Approach-Avoidance Motivation and the Use of Affect as Information

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1 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY, 17(2), Copyright O 2007, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Approach-Avoidance Motivation and the Use of Affect as Information Thomas Kramer Baruch College, The City University of New York Song-Oh Yoon Singapore Management University, Korca University Individuals often rely on their affect for information. However, positive or negative affect may not be informative for individuals who are more prone to feel affect of this particular valence in general, unless they chronically monitor their internal states. A series of studies demonstrates that differences in individuals' internal versus external focus of attention and in trait affective valence associated with their approach versus avoidance motivation determine reliance on affect as information. Specifically, our findings show that while positive affect is used as an input in product satisfaction judgments regardless of individuals' approach versus avoidance motivation, negative affect is used only by individuals with a predominant approach motivation. Individuals often use their affect as a source of information when making evaluative judgments-by holding a target in mind and asking themselves "How do I feel about it?'(e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988), and then infemng their liking of it from their feelings. Prior research has discussed a number of different factors that determine the use of affect in consumer judgments. For instance, consumers are more likely to use affect as information for hedonic (versus utilitarian) products (Adaval, 2001) and when they have experiential (versus utilitarian) consumption motives (Pham, 1998). The reliance on affect also depends on consumers' availability of cognitive resources (Albarracin & Wyer, 2001) and on chronic individual difference factors such as their self-regulatory focus (Pham & Avnet, 2004). However, while the literature has examined factors that moderate consumers' reliance on affect in general, there is a surprising dearth of research focusing on conditions that determine individuals' reliance on affect based on its particular valence, even though positive and negative affects have very distinct effects on evaluations and judgments (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Westbrook, 1987). Correspondence should be addressed to Thomas Kramer, Baruch College, The City University of New York, New York; Tel: ; Fax: Thomas-Kramer@baruch.cuny.edu Both authors contributed equally and are listed in alphabetical order. We therefore seek to investigate the differential reliance on positive versus negative affect as information and, more specifically, to test if individuals' approach-avoidance motivation (e.g., Gray, 1990) determines the use of affect of a particular valence as input in product satisfaction ratings. On the basis of the differences between these two types of motivation in their focus of attention and their associated trait affective valence, defined as affect of a valence individuals are more prone to in general, we hypothesize that reliance on affect as information is influenced by individuals' predominant approach versus avoidance motivation. Specifically, individuals with a predominant approach motivation tend to chronically monitor their internal states, making both momentary positive and negative affects salient to them. Conversely, since individuals with a predominant avoidance motivation tend to be externally focused, they are less likely to monitor their internal states. Therefore, momentary affect should be less salient to them, unless made prominent by its deviation from their trait affective valence. On the basis of the research that suggests that the salience of an input often has an impact on its perceived diagnosticity (e.g., Herr, Kardes, & Kim, 1991; Menon & Raghubir, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1991), we propose that the salience of positive versus negative affect in turn increases its diagnosticity and hence the likelihood that it will be used as input in judgments. Results of three experiments support our hypothesis. In particular, Study 1 investigates the use of positive and negative affects as information based on consumers'

2 APPROACH-AVOIDANCE AND AFFECT AS INFORMATION 129 approach-avoidance motivation as a measured chronic individual difference variable (operationalized as behavioral activation system versus behavioral inhibition system; Carver & White, 1994) on product satisfaction. As expected, we find that positive affect is used as input in product satisfaction judgments regardless of individuals' motivational tendencies. On the other hand, negative affect is used only by individuals with a predominant approach motivation, but not by individuals with a predominant avoidance motivation for whom negative affect is less likely to be salient. Next, Study 2 replicates these findings with a priming manipulation that temporarily makes an approach versus avoidance motivation accessible in subjects. Using an affect priming manipulation in Study 3, we find further support for the hypothesis that individuals with approach tendencies incorporate both positive and negative momentary (primed) affect in their product satisfaction ratings. Conversely, individuals with predominant avoidance tendencies use momentary (primed) affect as information only when its valence mismatches their trait affective valence. In the following sections, we discuss how predominant approach versus avoidance motivations influence individuals' internal versus external focus of attention and trait affective valence, and hypothesize how these differences determine the use of affect as information. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Approach-avoidance, Focus of Attention, and Reliance on Affect Motivational theorists have proposed that two distinct selfregulatory systems underlie individuals' motivation, behavior, and affect (e.g., Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1982, 1990; Higgins, 1997). For example, Gray (1982) showed that individuals' behavioral activation system (BAS) activates behavior that may lead to positive or pleasurable outcomes, while their behavioral inhibition system (BIS) inhibits behavior that may lead to negative or painful outcomes. Similarly, self-regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), which refers to the dominant process through which people approach pleasure and avoid pain, suggests two types of individuals according to their predominant promotion versus prevention self-regulatory focus. These differences in individuals' strategies to attain goals as proposed by self-regulatory focus theory are closely related to the approach and avoidance tendencies suggested by behavioral activation and behavioral inhibition tendencies, respectively, as proposed by Gray (1982). In particular, a promotion self-regulatory focus