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4 ABSTRACT OPEN- AND CLOSED-MINDEDNBSS, BELIEF-DISCREPANT COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR, AND TOLERANCE FOR DISSONANCE by Martin F. Hunt, Jr. Several writers have suggested that individuals differ in their tolerance for dissonance. The term tolerance for dissonance is used to describe a situation in which an individual, when faced with a set of environmental conditions calculated to produce internal tension (dissonance), fails to perform the predicted tension-reducing (dissonance-reducing) response (3). If people do differ in this respect, then the isolation and identification of factors that influence tolerance for dissonance should increase the explanatory and predictive power of dissonance theory. The present study examines the potential relevance of one personality construct, Open- and Closed-Mindedness, to determining tolerance for dissonance in a communication situation in which the individual is required to present a communication which advocates a position inconsistent with his prior beliefs. Certain characteristics of closed belief systems--i.e., dependence upon authority, difficulty in separating the content of a belief from the authority with whom it is associated, and the avoidance of discrepant beliefs--provide support for the statement that Closed-Minded individuals are more likely to have less tolerance for dissonance than Open-Minded individuals. When fagsd with a situation requiring belief-discrepant communication behavior, then, Closed-Minded subjects should demonstrate greater

5 Martin F. Hunt, Jr. attitude change in the direction of the discrepant position advocated in the message than Open-Minded subjects. These characteristics also suggest that the actual performance of the encoding behavior should require more cognitive effort on the part of Closed-Minded subjects, resulting in further and greater change on their part than on the part of Open-Minded subjects. Seventy-seven undergraduate students were administered a pretest which included a 20-item Dogmatism Scale and three controversial topics. Subjects were classified as either Open- or Closed-Minded on the basis of a median split of their scores on the Dogmatism Scale. Each group was then randomly split into three subgroups: an Irrelevant Communication group, a Belief-Congruent Communication group, and a Belief- Discrepant Communication group. Subjects in the Belief-Discrepant Communication groups were required to perform encoding behavior inconsistent with their prior beliefs; subjects in the Belief-Congruent Communication groups were required to perform encoding behavior consistent with their prior beliefs, and subjects in the Irrelevant Communication groups were required to perform irrelevant encoding behavior. This behavior was required of the subjects by a representative of a "faculty-student group sampling student Opinions for a report to be sent to Washington." The topic of disarmament was chosen and all subjects indicating an opinion favoring disarmament were used for the study. Immediately following the announcement of this requirement, a posttest was administered. Mean pretest-posttest attitude shift was then computed for each group by means of a two factor analysis of

6 Martin F. Hunt, Jr. variance. It was found that Closed-Minded subjects in the Belief- Discrepant Communication group demonstrated a significant change of attitude in the predicted direction, i.e., they indicated less favorable attitudes toward disarmament in the posttest. No other treatment group demonstrated a significant change in attitude. A week later, after the subjects had completed the assignment, a delayed posttest was administered. While the subjects in the Closed- Minded--Belief-Discrepant Communication group did demonstrate a change in the predicted direction, the change was not significant. This lack of significance is felt to be largely attributable to attrition of subjects. The findings of this study suggest that the isolation of individual difference variables such as Open- and Closed-Mindedness will increase experimental precision and control; that controlling for this variable in certain kinds of dissonance studies might culminate in results that are more readily interpretable, and that such control might reduce the need for selective removal of deviant subjects.

7 OPEN- AND CLOSED-MINDEDNESS, BELIEF-DISCREPANT COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR, AND TOLERANCE FOR DISSONANCE By Martin F. Hunt, Jr. A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Communication 1966

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9 ACKNOW LEDGMENTS I wish to express my great appreciation and thanks to my advisor, Dr. Gerald R. Miller, for his guidance, assistance, and advice throughout the writing of this thesis. I would also like to express my thanks to the other members of my committee, Dr. Erwin Bettinghaus and Dr. Murray Hewgill. For his advice and assistance in the statistical analysis of the data, I would like to thank Mr. Albert Talbott and also to Mr. Jeffrey Roth and Mr. Gary Barnas for their help in tabulating the data. I would like to express my gratitude to Mrs. Shirley Sherman for the typing of this thesis and especially for my countless "therapy sessions" with her. Finally, I wish to thank my wife for her patience and understanding throughout my graduate studies. ii

10 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTE R Page I RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES Rationale HypOtheSiS l o o o o o Hypothesis II METHOD.. o o SUbjeCtS o o o o 0 Topics 0 e e o o o StUdy Design 0 o 0 Procedures.... Measuring Instruments III RESULTS... o.... Hypothesis Hypothesis 2 IV DISCUSSION ll l REFER JPN CBS 0 O O O O I I O O 0 26

11 LIST OF TABLES TABLE Page 1 Pretest-Posttest Mean Attitude Scores and Amount of Change for Subjects in the Six Conditions l7 2 Analysis of Variance Summary Table of Change Scores (Pretest-Posttest) for Subjects in the Six Conditions Posttest-Delayed Posttest Mean Attitude Scores and Amount of Change for Subjects in the Six Conditions.. 20 u Analysis of Variance Summary Table of Change Scores (Posttest-Delayed Posttest) for Subjects in the Six conditionsoeoeoooooooo iv

12 LIST OF APPENDICES APPENDIX A: APPENDIX B: APPENDIX C: APPENDIX D: PRETEST QUESTIONNAIRE.... ASSIGNMENT SHEETS POSTTEST QUESTIONNAIRE... DELAYED POSTTEST QUESTIONNAIRE Page #6 51

