Critical Flight into Emotional Terrain

Transcription

1 Critical Flight into Emotional Terrain by Douglas A. Drury Centre for Sleep Research, University of South Australia, GPO Box 2471, Adelaide, South Australia 5001, Australia A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Psychology Division of Education, Arts and Social Sciences University of South Australia Submitted 2013

2 Table of Contents Table of Contents... ii List of Tables... v List of Figures... vi Glossary... vii Definitions of Key Terms... ix Declaration... xi Acknowledgements... xii Executive Summary... xiii Preface... xviii Chapter 1 Aviation Human Factors In the Beginning The Findings Merging Theory and Practice Easier Said Than Done Development of Crew Resource Management (CRM) Integration The Program Implementing Change The Need for Change Social Behaviours of the Team Intrapersonal Leadership Followership Interpersonal Relations Teamwork Shared Mental Model (SMM) Situational Awareness Intergroup Relations Cultural Design Developing the NextGen CRM CRM is Not Enough Emotional Behavioural Markers Conclusion Chapter 2 Emotions Introduction What Exactly are Emotions? Emotion Research Biological Response Emotional Response Neurocognitive Emotional Decision Making Emotional Behaviours Emotion Regulation Emotional Intelligence Emotions Fatigue Performance Set Theory Heightened Emotional Activity ii

3 2.9.2 Fatigue Performance Conclusion Chapter 3 Research Methods Overview Objectives Study 1 Reliability Study 2 Observation Study 3 Restricted Sleep Study 4 Semi-Structured Interviews Ethics Approval Studies 1, 2 and Study Participant Recruitment Study Studies 2 and Study Measures Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) Behavioural Markers Inter-Rater Reliability Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) Program Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM) Methodology HEA Markers' Reliability Observations Semi-Structured Interviews Data Analysis Chapter 4 Detection of Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) in Commercial Airline Crews Abstract Introduction Method Sample Design and Procedure Measures Results Discussion Summary of Results Observing Emotions in Context Limitations Conclusion Chapter 5 Managing Operational Threats: The Occurrence of Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) and its Relationship to Threat Management and Outcome Abstract Introduction Methods Sample Design and Procedure Measures External Threats iii

4 5.3.2 Validity Results Occurrences of HEA Distribution of HEA across Phases of Flight Distribution of HEA as a Function of Threat Type Relationship between HEA, Threat Management and Crew Error Discussion Application Limitations Conclusion Chapter 6 Restricted Sleep and Negative Affective States in Commercial Pilots during Short-haul Operations Abstract Introduction Methods Sample Design and Procedure Measures Results Sleep in the Previous 24 Hours Sleep in the Previous 48 Hours Wake Hours prior to Commencement of Cruise Flight Discussion Application Limitations Conclusion Chapter 7 The Interviews Abstract Introduction Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) Observation Methodology Reliability of HEA Behavioural Markers Flight Crew Perceptions of HEA Methods Participants Analytic Process Findings Triggers Nature of HEA Management of HEA Resolution Discussion (Overarching Themes) Conclusion Chapter 8 General Discussion Summary of Research Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) Observing Flight Crews Operational Significance Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) iv

5 8.6 Training Emotion Resilience Mindfulness Emotion Regulation Accident/Incident Investigation Future Directions (Science Fiction Vision) Adaptive Automation Cabin Crew Assistance Other High-Risk Environments Medicine Maritime Rail Police Fire Military Conclusion References Appendix 1.1 HEA Markers Consent Form Appendix 1.2 HEA Markers Reliability Form Appendix 2.1 Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) Appendix 2.2 Consent Form Appendix 2.3 LOSA Collection Form Flight Operations Details Flight Operations Description Non-Technical Performance Analysis Threat Management Analysis LOSA HEA Form Error Management Analysis Undesired Aircraft State (UDAS) Management Analysis Crew Feedback Appendix 3.1 Consent Form Appendix 3.2 Semi-Structured Interview Verbal Consent Appendix Triggers Appendix Nature of HEA Appendix Management of HEA Appendix Resolution List of Tables Table 4.1 Descriptions of the Eight Video Vignettes Table 4.2: Percentage of Pilot Concordance and Inter-Rater Reliability for the Five HEA Markers Table 5.1: Observer Handbook HEAs Table 5.2: Ratio of threats detected and managed, detected and mismanaged, detected and ignored and failed to detect depending on whether an HEA was present or absent Table 5.3: Ratio of threats detected and managed, detected and mismanaged or ignored and failed to detect depending on whether stress was present or absent Table 5.4: Ratio of threats resulting in minimal consequence compared to errors depending on whether stress was present or absent v

6 Table 6.2: Chi-square analysis of the relationship between occurrences of HEA in response to threats and restricted sleep reported in the previous 24 and 48 hours List of Figures Figure 2.1: Set Theory of HEA, Fatigue and Performance Difficulty Figure 5.1: Flow chart and pie chart representing the distribution of threats associated with HEA that were detected and managed/detected and mismanaged or ignored/not detected Figure 5.2: Percentage of threats of each type associated with at least one HEA and relative distribution of each type of HEA for each threat type Figure 5.3: Percentage of threats with each type of HEA that resulted in error, sorted from largest (top) to smallest Figure 7.1: Conflict flow chart non-exclusive pathways Figure 7.2: HEA is triggered and is the trigger vi

7 Glossary AC ALPA ANTS ASRS ATC ATSB BEA CDM CFIT CIAM CISM CMAQ CRM CVR EB EMS EQ ER ERAU FAA FAR FO FRMS HEA HF HREC ICAO ICC ILS IPA IRR KLM LOFT LOSA LTM NASA NASB NTS NTSB OPPS OTD OTP PL PTSD RC affect conflict Air Line Pilots Association Anaesthetist Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) Aviation Safety Reporting System (NASA) Air Traffic Control Australian Transportation Safety Board British European Airways critical decision method controlled flight into terrain confidence interval average measure confidence interval single measure Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire Crew Resource Management (formerly Cockpit Resource Management) cockpit voice recorder episodic buffer Emergency Medical Services emotional intelligence emotion regulation Embry Riddle Aeronautical University Federal Aviation Administration (US) Federal Aviation Regulations first officer Fatigue Risk Management System heightened emotional activity human factors Human Research Ethics Committee (UniSA) International Civil Aviation Organization intraclass correlation coefficient instrument landing system (approach) interpretative phenomenological analysis inter-rater reliability Royal Dutch Airlines Line Oriented Flight Training Line Operations Safety Audit (Program) long-term memory National Aeronautics and Space Administration Netherlands Aviation Safety Board non-technical skills National Transportation Safety Board Operational Performance Protection Strategy on time departure on-time-performance phonological loop Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder relationship conflict vii

8 RPT SA SHEL SME SMM SOP SSI STAI TC TCAS TEM TEMM TI UDAS UniSA VSS WM Regular Public Transport (airline) situational awareness Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware (Model) subject matter expert Shared Mental Model standard operating procedure semi-structured interview State-Trait Anxiety Inventory task conflict traffic collision avoidance system threat and error management Threat and Error Management Model tonic immobility Undesired Aircraft State (Management Analysis) University of South Australia visuo-spatial sketchpad working memory viii