refers to individuals' proclivity to approach matches to a desired end state and is hence affiliated with a greater sensitivity to the presence and absence of positive outcomes. Conversely, a prevention self-regulatory focus refers to individuals' proclivity to avoid mismatches to a desired end state, and is associated with a greater sensitivity to the presence and absence of negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997, 2002). According to past findings, differences in motivational systems have considerable impact on individuals' strategies for goal attainment, which in turn are likely to influence individuals' focus of attention. In particular, individuals with a predominant approach motivation or BAS are more concerned with eagerness to begin behavior that may lead to positive outcomes, while individuals with a predominant avoidance motivation or BIS are more concerned with vigilance to avoid behavior that may lead to negative outcomes (Carver & White, 1994; Higgins, 2000). These different goal attainment strategies lead to different foci of attention and hence differential reliance on internal versus external information. For example, Bless, Mackie, and Schwarz (1992) and Bless et al. (1996) find that eagerness leads to increased reliance on internal information, whereas vigilance leads to increased reliance on external information. Additional support for the proposition concerning individual differences in focus of attention comes from the crosscultural literature, suggesting that individuals with an independent self tend to be more internally focused, whereas individuals with an interdependent self tend to be more externally focused (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Morris & Peng, 1994, Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998). Since there is evidence (e.g., Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000) that individuals with an independent (interdependent) self tend to have a promotion (prevention) self-regulatory focus associated with an approach (avoidance) motivation, their primary focus of attention is likely to differ accordingly. Consumers' internal versus external focus of attention is likely to have important implications for their reliance on affect in judgments. Specifically, individuals have to be conscious of their momentary affective state before they can ask themselves how they feel about a target. For individuals who chronically monitor their internal states, momentary affect should in general be salient and hence be used in judgments. However, individuals who are externally focused are less likely to monitor their internal states and hence may in general not be conscious of their momentary affect. In line with this theorizing, Pham and Avnet (2004) show that states of eagerness associated with a promotion self-regulatory focus (corresponding to internally focused individuals with a predominant approach orientation) result in greater reliance on emotional responses when they evaluate the favorability of an ad. Conversely, states of vigilance associated with a prevention self-regulatory focus (corresponding to externally focused individuals with a predominant avoidance orientation) result in greater reliance on message substance. Additional research demonstrates that independent selves characterized by a strong sensitivity to positive outcomes show a greater tendency to incorporate their affective states into judgments, compared to interdependent counterparts associated with a strong sensitivity to negative outcomes (Suh et al., 1998).

3 130 KRAMER AND YOON On the basis of these findings, we expect that individuals with a predominant approach motivation are likely to rely on their affect regardless of its valence for information. In contrast, individuals with a predominant avoidance motivation tend not to monitor their internal states and should therefore in general be less likely to use their affect as input when making judgments. However, as we discuss next, these individuals will also rely on their affect, but only when it is made salient because its momentary affective valence mismatches their trait affective valence. Approach-avoidance, Affective Valence, and Reliance on Affect In addition to determining individuals' focus of attention, approach-avoidance tendencies also influence chronic or trait affective valence. Specifically, Gray (1982) and Carver and White (1994) suggest that the BAS is related to the experience of positive affect, while the BIS is related to the experience of negative affect. Thus, individuals with predominant BAS are generally more prone to feel positively valenced affect, whereas individuals with predominant BIS are generally more prone to feel negatively valenced affect. In this regard, Gable, Reis, and Elliot (2000) showed that there is a stronger relationship between positive events and positive affect for individuals with relatively higher BAS. Conversely, individuals with relatively higher BIS report more negative affect in response to negative events. Similarly, Dillard and Anderson (2004) demonstrate that individuals with a relatively higher (versus lower) BIS experienced greater fear, while differences in their BAS did not influence the degree of fear experienced. The propensity to experience affect of a certain valence, in turn, may impact how salient momentary affect is to individuals with an external focus of attention. These individuals, who have a greater tendency to experience negative affect in general, may therefore be less likely to use momentary negative affect as information. For example, if a consumer is more prone to feeling negative affect, then the experience of negative affect following a dissatisfactory product experience is unlikely to be salient and hence informative of the situation; therefore, it is unlikely to have an influence on their product satisfaction judgments. On the other hand, experiencing positive affect following product use is likely to be highly salient and informative of their satisfaction for individuals with a greater propensity to feel negative affect, since it mismatches their trait affective valence. In addition to its salience, the diagnosticity of the information also influences the likelihood that it will be used as an input to make judgments. As discussed by Feldman and Lynch (1988), diagnosticity of a particular piece of information refers to the extent to which inferences based on it alone would be adequate to make a decision. Operationalizations of diagnosticity include representativeness toward (e.g., Gorn, Goldberg, & Basu, 1993; Pham, 1998; Strack, 1992) and relevance of (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), affect toward the target. For example, individuals tend to rely less on their affect when they are aware that the source of their affect is not the target they are evaluating, that is, when not misattributing the feelings generated from an irrelevant source to the target. We propose, based on research that suggests that accessibility of an input and