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14 CHAPTER I RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES A number of writers, including Festinger (5) himself, have suggested that individuals differ in their tolerance for dissonance. If this is the case, the isolation and identification of factors that influence tolerance for dissonance should increase the explanatory and predictive power of dissonance theory. As used throughout this discussion, the term tolerance for dissonance serves as a shorthand description for the following situation frequently encountered in dissonance research: an individual (X). when faced with a set of environmental conditions calculated to produce internal tension (dissonance), fails to perform the predicted tensionreducing (dissonance-reducing) response (3). To illustrate, assume that X is known to be in favor of disarmament, and that he now plans and publicly presents a communication opposing disarmament. Since these conditions should be sufficient to induce a state of internal tension (dissonance) in X, it is assumed that X will eliminate this tension by demonstrating a less favorable attitude toward disarmament after his presentation of the anti-disarmament communication. When questioned, however, X indicates an attitude toward disarmament that is as favorable as his pre-communication attitude. Given this outcome, it can be said that X has demonstrated high tolerance for dissonance. Obviously, numerous individual difference variables--personality traits, needs, motives, etc.- may affect an individual's tolerance.

15 Cohen (1) speculates that a construct such as need for cognitive consistency might reduce apparent disparities in findings and improve the explanatory power of dissonance theory. Even though few studies have systematically manipulated individual difference variables to study their role in shaping response to dissonance-creating situations, a study by Paul (9) demonstrates that high Authoritarian persons may have less tolerance for dissonance than low Authoritarian individuals. And while they recognize that the study of individual differences poses numerous theoretical and methodological problems, Brehm and Cohen underscore its importance to dissonance theory, asserting that "predictions to a range of effects from dissonance theory could be sharpened by taking into account personality variables that are widely considered to be important determinants of cognition, perception, and social interaction." (1, 171) The present study examines the potential relevance of one personality construct, Open- and Closed-Mindedness, to determining tolerance for dissonance in a particular kind of communication situation: one in which the individual is required to present a communication which advocates a position incongruent with his prior beliefs. While such a situation could include a conscious choice to engage in incongruent communication behavior, it is typical in dissonance experiments to instruct the individual to adopt a discrepant position; i.e., to structure conditions involving compliant behavior on the part of the person. An examination of several representative studies employing this situation will illustrate some relevant considerations for the present study.

16 In their study dealing with the effects of role playing on opinion change, Janis and King (7) required one group of subjects to present communications which took positions at odds with their private beliefs. A second group of subjects with similar prior beliefs listened to these presentations. Measurement of the subsequent opinions of both groups indicated that those subjects who had given talks (roleplaying subjects) demonstrated a significantly greater shift of opinion toward the position advocated in the message. Furthermore, a second study (8) found that subjects who were required to give highly improvised talks advocating a discrepant position showed more Opinion shift than did subjects who read a prepared paper dealing with the same topic. These latter subjects, in turn, demonstrated more change than did a silent reading group. Although the results of the preceding studies were not based upon predictions derived from dissonance theory, they can be explained nicely within a dissonance context. In the first study, role-playing subjects were forced to make a public commitment that was discrepant with their private beliefs, while those subjects who listened passively to the presentations did not make this commitment. The greater dissonance generated by presenting a communication committing the subject to a discrepant position should cause the role-playing subjects to show more shift of opinion than the passive subjects, given the assumption that opinion change consistent with the position taken by the message would be one of the preferred modes of dissonance reduction. By the same token, the greater the effort involved in publicly proclaiming a discrepant position, the greater the magnitude of the

17 resultant dissonance, a position that explains why subjects in the second study who gave highly improvised speeches showed greater opinion change than did individuals who read prepared manuscripts. Taken as a whole, the findings of both studies lend themselves to a dissonance interpretation. Other investigators have used similar experimental procedures to investigate hypotheses based upon dissonance theory. In a study by Festinger and Carlsmith (6) subjects performed a boring and tedious task, and were then asked to tell the next subject (a confederate) that the task was enjoyable and interesting. Some of the subjects were paid one dollar for engaging in this discrepant communication behavior while others were paid 20 dollars. It was predicted that: (1) dissonance would be generated by making the discrepant statement; and, (2) the amount of dissonance would depend upon the attractiveness of the outcomes obtained from making the discrepant statement; i.e., that subjects who received 20 dollars for describing the task as interesting and enjoyable would experience less dissonance than subjects who received one dollar. Comparison of the post-experimental ratings of the desirability of the task generally confirmed the predictions: subjects who received one dollar rated the task more enjoyable than subjects who received 20 dollars, indicating that the former individuals had reduced their greater dissonance by greater changes in their perceptions of the task itself. In studies conducted by Cohen, Brehm, and Fleming (4) and by Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen (1) subjects were asked to write essays that took positions inconsistent with their private beliefs. In both

18 instances, the extent of the justification given for taking a discrepant position was systematically varied. Some subjects were given minimal reasons for writing the essays, while others were told several reasons to justify the request. As hypothesized, a posttest indicated that individuals who were given minimal justification for engaging in discrepant communication behavior had more favorable attitudes toward the message tepic than did persons who were given greater justification. Whereas the latter group should experience little dissonance because of the numerous reasons given to justify their behavior, the minimal justification subjects were not supplied with grounds to justify their attitude-discrepant communications. As a result, these subjects should experience greater dissonance, and one mode of dissonance reduction would be attitude change toward the issue involved. What are some of the common characteristics of the five studies described above? First, as mentioned earlier, each one has an element of forced compliance associated with it. Granted, subjects were sometimes placed in a weak choice situation--e.g., they could advocate a discrepant position or not participate in the study--but it is doubtful the subjects perceived that any meaningful set of alternatives was available to them. In no instance was a subject allowed to choose between presenting a communication consistent with his private beliefs or one running counter to his attitudes; rather, the subject was told that he could either "play the game" one way or not play at all. Thus, while it may be argued that some semblance of choice existed, it was certainly minimal. Closely linked to the compliance aspects of the situation is

