Motivated Information Processing, Strategic Choice, and the Quality of Negotiated Agreement

Transcription

1 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2006 by the American Psychological Association 2006, Vol. 90, No. 6, /06/$12.00 DOI: / Motivated Information Processing, Strategic Choice, and the Quality of Negotiated Agreement Carsten K. W. De Dreu, Bianca Beersma, and Katherine Stroebe University of Amsterdam Martin C. Euwema Utrecht University The authors tested a motivated information-processing model of negotiation: To reach high joint outcomes, negotiators need a deep understanding of the task, which requires them to exchange information and to process new information systematically. All this depends on social motivation, epistemic motivation (EM), and their interaction. Indeed, when EM (manipulated by holding negotiators process accountability or not) was high rather than low and prosocial rather than proself, negotiators recall more cooperative than competitive tactics (Experiment 1), had more trust, and reached higher joint outcomes (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 showed that under high EM, negotiators who received cooperative, rather than competitive, tactics reached higher joint outcomes because they engaged in more problem solving. Under low EM, negotiators made more concessions and reached low joint outcomes. Implications for negotiation theory and for future work in this area are discussed. Keywords: negotiation, dual process models, motivation, information processing, conflict The myriad agreements underlying close relationships, group decision making, or other forms of collective action often result from some type of negotiation the communication between parties with perceived divergent interests to reach agreement on the distribution of scarce resources, work procedures, the interpretation of facts, or some commonly held opinion or belief (Pruitt, 1998). High-quality agreements that meet both parties needs and integrate both parties aspirations create order and stability, foster social harmony, increase feelings of self-efficacy, reduce the probability of future conflict, and stimulate economic prosperity (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). Poor agreements or failures to agree leave parties dissatisfied, create frustration and annoyance, disrupt social order, and drive conflict and disharmony. Negotiating agreement is cognitively complex and emotionally taxing. To develop agreement, people need to get a good understanding of their own preferences and priorities, to communicate those to their counterpart, and to integrate information about other s preferences and priorities into their own understanding of the problem at hand. They further need to place demands and formulate concessions to foster agreements that meet their own Carsten K. W. De Dreu, Bianca Beersma, and Katherine Stroebe, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Martin C. Euwema, Department of Psychology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, the Netherlands. Katherine Stroebe is now at the Department of Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands. This research was supported by Netherlands Science Foundation Grant NWO P awarded to Carsten K. W. De Dreu. We thank Bernard Nijstad and Gerben Van Kleef for comments on a previous version of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carsten K. W. De Dreu, University of Amsterdam, Department of Psychology, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, the Netherlands. c.k.w.dedreu@uva.nl goals, while avoiding that the counterpart leaves the situation or remains resentful. Given this taxing task, it comes as no surprise that negotiation often ends in impasse, leaving participants empty handed and frustrated or in agreements that are suboptimal by some normative standard (Raiffa, 1982). How individuals negotiate and reach agreement and why negotiation often breaks down or results in suboptimal agreement pose a challenge for social psychological analysis. Traditionally, social psychological studies of negotiation have relied on either dualconcern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) or a behavioral decisionmaking perspective (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Dual-concern theory assumes that the quality of agreement negotiators reach is a function of their social motivation and their resistance to yielding (see, e.g., Druckman, 1994; Kelley, Beckman, & Fischer, 1967). When negotiators consider each other s interest (i.e., have a prosocial motivation) but also have high resistance to yielding, they engage in creative problem solving and achieve integrative agreements. 1 In its original formulation, the behavioral decision-making perspective assumed, in brief, that negotiators are bounded in their rationality, have limited cognitive abilities, and are likely to rely on inadequate cognitive heuristics that prevent them from reaching integrative agreements. Thus, whereas dual-concern theory had much to say about the role of motivation but little about cognition and information processing (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), behavioral decision-making 1 Dual-concern theory is related to the conflict management grid developed by Blake and Mouton (1964) and to the theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949; Tjosvold, 1998). Researchers working within this tradition have variably labeled resistance to yielding concern for self, assertiveness, or competition. Likewise, the prosocial motivation to consider other s interests has been variably labeled altruism, cooperation, or concern for other, However, the specific labels or operationalizations used have no noticeable effects on behavior or outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). 927