its perceived diagnosticity are often correlated (e.g., Herr et al., 1991; Menon & Raghubir, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1991), that the salience of positive versus negative affect in turn increases its diagnosticity and hence the likelihood that it will be used as input in judgments. Overall, the above discussions on focus of attention and chronic affective valence suggest that differences in approach-avoidance motivations may determine whether individuals use affect as information in judgments. In particular, individuals with a predominant approach motivation are relatively more likely to rely on their affect regardless of its valence because their internal focus of attention makes momentary affect salient. On the other hand, individuals with a predominant avoidance motivation are likely to rely on their affect only when it is made salient by its mismatch to their chronic affective valence. Therefore, we hypothesize: Hla: Positive affect is likely to be used as input in product satisfaction judgments by individuals regardless of their approach-avoidance orientation. Hlb: Negative affect is more likely to be used as input in product satisfaction judgments by approach-oriented (versus avoidance-oriented) individuals. We test our hypothesis in a series of studies investigating the use of positive and negative affects in product satisfaction judgments for individuals with predominant approach and avoidance motivational systems. Prior research has demonstrated that positive and negative affects occur as a result of satisfactory and unsatisfactory consumption experiences (Oliver, 1989), and that consumption emotions have distinct and independent impacts on satisfaction judgments above and beyond the cognitive evaluation (Edell & Burke, 1987; Oliver, 1993; Westbrook, 1987). Therefore, our experimental setting provides a valid context to test consumers' use of affect in their judgments. Overview STUDY 1 Study 1 was conducted to examine the moderating role of consumers' approach-avoidance orientation in their propensity to incorporate negative versus positive affect as information in product satisfaction judgments. In the study, participants read a scenario and were told to imagine that they had purchased a product that disconfmed their expectations

4 APPROACH-AVOIDANCE AND AFFECT AS INFORMATION 1 31 either positively or negatively, depending on randomly assigned condition. After reading the scenario, participants reported reason-based assessments of the brand as per Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, and Hughes (2001), emotional responses, and satisfaction ratings. At the end of the study, differences in approach versus avoidance motivation were assessed using the BISBAS measures (Carver & White, 1994). We predicted that positive affect would be a significant predictor for respondents with a predominant approach motivation and for respondents with a predominant avoidance motivation. In contrast, negative affect should be a predictor of satisfaction judgments only for approach-oriented, but not for avoidance-oriented, respondents. Method Participants and Procedure A total of 312 students were randomly assigned to the positive or negative product disconfirmation condition. Upon arriving in the lab, participants were asked to imagine that they had purchased a personal digital assistant (PDA) and found out one week later that the quality of their PDA was either below (i.e., negative disconfirmation) or above (i.e., positive disconfirmation) than what they should expect based on information provided by Consumer Reports magazine. The PDA was described using three attributes: data loss protection, processing speed, and memory capacity. Disconfirmation was manipulated by varying the values on both the data loss protection and processing speed attributes. For instance, participants in the positive disconfmation condition were told that the brand they had purchased was faster in processing speed and had more data protection compared to the standard values recommended by Consumer Reports. In contrast, participants in the negative disconfirmation condition were told that their PDA had both lower processing speed and less data protection. The value on the memory capacity attribute was the same as that recommended by Consumer Reports and did not differ between disconfirmation conditions. After reading the scenario, participants reported their reason-based assessments by indicating their attitude toward the brand, followed by satisfaction ratings, affective responses, BISBAS scales, and manipulation checks. Measures Following Pham et al. (2001), we measured reason-based assessments using three seven-point items ("good/bad," "favorablelunfavorable," and "likeldislike;" a=0.93). Participants' satisfaction toward their chosen brand was assessed by three items ("I am satisfied with my decision to buy Brand X," "My choice to buy Brand X was a wise one," and "I think that I did the right thing when I decided to buy Brand X") anchored on "disagree stronglylagree strongly" (a=0.95). Scales comprising primary positive and negative emotions were used to assess consumption affect in the positive and negative disconfirmation conditions, respectively. Specifically, participants indicated on a seven-point scale (anchored on "not at alya lot") the likelihood that they would respond to the given purchase situation with each of 13 positive emotions (e.g., glad, calm, happy, relieved) in the positive disconfirmation condition (a=0.90) and with each of 13 negative emotions (e.g., sad, hostile, distressed, irritated) in the negative disconfirmation condition (a=0.94). The average scores of these items were used as measures of subjects' reason-based assessment, satisfaction, and affective responses, respectively. Following administration of the main questionnaire, subjects' predominant approach versus avoidance motivation was assessed using the 12-item BISIBAS scale anchored on "strongly disagreelstrongly agree." The BIS scale includes items that measure an individual's behavioral inhibition tendencies (e.g., "I worry about making mistakes" and "I feel pretty worried or upset when I know someone is angry at me"). Conversely, the BAS subscale used includes items that assess an individual's behavioral activation tendencies in response to rewards (e.g., "When I get something I want I feel excited and energized" and "It would excite me to win a contest"). The composite index for approach-avoidance motivation was formed by subtracting subjects' mean BIS score from their mean BAS score (Diego, Field, & Hernandez- Reif, 2001; Sutton & Davidson, 1997). Finally, the disconfirmation manipulation was checked by asking subjects to evaluate the relative quality of the purchased brand on the data loss protection and processing speed attributes. Results Manipulation Check As expected, participants in the positive versus negative disconfirmation condition rated their brand as having higher processing power (M=6.52 versus 1.44, t=30.38, p < 0.01) and more data protection (M=6.54 versus 1.58, t=22.38, < 0.01). Further, reason-based assessment of the brand and satisfaction ratings were higher in the positive versus negative disconfirmation condition (M=6.08 versus 4.04, t= 17.25, p < 0.01; M=5.86 versus 3.34, t=19.09, p < 0.01, respectively). Affect as Information Following Pham and Avnet (2004; see also Suh et al., 1998), we tested our hypothesis regarding the differential weighing of reason-based assessments and affect for approach- and avoidance-oriented individuals in product satisfaction judgments by running a series of regression analyses. The regression for the negative disconfirmation condition included the following predictors: (a) reason-based assessment; (b) negative affect; (c) composite index for approach-avoidance motivation; (d) the interaction between reason-based assessment (a) and composite index for approach-avoidance