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20 the element of authority. In almost all cases, the subjects involved were college undergraduates, while the individuals requesting compliant communication behavior were authority figures; i.e., university faculty members. Furthermore, in some of the manipulations other authority figures were introduced. For instance, in the Cohen, Brehm, and Fleming study, composition of attitude discrepant essays was justified by the statement that, as well as helping the experimenter, the essays would help the school administration and science in general. In addition, in most of the studies the subject probably perceived some linkage between the authority figure and the discrepant views that he was asked to champion. Even though the experimenter never explicitly stated that he supported the side to be taken in the message, it is quite common for individuals to ask others to support the viewpoints that they themselves advocate. In the absence of any conflicting information, it is reasonable to assume that the subjects employed in the preceding studies would perceive the requirements in this manner. These considerations suggest the possibility that Open- and Closed Minded individuals, when placed in a compliant situation involving discrepant communication behavior, might display differential tolerance for dissonance. Consider the element of authority present in such a situation. Rokeach has suggested that Closed-Minded individuals are more dependent upon authority in formulating beliefs, and that they experience greater difficulty than Open-Minded persons in separating the content of the belief from the authority with whom it is associated. In his words:

21 ...a basic characteristic that defines the extent to which a person's system is open or closed...is the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant in formation received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person or from the outside...by irrelevant factors we have in mind most particularly the pressures of reward and punishment arising from external authority; for example, as exerted by parents, peers, other authority figures, reference groups, social and institutional norms, and cultural norms...the more open the belief system, the more should the person be governed in his actions by internal self-actualizing forces and the less by irrational inner forces. Consequently, the more should he be able to resist pressures exerted by external sources to evaluate and to act in accord with their wishes. (ll, 57-58) Thus, given a situation requiring belief-discrepant communication behavior, Closed-Minded individuals should experience greater tension than Open-Minded individuals because of the following dissonant relationship which exists for Closed-Minded individuals: their initial attitude is inconsistent with their knowledge that an authority figure asks that they advocate the Opposite side of the issue and with their probable perception that the authority himself favors that side. This linkage of authority with the discrepant belief, mentioned earlier, would occur more readily for Closed-Minded individuals due to their inability to separate the external source from the issue, a characteristic alluded to in the above quotation by Rokeach and empirically demonstrated in a previous study by Powell.(lO) Furthermore, this potential difference between Open-Minded individuals and Closed-Minded individuals could perhaps be magnified by introducing several strong authority figures into the situation, a technique employed in the present study. While Open-Minded individuals should be able to evaluate both the content of the discrepant communication and the required task on their own merits, Closed-Minded individuals

22 should seek to reduce their greater dissonance by changing their attitude to conform with that which they perceive to be acceptable to the authority figures in the environment. hypothesis: Taken as a whole, the above considerations lead to the following H1: Given a situation requiring belief-discrepant communication behavior, Closed-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Open-Minded individuals in the direction of the discrepant position advocated in the communication. The hypothesis implies, then, that Open-Minded individuals will demonstrate a relatively high tolerance for dissonance, while Closed- Minded persons will behave in a manner consistent with the results Obtained in prior research dealing with reduction of dissonance in situations requiring belief-discrepant communication behavior. Another factor common to all five of the studies discussed above is that they forced the subject to come to grips with beliefs that were at odds with his own private convictions. The amount of cognitive effort involved varies from study to study; for example, the subjects in the Festinger and Carlsmith study probably expended less effort telling the following subject that the task was interesting and enjoyable than did the subjects in the Cohen, Brehm, and Fleming and the Rabbie, Brehm, and Cohen studies, who were asked to write complete essays inconsistent with their prior beliefs. By the same token, as suggested earlier, those subjects in the Janis and King studies who engaged in improvised discrepant communication behavior undoubtedly put forth more effort than those who read prepared manuscripts. But even with admitted variations in the amount of effort involved and the degree Of

23 justification offered, all subjects in each Of the five studies described above have this much in common: they were asked to reflect upon beliefs that were contrary to their own; and, in addition, they were asked to prepare and/or present a communication advocating these discrepant views. That some cognitive effort and some internal tension was inherent in this situation seems unquestionable. These considerations suggest that the amount of cognitive effort required Of the individual partially determines the magnitude Of cognitive dissonance experienced by that individual. The greater the effort required of the subject, the greater should be the magnitude of dissonance experienced. This expected relationship suggests a second reason why Closed-Minded individuals should demonstrate less tolerance for dissonance in situations involving the preparation and the communication Of discrepant beliefs. Rokeach asserts:...the more closed his system, the more sensitive should he be to communications, reinforcements, warnings, prohibitions, and promises issuing forth from his own group of authorities, and the more should he be dependent on such positive authorities for information he accumulates about a particular disbelief sybsystem. Information about disbelief systems, ifireceivedl E_all (italics mine), should come secondhand, spoon-fed by the person's positive authority. (11, 61) In other words, Closed-Minded individuals should experience less exposure to discrepant beliefs, and the exposure should be of a biased nature. When Closed-Minded persons are subsequently placed in situations requiring them to cope with and to present communications advocating these beliefs, less tolerance for dissonance should be expected on two counts: first, the greater unfamiliarity with the discrepant beliefs should lead to greater tension arousal; and, second, the knowledge that a message advocating these discrepant beliefs must be