2 928 DE DREU, BEERSMA, STROEBE, AND EUWEMA research addressed cognition but was silent about the social context and motivational factors (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Kramer & Messick, 1995; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996). Motivated Information Processing in Negotiation The above lines of inquiry have in recent years somewhat merged, and the distinction between a motivational and a cognitive approach to negotiation is not as strong as it was a few decades ago (for discussions, see, e.g., O Connor, 1997; L. L. Thompson, Neale, & Sinaceur, 2004). As a case in point, De Dreu and Carnevale (2003) developed a motivated information-processing model of negotiation. It proposes that high-quality agreements that integrate both parties interests and perspectives as much as possible require the cooperative exchange of accurate information, the deliberate and systematic processing of information that is or becomes available during negotiation, the willingness to learn and to adapt preexisting but incomplete cognitive understanding of the task, and the willingness to make trade-offs between unimportant and important issues. The model further proposes that these cognitive and behavioral processes are driven by the interaction between social motivation and epistemic motivation. Social motivation is defined as the preference for a particular distribution of outcomes between oneself and the counterpart (McClintock, 1977). Epistemic motivation is defined as the desire to develop and hold a rich and accurate understanding of the world, including the negotiation problem at hand (Kruglanski, 1989). Whereas past research has examined the effects of social motivation and of epistemic motivation, no studies have examined how social and epistemic motivation interact to predict information processing, strategic choice, and agreement. This is unfortunate because the motivated information-processing model assumes that both classes of motivation are needed to understand conflict and negotiation. It is unsettling because competing sets of hypotheses can be developed. We cite evidence from social cognition research suggesting that high levels of epistemic motivation lead to an evenhanded consideration of new information and thereby reduce the impact of social motivation on information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of agreement. However, there are also good arguments to predict that high levels of epistemic motivation will amplify (rather than mitigate) the effects of social motivation on information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of agreement. In the next two sections, we briefly review past negotiation research on social motivation and on epistemic motivation. We then discuss possible interactions between social and epistemic motivation, advancing two competing sets of hypotheses. These hypotheses were pitted against each other in three experiments. Social Motivation in Negotiation Although a variety of social motives can be distinguished, including altruistic, competitive, individualistic, and cooperative motives (McClintock, 1977), many studies on social dilemmas, conflict, and negotiation have relied on the more global distinction between proself and prosocial motivation (e.g., Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Lange, 1999; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Proself motivation comprises both competitive and purely individualistic goals, and prosocial motivation comprises both cooperative and purely altruistic goals. Individuals with a proself motivation desire to maximize their own outcomes, and they have no (or negative) regard for the outcomes obtained by their opposing negotiator. Individuals with a prosocial motive desire a fair distribution that maximizes both own and other s outcomes, and they have a positive regard for the outcomes obtained by their opposing negotiator. Social motivation (also known as motivational orientation ; Rubin & Brown, 1975) may be rooted in individual differences like social value orientation, cultural differences in collectivist or individualistic values, and personality traits like agreeableness. Individuals with a prosocial value orientation, a collectivist background, or high agreeableness all tend to have a stronger prosocial motivation than individuals with a proself value orientation, an individualist background, or low agreeableness (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; see also Barry & Friedman, 1998; Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 1996; Hulbert, Correa da Silva, & Adegboyega, 2001; Van Lange, 1999). Individual differences may, however, be overruled by features of the situation (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). Individuals adopt a prosocial, rather than proself, motivation when their counterpart is referred to as partner rather than opponent (Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000); when they are told that payment depends on how well they do as a dyad rather than as a person (Weingart et al., 1993); when they anticipate future interaction with their opponent (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984); when shared, rather than different, group membership is emphasized (Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993); or when their counterpart is a friend rather than stranger (Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1984). Social motivation affects the processing of information. Individuals with a prosocial value orientation recall better possibilities for joint gain from prisoner dilemma type of games, whereas individuals with a proself value orientation recall better possibilities for own or relative gain (Camac, 1992). Likewise, prosocial negotiators recall more cooperative and less competitive tactics presented to them earlier, whereas proself negotiators do the reverse (De Dreu & Boles, 1998). Van Kleef and De Dreu (2002) studied the questions negotiators ask their counterpart and found that individuals asked about competition when the other was believed to be competitive and asked about cooperation when the other was believed to be cooperative. It is important to note that when other s goals were unknown, individuals relied on their own value orientation proself negotiators asked about competition, and prosocial negotiators asked about cooperation. A number of studies examined the effects of social motivation on strategic choice and negotiated agreement. A meta-analysis of this work showed that negotiators were less contentious, engaged in more problem solving, and achieved higher joint outcomes when they had a prosocial motivation rather than proself motivation, but only when resistance to yielding was high (cf. dualconcern theory). When resistance to yielding was low, prosocial and proself negotiators did not differ, and in some studies prosocial negotiators even achieved lower joint outcomes than proself negotiators (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). When resistance to yielding is low, prosocial negotiators may engage in more concession making and are more likely to settle for simple, fifty fifty compromises than proself negotiators (e.g., O Connor & Carnevale, 1997; see also Weingart et al., 1996).

