THE FIFTH WAY: FROM FINAL CAUSATION I. THE DATUM: FINAL CAUSATION

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1 THE FIFTH WAY: FROM FINAL CAUSATION I. THE DATUM: FINAL CAUSATION AQUINAS: The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. In the world of sense we find natural things lacking intelligence whose activity regularly produces certain effects, or a range of effects, rather than some other effect, or range of effects. e.g., the acorn s activity is regularly directed to becoming an oak tree, and not a banana tree. e.g., the phosphorus in the head of a match is regularly directed as generating heat and fire when struck and not cold, ice, or the smell of a rose. e.g., the activity of a heart is regularly directed to pumping blood and not seeing. e.g., the activity of plants are regularly directed to take in water and nutrients and exhibit growth patterns and not talk. Notice that in each of these cases we usually make sense of the regularity by appealing to some sort of inherent goal-directedness or intrinsic teleology (Greek telos end or goal) that is characteristic of a thing and its activity. The inherent tendencies of a thing and its activities are inscribed in a thing s very nature, flowing from the thing s substantial form (see Summa Theologiae I:5:5). These are inherent potencies that once actuated contribute to the thing s natural perfection. So there is an order between the thing, its activity, and the effect produced. This order is called the order of finality, or final causation. That these things are inherently directed to such ends is what Aquinas means when he says it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. In other words, they act for these ends/effects by virtue of their nature. Their tendency to these ends is constitutive of what they are. Each mode of being has a potency for certain activities that are inherently directed to bringing about an effect, or range of effects. The purpose of the proof is to explain or make intelligible the existence of this teleological ordering ( order-toward-an-end ) that is inscribed in the very natures of unintelligent things.

2 II. THE ARGUMENT (LONG VERSION) Step One AQUINAS: We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. P1: Whatever unintelligent being the activity of which regularly produces a specific effect (or effects) has an inherent tendency or determination ( built-ingoal-directedness ) to produce that effect by its activity. P1 Validation 1. If no inherent tendency of the agent s activity, then nothing to determine one effect rather than another. 2. If nothing to determine one effect rather than another, then no effect would result (if nothing to distinguish between no determination from determination, then no determination). 3. But an effect does result. 4. Therefore, it cannot be that nothing determines one effect rather than another. 5. Therefore, there must exist an inherent tendency of the agent s activity. P2: X is an unintelligent being the activity of which regularly produces a specific effect (or effects). C1: Therefore, X has an inherent tendency or determination to produce a specific effect (or effects) by its activity. Step Two AQUINAS: Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. P3: Whatever unintelligent being has an inherent tendency or determination to produce a specific effect (or effects) by its activity is directed to that effect by an extrinsic intelligent cause. P3 Validation #1: 1. The relation of a means to an end can only be determined by an intelligent cause. e.g., wind knocking over tower vs. the making of building materials for the sake of building the tower. There is no relation in the former, and therefore it doesn t require intelligence. But the latter does entail a relation. Therefore, it requires intelligence.

3 *Relations between things are dependent on their natures (e.g., fire to heat). Therefore, establishing the relation of things and their order depends on grasping the nature of things in the abstract. But to grasp the nature of things in the abstract is the function of an intellect. 2. The inherent tendency or determination of an unintelligent being to produce a specific effect (or effects) by its activity is a relation of a means to an end (e.g., fire -> heat). 3. Therefore, the inherent tendency or determination of an unintelligent being to produce a specific effect (or effects) by its activity can only be determined by an intelligent cause. 4. But an unintelligent being doesn t have intelligence. 5. Therefore, an unintelligent being can t be the intelligent cause of the directed activity. 6. Therefore, the intelligent cause must be an extrinsic intelligent cause. P3 Validation #2: 1. If a thing s activity is determined/specified by some effect/end, then the effect/end must exist in some way. e.g., the idea of a house existing in the builder s mind determines the cutting of the wood and shaping of materials for the building of the house. e.g., the idea of a MA in philosophy existing in the student s mind determines what a student will study and write papers on. * nothing cannot have an influence on the activity of a thing. 2. An unintelligent being s activity is determined/specified by an end. e.g., oak tree specifies the activity of the acorn. e.g., taking in water and nutrients specifies the activity of a plant 3. Therefore, the effect/end of an unintelligent being s activity must exist in some way. 4. The effect/end either has real existence or mental existence. 5. Not real existence (it s not actualized yet in the real world). 6. Therefore, the effect/end has mental existence. 7. But an unintelligent being doesn t have intelligence. 8. Therefore, the effect/end cannot have mental existence in the unintelligent being. 9. Therefore, the effect/end must have mental existence in an extrinsic intelligent cause. P4: X is an unintelligent being that has an inherent tendency or determination to produce a specific effect (or effects) by its activity. C2: Therefore, X is directed to produce that specific effect (or effects) by its activity by an extrinsic intelligent cause, call it EIC-A. Step Three AQUINAS: Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