24 lo constructed and presented should carry with it the perception of substantial effort, a factor that has been demonstrated to affect the magnitude of dissonance experienced. By contrast, Open-Minded individuals, because Of their more extensive prior exposure to, and evaluation of, the content of the discrepant beliefs, should experience less tension when faced with conditions requiring belief-discrepant communication behavior. Hence, in an authority-laden situation requiring beliefdiscrepant communication behavior, there would seem to be two factors affecting the magnitude of dissonance experienced by the Closed- Minded individual. The first factor, reflected in Hypotheses 1, would be the authority features of the situation; the second factor would be the amount of cognitive effort required of the individual to actually perform this behavior. This latter factor leads to the second hypothesis: H2: Following the performance of belief-discrepant communication behavior, Closed-Minded individuals will demonstrate greater attitude change than Open-Minded individuals in the direction Of the discrepant position advocated in the communication. Taken as a whole, the above rationale suggests two points in the process at which Closed-Minded individuals will demonstrate less tolerance for dissonance than Open-Minded persons: immediately after being assigned the task of engaging in belief-discrepant communication behavior (Hypothesis 1) and following actual performance Of the behavior (Hypothesis 2).

25 CHAPTER II METHOD Subjects Ss were 77 undergraduate students enrolled in Communication 100 at Michigan State University. All phases of the study were conducted in the classroom during regular class sessions. gs were classified as either Open- or Closed-Minded on the basis of their scores on an abridged, 20 item Dogmatism Scale.(13) A median split was used to classify the Es: those whose scores fell above the median were classified as Closed-Minded, while those who scored below the median were classified as Open-Minded. Topic: Three controversial topics: "Disarmament," "Communist Speakers on Campus," and "Women's Dormitory Hours" were included in the pretest questionnaire. Of these, the topic of disarmament was selected because the high percentage of indicating favorable attitudes toward disarmament provided suitable conditions for the appropriate experimental manipulations. All 77 gs utilized in the study expressed moderate to highly favorable attitudes toward disarmament. Study Desigp: Six conditions, three made up of Open-Minded and three made up Of Closed-Minded Sp, were employed in the study. Two of these conditions: Open-Minded: Belief-Discrepant Communication and Closed- Minded: Belief-Discrepant Communication functioned as experimental ll

26 l2 treatments, while the remaining four: Open-Minded: Belief-Congruent Communication, Closed-Minded: Belief-Congruent Communication, Open- Minded: Irrelevant-Communication, and Closed-Minded: Irrelevant~ Communication, served as control groups for assessing baseline attitudes toward disarmament of the various times Of measurement. As implied by the labels, s assigned to the Belief-Discrepant Communication conditions were asked to prepare messages inconsistent with their prior beliefs; i.e., they were asked to write three arguments opposing disarmament. s assigned to the Belief-Congruent Communication conditions were asked to write three arguments favoring disarmament, a task consistent with their prior beliefs; while Ss assigned to the Irrelevant Communication conditions were not asked to prepare a communication on disarmament; rather, they were asked to write three arguments dealing with federal aid to education. Composition of the six groups was accomplished by random assignment of all Ss within the two levels of Mindedness employed in the study. General Procedures: During the first week Of class, he instructor announced that the Department of Communication was undertaking a general evaluation of student beliefs regarding a variety of local, state, and national issues. The pretest questionnaire was then administered. Included among a number of filler items were the abridged Dogmatism Scale and items for assessing student attitudes toward the three topics mentioned above.

27 13 Two weeks later, during the class meeting preceding the experimental manipulations and administration of the first posttest, the instructor announced that two surveys would be conducted during the next class period. The instructor stated that one survey was being Sponsored by a faculty-student committee working on contract for a governmental office, and that the committee wished to assess student opinions on selected current issues. The students were told that these views would be included in a report to Washington. The instructor then stated that the second questionnaire would be administered as part of a pretest being conducted by a graduate student in political science. The procedure of ostensibly separating the testing period for two surveys served to minimize the probability that s would associate the two tasks; and, hopefully, to alleviate contaminating factors such as the evaluation-apprehension phenomenon discussed by Rosenberg. (12) It should be pointed out that credulity was probably not strained by this technique, since students had been told at the term's beginning that on certain days data for a variety of projects would be collected. At the following class meeting, an experimenter entered the classroom and announced that he was representing a faculty-student committee, contracted by the Agency for International Development to sample faculty and student views concerning certain relevant issues of national concern. s were told that questionnaires were being distributed to faculty members and to several large randomly selected classes. The experimenter further stated that the questionnaires would be examined by the faculty-student committee and that the results would be

28 14 incorporated into a report for the Agency. gs were told that the issues to be dealt with in their class were "Federal Aid to Education" and "Disarmament." The references to faculty committees and governmental agencies were intended to emphasize the authority dimension of the situation. As mentioned above, it was assumed that this induction would function differentially for Open- and Closed-Minded Ss. The experimenter then handed out envelopes to each _by name, a procedure employed to assign the _to the appropriate condition. The experimenter informed the Ss that upon Opening the envelopes they would find instructions concerning the position they were to take, and that they were to write their three best arguments in defense Of this position. Manipulation of the type of communication required was accomplished by the instructions appearing on the first page of the material. Se in the Belief-Congruent Communication conditions received instructions which included the following paragraph: Your task is to write your three best arguments in defense of disarmament. Remember, you are to defend this policy. Use page two of this questionnaire to state your arguments: By contrast, the instructions for the Belief-Discrepant Communication conditions contained the following paragraph: Your task is to write your three best arguments in Opposition to disarmament. Remember, you are to Oppose this policy. Use page two of this questionnaire to state your arguments. Finally, a paragraph contained in the instructions for the Irrelevant- Communication conditions asked the 83 to write three arguments Opposing