3 MOTIVATED INFORMATION PROCESSING AND NEGOTIATION 929 Taken together, the work on social motivation suggests that individuals with a prosocial motivation consider cooperative information, that is, information about cooperative tactics, about the effectiveness of cooperative tactics, and about the counterpart s trustworthiness. In contrast, individuals with a proself motivation consider competitive information, that is, information about competitive tactics, about the effectiveness of competitive tactics, and about the counterpart s lack of trustworthiness. When resistance to yielding is not explicitly high, this cooperative versus competitive bias sometimes translates into high versus low levels of problem-solving and integrative agreement, and sometimes into high versus low levels of concession making and mediocre compromises. Below, we argue that in these situations, epistemic motivation determines whether prosocial negotiators engage in mindless concession making or instead in effortful problemsolving behavior. First, however, we introduce the concept of epistemic motivation and the relevant research literatures. Epistemic Motivation in Negotiation No evidence has been reported that social motivation affects the amount or intensity of information processing. Prosocial individuals compared with proself individuals did not display an overall better recall of payoffs from the prisoner s dilemma game (Camac, 1992), a greater total recall of negotiation tactics (De Dreu & Boles, 1998), or a stronger tendency to search for information by asking more questions (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002). As such, the concept of social motivation fails to explain why individuals sometimes engage in shallow processing of information, relying on cognitive shortcuts and suboptimal reasoning (e.g., Bazerman & Neale, 1983), whereas at other times, they appear to be immune to heuristic cues (De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999), engage in systematic processing of information (L. L. Thompson, 1995), and reach a deep and accurate understanding of the negotiation problem and their counterpart (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). The motivated information-processing model assumes that the tendency to engage in shallow or deep processing of information depends on the negotiator s epistemic motivation the desire to develop and hold accurate and well-informed conclusions about the world. Consistent with dual-process models of human thinking (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999), it is assumed that at low levels of epistemic motivation, individuals solve logical problems, evaluate persuasive arguments, and form impressions of their counterpart through a quick, effortless, and heuristic processing of information that rests on well-learned prior associations. At higher levels of epistemic motivation, individuals engage in more effortful, deliberate, and systematic processing that involves rule-based inferences (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). Epistemic motivation derives from individual differences in (lack of) need for cognitive closure, which is central to layepistemic theory developed by Kruglanski and associates (e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Epistemic motivation can also be rooted in individual differences in need for cognition, which is central to the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). However, as is clearly recognized in these models as well, epistemic motivation can be influenced by the situation. Time pressure, noise, and fatigue have all been shown to reduce epistemic motivation and to increase the need for cognitive closure (for a review, see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Further, the situation may raise epistemic motivation. A good example is the presence or absence of process accountability, under which individuals expect to be observed and evaluated by others with unknown views about the process of judgment and decision making (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Simonson and Staw (1992) argued that individuals under process accountability tend to engage in preemptive self-criticism, leading to a more evenhanded evaluation of decision alternatives and reduced need for self-justification. Lerner and Tetlock (1999) concluded that Accountability attenuated bias on tasks to the extent that (a) suboptimal performance resulted from lack of self-critical attention to the judgmental process and (b) improvement required no special training in formal decision rules, only greater attention to the information provided. (p. 263) Several studies examined the influence of epistemic motivation on cognitive and behavioral processes in negotiation. Individuals with low epistemic motivation are more likely to base their concession making on heuristic cues including irrelevant anchor information or stereotypic cues about their opponent (De Dreu et al., 1999). Negotiators also pay less attention to, and are less influenced by, their counterparts emotional expressions when they have low, rather than high, epistemic motivation (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). De Grada, Kruglanski, Pierro, and Mannetti (1999) showed that small groups composed of individuals with high need for closure were more task oriented, were more tolerant of authoritarian leadership, and were less egalitarian in their decision making. Other studies showed that individuals under process accountability revise inaccurate preexisting cognitive structures to a greater extent during negotiation, and they do so because of more intense processing of information that becomes available during negotiation (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000). Vice versa, individuals under time pressure are less likely to revise inaccurate preexisting cognitive structures during negotiation and consequently reach agreements of lower quality (De Dreu, 2003). Joint Influence of Social and Epistemic Motivation From the work on social motivation, it follows that prosocial individuals tend to consider cooperative information more, whereas proself individuals consider competitive information more. This work also suggests that social motivation has little influence on how deeply and systematically information is processed and that, in and by itself, social motivation has little impact on the quality of negotiated agreement. From the work on epistemic motivation, it follows that epistemic motivation drives the amount and depth of information processing before and during negotiation, such that individuals with high epistemic motivation engage in more deliberate and deep processing of information, are less influenced by heuristic cues, and develop a more accurate understanding of the negotiation problem. It is interesting to note that there is no evidence that epistemic motivation makes negotiators more cooperative or competitive in their strategic choices. In short, social motivation seems to drive individuals to consider goal-consistent information more than goal-inconsistent information, and epistemic motivation seems to drive individuals to consider whatever information in a deep and systematic fashion.