5 132 KRAMER AND YOON motivation (c); and (e) the interaction between negative affect (b) and composite index for approach-avoidance motivation (c). The regression for the positive disconfinnation condition was identical, except that the negative affect variable was replaced with the positive-affect variable. There are two things to note about the test. First, reasonbased assessment was included as a predictor to emphasize the differential impact of reason-based and affect-based assessments on satisfaction (e.g., Oliver, 1993; Pham et al., 2001) and to ascertain that the proposed effect is limited to emotional responses, independent of cognitive responses. Second, the evaluation and affect scores were not highly correlated (r=0.36), suggesting that the inclusion of both predictors in the regression test did not produce a multicollinearity problem (variance inflation factors <I. 15). If our hypothesis is correct, we should observe a significant affect by approach-avoidance motivation interaction effect in the negative disconfirmation condition, but not in the positive disconfirmation condition. The results show a pattern consistent with our expectations; in the negative disconfirmation condition, reason-based assessment and negative affect had a significant and a marginally significant effect on satisfaction, respectively (/3=0.69, t=8.91, p < 0.01; P=-0.13, t= 1.70, p < 0.1). However, the marginally significant main effect of the affect on satisfaction was qualified by a significant affect by approach-avoidance motivation interaction (P=-0.20, t=-2.02, p < 0.05). This significant negative interaction between negative affect and approach-avoidance motivation suggests that individuals with a predominant approach (versus avoidance) motivation were more likely to use negative affect in their satisfaction judgment. This interpretation was corroborated further by a separate regression analysis for individuals whose motivation index scores are in the upper versus lower half of the scale. For individuals with a predominant approach motivation (i.e., those who scored in the upper half on the BAS-BIS index scale), both negative affect (/?=-0.32, t=-3.81, p < 0.01) and reason-based assessment (P=0.56, t=6.60, p < 0.01) had significant effects on product satisfaction. In contrast, for individuals with a predominant avoidance motivation (i.e., those who scored in the lower half of the BAS-BIS index scale), negative affect had no significant influence (t=-0.67, p > 0.10), while reason-based assessment had a significant positive influence on satisfaction (,6=0.75, t=9.50, p < 0.01). However, in the positive disconfirmation condition, only reason-based assessment (P=0.51, k5.84, p < 0.01) and positive affect (/3=0.34, r=3.45, p < 0.01) were significant predictors of satisfaction. As expected, there was no significant positive affect by approach-avoidance motivation interaction (P=0.27, t=1.06, p > 0.10), suggesting that both individuals with a predominant approach and avoidance motivation relied on their positive affect when judging their product satisfaction. Lastly, our basic premise underlying these effects was differential proneness to feeling positive versus negative affect by individuals with a predominant approach versus avoidance tendency. More specifically, individuals with a high BAS are prone to feel positive affect, while individuals with a high BIS are prone to feel negative affect in general. In line with this reasoning, we found a significant positive correlation between positive-affect and approach-avoidance motivation (p=0.24, t=2.89, p < 0.05) and a significant negative correlation between negative affect and approachavoidance t=-4.08, p <0.01), where higher (lower) scores on the approach-avoidance motivation measure indicate a higher BAS (BIS). Discussion The results of Study 1 successfully demonstrate that the reliance on affect in product satisfaction judgments depends on individuals' predominant approach-avoidance motivation. More specifically, positive affect was used as input in satisfaction judgments regardless of approachavoidance tendencies. However, only approach-oriented respondents relied on negative affect in their satisfaction judgments. Apparently, since individuals with a predominant avoidance motivation are externally focused and less likely to monitor their affect, negative (i.e., affect consistent with trait affective valence) was not salient and hence not used as information. While these results provide support for our hypothesis, a limitation of Study 1 is the use of separate affect scales in the positive versus negative disconfirmation conditions, which does not allow for a direct comparison of affective responses between the two conditions and use of an omnibus test for this study. To address this concern, in the next study we provide participants in the two disconfirmation conditions with the same affect scale consisting of both positive and negative affect items, as done in much prior satisfaction research (e.g., Schmitt, DubC, & Leclerc, 1992). In addition, we seek to find additional support for our hypothesis by generalizing the effect to a temporally accessible approach-avoidance motivation, that is, by priming an approach versus avoidance motivation, as opposed to measuring subjects' chronically accessible approach-avoidance motivation in the previous study. Priming an approach motivation in individuals is likely to activate eagerness strategies and an internal focus of attention. Therefore, we expect that these individuals will use both positive and negative affects as information. Conversely, priming an avoidance motivation may temporarily put individuals in a state of vigilance, resulting in greater sensitivity to negative outcomes and a greater likelihood of focusing on the negative aspects of a situation (Lee & Aaker, 2004). This suggests that when in a state of vigilance, negative (versus positive) information is more expected. However, because of the primed external focus, affect is likely to be used as input in judgments only when it is of a valence that mismatches (versus matches) this expectation (i.e., positive affect).

