Department of Psychology, Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113

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1 Induced compliance and opinion change HARUKI SAKAI1 Department of Psychology, Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113 The present study investigated the effects of commitment and inducement on opinion change in a forced compliance situation. Subjects were induced to record strongly counterattitudinal statements under two levels of commitment (Anonymous or Public recording). As inducement conditions, half of the subjects were offered one pencil while the remaining subjects were offered five pencils for recording the statements. It was found that subjects in the Public conditions showed opinion change in the direction of the counterattitudinal position while subjects in the Anonymous conditions did not. The inducement manipulation was not effective in producing differential opinion change. These results were discussed in terms of dissonance, self-presentation, and self-perception theories. Key words: dissonance, forced compliance, commitment, inducement, impression management, self-perception. It is well known that the early Christians were persecuted by the Roman emperors. In the seventeenth century, the early Japanese Christians also suffered much persecution. The administrative power of the times devised a peculiar instrument called fumiye consisted of a wooden or metalic board on which a figure of Jesus Christ or St. Mary was engraved. People had to tread on it to prove they were not Christians. Those who refused to tread on it were regarded as Christians and were sentenced to death. What happened to the people who believed in Christianity but nevertheless trod on the fumiye in public? In some situations, such as the above example, people find themselves having to do or say something publicly which is counter to their private opinion. According to Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, the overt behavior and the private opinion are in a dissonant relationship and therefore produce dissonance. One way of reducing the dissonance is to change the private opinion in the direction of the overt behavior. On the other hand, when people are caused to behave anonymously in a manner counter to their private opinion, they can dissociate themselves from the behavior. Accordingly, they will not experience as much dissonance and will not show opinion change. The first purpose of the present study was to test the hypothesis that individuals who make a public speech in a manner counter to their private opinion experience dissonance and try to reduce the dissonance by changing their private opinion in the direction of the counterattitudinal position while individuals who make an anonymous speech do not experience as much dissonance and do not show opinion change. The additional purpose of the present study was to shed light on the controversy between dissonance theory and" incentive" theory (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Janis & Gilmore, 1965). According to dissonance theory, a negative relationship is expected between inducement and attitude change after a person has per- helpful comments on the earlier manuscript. He also thanks Kazuo Kuno who served as the first experimenter. Appreciation is extended to Mikio Hosokawa and Yasuyuki Suzuki for their help in running the experiment. formed some counterattitudinal behavior. In their well-known forced compliance ex-

2 H. Sakai periment, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) reported a negative relationship between monetary inducement and attitude change. Cohen (1962) replicated the dissonance effect in an essay writing situation. On the other hand, according to incentive theory, a positive relationship is expected between inducement and attitude change. Janis and Gilmore (1965) proposed an incentive theoretical mechanism based on the concept of biased scanning and reported that more attitude change occurred when overt role playing was carried out under favorable sponsorship than under unfavorable sponsorship conditions. Rosenberg (1965) also reported a positive relationship between monetary inducement and attitude change after eliminating the " evaluation apprehension" in the Cohen's (1962) study. Today it is known that the two theories are not mutually exclusive but hold true only under specific conditions. For example, Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmreich (1966) found a negative relationship in a face-to-face role playing condition and a positive relationship in an anonymous essay writing condition. Similarly, Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967) obtained an incentive effect under the no choice condition and a dissonance effect under the choice condition. Holms and Strickland (1970) and Sherman (1970) also obtained similar results using the choice variable. Dissonance researchers have been searching for optimal conditions for dissonance arousal. In addition to the choice variable, such variables as commitment (Frey & Irle, 1972; Harvey & Mills, 1971 ; Helmreich & Collins, 1968), self concept (Nel, Helmreich, & Aronson, 1969), and personal responsibility for negative consequences (Calder, Ross, & Insko, 1973; Collins & Hoyt, 1972; Cooper, 1971; Cooper, Zanna, & Goethals, 1974; Hoyt, Henley, & Collins, 1972; Pallak, Sogin, & Van Zante, 1974; Riess & Schlenker, 1977; Sakai & Andow, 1980; Sogin & Pallak, 1976) have been identified as important factors for dissonance arousal (see Eag]y & Himmelfarb, 1978, Greenwald & Ronis, 1978, and Wicklund & Brehm, 1976, for reviews). In the present experiment, the generality of the Helmreich and Collins (1968) findings was examined. They manipulated a commitment (public-private) variable through an identified video tape recording and an anonymous audio tape recording and obtained a negative relationship between inducement and opinion change in the video tape conditions. As they admitted, the contrast between the anonymous audio tape and the video tape conditions was still so complex that it is desirable to replicate the findings with a methodologically simpler manipulation. Thus, in the present study, it was decided that only an audio tape recorder would be used. In the Public conditions, student subjects were induced to make a counterattitudinal speech in addition to stating their names, affiliated classes, and grades; whereas in the Anonymous conditions, subjects were caused to make a counterattitudinal speech with keeping their names and personal backgrounds secret. In addition to the commitment variable, two levels of inducement were introduced. It was hypothesized, as in the Helmreich and Collins (1968) study, that under the Public conditions the subjects in the Low Inducement cell would be more in agreement with the counterattitudinal position than the subjects in the High Inducement cell. It was also hypothesized that under the Anonymous conditions the subjects in the High Inducement cell would be more in agreement with the counterattitudinal position than the subjects in the Low Inducement cell. Thus, the three hypotheses were tested in the present experiment. Method Subjects. Subjects were 68 male senior high school sophomores aged whc