4 P5: Whatever EIC directs an unintelligent being s activity to produce a specific effect (or effects) must concurrently direct that unintelligent being s activity to produce a specific effect (or effects) at every moment that unintelligent being exists. P5 Validation: 1. If an extrinsic intelligent cause is required for a thing to have an inherent tendency to produce a specific effect through its activity as such, then an extrinsic intelligent cause is required for a thing to have an inherent tendency to produce a specific effect at every moment it exists. 2. P3 affirms the antecedent 3. Therefore, the consequent is affirmed. P6: EIC-A directs X s activity to produce a specific effect (or effects). C3: Therefore, EIC-A must concurrently direct X s activity to produce a specific effect (or effects) at every moment X exists. Step Four P7: EIC-A either has its directing intellectual activity caused by another concurrent extrinsic intelligent cause or not. P8: If EIC-A is uncaused in its directing intellectual activity, then EIC-A has existence per se (essence and existence identical and thus God) P8 Validation: 1. If EIC-A did not have existence per se, then it would have to receive its existence from a extrinsic concurrent cause. 2. If EIC-A were to receive existence from an extrinsic concurrent cause, then EIC-A s intellectual activity would be concurrently caused/directed by that extrinsic cause as well, since EIC-A can only have and exercise its intellectual activity if its nature has an act of existence. 3. But on supposition EIC-A s is not caused in its directing intellectual activity. 4. Therefore, on supposition EIC-A doesn t receive existence from an extrinsic concurrent cause. 5. Therefore, on supposition EIC-A has existence per se (of itself). P9: If from another concurrent EIC, then EIC-A would have existence per accidens. P9: Validation: 1. If EIC-A didn t have existence per accidens, then it is would have existence per se. 2. If EIC-A had existence per se, then it would be uncaused in its intellectual activity (if existence is identical to the nature by which a thing has its intellectual activity, then its act existence would be identical to its act of intellection, in which case there is no need for a cause of the intellection).

5 3. But on supposition EIC-A is caused in its intellectual activity by a concurrent extrinsic intelligent cause. 4. Therefore, on supposition EIC-A doesn t have existence per se. 5. Therefore, on supposition EIC-A has existence per accidens. P10: If EIC-A has existence per accidens, then at every moment EIC-A exists EIC-A would require another EIC, call it EIC-B, concurrently conjoining EIC-A s essence to an act of existence (same would apply to EIC-B if it has existence per accidens). Step Five P10 Validation: 1. The conjoining (which must be at every moment it exists) is either due to EIC-A s essence, to nothing, or to another. 2. It can t be due to EIC-A s essence (on supposition existence is per accidens). 3. It can t be due to nothing (if nothing to distinguish non-unity of essence and existence from unity, then non-unity of essence and existence). 4. Therefore, the conjoining is due to another (at every moment it exists). P11: The series of caused concurrent EICs either exists with a concurrent EIC that has existence per se (uncaused EIC) or without a concurrent EIC that has existence per se (uncaused EIC). P12: The series of caused concurrent EICs cannot exist without a concurrent EIC that has existence per se (uncaused EIC). P12 Validation: 1. If the series existed with no concurrent EIC that had existence per se, then there would be no source from which the concurrent EICs in the series could derive their existence. 2. If there were no source from which the EICs in the series could derive their existence, then no EIC in the series would have existence. 3. If no concurrent EIC in the series had existence, then X s activity wouldn t be directed to produce a specific effect. 4. But we know from sense experience that X is directed in its activity to produce a specific effect. 5. Therefore, the concurrent EICs in the series that direct X s inherent tendency to produce a specific effect (or effects) exists. 6. Therefore, there must be a source from which the concurrent EICs in the series derive their existence. 7. Therefore, the series must exist with at least one concurrent EIC that has existence per se. C4: Therefore, either EIC-A is uncaused in its intellectual activity, and thus has existence per se (from P8), or there exists a series of caused concurrent EICs that direct X s inherent tendency to produce a specific effect that exists with at least one concurrent EIC that has existence per se (from P11 & P12).

6 III. THE ARGUMENT (SHORTENED VERSION) P1: Whatever unintelligent being has an inherent tendency or determination to produce a specific effect (or effects) by its activity is directed to that effect by an extrinsic intelligent cause. P2: That extrinsic intelligence cause either has its directing intellectual activity of itself or from an extrinsic cause. P3: If of itself, then God. P4: If from an extrinsic cause, then an essentially ordered series of intelligent causes. P5: The essentially ordered series of intelligent causes either exists with or without a concurrent intelligent cause that has its intellectual activity of itself. P6: Not without. C1: Therefore, either the first extrinsic intelligent cause has its intellectual activity of itself, which would be God, or the essentially ordered series of intelligent causes exists with a concurrent intelligent cause that has its intellectual activity of itself, which would be God.