4 930 DE DREU, BEERSMA, STROEBE, AND EUWEMA To say that social and epistemic motivation have qualitatively different effects on information processing is not to say that the two have independent effects on strategic choice and the quality of agreement. High levels of epistemic motivation may lead people to engage in a more evenhanded consideration of the available information, thus considering both cooperative and competitive pieces of information. Research on impression formation, for example, showed that people consider both category and attribute information provided to them more when epistemic motivation was high rather than low (e.g., Hattrup & Ford, 1995; Pendry & Macrae, 1994; E. P. Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994; for discussions, see Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman, 1999; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). These findings imply that the tendency for prosocial negotiators to consider cooperative information more than competitive information is stronger under low, rather than high, epistemic motivation. Similarly, negotiators with low, rather than high, epistemic motivation will be more likely to perceive each other as cooperative, to trust each other, and to exchange the information needed to reach integrative agreements. Likewise, these research findings suggest that the tendency for proself negotiators to consider competitive information more than cooperative information, to opt for contentious tactics more, and to fail to reach integrative agreements is stronger under low, rather than high, levels of epistemic motivation. In their motivated information-processing model, De Dreu and Carnevale (2003) reasoned differently. In conflict and negotiation, participants often lack important information about the task and about their counterpart, and through a motivated search for information and provision of information, new pieces of information become available on an almost continuous basis. On the basis of the research evidence discussed above, these authors presumed that social motivation drives the kind of information (i.e., either cooperative or competitive) that negotiators seek, provide, and consider. Epistemic motivation, they further argued, only determines the extent to which this cooperative or competitive information is being processed and thus the extent to which this information impacts strategic choice and the quality of agreement. This implies that when epistemic motivation is low, prosocial negotiators engage in more effortless concession making than proself negotiators. When epistemic motivation is high, prosocial negotiators develop more trust, engage in more effortful problem solving, and reach higher quality agreements than proself negotiators. Thus, in contrast to the reasoning provided earlier, the motivated information-processing model of negotiation holds that epistemic motivation permits (rather than prohibits) effects of social motivation on information processing, strategic choice, and joint outcomes. Together, these facts lead us to expect social motivation to impact the exchange and processing of cooperative (vs. competitive) information and, therefore, to influence perceived cooperativeness of the other party and the trust placed in him or her. However, the impact of social motivation will be contingent upon epistemic motivation. On the basis of social cognition research, one could forward an attenuation hypothesis : The extent to which social motivation impacts information processing and joint outcomes is reduced by epistemic motivation because epistemic motivation reduces the processing bias induced by social motivation. Alternatively, on the basis of the motivated informationprocessing model, one could forward an amplifying bias hypothesis : When epistemic motivation is low, prosocial negotiators engage in superficial information processing and thus more often make mindless concessions than proself negotiators. When epistemic motivation is high, prosocial negotiators engage in deep information processing, develop high levels of trust, engage in more effortful problem solving, and reach high joint outcomes. To examine which reasoning holds, we conducted three experiments. In the first experiment, we considered the joint impact of social and epistemic motivation on cognitive processes. In the second and third experiments, we examined the joint impact of these distinct classes of motivation on perceived cooperativeness and trust, strategic choices, and the quality of agreement (i.e., joint outcomes). Experiment 1 To examine the joint influence of social and epistemic motivation on cognitive processes, we used the recall methodology of De Dreu and Boles (1998). Participants read the instructions for an upcoming negotiation, social and epistemic motivation were manipulated, and participants were presented with a list of competitive and cooperative tactics. At a later point, they were asked to recall as many tactics as possible. Recall is widely used as a measure of the depth and direction of information processing (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). As mentioned, two possible hypotheses exist with regard to the impact of epistemic motivation. On the one hand, it could be argued that epistemic motivation mitigates the tendencies set forth by social motivation social motivation determines the type of tactics negotiators consider, but only when epistemic motivation is low. When epistemic motivation is high, prosocial and proself negotiators engage in more balanced and evenhanded consideration of cooperative and competitive tactics. On the other hand, it could be argued that epistemic motivation amplifies the tendencies set forth by social motivation social motivation determines the type of tactics negotiators consider, but only when epistemic motivation is high and information attended to is systematically processed. When epistemic motivation is low, the bias set forth by social motivation is weak and no or small effects on recall should be expected. Method Design and participants. The design of Experiment 1 was a 2 2 factorial, with social motivation (prosocial vs. proself) and process accountability (absent vs. present) as independent variables. The dependent variable was the amount of recall of cooperative and competitive tactics. Forty-one undergraduate students at the University of Amsterdam participated in the experiment. Participants were allocated at random to experimental conditions (n 10 11, per condition), and they received 5 euros ($6.00 USD) for participation. Procedure and independent variables. Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were placed in individual cubicles preventing them from seeing or communicating with other participants. Each participant received a folder containing the instructions for a negotiation in which they would take part. The instructions described an upcoming negotiation modeled after those used in past research (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Participants were told they were to assume the role of a bartender who would negotiate with a colleague about the work schedules for the next 2 months. The issues to be negotiated included (a) the amount of hours each would tend bar instead of waiting tables, (b) the distribution rules for tips, (c) the