3 Induced compliance and opinion change were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental or one control conditions. Actually, 70 subjects were run, but two of them, both in the Public/High Inducement condition, were excluded because of their refusal to make the counterattitudinal speech. Procedure. The basic procedure was similar to that used by Helmreich and Collins (1968). On arriving at the experimental room, subjects were met by an experimenter (a male teacher of the subjects' school). Once in the room, the experimenter stated that he was interested in students' attitudes about their parents and various campus topics. He added that there were two questionnaires to be administered. Subjects in the experimental conditions were then given the first questionnaire which assessed attitudes toward their parents. Just after each subject had completed the first questionnaire, a second experimenter knocked on the door and told the first experimenter that he was very busy in preparing materials to be used in the research with freshmen and that he was looking for some sophomores or juniors who could help him. The second experimenter (the present author) disguised himself as an extra member of a certain project team of the school. Noticing the subject, he asked the first experimenter what year the subject was in. Upon learning that he was a sophomore, the second experimenter requested the first experimenter to lend the subject to him for a few minutes. After the first experimenter asked the subject about his willingness, he reluctantly agreed to lend the subject. The second experimenter then took him to a second experimental room which was adjacent to the first one. In the second experimental room, the subject was told that the research was on social influence processes and that a number of communications from upper class students would be presented to freshmen to see how much their opinions could be influenced. The inducement variable was then introduced. The experimenter stated that he would give the subject one pencil (or five pencils) for preparing a communication. Subjects were then told: We would like you to make an audio tape stating these arguments in opposition to coeducation. (Subjects were handed a card on which statements were written.) As you can see, there are four statements on the card and you can add any additional arguments you like. We are interested in the long term effects of the communications on attitudes as well. Therefore, we plan to measure their opinions right after we play the tape and again after three months. Because of this, it is very important that you do not tell anyone, at least for the next three months, what you really think about the issue or why you made the tape, even if someone asks you. The procedure then varied according to the conditions. Subjects in the Public conditions were told, "After stating the arguments, please state your name, class, and grade so that the freshmen can know that the communications are from upper class students. We can never force you, but can you help us out?" Subjects in the Anonymous conditions were told, " You don't need to give your name or anything about your personal background, just give the arguments. The tape will be played after we explain that the communications are from upper class students. We can never force you, but can you help us out?" The statements on the card were:(a) It was the wrong policy for almost all senior high schools to have adopted coeducation after World War II; (b) Because of coeducation, men have become like women; (c) Senior high school students prior to coeducation must have enjoyed their campus life without the distraction of female students; (d) I am quite opposed to the coeducation of this school. After making the recording, the subjects' presentation was played back to