6 APPROACH-AVOIDANCE AND AFFECT AS INFORMATION 1 33 STUDY 2 The basic procedure and stimuli used in Study 2 were identical to those of Study 1, except for the following changes. First, all participants received a 10-item scale containing five positive (cheerful, joyful, pleasant, pleased, and good) and five negative (angry, depressed, disgusted, annoyed, and bad) emotion items, as used in prior consumer studies (e.g., Pham, 1998). The negative affect items were reversescored and combined with the positive ones to form an "emotion response" scale (a=0.91). Second, participants' approach versus avoidance motivation was temporarily activated using a priming manipulation developed by Pennington and her colleagues (Pennington, Aaker, & Roese, 2005). In the approach-motivation prime condition, participants were asked to list 10 beauty and health products that help bring about positive and desired outcomes, while in the avoidance-motivation prime condition, participants were asked to name 10 beauty and health products that help avoid and undo negative outcomes. This procedure influences judgment and behavior in a manner consistent with the activation of approach and avoidance motives, respectively (Pennington et al., 2005). In a separate manipulation check of the study materials, 56 respondents were randomly assigned to the approach- versus avoidance-primed condition. Following completion of the main study questionnaire, they were then asked to indicate the degree to which their thoughts were focused on products that can help prevent or undo a negative outcome and the degree to which their thoughts were focused on products that can help bring about a positive, desired outcome, where l=not at all and 7=extremely. Results showed that a significantly greater number of subjects reported thinking about products that can bring about a positive, desired outcome (versus avoid or undo a negative outcome) in the approachprimed condition, and a significantly greater number of subjects reported thinking about products that can avoid or undo a negative outcome (versus bring about a positive, desired outcome) in the avoidance-primed condition (p's <.05). Method Participants and Procedure A total of 181 students were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (prime: approach versus avoidance motivation) x 2 (product disconfirmation: positive versus negative) between-subjects design. The experiment was administered as two supposedly unrelated studies. In the first study participants completed the priming task, disguised as a study examining consumers' knowledge about beauty and health products. In the second study, participants received the product purchase scenario and responded to the same set of questions as in Study 1, except for the abovementioned changes. Results Manipulation Checks Participants in the positive versus negative disconfirmation condition evaluated their purchased PDA as having higher processing power (M=6.62 versus 1.64, t= 18.92, p < 0.01) and more data loss protection (M=6.63 versus 1.54, t=20.92, p < 0.01). Importantly, as expected, participants in the positive versus negative disconfirmation group showed more positive-affect responses (M=5.48 versus 3.86, t=9.45, p < 0.01), and this pattern did not interact with the type of affect (i.e., negative- and positive-affect items). Affect as Information Participants' satisfaction scores were entered into a multiple regression analysis with the following predictors: (a) reason-based assessments; (b) affect; (c) a dummy for approach-avoidance motivation prime (O=avoidance, l=approach); (d) a dummy for product disconfirmation (O=negative, l=positive); (e) two-way interaction terms; and (f) three-way interaction terms. Analysis showed a marginally significant affect by approach-avoidance prime by product disconfirmation interaction effect (,B=-0.72, t=-1.81, p < 0.1). However, in line with our proposed distinction between affect and reason-based evaluations, the reason-based assessments by approach-avoidance prime by product disconfirmation interaction was not significant. Further examination of the affect by approach-avoidance prime by product disconfirmation interaction show that, consistent with Study 1, in the negative disconfirmation condition there was a significant effect for reason-based assessment (P=0.75, t=4.85, p < 0.01) and for the affect by approach-avoidance motivation interaction (P=0.69, t=2.01, p < 0.05). Additional analysis of the interaction effect supports our hypothesis; when participants' approach motivation was activated, emotional responses as well as reason-based assessment had a significant impact on satisfaction (P=0.38, t=3.01,p < 0.05; P=0.53, t=4.28,p < 0.01, respectively). However, for participants primed with an avoidance motivation, affect did not have on effect on satisfaction (t=0.13), while reason-based assessment had a significant influence (P=0.75, t=5.00, p < 0.01). In contrast, the only significant effects in the positive disconfirmation condition were the main effects of reasonbased assessment and emotional responses (P=0.45, t=3.37, p < 0.01; P=0.28, t=2.12, p < 0.05, respectively), but no significant affect by approach-avoidance motivation interaction was observed (t=0.09). This null interaction effect suggests that, as expected, reliance on positive affect in satisfaction judgment did not depend on the temporary activation of an approach versus avoidance motivation; both approach-primed and avoidance-primed participants used their positive-affect responses with reason-based assessments