9 Definitions of Key Terms Emotion Izard (2009) defined this as a phase of neurobiological activity that is experienced as motivational and informational and that influences thought and action, a felt cognition, or action tendency (p. 3). Error The FAA (2006) defines crew error as action or inaction that leads to a deviation from crew or organizational intentions or expectations. Errors in the operational context tend to reduce the margin of safety and increase the probability of adverse events. Broadly speaking, there are handling errors (flight controls, automation), procedural errors (checklists, briefings, and callouts) and communication errors (with ATC, ground, or pilot-to-pilot). Understanding how the error was managed is as important, if not more important, than understanding the prevalence of different types of error. It is of interest then if and when the error was detected and by whom, as well as the response(s) upon detecting the error, and the outcome of the error. As with threats, some errors are quickly detected and resolved, leading to an inconsequential outcome, while others go undetected or are mismanaged. A mismanaged error is defined as an error that is linked to or induces additional error or an undesired aircraft state (p. 2, Appendix 1). Fear Fear is defined as the physiological changes that occur in response to a perceived threat that prepares the body for a fight or flight response (Darley, Glucksberg, & Kinchla, 1991; Damasio, 1994). HEA (Heightened Emotional Activity) HEA is defined as emotional responses to perceived threats in high-risk environments. Line Operations Safety Audit The FAA (2006) defines a LOSA as a formal process that requires expert and highly trained observers to ride the jumpseat during regularly scheduled flights to collect safety-related data on environmental conditions, operational complexity, and flightcrew performance. Confidential data collection and non-jeopardy assurance for pilots are fundamental to the process (p. 2). ix

10 Stress Stress is defined as it relates to human performance in that the demands of the task outweigh the perception of ability (Stokes & Kite, 1994). Threat The FAA (2006) defines a threat as an event or error that occurs outside the influence of the flightcrew (i.e., it was not caused by the crew), increases the operational complexity of a flight, and requires crew attention and management if safety margins are to be maintained (p. 1, Appendix 1). Klinet et al. (1999) defines threat management as the act of minimizing the potential consequences of threats on flight safety (p. 2). x

11 Declaration I declare that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge it does not contain any materials previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text. Signed. Date. xi

12 Acknowledgements I would like to thank the following people and organizations for providing me with invaluable support during my candidature: My principal supervisor, Dr Kurt Lushington. My associate supervisors, Dr Jill Dorrian, Dr Sally A Ferguson and Dr Matthew JW Thomas. Dr Jill Dorrian for providing statistical support for Study 1. Professor Drew Dawson for the title of the thesis. Dr Siobhan Banks for reviewing my work. Dr Greg Roach for the use of his thesis. Ms Lynn Easley for showing me that, in order to study emotions, one must truly know the depths of emotional distress. The airlines that provided me with a platform from which to conduct my research. The airline that participated in the study in Chapter 4, and the individual crew members who volunteered their time and expertise. We acknowledge their contributions to the science of observing emotions in others. The airlines that participated in the studies in Chapters 5 and 6, and the individual crews who not only volunteered information about their personal histories, but also allowed observers to analyse their performance during normal flight operations. We acknowledge their contributions to the science of fatigue, emotions and performance. The pilot volunteers who participated in the studies. The Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Aboriginal people of South Australia for helping to ease my distress. I would like to thank Valerie Williams for doing the hard yards editing this thesis. xii

13 Executive Summary This exploratory research looked at emotions in response to perceived threats on the flight deck. Following is a summary of the chapters contained within the thesis. Due to a lack of aviation literature on emotions, the literature review is contained in Chapter 1 Aviation Human Factors and Chapter 2 Emotions to explore the need to understand what may be a key component of Crew Resource Management (CRM). Chapter 1 Aviation Human Factors A series of accidents brought the aviation industry together to investigate why human error was so prevalent in the accidents and what could be done about it. It was decided that there was a need for a training program that integrated team resource skills with technical skills to improve the safety of flight. One of the key components of the initial findings identified a lack of interpersonal communication skills on the flight deck. Initially called Cockpit Resource Management (CRM), the program was developed to improve the soft skills of the flight deck team. After nearly 30 years of science has informed CRM, pilot training has shifted from roleplay acting to identifying threats to the flight environment and mitigating errors using the Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM). Developers of CRM programs struggled with the delivery of interpersonal communications which was labelled in part as pilot charm school. The program was modified to reflect what pilots should do when encountering a threat, keeping more in line with the development of pilot skills. It is hypothesised, in this research, that emotions are a very real and common occurrence on the flight deck. Additionally, pilots are very aware and can identify with accuracy when emotions are a potential threat to the operating environment. It is the objective of this study to develop within the industry an awareness of emotions on the flight deck and to provide the research that will promote further studies into the development of emotion-regulating skills for crew members. xiii

14 Chapter 2 Emotions Emotions have been keeping us out of harm s way for millions of years with biological responses such as fight or flight that prepare us to avoid danger or defend against a threat. Used every day, emotions assist in the decision-making process as we negotiate to attain goals within our environment. Positive emotions promote a blue-sky day as we use a top-down approach for problem solving. Negative emotions are labour intensive, requiring higher cognitive energy for a bottom-up approach to problem solving. Understanding how emotions are used in decision making can facilitate a greater awareness amongst flight crews of how to regulate the emotional response. Chapter 3 Research Methods Conducting research on emotions in aviation is difficult due to the paucity of literature on the subject. This therefore required a two-fold approach by researching both the emotion literature and the aviation human factors literature to develop the following research questions used in this research: Can heightened emotional activity (HEA) be identified by other crew members? What is the relationship between the observed occurrence of HEA and (in)effective threat and error management by the crew? Is there a significant relationship between the occurrence of HEA and the recent amount of sleep? Can pilots identify the events that trigger HEA? This project contained four studies. They were: Study 1 used video vignettes of flight deck situations to test the reliability of a unique set of behavioural markers used in the observation study. Study 2 used a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) to observe flight crews during normal operations. Threats were identified as were the emotional responses to the threats. xiv

15 Study 3 queried flight crews during the LOSA about restricted sleep during the previous 24 and 48 hours to establish a relationship between restricted sleep and HEA. Study 4 used a semi-structured interview process to explore the level of flight crew awareness of HEA on the flight deck. Chapter 4 Reliability The aim of this study was to establish the reliability of a unique set of behavioural markers that would predict heightened emotional activity (HEA). These markers could be deployed in a range of research and operational contexts to better understand the relationship between heightened emotional activity and performance. These markers are: confusion, disagreement, unease, frustration and stress. This study has identified the need for flight crews to understand when HEA is detrimental to the safety of flight. That is, to give the crews the necessary tools to listen to what their biological senses are telling them. If a crew has been trained in emotion regulation (ER), it was hypothesised that they would be better equipped to understand when emotional responses may show a breakdown in the team s Shared Mental Model (SMM). If the crew needs to intervene to resolve the HEA, the intervention could be anything that would prevent a flight from continuing along the accident chain. This study found that the raters scores were Almost Perfect scores in terms of the strength of rater agreement. Chapter 5 Observation The study in Chapter 5 examined the relationship between heightened emotional activity (HEA), and the management of operational threats and errors by commercial flight crew. Through the observation of normal flight operations, and the systematic coding of flight crew behaviour using HEA markers, the potential relationship between HEA and enhanced flight crew performance was examined. The crew behaviours that underpin effective error management are traditionally measured using behavioural markers for non-technical crew skills. xv

16 These markers code crew behaviour according to pre-defined constructs such as vigilance and contingency planning. The findings from this study show that in the 302 sectors studied, there were 884 threats identified across five phases of flight with 535 observed and recorded emotional responses to those threats. The findings suggest that there is a significant relationship between HEA and performance decline. Chapter 6 Restricted Sleep The study in Chapter 6 examined the relationship between restricted sleep and HEA in the flight crews observed during the observational Study 2. The flight crews were questioned to determine their amount of sleep in the previous 24 and 48 hours. Fatigue has been identified as a factor in several accident investigations and it was hypothesised that restricted sleep may increase the strength of the HEA. The findings from this study show a significant relationship between restricted sleep and HEA that may have operational significance. Chapter 7 The Interviews The study in Chapter 7 used a semi-structured interview technique to assess the level of understanding within the pilot community of emotional activity on the flight deck. The interviews were conducted to gain an understanding of what crew members thought triggered their emotional event, what was the nature of the HEA, how the HEA was managed, and whether there was a resolution to the HEA event. This study provides information on how pilots currently manage HEA on the flight deck. The semi-structured interview process allowed pilots to discuss past experiences and events that they had witnessed based around four key themes: the trigger event, the nature of HEA, the management of HEA and the resolution of HEA. The emotive triggers were coded in accordance with one of three interpersonal conflict types: relationship, task or affect. The findings show that there were emotive moments on the flight deck of which the pilots had been a part or that they had witnessed. xvi