4 H. Sakai them in all experimental conditions. The subject was then thanked, given the promised reward and sent.back to the first experimenter. In the first experimental room, the subject was given the second questionnaire. At this time, the first experimenter did not know which condition the subject was in and asked nothing about the second experimenter's research. The second questionnaire consisted of eight items of current campus topics. Included in the questionnaire was the statement, " The coeducation of this school should be abolished and the school should become a boys' school." It was followed by a 31-point scale, whose end points were labeled "strongly agree" and " strongly disagree." The item served as the major dependent measure. After each subject had completed the questionnaire, the second experimenter knocked on the door again in a hurried manner and said that he was sorry to bother the subject again, but he had forgotten to ask the subject to fill out a short questionnaire. With the permission of the first experimenter, he handed the questionnaire to the subject. The questionnaire consisted of five questions including two open-ended questions. One of the questions was," How valuable do you feel the present study is?" Another question asked how much difficulty the subject had experienced in making the recording. These two questions were answered on 31-point scales. The other question asked whether the subject felt that he could have refused to make the recording or not. The remaining two questions asked the purpose of" the research" and the reasons for difficulty in making the recording. After completing the questionnaire, the subject was queried as to any possible suspicions they might have. No subjects reported any suspicion or insight into the true purpose of the study. The subject was then sworn to secrecy, and dismissed. Debriefing regarding the deception and Table Mean ratings of opinion about abolition of coeducation Note. The higher the number, the more the agreement with abolition of coeducation. Numbers of subjects are indicated in parentheses. purpose of the experiment was carried out in the subjects' dormitory after all data had been collected. Subjects in the Control condition gave no counterattitudinal responses. Their task was to fill out the two questionnaires which the first experimenter administered. Accordingly, the second experimenter did not appear in this condition. I Results Mean ratings of opinions about abolition of coeducation are presented in Table 1. Planned comparisons were performed on the data to assess the specific hypotheses of the experiment. As can be seen in Table 1, the subjects in the Public conditions were significantly more in agreement with abolition of coeducation than the subjects in the Anonymous and Control conditions (t= 2.20, df =63, p<.05). On the other hand, the subjects in the Anonymous conditions did not differ significantly from the subjects in the Control condition (t <1) regarding their opinions about the abolition of coeducation.2 These results seem to support the first hypothesis that individuals who 2 The difference of means between the Public and Control conditions was significant (1=2.38, df=63,p<.05) and the difference between the Public and Anonymous conditions was not significant (t= 1.46). These analyses are, however, statistically redundant since the comparisons are not orthogonal to those in the text.

5 Induced compliance and opinion change make a public speech in a manner counter to their private opinion experience dissonance and try to reduce the dissonance by changing their private opinion in the direction of the counterattitudinal position while individuals who make an anonymous speech do not experience as much dissonance and do not change their private opinion. To test the second and third hypotheses, individual comparisons were performed within the Public and the Anonymous conditions respectively. It was predicted that under the Public conditions the subjects in the Low Inducement cell would be more in agreement with the counterattitudinal position than the subjects in the High Inducement cell. The difference between the two cells, however, did not attain significance (t< 1). It was also predicted that under the Anonymous conditions the subjects in the High Inducement cell would be more in agreement with the counterattitudinal position than the subjects in the Low Inducement cell. The difference between these two cells also did not attain significance (t<1). Thus, the data supported neither the second nor the third hypothesis. Regarding the measures assessing the value of the" present study" and the difficulty in making the speech, there were no significant effects from the independent variables. The grand means were 19.9 and 18.8, respectively. Regarding the measure of decision freedom, there were also no significant differences among the experimental conditions. Thirteen percent of the subjects reported that they could not have refused the request. Fiftynine percent of the subjects answered that they could. The remaining 28% answered" DK." To examine the quality of the counterattitudinal speeches, all speeches were content-analyzed by two independent raters who were blind to the experimental condition. The quality of improvisation was scored on a 4-point scale. The reliability coefficient for these ratings was.93. The analysis of variance on the combined scores indicated a significant main effect for the inducement variable, F(1,42)=4.62, p<.05. The quality of improvisation was higher in the High Inducement conditions (M=4.86) than in the Low Inducement conditions (M=3.42). Discussion The present study revealed that when individuals were induced to make a public speech in a manner counter to their private opinion, they changed their private opinion in the direction of the counterattitudinal position. When individuals were allowed to make an anonymous speech, they did not change their private opinion. These findings can easily be explained in terms of dissonance theory. In the Public conditions subjects probably had to anticipate an attack from the speech listeners. This cognition should have increased the magnitude of dissonance. On the other hand, in the Anonymous conditions subjects could dissociate themselves from the counterattitudinal speech. Accordingly, the cognition about the speech and the cognition about the private opinion should have been successfully compartmentalized in the Anonymous conditions. Kiesler (1971) has suggested that commitment manipulations affect both salience and organization of one's relevant cognitions. In the present study, however, this was not the case since the quality of performance (improvisation) was not affected by the commitment manipulation but affected by the inducement variable. The finding that the quality of improvisation was higher in the High Inducement conditions than in the Low Inducement conditions is consistent with the biased scanning hypothesis of incentive theory (Janis & Gilmore, 1965). However, opinion change was not accompanied by the differential quality of improvisation. Ac-