7 1 34 KRAMER AND YOON when evaluating their satisfaction of the product (/3=0.42, k3.14,~ < 0.05; /3=0.52, t=3.68, p < 0.05, respectively). Discussion The current study replicated and extended the findings of Study 1 by making participants' approach versus avoidance motivation temporally accessible, using a single scale assessing positive and negative affect. Consistent with Study 1, the results show that participants with a temporarily accessible approach motivation and participants with a temporarily accessible avoidance motivation relied on positive affect when evaluating their product satisfaction. However, in support of our hypothesis, negative affect was used as information only by participants primed with an approach motivation. The replication of the results of Study 1 using a priming manipulation provides further evidence that the effects are indeed due to the different focus of attention and affective valence, as operationalized by chronic (Study 1) and temporary (Study 2) accessibility of respondents' approach-avoidance motivation. However, one limitation of our previous studies is that we used participants' subjective assessments of their own emotional responses to product success and failure. Owing to the nature of the design, the influence of affect independent of other factors that might be associated with positive and negative expectation disconfirmations could not be examined. Therefore, we attempt to show the robustness of the effect and replicate our findings by manipulating the valence of the affect through a priming technique in the next study. In particular, we test if approach-oriented participants will incorporate both positive and negative primed affect in their satisfaction judgments, while avoidance-oriented participants will incorporate only positive (but not negative) primed affect in their satisfaction judgments. Additionally, and in contrast to the first two studies in which we measured approach-avoidance motivation following the main questionnaire, in the current study we measure individuals' approach-avoidance tendencies prior to the dependent measures to eliminate any potential impact of the manipulations and dependent measures on their responses to the BISBAS scale. Furthermore, we seek to provide additional evidence for our proposition that individuals with a predominant approach (versus avoidance) motivation differ in their focus of attention, using Rotter's (1966) locus of control scale. This scale assesses the degree to which individuals believe that events result primarily from their own behaviors and actions, which is consistent with an internal focus, rather than powerful others or fate, which is consistent with an external focus. Lastly, we test an alternative explanation that suggests that avoidance- (versus approach-) oriented individuals are less likely to use their momentary affective states in judging target objects not because they are more externally oriented but because they are relatively more skeptical or cynical in general, which leads them to question the diagnosticity of any type of information, including their affect. Method STUDY 3 Participants and Procedure A total of 198 students were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 3 (affect prime: control versus positive versus negative)^:! (motivation: approach versus avoidance) mixed-factorial design, where the former factor was manipulated and the latter was measured. The experiment was administered as three ostensibly unrelated studies. In the first study, which was titled "Student Inventory," all participants completed the BISfBAS scale. The second, supposedly unrelated study was disguised as research developing a new emotion scale. Following a standard priming procedure used in prior research (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983), participants in the affect priming conditions wrote an essay for 5 minutes about personal events in the past that made them feel really good (positive affect) or really bad (negative affect), while participants in the control condition performed an unrelated filler task. Finally in the supposed third study, all participants completed the product satisfaction questionnaire, which was similar to that used in Study 1 and Study 2. However, in the current study, the attribute values of the target product (i.e., processing speed and memory capacity of the PDA) were equal to those provided by Consumer Reports, so as not to confound subjects' momentary affect induced by the prime and their momentary affect induced by the positive or negative expectation disconfirmation. Next, subjects rated their satisfaction with the product. Then, to ascertain that our results were independent of potentially differential levels cynicism associated with differences in approach-avoidance motivation, subjects completed Kanter and Mirvis' (1989) cynicism scale (cu=0.77). This was followed by the locus of control scale (cu=0.57) and manipulation check items. Scores on the locus of control scale were coded such that a lower (higher) score reflected an internal (external) locus of control. Results Manipulation Checks A five-item mood scale assessed participants' momentary affective states ("cheerfuydepressed," "sadjoyful," ''happy1 unhappy," "annoyedpleased," and "good moodhad mood;" cu=0.94). Consistent with our expectations, the positive-affect prime elicited more positive affect than did the control condition

8 APPROACH-AVOIDANCE AND AFFECT AS INFORMATION 135 (M=4.88 versus 4.58, t=2.48, p < 0.05). Further, the negative-affect prime elicited more negative affect than the control condition (M=3.71 versus 4.58, t=7.25, p < 0.01). Locus of Control We found support for our proposed link between individuals' approach-avoidance tendencies and their locus of control. In particular, the correlation between participants' approach-avoidance tendencies and their locus of control score (r=-0.16, p < 0.05) was significant, indicating that approach- (avoidance-) oriented individuals are associated with a greater internal (external) focus. Cynicism We also tested for differences in level of cynicism associated with approach-avoidance tendencies. However, the results showed that level of cynicism did not differ between the two groups (M=5.63 versus 5.75, t=0.63, p > 0.1). Further the correlation between approach-avoidance motivation and cynicism scores was not significant (r=0.03, p > 0.1). Affect as Information Subjects were classified as having a predominant approach (avoidance) motivation based on a median split of the mean difference between their BIS and BAS scores. The upper (lower) half of the participants on this index scale was considered having a predominant approach (avoidance) motivation. A 3 (affect prime: control versus positive versus negative)x2 (motivation: approach versus avoidance) analysis of variable (ANOVA) was conducted on subjects' satisfaction scores. As expected, we found a significant affect prime by motivation interaction effect [F(2, 192)=2.92, p < Adding cynicism as a covariate in the analysis did not impact the significance of the interaction [F(2, 190)=3.38, p < Additional analysis of the affect prime by motivation interaction effect suggests that both positive and