17 Chapter 8 Discussion This thesis highlights the need for the interpersonal communications component of human factors CRM training as it facilitates a better understanding of how emotions can impede critical thinking and how the use of emotion regulation (ER) can improve the cohesiveness of the team when encountering threats to the operating environment. It was hypothesised that these skills would improve the performance of the team when threats were encountered, and the research contained in this thesis supports this notion. Future technologies could utilize adaptive control to reduce the workload during moments of HEA. Whilst this research focused on commercial airlines, the data collected here would benefit any high-risk industry which would include, but is not limited to, medicine, the military and all first responders. xvii

18 Preface A Personal Perspective There are only two emotions in a plane: boredom and terror. ~Orson Welles~ My interest in human emotions within the aviation domain began in 1990 after an event that literally changed my life. I was a brand-new reserve airline pilot who had been flying at this particular airline for less than 30 days after my training had been completed. Mind you, I was not new to aviation as I had been in the military flying helicopters in challenging environments and locations around the world for the previous seven years. This particular airline flight was a reasonably short hop and the last one of the day that would have us on the ground at 11:30 at night. There was a solid layer of clouds in the area that was around 2100 thick and the elevation of our destination airport put the bottom of the cloud layer right at the minimum allowed (200 ) for the instrument approach for that airport. As the hot reserve pilot, I would fly with any captain in need of a first officer. On this particular night, I received the call from flight operations notifying me of the upcoming flight, the name of the captain, aircraft number and time of departure. I conducted the pre-flight before I checked in with the captain to ensure the aircraft was operational. While conducting my walk-around, the previous first officer came up and told me to watch the captain with whom I was flying as he could get funny in the clouds. I didn t know what he meant and continued on with my checks. However, I did get my first clue when I checked in with the captain and found him reading the weather report for our destination and rocking back and forth and side to side. Other pilots in the crew room had obviously seen this side of the captain before and were adding to his unease by joking with him about the weather and the new pilot who would be backing him up. After taking on additional fuel above and beyond what was required, just in case, we departed for our destination airport. After climbing up through the cloud layer, we reached clear conditions above. A full moon and calm conditions were to xviii

19 remain throughout the flight and the captain appeared to be OK and cheerful. As we approached the controlled airspace for our destination, Air Traffic Control notified us that we were the last flight in and to expect an abbreviated approach to the airport. Air Traffic Control was going to vector us in for a 15 mile straight-in approach without the associated mandatory turns as we were the only aircraft. Through this initial process, the captain as the flying pilot and I as the monitoring pilot were communicating about the necessary checklists and descent and approach procedures in a very normal way. All of that was about to change. The weather over the airport was still overcast with a cloud layer starting around 2300 and ending at 200. Air Traffic Control was vectoring us to intercept the final approach heading and gave us an altitude change to facilitate the interception of the glide slope on the instrument landing system (ILS) approach. My job as the monitoring pilot was to call out all headings, altitude changes and deviations from the normal configuration of the approach. A normal approach angle on the glide slope is around three degrees which equates to a descent rate of 750 per minute. When we began our descent, we were around 11,000 and everything was normal on the approach. Upon entering the cloud layer at 2300, the aircraft began to speed up which caused the rate of descent to increase. This in turn caused the aircraft to go below the glide slope of the approach path and so, as was my duty, I informed the captain that we were a dot below the glide slope. Normally, his response would have been roger, correcting but that did not happen. The rate of descent increased even more to around 1500 per minute and I called out that we were two dots below and needed to correct now. The captain sat there looking normal but unresponsive so I began to challenge him even more. I banged on the yoke to get his attention but he was still unresponsive. We were now at a full-scale deflection below the glide slope in a 3000 per minute rate of descent. I began hitting his hand on the throttle quadrant and yelling for him to go around! At some point, I realised that we had roughly eight seconds before impact and I began to talk to my wife as this would be recorded by the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), knowing the accident investigation would recover my final thoughts to my wife. I knew that we were out of options and I started to reach for my very large, FAA (Federal Aviation Administration)-mandated, flashlight to use to hit the captain as a last-resort wake-up call. Unfortunately, I did not get to use it. xix

20 We popped out of the clouds at 200 with the airspeed indicator pegged on the barber pole (maximum airspeed) and a plethora of alarms going off. The first thing we saw upon exiting the clouds directly in front of us was an apartment building. By this time, everything was moving in slow motion as I sat there watching what appeared to be the last moments of my life. The captain awoke out of his frozen state in that instant and pulled back on the controls just before we impacted into the building. We flew over the apartment building with ten feet clearance as the captain asked where we were supposed to be. I yelled to go around and smashed my flashlight down on his hand which was still in a death grip on the throttles. The captain pushed the throttles all the way up and pulled back on the controls and we began a near vertical climb at which time I thought we would stall and do a tail slide back to Earth. We somehow had managed to stay on the final heading for the runway when the captain re-engaged the glide slope and performed a negative g bump over of the controls which caused everything not nailed down to stick to the roof of the aircraft. This is a fairly aggressive manoeuvre that is normally used by military pilots. With all of the passengers screaming at the top of their collective lungs, I thought that the end was coming for a third time as we reversed course and dove down in a repeat of the earlier descent. Fortunately, the ride from hell ended as we popped out of the clouds for a second time just above the approach end of the runway and landed without further incident. As the aircraft was rolling to a stop on the runway, the captain began yelling instrument failure! I looked at him and said, bullshit, pilot failure. Parked at the gate, after we had shut everything down and all of the distraught passengers as well as the captain had gone, I sat in the aircraft trying to figure out what had just happened. I have never felt so helpless in my life. I made a promise to myself that no matter how long it took I would figure out what caused the captain to freeze at the controls with me unable to do anything about it. Here I sit, 21 years later, reliving those moments with a true feeling of dread and a dry mouth, writing this in my quest to develop an understanding of human emotions. xx

21 Chapter 1 Aviation Human Factors A superior pilot is one who uses superior judgment to avoid situations requiring the use of superior skills. ~Anonymous~ 1

22 1.1 In the Beginning Several major accidents in the 1970s prompted many people to question why highly qualified pilots were flying advanced modern aircraft into the ground. On 17 December 1977, United Airlines Flight 2860 flew into a mountain while the crew were focused on an electrical problem. On 31 July 1973, Delta Airlines Flight 723 landed 3000 feet short of the runway as the crew continued to fly on an unstable approach. On 29 December 1972, Eastern Airlines Flight 401 flew into the Florida Everglades while the crew were focused on a landing gear light problem. Several key characteristics were identified as the probable causal factors of these and other accidents. They included: lack of teamwork, flight crew communication failures, steep authority gradient and failure to make sound decisions (Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1979; Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999; Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). Importantly, each contributed to, or was associated with, human error. Wiegmann and Shappell (2001a) stated that humans, by their very nature, make mistakes; therefore, it should come as no surprise that human error has been implicated in a variety of occupational accidents. In a highly regulated industry, where every agreed-upon operational procedure is a detailed algorithm, the role of human error in accidents provides a great deal of data both to understand the accident process and provide a platform for augmenting operational safety programs (Dismukes, 2010). As a result of accidents such as those highlighted above, the decision was made to bring the issues to a forum of experts in order to develop a program to help pilots identify and understand the issues around human error and how these errors affected the safety of flight. Several groups in the USA and Europe had begun developing tools based on findings from accident investigations that would be used in system design as well as CRM training programs (Wiener, Kanki, & Helmreich, 1993; Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001). In the 1970s, Elwyn Edwards developed the Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware (SHEL) Model which became the basis for KLM s human factors training (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Likewise, Pan America World Airways had begun the development of a formalized crew concept-training program that focused on the non-technical issues associated with operating jet airliners while United Airlines had begun the development of their Command, Leadership and 2