6 H. Sakai cordingly, the biased scanning notion can not explain the opinion change in the Public conditions. Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1971) have contended that people want to appear consistent in order to enhance their credibility with others and so they report postbehavioral attitudes that will foster such an impression. The impression management theory assumes that an interpersonal concern with presenting a positive identity mediates the verbal responses of subjects and counterattitudinal behavior must be public or else subjects do not show attitude change in the forced compliance situation (Gaes, Kalle, & Tedeschi, 1978). Apparently the opinion change in the Public conditions can be interpreted using the impression management theory. Subjects in the Public conditions may have managed their impressions so as to look consistent with their public counterattitudinal speeches.3 If so, opinion change in the Public conditions should not be "genuine." Gaes et al. (1978) have suggested that no genuine attitude change occurs in the forced compliance paradigm. Whether attitude change in the forced compliance situation is real and genuine or simply an identity protecting tactic used for self-presentation (Schlenker, Forsyth, Leary, & Miller, 1980) should be further explored. Self-perception theory (Bern, 1967, 1972) proposes that individuals observe their own overt behavior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs and then infer their own attitudes and other internal states in much the same way that an external observer would do. If it can be assumed that subjects in the Public conditions perceived the external pressure less, and felt that they had had more freedom to refuse, than subjects in 3 Although all the subjects answered the questionnairs anonymously, it is still probable that they were aware that their answers could be identified since the first experimenter was their teacher. the Anonymous conditions (cf. Kiesler, 1971, p. 168)," opinion change" in the Public conditions can be interpreted in terms of self-perception theory. Subjects in the Public conditions may have simply processed the information about their behavior and the situation in which it occurred. This interpretation, however, has some weakness because the reported decision freedom did not differ significantly among the experimental conditions. Bern and Funder (1978) have suggested that attitude change in the forced compliance paradigm can be explained by any of the dissonance, self-perception, and self-presentation theories, but each theory must be applied to different persons, that is, dissonance reducers, self-perceivers, and self-presenters, respectively. To study the person factors as well as the situation factors may be important in understanding attitude change in the forced compliance paradigm. The failure of the inducement manipulation in producing differential opinion change among the Public and among the Anonymous subjects may be due to the small difference between one pencil and five pencils. Alternatively, it may be due to the lack of contract notion among the subjects. Anyway, the Helmreich and Collins (1968) findings were not replicated in the present experiment. It can be inferred from the results of the present study that the people in the earlier example who believed in Christianity, but nevertheless trod on the fumiye in the public eye, probably gave up their belief in Christianity. The fumiye was first devised to detect Christians among the people. However, that may have been effective as an attitude change technique as well. It would have been political ingenuity if the administrative power of the times had known the two functions of the fumiye without knowing dissonance, self-perception, or self-presentation theory.

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