29 15 federal aid to education. All gs were told to take 30 minutes outside of class to write the arguments and to return the questionnaires at the next class meeting. The experimenter then departed and a second individual--supposedly a graduate student in political science--told the Se that he was sampling student political attitudes at Michigan State University. While the survey was described as a pretest, it was emphasized that the s should fill out the items carefully. Included among a number of filler items were the scales utilized to measure attitudes toward disarmament. At the next class period, the first experimenter (representing the committee contacted by AID) returned and collected the completed assignments. After collecting the assignments, he explained that he had neglected to get the Ss' Opinions on the topics. The experimenter then distributed questionnaires in order to Obtain a second posttest of attitudes toward disarmament. These questionnaires were used to measure the second factor noted above, i.e., to measure the effect of actually performing the behavior. Hence, the study was presented to the Se in a way calculated to give the impression that three separate studies were being conducted. Reactions indicate that they did not associate the three tasks. The true purpose of the study was divulged at the next meeting of the class. Measuring Instruments: For each of the three measurements of attitudes toward disarmament, six, seven-interval, semantic differential-type scales were employed. The six sets of bipolar adjectives utilized were: good-bad, wisefoolish, fair-unfair, honest-dishonest, nice-awful, and valuable-worthless.

30 16 On the pretest instrument, the six scales were listed under the topic to be rated, with the direction of polarity alternated in order to reduce response set effects. On the first posttest instrument, the topics were listed in a column at page left with a single scale appearing next to the topic in a column at page right. The second posttest instrument was similar to the pretest questionnaire. As mentioned above, filler topics and scales were included on each of the three questionnaires. The six scales were scored by assigning a value of seven to the response indicating the most favorable attitude toward disarmament and a value of one to the response indicating the least favorable attitude. Since each js score was based on a summation of his responses to the six scales, a total score of #2 would indicate a maximally favorable attitude toward disarmament and a score of six a maximally unfavorable attitude. The pretest scores of the 77 Es employed in the study ranged from 25 to #2. Subsequent analysis of the semantic differential scales has indicated that there is a high correlation among the six scales.

31 CHAPTER III RESULTS Hypothesis 1 Table 1 contains a summary of the mean pretest and posttest attitude scores and the amount of pretest-posttest shift for subjects in each Of the six groups. A lower posttest score indicates a less favorable attitude toward disarmament, while a higher posttest score reflects a more favorable attitude. It can be seen that only the Closed-Minded--Belief-Discrepant Communication group indicated a substantial shift in attitude from pretest to posttest measurement. This shift is consistent with the hypothesis Of the study; viz., subjects in the Closed-Minded--Belief-Discrepant Communication condition demonstrate a shift in the direction of the belief-discrepant position that they were assigned to advocate. Table l. Pretest-Posttest Mean Attitude Scores and Amount of Change for Subjects in the Six Conditions Condition _ Pre Post Shift 0pen-Minded--Irrelevant Communication HO Closed-Minded--Irrelevant Communication l.08 0pen-Minded -Belief Congruent Communication n Closed Minded--Belief-Congruent Communication u Open-Minded--Belief-Discrepant Communication Closed-Minded--Belief-Discrepant Communication 18_ u5 * *2. = l7

32 18 Two factor analysis Of variance was employed to analyze the pretest-posttest change scores for subjects in the six groups. A summary of this analysis is found in Table 2. Both the test Of the interaction between Mindedness and Type of Communication and the main effect for Type of Communication were not significant; however, the test of the Mindedness effect yielded a significant F of Table 2. Analysis of Variance Summary Table of Change Scores (Pretest-Posttest) for Subjects in the Six Conditions Source at a:.ma.1;.p; Mindedness Type of Communication % n.s. Mindedness by Type Of Communication n n.s. Error Total Several comparisons of treatment means were carried out to determine the locus Of the differences indicated by the analysis of variance. The most direct test Of the hypothesis of interest necessitated a comparison of the mean shift for subjects in the Open- Minded -Belief-Discrepant Communication and the Closed-Minded--Be1ief- Discrepant Communication conditions. This comparison resulted in a significant _of The differences are consistent with the hypothesis; i.e., when compared to Open-Minded subjects, Closed-Minded subjects assigned the task of engaging in belief-discrepant communication behavior demonstrated a significantly greater shift of attitude

33 19 in the direction of the discrepant position. Since almost all subjects in the condition shifted in the hypothesized direction, this difference cannot be attributed to only extreme shifting on the part of several subjects. In addition, the amount of pretest-posttest shift for subjects in the Closed-Minded--Belief-Discrepant Communication was significantly greater than that for subjects in the Closed-Minded--Irrelevant Communication and the Closed-Minded--Belief-Congruent Communication control conditions. By contrast, there were no significant differences in amount of shift amount the three types Of communication treatments I made up Of Open-Minded subjects. Thus, comparisons among the various treatment means support the first hypothesis investigated in the study. As an additional check, within group comparisons of pretest-posttest attitude shift were carried out, utilizing 3 tests for related measures. As would be anticipated from examination of Table l, the Closed-Minded--Be1ief-Discrepant Communication condition was the only group in which a significant pretest-posttest attitude shift occurred. The attitude scores of subjects in the Open-Minded--Belief-Discrepant condition are remarkably stable, the shift from the first to the second measurement being only scale units. Hypothesis 2 Table 3 contains a summary of the mean posttest and delayed posttest attitude scores and the amount of posttest-delayed posttest shift for subjects in each of the six groups. Scoring is the same as in

34 Table l--the higher the score, the more favorable the attitude. Table 3. Posttest-Delayed Posttest Mean Attitude Scores and Amount Of Change for Subjects in the Six Conditions Condition.11 Post Delayed Post Shift 0pen-Minded--Irrelevant Communication Closed-Minded--Irrelevant Communication Open-Minded--Belief-Congruent Communication Closed-Minded--Belief- Congruent Communication Open-Minded--Belief Discrepant Communication Closed-Minded--Belief-Discrepant Communication It can be seen that the only sizable shift was in the Closed- Minded--Belief Discrepant Communication condition.. The other conditions show negligible shift. A second two-factor analysis of variance was employed to analyze these posttest-delayed posttest data.* A summary of this analysis, found in Table A, shows no significant effects. *Generally, the analysis of variance design would include an overall testing of all three measurements. The great loss of subjects at the time Of the delayed posttest, however, necessitated the utilization of the above design.