5 MOTIVATED INFORMATION PROCESSING AND NEGOTIATION 931 evenings they would work, and (d) how often each would clean up. The following two pages of the materials described a scoring system indicating the number of points that could be obtained for various options within each of the four issues (participants saw only their own payoff table and were not shown the payoffs to their counterpart). We return to this part of the instructions when we describe the methods of Experiment 2. Participants read that they could earn a maximum of 500 points and that not reaching an agreement would result in 0 points. To motivate participants to take the negotiation seriously, we told them that at the end of the study, points earned would be converted into lottery tickets, so that more points would result in more lottery tickets. The tickets would go into a draft, and three winners would receive an extra payment of 50 euros ($60.04 USD). Social motivation was manipulated through instructions. At the end of the instructions, we summarized the main points of the procedure. In this summary, we included a statement indicating in the prosocial-motivation condition: For success in the negotiation, think of the other as your partner, whose interests are important to you. In the proself-motivation condition this statement indicated: For success in the negotiation, think of the other as your opponent, whose interests are not important to you. Past research in our laboratory, and in others, has shown that this is an effective manipulation of social motivation that produces effects highly similar to those of other operationalizations of this construct (Burnham et al., 2000; Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 2000). Epistemic motivation was induced by varying the presence or absence of process accountability and was modeled after the manipulation used by De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel (2000). Participants in the process accountability condition received a special memo explaining that after the study, questions would be asked by an experienced negotiator and a psychologist interested in the ways you negotiated, the decisions you made, the procedures you followed, and why you pursued or dropped particular strategies. They were further told that they should prepare themselves as well as possible and were allowed to take notes during the negotiation. To further increase the credibility of the manipulation, we also included a time sheet on which participants were to circle the times and dates they could attend the interview session. Participants in the no-accountability condition did not receive these instructions. They were told only that they could take notes during the negotiation. It may be that the order in which social motivation and epistemic motivation are manipulated influences whether epistemic motivation mitigates or, instead, amplifies the effect of social motivation. As a precaution, order was varied systematically (i.e., social motivation was induced on the penultimate page of the instructions, and epistemic motivation on the final page, or vice versa). This variation had no effects whatsoever (all Fs 1.00), indicating that the specific order in which motivations were manipulated did not favor one hypothesis over the other. We excluded this factor from the analyses, but return to it in the Conclusions and General Discussion sections. When participants had read these instructions, the experimenter entered their cubicle and gave the participant a sheet labeled negotiation tactics. The experimenter asked the participant to take a look at the sheet and then left. Participants read the following: Because many of you have few experiences with negotiation, it may be useful to see some tactics and strategies that are commonly used in negotiation. The list contained 8 competitive tactics and strategies and 8 cooperative tactics and strategies. The list is given in Table 1 (in the experiment, tactics were randomly ordered). These materials were developed and used by De Dreu and Boles (1998), who provided pilot test data showing that the tactics differed in perceived cooperativeness competitiveness as intended. After exactly 3 min the experimenter returned and collected all materials. The experimenter told the participant that a little bit more time was needed to set up the laboratory for the actual negotiation. He asked whether the participant would mind helping a colleague by filling out some test materials that were unrelated to the negotiation experiment (all participants agreed). The experimenter handed out the materials, to return after 10 min. Table 1 Cooperative and Competitive Tactics Presented in Experiment 1 Cooperative tactics Share and share alike Lying never pays Equal split is fair Always give others the benefit of the doubt Take a problem solving approach Do unto others as you would have them do unto you Play fair Be willing to compromise Competitive tactics Never trust your opponent Your loss is my gain The best defense is a good offense First come, first served Never lay all your cards on the table Never make the first offer An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth Winner takes all Note. Tactics were adapted from De Dreu and Boles (1998) and presented in random order. At that point, he informed participants that the lab was ready now and that before proceeding, he would like to give them an opportunity to prepare. To facilitate further preparation, the experimenter gave participants a blank sheet of paper and asked them to write down as many of the negotiation tactics as they could remember. After 5 min, the experimenter collected the recall measure and gave participants a short questionnaire (this was used to check the adequacy of the manipulations; see the Results and Discussion section below). Hereinafter, he informed participants that the experiment was over and that no real negotiation would take place. He fully debriefed participants about the goals of the study and told them that each participant would have an equal chance in the lottery (to make up for the fact that no points and lottery tickets could be earned through negotiation). Then, participants were thanked for participation and paid. Dependent variables. Individual recall was coded into one of five categories independently by two coders, who were unaware of the goals and design of the study. The categories were: (a) true cooperative tactic, when a recalled item matched one of the cooperative tactics in the list; (b) true competitive tactic, when a recalled item matched one of the competitive tactics in the list; (c) false memory cooperative tactic, when a recalled item did not match one of the cooperative tactics in the list but was coded as cooperative; (d) false memory competitive tactic, when a recalled item did not match one of the competitive tactics in the list but was coded as competitive; and (e) other, when an item could not be coded as cooperative or competitive. Intercoder reliability was good (Cohen s Ks.80), and discrepancies were solved through discussion. Results and Discussion Two participants in two different process-accountability conditions did not recall anything and were excluded from the analyses. Results are based on the remaining 39 participants (including these 2 participants did not change the results or the conclusions). Manipulation checks. Immediately after the recall materials were collected, participants responded to four items intended to check the adequacy of the manipulation of social motivation. Participants were asked whether they would, in the negotiation, (a) try to do better than their counterpart (reverse scored), (b) try to get a fair agreement, (c) try to get good outcomes for themselves as well as the other, and (d) try to be competitive (reverse scored; all