negative primes had significant impacts on satisfaction ratings of participants with a predominant approach motivation. However, for participants with a predominant avoidance motivation, only the positive- (but not the negative-) affect prime had a significant influence on satisfaction ratings. Specifically, as shown in Table 1, approach-oriented participants TABLE 1 Experiment 3: Mean Product Satisfaction Ratings as a Function of Approach-Avoidance Motivation and Affective Prime Affective Prime Control Negative Positive Approach motivation 4.86, 4.30, 5.35,, Avoidance motivation 4.74, 5.05,~ 5.28, Note: Means with unlike subscripts differ at p <.05, two-tailed indicated marginally significantly higher satisfaction in the positive versus control condition (M=5.35 versus 4.86, t=1.73, p < 0.1) and significantly lower satisfaction in the negative affect versus control condition (M=4.30 versus 4.86, t=2.05, p <0.05). However, for participants with a predominant avoidance motivation, the only significant difference in satisfaction ratings emerged between the positiveaffect and control condition (M=5.28 versus 4.74, t= 1.97, p < 0.05), but not between the negative affect and control condition (M=5.05 versus 4.74, t= 1.12, p > 0.1). Furthermore, and in line with our expectation, the mean satisfaction levels significantly differed between approach and avoidance individuals in the negative-affect prime condition (M=4.30 versus 5.05 for approach- versus avoidanceoriented participants, respectively; t=2.55, p < 0.05). However, no such difference in satisfaction rating between the two types of motivation emerged in the positive-affect condition (M=5.28 versus 5.35, t=0.29, p > 0.1) or in the control condition (M=4.74 versus 4.86, t=0.45, p > 0.1). Discussion and Follow-up Study Study 3 focused on the differential impact of positiveand negative-affect primes on satisfaction judgments of individuals with a predominant approach versus avoidance motivational system. Using an affect priming manipulation, we found support for our proposition that consumers with predominant approach motivational tendencies, who are more internally focused, incorporate both positive and negative momentary (primed) affect in their satisfaction ratings. On the other hand, individuals with avoidance motivational tendencies, who are more externally focused and are more prone to feel negative affect in general, use momentary (primed) affect as information in satisfaction judgments only when its valence mismatches their trait affective valence. Next, we demonstrated empirically that approachavoidance tendencies are associated with differential loci of control. Lastly, we found that the effect of differences in motivational systems on use of affect as information was independent of individuals' level of cynicism. One potential alternative explanation for the results we have obtained in this study may be that the degree to which participants experience affect in response to the affect prime might differ according to their approach-avoidance motivation. This might be a plausible explanation given that sensitivity to mood priming depends on certain individual personality traits (Larson & Ketelaar, 1991). However, we found neither a significant approach-avoidance motivation main effect [F(1, 193)=0.84, p > 0.11 nor an approach-avoidance motivation by affect priming interaction effect on affect ratings [F(l, 193)=1.68, p > 0.11, suggesting that both individuals with a predominant approach and avoidance motivation were equally responsive to the affect priming tasks. Finally, we conducted a follow-up study with a 2 (affect prime: positive versus negative)x2 (motivation: approach

9 1 36 KRAMER AND YOON versus avoidance) between-subjects design, which investigated the degree to which relevance of momentary affect influences use of affect as information for approach versus avoidance individuals, using Schwarz and Clore's (1983) misattribution paradigm. Attributing their momentary affect to something other than the PDA should eliminate the differential effect of relying on affect as information for approach versus avoidance individuals. In particular, when 91 participants arrived at the lab but before receiving the priming manipulation of the main study, they completed an ostensibly unrelated questionnaire. Participants who subsequently would be assigned to the positive-affect priming condition were told in the instructions that subjects in an earlier study had informed us that they felt "elated and "kind of high ("tense" and "depressed for participants in the subsequent negative affect priming condition) in the rooms of our behavioral lab, perhaps because of its ventilation and air quality. They were then asked to rate the room on a variety of dimensions (e.g., lighting, ventilation, comfort). Following the misattribution manipulation, participants completed the affect priming manipulation and satisfaction questionnaire as in the main study. As expected, following the misattribution manipulation, we found neither a significant affect priming main effect [F(l, 87)=0.15, p >0.1] nor a significant affect priming by approach-avoidance motivation interaction effect [F(1, 87)=0.22, p > 0.11 on satisfaction judgments. Importantly, the mean satisfaction rating by approach versus avoidance individuals did not differ significantly in the positive-affect prime condition (M=5.63 versus 5.08, t= 1.64, p > 0.1) or in the negative affect prime condition (M3.42 versus 5.10, t=0.92, p > 0.10). This null difference occurs despite the fact that the priming manipulation worked as intended (M=4.98 versus 4.25 for positive versus negative affect priming, t=4.14, p < 0.01), which further suggests that misattribution of the affect, and not the failure of the priming manipulation, is responsible for the observed null effect. GENERAL DISCUSSION While individuals often incorporate their affect into judgments (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983), we hypothesize and find that reliance on affect as information differs according to individuals' approach-avoidance motivation. We furthermore suggest that the differential reliance on positive versus negative affect is due to differences in focus of attention and diagnosticity of affective valence associated with the two motivational systems. In particular, the first two studies showed that positive affect is used in