23 Resource Management program, continuing the ground-breaking work after the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) symposium (Wiener & Nagel, 1988; Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). In 1979, NASA partnered with the US Air Force and several airline industry leaders to conduct a workshop, Resource Management on the Flight Deck, that was heralded as the first event to focus on the human factors (HF) and non-technical skills (NTS) in a public domain (Cooper et al., 1979; Chidester, 1993; Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Research scientists and training developers came together to work out why it was that in 1979 over 80% of all aviation accidents were caused by highly qualified flight crews (Lauber, 1986; Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001b; Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). Another driver was the seminal simulation study by Ruffell Smith which showed a great deal of variance amongst flight crew effectiveness in responding to divergent task demand scenarios (Cooper et al., 1979; Smith, 1979; Chidester, 1993). It was decided that an industry-wide HF training program for pilots was needed to improve the functionality of flight deck management, reduce human error and increase the overall safety of the industry. 1.2 The Findings The NASA symposium produced a much-needed focus for developing a new training program that was founded in psychology. The Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) program was defined as the effective management of cockpit resources such as technical, procedural and human (Kanki, 2010). The CRM program became the locus of non-technical skills such as interpersonal communications, leadership, decision making and resource management between crew members with the goal of reducing human error (Cooper et al., 1979; Lauber, 1986; Wiener et al., 1993; Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). The process of implementing a new interpersonal team -focused training program was going to be difficult for a number of reasons. Primarily, however, teams were established by the airlines hiring individuals based on their individual qualifications and individual performance during the individual interview process (Ginnet, 2010). However, the requirement to function in a team and to maintain interpersonal relationships is a critical element of safe operations. 3

24 Flin, O'Connor and Crichton (2008) defined interpersonal non-technical skills as the cognitive, social and personal resource skills that complement technical skills, and contribute to safe and efficient task performance. Initially rejected by crew members as pilot charm school or hot tub therapy (Helmreich, 1986; Flin et al., 2008), CRM was subsequently changed to better suit the mindset of the predominantly male pilot group. Hackman (1986) wrote so there would be a strong temptation, in designing and executing team-focused CRM training, to slip back to a more familiar and culturally agreeable emphasis on the attitudes and skills of individual pilots. Subsequent training focused more on the role of the individual crew member as a part of a team rather than the integration of effective interpersonal team performance (Salas et al., 1999). The team-based non-technical skills were at risk of being removed from the training curriculum. 1.3 Merging Theory and Practice The CRM program that began as high-interest training within the industry to improve flight crew interactions soon began to stall. The program was criticised by the pilots who it was designed to help for its psychobabble and it was considered to have minimal relevance to flying (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). In 1986, NASA convened a second meeting of the industry, regulators and researchers to address the survivability of a stand-alone CRM program (Chidester, 1993). For CRM to survive, it needed to be incorporated into technical training in a presentation of hard and soft skills as one ideology. In 1987, the US FAA responded by creating a task force to identify the processes needed to merge the two training programs (FAA, 1991). The task force presented its findings in 1988 after which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released the Safety Recommendation (A-88-71) which advocated that all Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 121 commercial transport airlines incorporate CRM training into aircraft and simulator training to improve crew coordination procedures (FAA, 1991). In 1990, the FAA established the Advanced Qualifications Program as new and innovative pilot training that had merged CRM within a technical flight program (FAA, 1991; Salas et al., 2001). The integration process of the Advanced Qualifications Program was not easy as CRM topics such as interpersonal communication, decision making and leadership were 4

25 difficult to establish as direct interventions for crew member behaviours during Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) (Chidester, 1993; Longridge, 1997). 1.4 Easier Said Than Done The vast majority of commercial airline pilots were college graduates who came from the ranks of the armed services. The pilots were thus accustomed to single pilot operations and the hierarchical rank structures of leaders and followers which preserved the individualistic competitive culture of reward for individual achievement (Hackman, 1986). This competitive culture was the core element of the individualistic team that showed the inequality in the balance of prestige and affluence between the captain and first officer, simultaneously maintaining the notion of power distance (Hofstede, 1984; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Airline flight training closely resembled military training in its approach to command authority creating a rigid atmosphere on the flight deck (Ginnet, 2010). The single pilot mindset did not initially adapt well to the multi-crew team environment (Foushee, 1984). Captains had the authority to make all decisions regarding the operation of the aircraft delegating to the first officer as they deemed necessary thus inhibiting open communications (Kanki, 2010). In line with this, first officers deferred all decisions to the captain s knowledge and position (Forgas, 1990). The notion of team was not a natural one and the concept took some time to develop. 1.5 Development of Crew Resource Management (CRM) Integration The training program that attempted to address these issues was initially called Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) but over time became Crew Resource Management (CRM) to better capture the team concept (Flin, 2008). For over 30 years, CRM has been used to train members of flight crews to work as a team to reduce incidents and improve safety in flight operations. Considered a soft skill, CRM was first introduced to assist aircrews in understanding the human nature of social interaction to create a team environment and improve communications on the flight deck with the ultimate goal of reducing human errors (Chidester, 1993; Salas et al., 2001; Flin, 2008). CRM has evolved to become a vital tool in the human factors arsenal for the management of threats and errors affecting the safety of flight (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Despite the significant energy and effort 5

26 dedicated to translating the concepts of CRM and non-technical skills, to this day, human error remains a leading cause in up to 80% of all aviation accidents (Salas et al., 2001; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2009). The structure of the initial program, developed to address the issues of human error, was very academic and did not yield a model from which the training of team skills could be developed (Chidester, 1993; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001c). The development of CRM training programs that focused on improving social interaction to encourage better team skills was generally left up to the individual airlines to produce a training program that focused on improving social interaction to encourage better team skills (Chidester, 1993; Salas et al., 1999). The gap created by a lack of standardized CRM material meant that the message catered to the culture of the times and some airlines took the easy way and did not seek to create change in the training model. In some cases, CRM was sanitized to reduce the irrelevant aspects of interpersonal communications, such as awareness of heightened affective states or psychological stresses, to focus more on the individual behaviours needed to function in an effective team (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999; Salas et al., 1999). 1.6 The Program The core elements of CRM have not changed in over 30 years. The findings of the working groups at the 1979 NASA program identified five main items of concern that needed to be addressed: 1) skills required for resource management; 2) social and communication skills; 3) management skills; 4) planning skills; and 5) problemsolving skills (Cooper et al., 1979). These were to be incorporated into all initial, recurrent and upgrade ground schools and simulator Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) sessions. It is testament to the success of the initial developers understanding of the key behaviours required to bring about improvements in the safe operation of a complex function in a high-risk environment that the five elements were defined so accurately. Although CRM and human factors (HF) training is not infallible, these programs are part of a variety of factors that have facilitated a decline in major accidents for most global carriers since the development of CRM, constituting a trend of change for the better. The five key findings for improving safety of flight through changes made on 6

27 the flight deck came from incidents. Evidence showed that in an emergency, the captain became overloaded by taking over as flying pilot in order to manage the emergency, coming up with solutions for contingencies, as well as communicating to Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the cabin crew (Cooper et al., 1979). Major changes were needed to disrupt the mindset of the day that everything was okay and to convince a fairly rigid pilot group to open up and accept a model of training that involved becoming more interpersonally aware. To suggest that a military-trained (B-52 Colonel) captain of a 747 could find harmony and synchronicity with a general aviation-trained first officer (Beech Baron flight instructor) in the right seat was, and still is, an enormous challenge that involves breaking down preconceived notions to build a team from significantly different cultural backgrounds. One controversial finding was that flight deck communications were one sided, and in most cases, one directional. The workgroup identified the need for first officers to step up and assert themselves with a certain level of directness not previously seen on most flight decks (Orlady & Foushee, 1986). Challenging the captain s decisions was seen as an affront to all command positions and was met with some resistance (Chidester, 1993). Developing a training program where first officers were able to challenge the captain and required him to listen, was a major barrier to success and required a high level of creativity in the facilitation so as to not lose the customer. However, with a growing aviation industry and a diminishing military pilot pool from which to draw seasoned aviators to fill both seats, some organizations around the globe solved this problem by creating an internal cadet corps to feed the ranks of the airline. The rigidity of the training lost the militaristic edge which some found to be overbearing and detracting from the job of learning to fly. The training process became a separation of the wheat from the chaff. Lose the hard shell rigid authority figure and accept the fact that you must expose a softer side when communicating with others. No one at that time had successfully designed training to reduce the severity of the authority gradient of the flight deck; training that had to convince 30-year captains that angrily berating crew members was not good communications in the team concept: it was suggested that this training would involve getting together after a flight with the captain asking crew members how you felt things went as a part of team building (Helmreich, 1979). 7