6 932 DE DREU, BEERSMA, STROEBE, AND EUWEMA items: 1 not at all to 5 very much). These items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach s.79), and a 2 2 (Social Motivation Process Accountability) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the aggregated scores revealed a main effect only for social motivation: Participants in the prosocial-motivation conditions reported higher prosocial motivation than participants in the proselfmotivation conditions (M 3.86 vs. M 2.03), F(1, 35) 14.87, p.001, To check the adequacy of the manipulation of epistemic motivation, we asked participants whether their decisions and judgments would be subject to an interview after the study was over (1 yes, 2 no). In the no-accountability condition, all participants correctly stated that they would not be interviewed. In the process-accountability condition, all participants correctly stated that they would be interviewed. In addition, we asked participants about their motivation to process information systematically. Two items, adapted from De Dreu et al. (1999), were used: In the upcoming negotiation, (a) I will try to make judgments and decisions as thoroughly as possible (5 absolutely agree to 1 absolutely disagree) and (b) I will think deeply before making a decision (5 all the time to 1 hardly at all). Ratings were averaged into one index (r.81), and a 2 2 (Social Motivation Process Accountability) ANOVA on the aggregated scores showed that participants in the process-accountability conditions reported a higher information-processing motivation than did participants in the no-accountability conditions (M 3.23 vs. M 2.57), F(1, 35) 3.99, p.05, No other effects were significant. Recall. Individuals generated a mean recall of 5.67 items, of which 4.43 could be classified as true and the remainder as false. All subsequent analyses included both true and false hits excluding false hits did not change the results. It should be noted that the relatively low overall number of items recalled is consistent with past work in this area (De Dreu & Boles, 1998) and is probably related to the fact that (a) participants were not forewarned about the recall task, (b) the time span between reading the tactics and the recall task was rather long, and (c) participants were given only a short time to study the list of tactics (i.e., 3 min). To examine differences in total recall, we conducted a 2 2 ANOVA, with social motivation and process accountability as the independent variables and total recall as the dependent measure, which showed that individuals under process accountability recalled more tactics than did individuals in the no-accountability conditions (M 6.55 vs. M 4.91), F(1, 35) 6.19, p.018, This finding supports the idea that process accountability increases epistemic motivation and the tendency to engage in systematic processing of information. The absence of any effects involving social motivation is consistent with previous findings that social motivation does not influence the depth of information processing. To account for differences in total recall, we conducted all subsequent analyses on the ratio of cooperative (competitive) items recalled and the individual s total recall (including false hits). We submitted these indices of cooperative and competitive recall to a (Social Motivation Process Accountability Type of Tactic) ANOVA, with the last variable as a withinparticipant factor. Consistent with past work (De Dreu & Boles, 1998; see also De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003), prosocial negotiators recalled more cooperative than competitive tactics (M.38 vs. M.34), whereas proself negotiators recalled more competitive than cooperative tactics (M.42 vs. M.36). These effects became significant, however, only when process accountability was added to the model. That is, results revealed the expected three-way interaction among social motivation, process accountability, and type of tactic, F(1, 35) 5.70, p.025, Decomposing this complex interaction through simple effects analyses revealed that in the no-accountability conditions, effects of social motivation, type of tactic, or their interaction were not significant (all Fs 1.00). In the process-accountability condition, however, only the interaction between social motivation and type of tactic was significant, F(1, 35) 6.38, p.025, Cell means and standard deviations are shown in Table 2. In the process-accountability condition, but not in the no-accountability condition, prosocial individuals recalled more cooperative than competitive tactics, whereas proself individuals recalled more competitive than cooperative tactics. This pattern is inconsistent with the idea that epistemic motivation mitigates the effects of social motivation on cognitive processing of information. Instead, and consistent with the motivated information-processing model, it appears that epistemic motivation amplifies the effects of social motivation on cognitive processes in negotiation: Social motivation drives individuals toward goal-consistent pieces of information and affects recall especially when epistemic motivation is high. It should be noted that past work (Camac, 1992; De Dreu & Boles, 1998; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002) found effects of social motivation on information processing in the absence of process accountability (i.e., when epistemic motivation was low or not determined). In this experiment, we found significant effects only when participants were under process accountability and not when process accountability was absent. 2 Perhaps when epistemic motivation is low, social motivation sometimes has a significant effect and sometimes has no significant effect. Alternatively, the difference in results may be related to the fact that past work considered individual differences in social motivation (social value orientation) whereas the present experiment was about manipulated motivation. Social value orientation may be correlated with individual differences in epistemic motivation (De Dreu et al., 1999), and this may explain why past work did, and the current experiment did not, find differences in recall between prosocial and proself negotiators even when process accountability was absent. Regardless of the precise reason for the slight discrepancy between prior work and the current results in the no-accountability condition, Experiment 1 did show that epistemic motivation amplifies, rather than mitigates, effects of social motivation. This is important first evidence for the motivated information-processing model, and it serves as a foundation for Experiments 2 and 3, in 2 This is not true when we analyzed observed true recall. For observed recall, we found, in addition to the predicted three-way interaction, F(1, 35) 5.07, p.031, a two-way interaction between social motivation and type of tactic recalled, F(1, 35) 6.73, p.015: Regardless of the presence or absence of process accountability, prosocial negotiators recalled more cooperative than competitive tactics (M 2.31 vs. M 1.94), whereas proself negotiators recalled more competitive than cooperative tactics (M 2.78 vs. M 1.85).