satisfaction judgments by both approachand avoidance-oriented individuals, while negative affect is relied on only by approach-oriented individuals. We obtained these results with chronic (Study 1 and Study 3) and temporarily induced (Study 2) approach-avoidance motivations. Relatedly, the last study demonstrated that approach-oriented individuals rely on both positive- and negative-primed affects, while avoidance-oriented individuals only rely on positive primed affect for information. We hypothesize that these effect are observed because approach-oriented individuals are likely to monitor their internal states, making momentary affect of any valence salient. On the other hand, avoidance-oriented individuals are more likely to focus on the external environment and may not find salient affect of a valence they tend to experience more in general. Instead, only affect made conscious by its mismatch to their trait affective valence is perceived to be diagnostic and is incorporated into judgments. IMPLICATIONS Most existing research on affect as information has been focused on factors that influence individuals' reliance on affect in general (e.g., Gorn et al., 1993; Pham, 1988; Pham & Avnet, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988), with little attention directed to the issue of affect valence. However, given the differential impact of positive versus negative affect on such important consumer variables as satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and post-purchase behaviors (Abelson et al., 1982; Westbrook, 1987), and differential sensitivity to certain types of affect by individuals with different personality traits (Larson & Ketelaar, 1991), the more fine-grained distinction of affect we utilize is an important one to make in this literature. In this research, we have investigated a factor that influences the differential reliance on positive versus negative affect in judgments. We thereby also extend the current literature on affect-as-information by demonstrating that feelings may lose their informational value when habitually felt and not chronically monitored. In order to be informative for individuals who do not in general monitor their internal states, feelings must be made salient; that is, present a mismatch to the emotional valence individuals have a greater propensity to experience. Next, we found support for our proposed link between individuals' approach-avoidance tendencies and their locus of control. Using Rotter's (1966) locus of control scale, we showed that individuals with a predominant approach motivation tend to have an internal locus of control, suggesting that these individuals are likely to see themselves in control of their own actions and outcomes. Conversely, individuals with a predominant avoidance motivation tend to have an external locus of control, suggesting that these individuals are likely to see situational factors in control of their outcomes. Notice that this finding is consistent with findings from the cross-cultural literature that show, for example, a greater reliance on internal or dispositional factors by Americans, and greater reliance on external or situational factors by Chinese individuals, when explaining social

10 APPROACH-AVOIDANCE AND AFFECT AS INFORMATION 137 behaviors (Morris & Peng, 1994). Additionally, this finding may suggest that avoidance (versus approach) individuals may be less subject to the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). This research has important implications concerning the effectiveness of sales promotions or advertisements that depict or are set to induce positive versus negative affect. prior research has provided many examples of how emotionally rich advertisements can have significant impacts on evaluation and liking of brands and the advertisements themselves; however, the findings of our study suggest that the effectiveness of emotional appeals may depend on consumers' approach-avoidance motivation as well as the valence of the affect depicted in the advertisement. Additionally, since we find that regardless of approach-avoidance motivation, positive (versus negative) affect is always incorporated into judgments, marketers need to devise ways to ascertain that ads that arouse negatively valenced affect are effective for all individuals. For example, marketers may want to induce fear in order to induce women to get a mammogram. Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of such a tactic can be improved if marketers succeeded at priming an approach motivation either before or concurrently with the emotional ad. That is, marketers may frame the ad to point out what women could gain from getting a mammogram. Our findings furthermore suggest that negative affect that results from product and service failure will have less damaging impact on consumer dissatisfaction ratings and future negative post-purchase behavior for consumers with a predominant avoidance motivation, as long as the failure does not have a serious impact on consumers' cognitive evaluations of the product or service. However, future research should investigate if the differential reliance on positive versus negative affect generalizes to domains other than product satisfaction ratings. Additionally, it is noteworthy to mention that we found differences in use of affect as information based on individuals' approach versus avoidance tendencies, which we operationalized as BAS versus BIS, respectively. As we pointed out, a closely related research stream by Higgins (1997, 2002) distinguishes between two types of self-regulatory foci, each related to distinct emotions, with cheerfulness (dejection), a positive (negative) promotion focused emotion, and quiescence (agitation), a positive (negative) prevention focused emotion. While our affect measures included both promotion- and prevention-related emotions (e.g., agitated, calm), future research may test if individuals with different self-regulatory foci differentially rely on different types of affect as information; that is, whether prevention-focused individuals are more likely to rely on cheerfulness versus dejection emotions, for example. Note that prior research (e.g., Pham & Avnet 2004) only tested reliance on affect versus reason-based assessment, without distinguishing differences based on affective valence. 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