28 These were behaviour modification programs used by large corporations that were not available to most airline training program developers (Chidester, 1993). Training at this level required participation and a willingness to change by the customers to whom the training was directed. Whilst some of the findings were considered harder to develop and facilitate, not all of the ideas were out of reach for most training developers. The training was also tasked with improving the decision-making skills of the captains, who tended to load themselves up during an emergency thus impeding a successful solution. Resource management was considered a key finding from the NASA symposium, in that it was essential to assist the captain to develop an understanding of the multitude of resources available to them (Cooper et al., 1979). Resource management became the key to success with this new training which showed the captain how to better manage an event like an emergency by delegating tasks to other crew members. A gradual acceptance began to take place with this new way of doing business through training that helped define the roles of the individual team members without creating a flat authority gradient for command (Flin et al., 2003). Facilitation of these ideas was more trial and error than exact science with the pilot group. Role playing was initially popular with the training developers who were following the suggestion of the NASA CRM workgroup (Cooper et al., 1979; Beard, Salas, & Prince, 1995). The purpose was to act out scenarios designed to show the group what an overbearing captain or a non-responsive first officer looked like. The training sometimes incorporated role reversal, with first officers as captains and captains as first officers. Two pilots sat in chairs holding something to portray the yoke of the aircraft. Broomsticks were a classic example of the ad hoc training devices used and the author s personal experience was to hear a collective groan from the group when they were brought out. Needless to say, the role playing was overdone and a bit too comedic to properly replicate any behaviours on the flight deck or to be considered of any real value. Role playing was not very popular with pilots and was one of the first casualties of the new training program. Developers still believed in the medium and the role playing was replaced with the same scenarios filmed by the training department and then shown during the training. Over time, the scenarios became increasingly more realistic and a positive learning experience. 8

29 Another technique was modelled from elementary school lessons where a series of instructions was passed from one person to the next in a whisper (International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 2003). This was done to show how communications could change the information as the message passed from person to person. These were all interactive attempts to get the pilot group to engage in CRM training in a way that did not take the pilot group outside of their comfort zone. Each evolutionary change to CRM brought with it a refinement in how the increasingly complex information was transferred to the pilot group. Other groups within the industry considered CRM training a success and the program was integrated into cabin crew, maintenance and air traffic control training (Chidester, 1993). The focus of the training remained on the initial core findings; however, the training list of topics was expanded to include new ideas for issues such as conflict resolution, distraction avoidance and stress reduction to better suit the target group (Flin et al., 2003). The inclusion of the cabin crew with the pilots CRM training was considered a major modification by some airlines (ICAO, 2003). The idea was to develop an understanding amongst crew members about how a decision made up front could impact on the back of the plane. All of the ideas, both successes and failures, helped to bring about a change in crew members perceptions and expectations that now regarded CRM as a regular component to a training cycle. The new focus for CRM was on observing behaviours that were intuitive to the developer that could be evaluated along with technical flying skills (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001c). The CRM vision became what to do when encountering threats (Salas et al., 1999) without acknowledging the emotions experienced with the threat or how to manage them. 1.7 Implementing Change Despite each generational modification to CRM, the focus remained on reducing the errors made by highly qualified individuals. Researchers began to understand that there were factors beyond humans simply making errors (Reason, 1990; Dekker, 2006). Outside influences, such as on-time-performance (OTP), were understood to play a major role in influencing the processes that led to the errors. While most of the threats, such as weather, were easily identifiable, others were 9

30 latent, such as exceeding the OTP limits, and were not as clearly defined (Dekker, 2002). From this new understanding came the Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM). The TEMM is one of the most valuable tools in the CRM arsenal, providing flight crews with an increased awareness of the threats that are likely to be encountered during most flights. The more capable the pilot is in identifying threats, the less likely those threats are to become errors as the model prompts individuals to capture errors before they become unmanageable (Klinect, Wilhelm, & Helmreich, 1999). At the second NASA workshop in 1986, two training captains from People Express (Bruce & Jensen, 1986) stated that little doubt exists that significant improvements in flight safety and accident prevention will result when aircrews are trained in and practice effective CRM (p. 50). With the development of each new generation of CRM comes the knowledge that aviation is closer to confirming the prediction made by Bruce and Jensen. This statement remains true today as CRM training is assumed to have contributed to the reduction in the aviation accident rate in the developed countries that practise CRM, despite flight crew acceptance being hard to measure. However, continued refinement remains critical. In January 2009, an Empire Airlines ATR 42 crashed after repeated warnings of an impending stall during an approach to land at an airport. One of the probable causes cited by accident investigators was the flight crew s poor crew resource management (NTSB, 2009). How does this happen? In this example, a fully functional crew took actions which were in direct contradiction to standard operating procedures (SOPs) and hours of emergency training in a flight simulator with the pilot who was flying pushing the throttles forward to initiate a go-around manoeuvre after receiving the initial stick shaker warning of a stall. The answers must lie, at least in part, in the human response. 1.8 The Need for Change In 2007, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) hosted a CRM symposium in the USA attended by a diverse group from around the globe. The objective of the symposium was to discuss the current status of CRM and future directions. Working group discussions focused on doing more of the same with CRM, which was to keep using the same format of TEMM with updated accident scenarios. 10

31 This demonstrated an acceptance of the status quo within the CRM developers group, which may have been due to either a lack of motivation and commitment to push for change within the CRM community, or the lack of new ideas. Arguably, it also shows a lack of commitment or innovation within the scientific community to keep pressing for more knowledge and understanding of human behaviour that will benefit aviation human factors. Maintaining CRM at its current level may run the risk that the future development of the program based on emerging science will be neglected. The aviation industry conducts several seminars every year to discuss training concepts and safety of flight issues yet there does not appear to be any shift away from what has become the common practice of maintaining a comfortable knowledge base of an outdated HF/CRM curriculum. The only thing that has changed is the data on the number of new accidents. In the one camp, you have the technically-grounded training manager who generally comes from the flight line and maintains very good technical knowledge and interest in all things associated with human factors training that is generally known and accepted within the industry. Then, there are the CRM developers and facilitators who are generally flight crew members or retired crew members who are quite passionate about all things CRM who work with the resources with which they are presented while always searching for new material(box 1). In the other camp, there is the research scientist who looks at human error as the underlying cause of all things wrong associated with the safety of flight which, from a theoretical perspective, could be remedied. However, these two camps should meet and agree upon a common understanding of the best way to facilitate human behaviours associated with threat responses informed by our perceptions and emotions. 11