7 MOTIVATED INFORMATION PROCESSING AND NEGOTIATION 933 Table 2 Recall of Cooperative and Competitive Tactics as a Function of Social Motivation and Process Accountability (PA; Experiment 1) Tactic which we examined implications for strategic choice and outcomes. Experiment 2 The results of Experiment 1 cast doubt on the validity of the attenuated bias hypothesis and favor the amplified bias hypothesis. According to the latter hypothesis, the higher level of cooperative exchange under prosocial motivation would be thoroughly processed when epistemic motivation is high rather than low (cf. Experiment 1). Prosocial motivation would thus lead to greater perceived cooperativeness when epistemic motivation is high rather than low. Perceived cooperativeness is strongly related to interpersonal trust the belief that the other party will not hurt participant s interests (for discussions on trust, see Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) and leads to the problem-solving activity needed to find creative, integrative agreements (Giebels et al., 2000; Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar- Golband, & Carnevale, 1980; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Weingart et al., 1993). Thus, when epistemic motivation is high, prosocial negotiators perceive each other as cooperative, trust each other, and reach more integrative agreements than proself negotiators. When epistemic motivation is low, negotiators pay less attention to the new information that becomes available and do not incorporate it into their understanding of the negotiation task. Thus, when epistemic motivation is low, no effects of social motivation on perceived cooperativeness and joint outcome are to be expected. Method Prosocial (n 11) PA absent Proself (n 10) Prosocial (n 9) PA present Proself (n 9) Cooperative M.33 a,b.39 a,b.44 a.29 b SD Competitive M.39 a,b.36 a,b.32 b.51 a SD Note. Numbers refer to proportions. Means not sharing a similar subscript differ per row or per column at p.05, according to betweenparticipants and within-participant t tests, respectively. Design and participants. The design of the experiment was a 2 2 factorial, with social motivation (prosocial vs. proself) and process accountability (absent vs. present) as between-dyads factors. Main dependent variables were perception of cooperativeness, interpersonal trust, and joint outcomes. Two hundred twenty-two undergraduate students at Utrecht University participated in the experiment as part of a course requirement. Participants were assigned to dyads on a random basis, with the only restriction that they were not acquainted. Dyads were assigned to experimental conditions on a random basis. The experiment was conducted by one male and one female experimenter. Exploratory analyses revealed no effects for experimenter or for sex composition of the dyad. These factors are not discussed further. Task and procedure. The instructions, the task, and the manipulation of process accountability were the same as in Experiment 1. Social motivation was manipulated throughout the instructions. In the prosocial motive conditions, we consistently referred to the other party as your partner. In the proself-motivation condition, we consistently referred to the other party as your opponent (for similar procedures, see, e.g., Burnham et al., 2000; Giebels et al., 2000). As in Experiment 1, the instructions described a scoring system indicating the number of points that could be obtained for various options within each of the four issues (participants saw only their own payoff table and were not shown the payoffs to their counterpart). Issue charts are given in Table 3. As can be seen, each bartender can reach an outcome between 0 (in case of no agreement or total victory to the other) and 500 (in case of a total defeat of the other). As can be also seen, some issues are more important (i.e., provide more points) than others, and rank order in terms of importance differs within dyads. That is, bartending is most important to both Bartender A and Bartender B, but whereas the distribution of tips is second most important to Bartender A, it is least important to Bartender B. Vice versa, which evenings to work is second most important to Bartender B but least important to Bartender A. Thus, negotiators would earn higher joint outcomes when Bartender A gets his or her way on the distribution of tips and Bartender B gets his or her way on which evenings they work (joint outcome: [ ] [ ] 600), compared with an agreement that simply splits the difference on all four issues (joint outcome: [ ] [ ] 540) or grants a total victory to one (joint outcome: [ ] [ ] 500). Because individuals did not receive their counterpart s issue chart and were told not to exchange these issue charts during the negotiation, they were unaware of the integrative potential in the task, and through negotiation and the exchange of information, they had to uncover possibilities for trade-off and high-joint gain. After participants had read their role instructions, they were quizzed about their understanding of the negotiation task. In contrast to Experiment 1, they did not receive a list of tactics but instead started the negotiation. Table 3 Issue Charts for Bartender A and Bartender B Bartending vs. waiting tables Distribution of tips in pot Bartender A Evenings to work together Times you clean 6 hr (180) 100% (50) Monday (150) 0 (120) 5 hr (150) 80% (40) Tuesday (120) 1 (100) 4 hr (120) 60% (30) Wednesday (90) 2 (80) 3 hr (90) 40% (20) Thursday (60) 3 (60) 2 hr (60) 20% (10) Friday (30) 4 (40) 1 hr (30) 0% (0) Saturday (0) 5 (20) 0 hr (0) 6 (0) Bartender B 6 hr (0) 100% (0) Monday (0) 0 (0) 5 hr (30) 80% (30) Tuesday (10) 1 (20) 4 hr (60) 60% (60) Wednesday (20) 2 (40) 3 hr (90) 40% (90) Thursday (30) 3 (60) 2 hr (120) 20% (120) Friday (40) 4 (80) 1 hr (150) 0% (150) Saturday (50) 5 (100) 0 hr (180) 6 (120) Note. Participants were shown only their own issue chart and were not allowed to show their issue chart to their counterpart. Numbers in parentheses refer to points earned by the participant.