35 21 Table A. Analysis Of Variance Summary Table Of Change Scores (Posttest- Delayed Posttest) for Subjects in the Six Conditions Source if _s_s_ 9.3. E E Mindedness 1 l 3.2% 3.2M '< l n.s. Type of Communication ( 1 n.s. Mindedness by Type Of Communication < l n.s. Error 35 72u Total Since the analysis of variance yielded no significant differences, comparisons of treatment means carried out on the data for Hypothesis 1 were not computed for the immediate-delayed posttest data. However, the shift demonstrated by the Closed-Minded -Belief-Discrepant condition is noticably larger than any of the other shifts, and is in the predicted direction. Possible explanations Of the failure to achieve significance for this group are discussed in the following chapter.

36 CHAPTER IV DISCUSSION Results Obtained in this study provide support for the first hypothesis that Closed-Minded and Open-Minded individuals will demonstrate differential behavior in a situation demanding beliefdiscrepant communication behavior. Specifically, Closed-Minded persons demonstrate greater attitude shift in the direction of the discrepant position to be advocated in the message, a response taken to be indicative Of lower tolerance for dissonance on the part of Closed- Minded individuals. The stability of the pretest-posttest attitude scores for subjects in the other five conditions militates against certain alternative explanations Of the results. While it could be argued that the initial polarity of attitudes might result in posttest regression effects, the pattern of the means does not support this position. Rather, the amount of change at the time of the second measurement is minimal for all conditions except the Closed-Minded--Belief-Discrepant Communication condition. The shift demonstrated by these latter subjects thus appears to have resulted from psychological factors inherent in the situation, rather than from considerations of a statistical nature. The attitudinal response consistency Of Open-Minded subjects faced with a situation requiring belief-discrepant communication has been labeled tolerance fer dissonance. Obviously, Open-Minded subjects could have responded in one or more of several ways to the situation. 22

37 23 Each of these possible response alternatives raises questions regarding the scientific efficacy of dissonance theory. First, it could be argued that attitudinal response consistency resulted from the fact that Open-Minded subjects hit upon different modes of dissonance reduction. The problem with this interpretation lies in Specifying the appropriate dissonance reducing behaviors prior to experimental manipulation and in devising means for measuring them. Any appeal to such an explanation is patently circular. Second, it might be argued that Open-Minded individuals did not perceive the elements Of the situation as dissonant; or at least, as suggested earlier, that the situation was more dissonant-producing for Closed-Minded persons.' If this was indeed the case, it becomes apparent that a more precise specification of behavioral criteria for labeling a situation as dissonant would serve to increase the predictive power of dissonance theory. This study is, in fact, a beginning attempt to specify such criteria. Finally, one could hold that the Open-Minded subjects did experience dissonance, but that they retained their original behavior in the face of it; in a sense, this would be the most literal case Of tolerance 23 dissonance. Such a position would, however, cast doubt upon one of the primitive generalizations of dissonance theory; specifically, that the experiencing Of tension, or dissonance, must inevitably be followed by behavior intended to reduce this tension and to restore consonance. At present, methods for dealing directly with this interpretation are not readily available.

38 _ 24 Results Obtained in this study fail to support the second hypothesis that the attitude position for Closed-Minded--Belief- Discrepant subjects will shift significantly during the period from the posttest attitude measurement to the delayed posttest attitude measurement. Theoretically, we would have expected the subjects in the Closed-Minded--Belief-Discrepant treatment group to demonstrate such a change because of the greater effort involved. That is, the authority figures associated with the assignment, coupled with the greater cognitive effort required of the Closed-Minded subjects should have produced a significantly greater amount of attitude shift between the posttest and the delayed posttest for subjects in the Closed-Minded-- Belief-Discrepant Communication treatment group when compared with subjects in the Open-Minded--Belief-Discrepant group. Analysis of the data, however, produced no significant changes. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the greatest amount of posttest-delayed posttest shift was demonstrated by the subjects in the 0pen-Minded--Be1ief- Discrepant Communication group and, further, that this shift was in the predicted direction. The most likely explanation for this failure, and indeed, the most parsimonious explanation is found in the fact that a large number Of subjects were lost at the time of the delayed posttest. Since college students were used as subjects and the classes utilized for the study did not have required attendance, the experimenter had little control over their participation in each phase of the experiment. It was unfortunately true that the delayed posttest was administered on a Friday afternoon and on the first warm spring day of the year. The

39 25 loss of 37 subjects, or almost half, provided for a rather large loss of power and an increase in error. At any rate, this study not only raises certain theoretic questions, it should also be of some methodological value to investigators conducting research within a dissonance framework. Recently, there has been considerable criticism of the practice of selective removal of subjects from studies designed to test hypotheses stemming from dissonance theory. (2) To the extent that failure of the experimental manipulations to "take" can be attributed to individual difference variables, the isolation Of these variables will increase experimental precision and control. Use of Open- and Closed-Mindedness as a control variable in certain genres of dissonance studies might culminate in results that are more readily interpretable and might reduce the need for selective removal of deviant subjects. Further studies Of the relationship between Open- and Closed- Mindedness and dissonance theory must be conducted to more reliably and precisely establish the nature of this relationship. A beginning step would be a replication Of the present study in order to assess the influence Of the authoritarian nature of the situation and the influence of the cognitive effort required by the situation.