32 Box 1: The Role of Human Emotions I began my interest in human factors training development as a pilot within the technocrat camp who struggled to understand what exactly the sciences were trying to tell me. There was a genuine disconnect between what the research had identified as HF/CRM issues and what we were supposed to extract from this highlevel information to incorporate into the training. All things not being equal in commercial aviation, my airline and numerous other airlines did not have the financial power to pay someone to develop a high-level training program based on the new science (Chidester, 1993). The government regulator and keeper of all of this new science, AFS-230, could not give me a definitive answer as to how I should use the content in developing training programs that focused on CRM as there were no one size fits all program design templates. AFS-230 Voluntary Safety Programs Branch of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) maintained all of the data produced from the initial CRM programs. These programs produced volumes of data which were part of the public domain providing program developers with access to the data provided they could understand and make use of what they were seeking, without much assistance from AFS-230, in order to develop their own CRM program. This has promoted a developer s beggars banquet that takes a piecemeal approach to a CRM program created from bits and pieces of other programs that are focused on what the human interaction on the flight deck should look like due to a lack of understanding of these new concepts (Chidester, 1993) and more importantly of the role of human emotions. The more we understand about emotions, the better equipped we are to correctly use them. Understanding the role of social and communications skills, identified in the original report as a key component, has not been researched to its full extent to facilitate how to respond to a feeling that something is not quite right. This is despite the fact that human error continues to be a major causal factor in accidents. Human factors (HF) training, even the most effective imaginable, will not eliminate human error. The aim can only be to minimize errors and take appropriate mitigation measures. 12

33 The message should have been that we would use this new science to examine the role of emotional awareness on the flight deck with the idea of developing techniques for enhancing crew members awareness of and responses to threats. The intrapersonal aspect would focus on how an individual might better interpret and use their innate emotional response skills. The interpersonal would focus on the emotions of the team thereby enabling the team to respond more appropriately to heightened emotional activity. 1.9 Social Behaviours of the Team To understand the concept of team functionality requires an understanding of the many parts that make up the social behaviours within the team. The first place to start is with the individual and some of the social roles that the individual is required to fill. Next, we will look at the group of individuals that make up the team and the social roles that make up the qualities that are necessary to operate with other teams Intrapersonal Whether the role of the team member is leader or follower, the individual must have an understanding of what drives them to make the choices they have made and will make in the future to function efficiently. An Emergency Medical Services (EMS) pilot may decide to accept a flight at two o clock in the morning knowing that there are many risks associated with a night flight to a landing zone in unfamiliar territory. Zimmerman (as cited by Moran [2009]) stated that by knowing ourselves and our province, we can participate in culturally-valued activities that serve a greater purpose beyond our own personal needs. Evolutionary designs for control of the self have given humans the capacity to make choices for future benefit as well as providing a self-regulating function of emotional control when seeking to delay the benefit (Baumeister, Zell, & Tice, 2007). CRM training will only be effective if the individual believes in the knowledge and skills that are a part of the training program (Hackman, 1986). It may be prudent for the EMS pilot to reject white knight tendencies and decline the flight armed with the CRM skills to make the right decision knowing that the weather is anticipated to change for the worse thus requiring the patient to be transported by ground ambulance. The intrapersonal regulation of emotional responses to 13

34 environmental stimulus controls how individuals express joy or sadness when appraising any given event (Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011). As the team leader, the EMS pilot would have to explain the decisions made to the other team members who are also anticipating and prepping for the flight as to why the flight can or cannot be made. The decisions made are done so by maintaining an intrapersonal awareness of the individual and team capabilities to ascertain the threats to success in attaining the goal Leadership House (as cited by Schaffer [2008]) defined leadership as the ability of an individual to influence, motivate and enable others to contribute toward the effectiveness and success of the groups of which they are members. From the dawn of civilization, human history is replete with individual accounts of leadership passed down through the generations in the form of the written word, shared stories and song (Bass, 1990). It is the history of the individuals who have helped to shape the leadership culture. We conceptualize the idea of leadership at an early age as we look to our parents for security and survival (Bass, 1990). We accept the concept of authority knowing that they hand out the reward and punishment for our actions thus developing the intrapersonal motivations we will use along the way in our personal development (Weiner, 2000). Leadership requires a process, influence over the process, people to participate in the process and a goal for the process (Northouse, 2004). The process is not one-dimensional in the sense that the leader gives orders and the submissive followers blindly obey (Northouse, 2004; Howell & Shamir, 2005). It is the group of followers who can influence goal attainment if they believe in the leadership process. The leader must influence the direction of the group and accept their feedback to maintain a better understanding of the process required to achieve the goal (Northouse, 2004). To accomplish the goal, an effective leader on the flight deck will utilize the resources available in a manner that does not overtax any one system Followership Bjugstad, Thach, Thompson and Morris (2006) defined followership as the ability to effectively follow the directives and support the efforts of a leader to 14

35 maximize a structured organization. We are attracted to the ideologies of our leaders if we believe that we have a shared goal. We look to these individuals with the hope that they are capable of leading the group to the successful attainment of these goals. In 1948, Knickerbocker (as cited by Bass [1990]) wrote, [t]he functional relation which is leadership exists when a leader is perceived by a group as controlling means for the satisfaction of their needs. Once the follower group has lost faith in the direction of the leadership to achieve goal attainment, a shift occurs to find new leadership. Without the follower group there is no one to lead (Bjugstad et al., 2006). Therefore, the success of the leader is dependent on the willingness of the followership to be led Interpersonal Relations Individuals working together within a defined social in-group do not automatically have a functionally harmonious relationship. In fact, the findings from the initial CRM study found interpersonal relations on the flight deck to be problematic (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). The individualistic nature of achievement found in Western societies will dictate who is allowed membership into the exclusive environment of the flight deck (Hofstede, 1984). Thus, the group members define the levels of required performance and knowledge of the organization s human capital while defining the nature of the relationships of the group (Evans & Davis, 2005). The command environment of the flight deck arose from a very hierarchical single pilot military mindset, yet the exclusivity of the group has been challenged by the technological advancements of the aircraft facilitating a transition to redundant systems by way of adding a co-pilot to improve system safety (Tajfel, 1982; Evans & Davis, 2005; Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). The acceptance of the redundant systems was the first step in acknowledging the team as an interpersonal function of the operating process Teamwork From a Gestalt perspective, air travel is a highly complex process. The number of individuals working in harmony, performing all of the necessary tasks in order to safely fly from New York to Sydney is too numerous to list. These teams work on individually assigned tasks that, taken in isolation, set apart from all of the other tasks required, will not get you to Sydney without input from the other 15

36 mutually supportive teams (Sasou & Reason, 1999). The team structure on the flight deck is made up of a captain and first officer for short-haul flights with the addition of a second officer for long-haul international flights. Each crew member has certain responsibilities that they must attend to as part of the flight team. The captain is the team leader with the first officer as second in command in a supporting role (Ginnet, 2010). These well-defined roles have certain expectations in regard to the actions required for specific tasks. The captain is the pilot in command of the aircraft at all times but may not be the pilot manipulating the controls in the role that is defined as the flying pilot. The role in support of the flying pilot is known as the non-flying pilot or pilot monitoring, responsible for all sub-tasks required to conduct the flight without manipulating the controls. In the event of an emergency, the captain has the authority to take over the flying pilot responsibility, relegating the first officer to the non-flying support role. A functioning team is therefore critical to the safety of the flight. Teamwork is defined as series of actions performed by individuals with shared goals and beliefs that their effort is necessary to complete the task (Cohen & Levesque, 1991). The size of the team depends on the number and complexity of the processes required to complete the task. Modern airliners require only one person to manipulate the controls to safely fly the aircraft. However, advancements in technologies have necessitated the need for redundant systems by way of a second pilot to assist the flying pilot in performing certain tasks to reduce the workload (Foushee, 1984; Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). For the team to function efficiently and effectively, members must possess a shared or compatible knowledge from which they can adapt their behaviours (Mathieu et al., 2000; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001; Banks & Millward, 2007) Shared Mental Model (SMM) Shared cognition is arguably one of the most valuable interpersonal functions of the team s processes. With training, practice and experience, highly effective teams can perform complex functions without the need to communicate their actions to the other team members (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001). It is important for the individual team members to maintain good situational awareness (SA) of the team processes and their capacity to perform any of the necessary tasks required to 16