8 934 DE DREU, BEERSMA, STROEBE, AND EUWEMA Dyads were given 20 min to discuss their case and to reach an agreement (it was emphasized once again that not reaching an agreement would result in 0 points and, thus, no chance on additional cash). Participants were given a 1-min warning before the negotiation time was over. After 20 min of negotiation, or before, if dyads reached an agreement earlier, the experimenter collected the materials and gave each participant a postnegotiation questionnaire to be filled out individually and without consulting the counterpart. Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants were fully debriefed, thanked for their participation, and dismissed. Dependent variables. In the postnegotiation questionnaire, we assessed perceptions of the counterpart, interpersonal trust, and the adequacy of the manipulations of social motivation and process accountability. Perception of cooperativeness was measured with three semantic differentials: I see the other as... very competitive (1) to very cooperative (5) as very hostile (1) to very friendly (5), and as very immoral (1) to very moral (5). Interpersonal trust was assessed with three items: In the negotiation, (a) the other party could not be trusted at all (1) to be trusted very well (5) ; (b) we were dishonest (1) to honest (5); and (c) the atmosphere was very tense (1) to very relaxed (5). Although initially constructed as two distinct but related variables, the items for perceived cooperativeness and for trust loaded all on one factor (eigenvalue 4.53, explained variance 75%). Consistent with previous research (e.g., Butler, 1995; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; see also Mayer et al., 1995), trust and cooperativeness were thus strongly correlated. We therefore combined items into one scale, henceforth referred to as perceived cooperativeness trust (Cronbach s.79). The questionnaire concluded with several items assessing the adequacy of the experimental manipulations. The manipulation of social motivation was checked by asking participants whether they were considering their own interests only (1) to considering own and other s interests equally (5) and whether they saw their counterpart as opponent (1) to partner (5). Ratings were correlated (r.67) and averaged into one index. The manipulation of process accountability was checked by asking participants whether there would be an interview about the process of negotiation (1 no, 2 yes). In addition, we checked the manipulation by asking: During the negotiation, (a) I thought deeply before making a decision, (b) I reflected on why things happened the way they did, and (c) I tried hard to make balanced judgments and decisions (1 hardly ever to 5 almost always). We assessed the joint outcome dyads obtained by summing the points obtained by Bartender A and Bartender B. Results Treatment of the data. Occasional missing values on the questionnaire items were replaced by the mean for that item based on all participants answering the item (alternative substitution procedures did not change the results). Because perceptual and motivational measures were assessed after interaction took place and referred to a jointly experienced situation, data within dyads might be interdependent. To verify this possibility, we calculated intraclass correlation coefficients and eta-squared statistics. Data were interdependent at the dyadic level (all r wg.68 and all 2.35; Kenny, Kasher, & Bolger, 1998). Following the advice offered by Kenny et al. (1998), we aggregated ratings at the dyadic level for further analyses. Manipulation checks. Ratings on the check of the social motivation manipulation were submitted to a 2 2 (Social Motivation Process Accountability) ANOVA. Results showed a main effect of social motivation only: Participants were more inclined to consider own and other s interests in the prosocial-motivation conditions (M 4.01) than in the proself-motivation conditions (M 2.52), F(1, 107) 30.32, p.001, Most participants (n 108, 97.5%) in the process-accountability conditions answered correctly that there would be an interview, and all participants (100%) in the no-accountability conditions answered correctly that there would be no interview. This indicates that instructions regarding process accountability were well understood. We also analyzed the ratings for motivation to process information systematically in a 2 2 (Social Motivation Process Accountability) ANOVA. Results showed a main effect for process accountability only: Participants reported greater motivation to process information systematically in the process-accountability conditions (M 3.60) than in the no-accountability conditions (M 3.37), F(1, 107) 3.86, p.05, Joint outcomes. Joint outcomes were analyzed in a 2 2 ANOVA. Results showed that prosocial negotiators reached higher joint outcomes than proself negotiators (M 569 vs. M 547), F(1, 107) 8.01, p.01, Results further showed that negotiators under process accountability achieved higher joint outcomes than did negotiators in the no-accountability conditions (M 566 vs. M 550), F(1, 107) 4.44, p.05, As predicted, both main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between social motivation and process accountability, F(1, 107) 3.89, p.05, Cell means and standard deviations are shown in the top row of Table 4. Simple effects analysis revealed that the effect of social motivation was significant under process accountability, F(1, 108) 11.55, p.005, 2.22, but not in the no-accountability condition, F(1, 108) 1, ns, Perceived cooperativeness trust. The second row of Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations for perceived cooperativeness trust as a function of social motivation and process accountability. A 2 2 (Social Motivation Process Accountability) ANOVA revealed a main effect for social motivation, F(1, 107) 17.42, p.001, 2.15, and the predicted interaction between social motivation and process accountability, F(1, 107) 5.43, p.025, Simple effects analysis revealed that the counterpart was perceived as more cooperative in the prosocial-motivation condition than in the proself-motivation condition when negotiators were under process accountability, F(1, 108) , p.001, 2.29, but not when negotiators were not held accountable, F(1, 108) 2.72, p.12, Test for mediation. According to the motivated informationprocessing model, social motivation drives negotiators to consider goal-consistent information more than goal-inconsistent information, and epistemic motivation determines the extent to which this information is processed and affects social perceptions and joint outcome. Consistent with this position, we saw that social and epistemic motivation interact to predict perceived cooperativeness trust and joint outcome. The further implication is that the interaction effect of social and epistemic 3 Although the motivated information-processing model is primarily concerned with joint outcomes and integrative agreements, one could argue that because proself negotiators seek good personal outcomes, focusing exclusively on joint outcomes ignores the goals of proself negotiators. We therefore analyzed individual outcomes within dyads as well. Results showed no effects of process accountability, social motivation, or their interaction on individual outcomes or the difference in individual outcomes within dyads (all Fs 1.00).