities at LWRs while reducing on-site inspector presence. As an initial step, the Agency proposed that all relevant entities participate in a working group to seek more efficient and effective ways of safeguards implementation by enhancing cooperation between the IAEA and SSAC in ROK. During the 8 th IAEA-ROK Joint Review Meeting on Safeguards Implementation, both sides agreed to establish a working group, which prepares a draft proposal describing options for the enhanced use of the SSAC at LWRs. The working group examined the following options: 1 - inspection regime with C/S permanently used and timeliness of 3 months : 2 - inspection regime with surveillance activated only for core open period and timeliness of 3 months : 3 - inspection regime with C/S working in remote data transfer mode and timeliness of 3 months : 4 - inspection regime with surveillance activated only for core open period and timeliness of 1 year. It was proposed that option 3 of the remote monitoring inspection regime is the most appropriate scheme for the moment while option 4 of the integrated safeguards inspection regime is considered as a possible approach in the future under integrated safeguards. It was backed at the 9 th IAEA-ROK Joint Review Meeting on Safeguards Implementation 3,4. It is planned that the Memorandum of Understanding between the IAEA and the Korea will formalize its implementation in the near future 5. A summary of the Enhanced

5 Cooperation Scheme is as follows. All possible removal routes in all LWRs are under continuous C/S measures which include digital cameras at equipment hatch and spent fuel storage pond, VACOSS seals at equipment hatch and Canal Gate. All the C/S data are remotely transmitted to the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna through the Central Hub installed at KAERI, Taejon. Remote monitoring data necessary for technical and safeguards review shall be shared between the IAEA and the SSAC. Korea shall carry out all scheduled inspections for each facility for each year, while the IAEA shall carry out the annual PIV and post-piv, and a random selection of the remaining inspections. The IAEA shall bear the costs of purchasing remote monitoring equipment and communication operating costs from the central hub station in Taejon to Vienna while Korea will bear the costs of installing all RM equipment and communication operating costs from each LWR to the central hub station in Korea. Remote Monitoring Based Inspection Inspection takes advantages of remote monitoring to streamline inspection efforts which were duplicated by both parties. National inspections for each facility would include all inspections as defined by the current safeguards approach which would include 1 pre-piv, 1 PIV, 1 post-piv, 3-4 IIV s, FF receipts and 1 FF Simultaneous Inspection. IAEA inspections would include the annual PIV and Post-PIV, as well as the random selection of pre-piv, 0 to 4 IIV s, FF receipts and/or FF Simultaneous Inspection. It will employ a random selection process for all inspections except the PIV and Post-PIV. Typically, this will mean 1 IIV, on average, per facility per annum. This approach should satisfy the safeguards criteria for 100% verification of all LWR s using the random inspection selection. When the IAEA does not participate, Korea will perform inspection which includes book up-dating, item counting of nuclear material fuel assemblies, attachment/detachment/reading of VACOSS seals, and check of the metal seals numbers. Remote Monitoring in Integrated Safeguards The IAEA is considering softening timeliness goal, and containment and surveillance of insensitive facilities such as LWRS from three months to one year, and from permanent surveillance and seals to nothing. The current requirement is based on the possible existence of an undeclared reprocessing with consideration of conversion time. There exist different views on the change of timeliness goal, and containment and surveillance in Integrated Safeguards about the IAEA that is moving fast. Integrated safeguards option includes an alternative using permanent surveillance equipment that can be remotely triggered on demand at the time when the inspection is announced or can be a continuously operating surveillance camera 6. That will be compensated for unannounced inspection with announced inspection a week advanced notice. Therefore rather than remove digital cameras and seals which are already installed, which are remote monitoring ready, it would be better to leave them in place and use them effectively to find methods to reduce inspection efforts. It may be a wise approach to use permanent surveillance and seals already installed even after the integrated safeguards is implemented after effectiveness study, even though it is not yet decided which direction it

6 will head for. Cost freeze is one of the major causes to determine the timeliness goal and use of surveillance, due to current resource limitations. It is expected that remote monitoring will play a crucial role in the reduction of inspection efforts, in which Korea assumes the interim inspection role while the IAEA takes PIV and unannounced inspections before Integrated Safeguards is fully in place, which will lead to the reduction of the inspection cost and maintain current inspection quality. Remote monitoring will provide cost and technical effectiveness without raising much additional cost to both sides through technical advance and institutional cooperation, which may be born by the states concerned. Conclusion It is the goal of the SSAC to strengthen efficiency while maintaining effectiveness for inspections through the enhanced cooperation with the IAEA. An inspection regime with containment and surveillance working in the remote data transfer mode is under evaluation to enhance the IAEA s and Korea s ability to improve safeguards inspection activities while reducing on-site inspector presence according to the recommendation of the working group of the IAEA and Korea to find more efficient and effective ways. It will lead to nation wide application of remote monitoring at PWRs. It is expected that remote monitoring will become a vital tool in enhanced cooperation to streamline inspection efforts of the IAEA and the Korea under both traditional safeguards and integrated safeguards. References 1. R. Abedin Zadeh, Status of the Remote Monitoring Project, Presentation, IAEA, Oct H.A. Smartt, S. Caskey, R. Martinez, T. Honkamaa, Application of a Virtual Private Network to the Finnish Remote Environmental Monitoring Systems, INMM Conference, Report of the Working Group on the Enhanced Cooperation between the IAEA and SSAC on Implementation of Safeguards at LWRs in the ROK., Enhanced Co-operation Arrangements between the Agency and ROK SSAC on the Implementation of Safeguards at LWRs in the ROK, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Ministry of Science and Technology of Republic of Korea for an Enhanced Cooperation on Safeguards Implementation at Light Water Reactors (LWRs) in the ROK (under development), Integrated Safeguards Approach for LWRs Rev