37 operate safely (Endsley, 1995). Teams that perform autonomously using a Shared Mental Model (SMM) of understanding what is needed and required to complete the task, without expressing intent, beliefs or goals, operate more effectively and at a higher efficiency (Cohen & Levesque, 1991; Orasanu & Fischer, 1991; Banks & Millward, 2000; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001). However, the team must know what information is to be shared and the best method for distribution as the process requires a continuous update to maintain a good SA and SMM (Bolstad & Endsley, 1999) Situational Awareness Good situational awareness (SA) of an event means that, in addition to understanding the antecedent events and the current state of place and time, it is beneficial for projecting future outcomes. The EMS pilot evaluated past, current and future environmental conditions whilst estimating fuel requirements to ensure that, if conditions changed, the possibility of inflight deviations would not be impeded by a lack of pre-flight planning. Good SA prevents white knight tendencies or the tendency to override better judgement and common sense to get the job done no matter what the conditions. Too many bad decisions have been made that quite possibly were derived from diminished SA which resulted in loss of life due to white knight tendencies as pilots pressed on when conditions would dictate turning around and returning to base Intergroup Relations Organizational structures are made up of uniquely different occupational groups that interact in support of the processes that define the organization. The structure within the different groups is similar yet functionally different, for example, ticketing and maintenance, to achieve a common goal of flying the general public. The social structure of the group is defined by the personal attributes of the individuals who collectively distinguish the group from others by way of membership (Tajfel, 1982). The captain and first officer define membership within the airline pilot group whilst seniority defines the membership between and within the structures of each group. Behaviours between the internal memberships of the social group are motivated by the positive potential of individual goal outcomes and expectations of upward mobility within the group (Blau, 1956; Hofstede, 1984). 17

38 Intergroup behaviour between social groups, based on in-group and outgroup perceptions, may be defined by discriminatory prejudices predicated on membership type (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Sherif (as cited by Tajfel [1982]) defined intergroup behaviour as individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identifications. For example, an EMS flight crew is generally made up of a pilot in command, flight paramedic and flight nurse creating an in-group when activated for a mission on the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft and in some regions around the globe, there will be a second co-pilot and flight doctor who will replace the flight paramedic. Generally, at the base of operations for this in-group, there will be a splintering into separate out-groups where the pilot will have one room (aviation group) and the flight medical team (aviation medicine group) will have a separate room that they may share with an out-group ground ambulance crew (ground medicine team). There is relatively little interaction at the base between these out-groups, unless the med teams are training. However, when they are working a flight and land at a trauma centre where there are other operational EMS aircraft, the in-group structure remains in place. There is some evidence of different treatment for different groups from a social identity perspective (Hewstone & Greenland, 2000) that shows intergroup conflict is not the same between all groups. Stereotyping of out-groups from an ethnocentric point of view requires higher cognitive processes increasing emotions and discriminatory practices (Vaes, Castelli, Giovanazzi, Paladino, & Leyens, 2003). Blending the social aspect of out-group interaction with the culture of in-group stereotypes and prejudices promotes an externalization of inner conflict behaviours which unconsciously represent the internal discord (Pettigrew, 1958). The prejudices we place on the out-group, as a whole, will be reflected in the interaction with individual members from that group Cultural Design CRM was developed as a monocultural mechanism devoid of any significant input from the multicultural industry that it was designed to assist. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) wrote one should think twice before applying the norms of one person, group, or society to another (p. 6). CRM was written for individual behaviours learned within a Western culture, an example of which can be found in 18

39 the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ) (for more on this see Helmreich [1986]). The three-factor structure of the questionnaire does not translate to other cultures (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996). The tendency here is to think about the individualistic I before the collectivist we. This is, in part, due to the hierarchical nature of the Western flight deck. When defining the roles for interpersonal interaction on the NextGen CRM flight deck, the cultural norms for the pilot group should be considered when designing methods for challenge and response to perceived threats Developing the NextGen CRM To develop a next generation of CRM, we must understand what works and what doesn t and what is missing. Very little research had been undertaken in the area of human emotion regulation when the first generation of CRM was introduced in the early 1980s. This meant that the information available to the general pilot group did not provide the educational tools that were necessary to help them give meaning to this new way of doing business on the flight deck. The lack of resources created a problem for the training departments at the airline level who were trying to develop a training program based on Helmreich s (Cooper et al., 1979) idea of the social interaction of personalities in a group setting solving complicated problems. The overall concept of human affect as a key component to personality interaction within interpersonal relations was forgotten due to the difficulty of developing a theoretical program for trainers who did not understand how to present this new material in a way that was relevant to aviation. The shift to a reactive response style in crew communications happened as a result of not knowing how to make emotion regulation (ER) useful in CRM. Accident reports provide a wealth of information as to the state of flight crew communications from CVR transcripts which are replete with heightened emotional responses to deteriorating performance levels during the development of an emergency situation. Heightened emotional responses should have triggered a review of the current situation in light of a mismatched emergence amongst the crew of vital cues needed to safely continue on with the task. In the example in Box 2, we can see the breakdown in CRM as the fatigued captain (who opted out of a 19

40 straight-in approach for a much more difficult circling approach) continued to press forward into a bad situation disregarding the comments of the other crew members. Box 2: American International Airways Flight 808 On 8 August 1993, American International Airways Flight 808 crashed while on the approach to the US Naval Air Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The captain, the pilot flying, lost control of the DC-8-61 and stalled the aircraft even after several emotive responses from the first officer and flight engineer that were made as they doubted the successful outcome of the approach. The captain had rejected the straight-in approach to runway 28, the wind was 200 and 7 knots, and the captain opted for the more difficult circle to land on runway 10 just for the heck of it to see how it is. The fatigued crew were looking for a strobe light (inoperable at the time) that designated the beginning of Cuban restricted airspace when the aircraft stalled and crashed. All three crew members were critically injured CRM is Not Enough Training pilots how to act in a given situation designed to replicate any number of possible scenarios may not be that difficult given the professional nature of the aviation community. Changing a pilot s behaviour in response to a number of complex and demanding problems that they may encounter is very difficult due to the individualistic nature of the pilot. We are biologically predisposed to take a stand and fight stance when we feel threatened or do what we have to do to get away from the threat (LeDoux, 1998). These behaviours are one key to understanding the sequence of events in which human emotions impact on the decisions made during the course of an incident. More than three decades after the NASA workshop, accident investigators are still identifying a lack of CRM skills as part of the cause of the accident or incident chain of events. The Australian Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) reported that, in 2010, an Airbus 321 had to abort a landing in Singapore after both crew members noticed that the landing gear was not down. The first officer, flying the approach, reported that he had the feeling that something was not quite right, and the captain reported that he noticed the aircraft was not configured for landing but didn t say or 20

41 do anything until a master warning alarm alerted the crew to the incorrect configuration. The captain was preoccupied on the approach with text messages on his mobile phone. In 2008, Spanish investigators investigating a runway overrun claimed that an overbearing captain created an atmosphere on the flight deck that caused an overloaded first officer, who was flying the Boeing 737 in an unstable manner, to continue the unstable approach which overran the runway on Lanzarote (Kaminski-Morrow, 2012). The captain refused to intervene directly to assist the first officer yet urged him to continue the descent ignoring multiple cues that the landing should be aborted (Kaminski-Morrow, 2012). These events and others like them all contain an emotional component that acts as a first alert system notifying us that attention is required. The strength of the emotion may determine the strength of the response, such as when the successful outcome of an unstable approach is in doubt. The crew may revert to silence or minimal input which is likely if the crew member is a first officer who is relying on the greater experience of command to have the answers and on a captain who is focused on trying to figure out the problem. However, as CRM was never designed to identify heightened emotions in an individual, the process of seeking an understanding of crew discomfort is not part of the common flight deck discourse Emotional Behavioural Markers The behaviours that make our current emotional state readily identifiable to others are shaped by our affective responses to the threat situations we encounter within our environment and are defined here as heightened emotional activity (HEA). The five markers of heightened emotional activity were selected based on the research literature on aviation accidents as well as on official government aviation accident reports in which emotions were discussed. HEAs are expressed in the form of questions, statements, utterances and body language that are biologically-evolved responses to the perception of changes in the nature or level of threats to the environment. Each of the HEA markers had three of the most distinctive features described by Ekman (1992a, 1992b) in that they were universally understood, they had antecedent events and they activated a physiological response based on the event. The five HEA markers chosen represent the unambiguous substratum of negative emotional states that actuate an increase in emotions and are relevant within the aviation domain. 21