40 REFERENCES l. Brehm, J. W. and Cohen, A. R. Explorations incpgnitive Dissonance. John Wiley 8 Sons, Inc., Chapanis, N. P., and Chapanis, A. C. Cognitive dissonance: five years later. Psych. Bull., 196%, 2;, Cohen, A. R. Attitudinal consequences of induced discrepancies between cognitions and behavior. In: Katz, D. (ed.) Attitude change. POQ, 1960, 21, Cohen, A. R., Brehm, J. W., Fleming, W.H. Attitude change and justification for compliance. J. abnorm. soc. Psyphol., 1958, pp, Festinger, L. A Theo Of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford Univer31ty Press, Festinger, L. and Carlsmith, J. M. Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. J. abnorm. soc._psychol., 1959, Janis, I. L. and King, B. T. The influence of role-playing on Opinion change. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., ' ll. 12. King, B. T. and Janis, I. L. Comparison of the effectiveness of improvised versus non-improvised role playing in producing Opinion change. Paper presented before the Eastern Psychological Association, April, 1953, reported in Hovland, Janis, Kelley, Communication and Persuasion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, Paul, I. H. Impressions of personality, authoritarianism, and the fait-accompli effect. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1956, 53, Powell, F. A. Open- and closed-mindedness and the ability to differentiate source and message. J.A.S.P., 1962, 65, Rokeach, M. The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Rosenberg, M. J. When dissonance fails: on eliminating evaluation apprehension from attitude measurement. J.A.S.P., 1965, 1, M. Troldahl, V. C. and Powell, F. A. "A short-form dogmatism scale for use in field studies." Social Forces, 1965, Walker, H. M. and Lev, J.) Statistical Inference. New York: Henry Holt and CO.,

41 APPENDIX A PRETEST QUESTIONNAIRE 27

42 GENERAL INFORMATION Name: 1.0. NO.: Sec. NO.: Room NO.:

43

44 Opinion Profile Instructions Appearing below are some statements about which people have different Opinions or beliefs. Please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each statement by checking the appropriate response. Remember there are no "correct" answers for any Of the statements. only in your personal opinions and beliefs about each Of them. We are interested 1. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 2. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 3. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 4. Most people just don't know what's good for them. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree HIH [n 0 Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree. Strongly Disagree HHH

45 ..l.l..l Ellllllllulll 111A lll-lllllllll 1 l

46 HIH HHI -2- The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree HHI 7. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agrees Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree Nest of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 10. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree Hllll

47 a. e - J.,....~ «

48 It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 12. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 13. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree fildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 14. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects. 15. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree The present is all too often full of unhappiness. counts 0 Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree It is only the future that

49

50 The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 17. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood. 18. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree While I don t like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree to 19. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedomuof certain political groups. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 20. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward. Strongly Agree Agree Mildly Agree Mildly Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree

51 2 OPINION PROFILE Appearing below are some statements about which people have different opinions and beliefs. Please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each statement by checking the appropriate response. Remember that there are no "correct" answers for any of the statements. We are interested only in your personal opinions and beliefs about each of them. 1. Poison gas and germ warfare make it senseless to spend money for shelters for nuclear attack. Strongly Agree Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree 2. We could easily increase the size of the present shelter program without hurting the economy. Strongly Agree Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree lhl 3. Our national debt is '0 now for us to be spending extra money on bomb shelters we may never need. ('1' O O 0" H '3 Strongly Agree Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree HI! 4. Money spent on shelters is money wisely spent. Strongly Agree Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree 5. We would be wiser to spend our money on hospitals and schools than on shelters. Strongly Agree Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree

52 HI! The government is presently spending less than it should on the shelter program. Strongly Agree Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree 7. Money spent on shelters is money wasted and we should discontinue all further expenditures. Strongly Agree Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree 8. Reasonable expenditures for shelters should be encouraged. Strongly Agree Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree Hlll

53 Ol MW ' 0 ) TT' 1173' (F'VT I Y'T' IL- _..\./.L Kuhn.) On each nage of tlis questionnaire, you will find.f a number of tooics. Listed uldc'ncth each tonic are 51 six ; CSCh scale consists of two discriotive ad jectives separate. 3y STVOH steos. Your tas;k is to rate each tonic on isch o the seal s Here is an examile of how you should resuond to each j. tonic: H..,.. l i; "Annitting Red China to the U.h." l 3 "V "N l; oood : : : : : : bad o l 2 3 ill , If you felt that this ly good, you would since a tonic res in general extreme cthk mark in s3300 number 3. In general, consider t'he 0o itions on the scale to Y represent the following judgment-: extremely good quite good slightly good neither good nor had, "I don't know," "This scale doesn't anply" l slightly bad -2 quite bad -3 xtrcmcly bad ( 1 Be sure to out one check mark, and only one, along each scale. Do not omit any scales.

54 1 r -. \ J a ' 7 v- r ( 1 1 (a "oomaunipt smashers on oamius" Good : : z : : : Bad Foolish : : : : : : Wire Fair : : : : : : Unfair Dishonest : : : : : : Honest Nice Worthless iwful Valuable

55 "Dormitory Hours : : : : : : Bad : : : : : Wise :_: z : : : Unfair : : : : : Honest : : : : : Awful : : : : : : Valuable

56 "Disarmament" Good : : : : : : End Foolish : : z : z : Wise Fair : : : : : : lnfair Dishones : : : : : : Honest Nice : : : z : : Awful Worthless : : : : : : Valuable

57 APPENDIX B ASSIGNMENT SHEETS 39

58 S.U. Proj. No M. U S.G A I.D. Pha. No. A Comm 100 Name: Your task is to write your three best arguments in opposition to federal aid to education. Remember, you are to oppose this policy. Use page two of this questionnaire to state your arguments. It should not be necessary for you to spend more than 30 minutes on this assignment. Do not do this assignment in class; it is to be turned in during the class period one week from today. Since it is essential that we get each student's independent views, please do not discuss any part of this assignment or your own attitudes with anyone else. Thank you for your cooperation.

59 . o A. r v u. r a l u. l. In a a Ȯ.. 1. I -. t I sv \ ' s 7 x.... I.,.. \.. I.) l! T.....J I... n u.... J..... J... as..tv,j u r......o a A n.».. I.I I. r I.....I l Isl. I. 9 u. q I a ~ I..... u t. II In, 7. r: a. t r '. r -J. '. c Jflut I. I.-' 5 Eur. '~ r I..... It..

60 Name: Page 2

61 n.s.u. Proj. No U.S.G A.I.D. Pha. No. B Comm 100 Name: Your task is to write your three best arguments in defense of disarmament. Remember, you are to defend this policy. Use page two of this questionnaire to state your arguments. It should not be necessary for you to spend more than 30 minutes on this assignment. Do not do this assignment in class; it is to be turned in during the class period one week from today. Since it is essential that we get each student's independent views, please do not discuss any part of this assignment or your own attitudes with anyone else. Thank you for your cooperation.

62 .. s. r.. a. u I -. u. a u. I. 1. I. ;.. I l. y A : x.. u r.....,....1 & uel. 1: J.... ' -....\ l f:. o \ t p... u.l.. a s-. A rl n t.... a. I)

63 Name: Page 2

64 M.S.U. Proj. No. I U.S.G A.I.D. Pha. No. C C0mm 100 Name: Your task is to write your three best arguments in opposition to disarmament. Remember, you are to oppose this policy. Use page two of this questionnaire to state your arguments. It should not be necessary for you to spend more than 30 minutes on this assignment. Do not do this assignment in class; it is to be turned in during the class period one week from today. Since it is essential that we get each student's independent views, please do not discuss any part of this assignment or your own attitudes with anyone else. Thank you for your cooperation.

65 .ln

66 Name: Page 2

67 APPENDIX C POSTTEST QUESTIONNAIRE 46

68 Instructions for the Use of This Questionnaire This questionnaire will be used in an experiment being conducted by the Political Science Department. At the present time, we need an indication of how good the questions are. To get this indication, we are asking you to mark the following questions. Even though this is a pre-test, it is extremely important that you fill this out very carefully. At the end of this questionnaire is space for you to write your reactions to the questionnaire. If you have any suggestions or comments about these questions, please note your suggestions in the place provided. Thank you for your help in this matter. D. Costello Department of Political Science Please write your name and student I. D. Number below. NAME: STUDENT I. D.

69 ...4;

70 -1- Please place an X in the space following each topic that best indicates your attitude toward that topic. For example, if I believe that it would be extremely foolish to allow Red China into the U. N., I would mark the scale in the following manner: ADMITTING RED CHINA TO THE U. N. wise :_;(_foolish Please mark one space on each of the following scales. Do not double check your marks; do not refer back to any question once it has been marked. WW**M***W*****M*M*W*m************mflmfl*mmm** U. S. POLICY IN VIET NAM bad good UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS wise foolish MEDICARE unfair fair DISARMAMENT honest dishonest JOHNSON'S POVERTY BILL awful nice CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS valuable worthless UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS unfair fair MEDICARE honest dishonest DISARMAMENT awful nice JOHNSON' S POVERTY BILL valuable worthless CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS bad good U. 8. POLICY IN VIET NAM wise foolish MEDICARE awful nice DISARMAMENT valuable worthless

71 v- u I u a.... a. I

72 JOHNSON'S POVERTY BILL bad good CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS wise foolish U. S. POLICY IN VIET NAM unfair fair UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS honest dishonest DISARMAMENT good bad JOHNSON'S POVERTY BILL foolish wise CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS fair unfair U. S. POLICY IN VIET NAM dishonest honest UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS nice awful MEDICARE worthless valuable JOHNSON'S POVERTY BILL fair unfair CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS dishonest honest U. S. POLICY IN VIET NAM nice awful UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS worthless valuable MEDICARE good bad DISARMAMENT foolish wise CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS nice awful U. 8. POLICY IN VIET NAM worthless valuable

73 - n..,.. _., ,, n..... O a u I , _,_. ' _ ~.....,. A t ,, ,. _.._ ,-.'.- I ' '.'.....,, ,,._,.., V... ' ' ' -. _, u.1....,., _ ~, _. s....., ,.. I... y - r 3,., n.'.' '.,,,, , _.7.

74 -3- UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS good : z : : : : bad MEDICARE foolish : : : : : : wise DISARMAMENT fair : : : : : : unfair JOHNSON'S POVERTY BILL dishonest : : : : : : honest *********~k7 c*********** k*av'nhhk kpk********* k**9:****************m*********m*** Please use the rest of the page to note any comments you would like to make.

75 1.!.DII-l......s \

76 APPENDIX D DELAYED POSTTEST QUESTIONNAIRE 51

77 M.S.U. Proj. No. IV-O7-24 U.S.G A.I.D. Pha. No. D Comm. 100 Name: Please rate disarmament on the following scale: valuable awful honest unfair wise bad worthless nice dishonest fair foolish good

78 M.S.U. Proj. No. IV-O7-24 U.S.G A.I.D. Pha. No. F Comm. 100 Please rate federal aid to education" on the following scale: valuable awful honest unfair wise bad worthless nice dishonest fair foolish good

79