42 Confusion In a high-risk environment, bringing together two people who have never met to fly a modern jetliner from point A to point B can only be accomplished if they both have the same idea, or a Shared Mental Model (SMM), of how the processes are supposed to be accomplished (Orasanu, 1997). The success of the team depends on the accuracy of the SMM to provide a greater understanding and comprehension of the processes required for operating and adapting to variance in a high-risk environment (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001). It is quite possible for something to change during a particular flight to disrupt the SMM. This may create cognitive dissonance in one or both crew members prompting them to misclassify information or hold a simultaneous belief in two or more inconsistent data sources limiting their comprehension of the situation (Rosenthal, Chamberlin, & Matchette, 1993). Charles Darwin (1872) defined the state as perplexed reflection (p. 82). Misulis and Edwards-Lee wrote (as cited by Graham [2001]) confusion is the state of being perplexed, disoriented, or disordered (p. 170). States of confusion range from slight to serious and may build up over time or come on suddenly (Lavie, 2005). Within aviation, these states of confusion may be associated with the shortterm effect of aircraft automation, Air Traffic Control, a system malfunction or outof-the-loop performance problems stemming from a lack of manual handling of the flight controls. An out-of-the-loop performance decline results in reduced situational awareness (SA) and diminished understanding of aircraft system processes (Endsley & Kiris, 1995). The most common source of confusion in aviation is associated with flight deck automation which is the very system designed to assist flight crews decision making on the high-technology flight deck (Sherry & Polson, 1999; Rice & McCarley, 2011). Mode confusion is short term and is caused by incorrect inputs by a crew member into the aircraft flight-guidance automation system (Mosier, Skitka, Heers, & Burdick, 1998). An example might be if an aircraft were asked to descend to a lower altitude and maintain a specific airspeed in the descent. If the crew member set up the descent in the flight guidance system without the airspeed mode set correctly, the airspeed may increase or decrease outside of the requested parameters causing confusion among both ATC and the flight crew. Over time, flight crews have become more like flight guidance system monitors, the consequence of which is some abatement of manual flying skills which 22

43 are necessary in an emergency landing (Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Funk et al., 1999). Automation has been credited with creating an out-of-the-loop performance problem amongst flight crew accustomed to relying on that automation. When confronted with a threat in flight, the first conscious process a crew member must conduct is to try and make sense of it all (Weick, 1988). Decisions made to act on the perceived threat may be made under uncertain, and less than desirable, circumstances due to a lack of environmental cues (Weick, 1988; Mosier et al., 1998; Joslyn & LeClerc, 2012). These actions follow a belief in the necessity for required intervention whilst crew member inaction engenders confusion (Weick, 1988; Moray, Inagaki, & Itoh, 2000). A crew member may develop an over-reliance on automation and display uncertainty or a general lack of understanding as to the nature of a threat when one is encountered or the nature of a threat s potential impact on operations (Stokes & Kite, 1994). Air France Flight 447 stalled and crashed after the autopilot disconnected due to ice build-up in the aircraft pitot system giving the flight crew erroneous airspeed indications. The crew appeared confused by the information they were receiving and applied incorrect inputs (simultaneous at one point) into the flight control system and stalled the aircraft at 37,000 feet and crashed (British European Airways [BEA], 2012). Another example of a fatal accident where confusion was cited as causal occurred on 6 September 1985 when a Midwest Express Airline DC-9 departed with 27 passengers and a crew of captain, first officer and two flight attendants (NTSB, 1985). On the climb out at approximately 450 feet above the ground, the DC-9 experienced a failure of the right engine. The aircraft continued to climb to 700 feet before rolling right into a 90 bank angle, which caused the aircraft to stall and crash, killing all on board. The NTSB (1985), in section Crew Coordination, stated: The CVR comments suggest that the captain was uncertain and perhaps confused by the events immediately following the failure of the right engine. If the first officer recognised the nature of the emergency, he should have responded to the captain s request for information. Failing to respond may have further confused the captain and that confusion apparently precipitated an improper control response when the airplane was in a critical phase of flight. However, the Safety Board believes it is more probable that the first 23

44 officer also was confused by the indications he observed and heard following the engine failure (pp ). The findings determined that the captain made improper control inputs for a right engine failure which caused the severe bank angle and eventual stall. The captain was trained to handle an engine failure on departure as his training records documented that he had demonstrated his ability to handle this emergency on multiple occasions during training at Midwest Airlines (NTSB, 1985). The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database showed that pilot confusion was identified in one in 10 reports (Rosenthal et al., 1993). It should be recognised that this is likely to be an under-estimation of the role that confusion plays. Rosenthal et al. (1993) stated that pilots must admit to sensed confusion more readily, and must be more willing to ask controllers to repeat or clarify confusing clearances, even if there are impediments to doing so (p. 6) Disagreement The process that defines flying from point A to point B is made up of a series of performance goals. A team operating at efficient levels requires accurate mental models of the goals and the outcomes associated with success or failure in achieving these goals. If there is a difference of opinion in what the goal is and how best to attain the desired outcome, the individual members of the team will compete for their personal goal, thereby creating conflict. The team will enter into the social confines of conflict management to negotiate for their personal goal. Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) stated: [i]f negotiators perceptions of a fair settlement are biased and if they are unwilling to settle for less, they may fail to reach an otherwise mutually beneficial agreement (p. 177). Emotion levels will be driven by the strength of the individual achievement expectancies (Atkinson & Reitman, 1956). Goal attainment is the belief that the value of the goal outcome fulfils the perceiver s goal needs thereby generating a positive emotional response (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Additionally, the individual obtaining the goal measures the success of goal attainment with the desired image of who they would like to be, thereby generating positive feelings of the self (Higgins et al., 1997). These positive emotions drive the level of performance needed for obtaining future desired goals (Cron, Slocum, VandeWalle, & Fu, 2005). An example of this might be successfully landing in difficult weather conditions. Negative emotions evolve from failure to 24

45 obtain the desired goal and weaken future goal desirability (Higgins et al., 1997; Cron et al., 2005). This might happen after several attempts to land in bad weather and diverting to an alternate airport thereby generating unease towards future flying in bad weather. Interpersonal conflict will arise if either crew member perceives that the other is not committed to the course of action required for their goal-attainment (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). Whilst there are many definitions of conflict, there are three themes that are consistently repeated: disagreement, negative emotions and interference (Barki & Hartwick, 2004). The basis for interpersonal conflict stems from a contradiction of goal attainment by participants in a group (Weider-Hatfield & Hatfield, 1995; Bar- Tal, 2000). Groups in high-risk industries are characterized by interdependent, superior subordinate relationships where conflict is task or relational in nature (Barki & Hartwick, 2004). This may become more apparent if there is a large disparity between experience levels. Task conflict may be experienced if the subordinate crew member struggles with a difficult landing or automation set-up. Relationship conflict may arise if the superior crew member negatively critiques the subordinate crew member who will assume an avoidance of conflict posture (Rahim, 1986). Interpersonal conflict is present in all cultures and while it is readily identifiable as a social behaviour, the individual differences underlying the strength of the goal attainment are not as easily identified (Gormly, Gormly, & Johnson, 1972; Weider-Hatfield & Hatfield, 1995; Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 1996). Following is a description of an interpersonal, cross-cultural conflict that occurred between a Canadian captain and a South Korean first officer attempting to land in difficult conditions. Gooderham (1994) wrote an article in The Globe and The Mail about Korean Airlines Flight 2033 that crashed while trying to land in Cheju, South Korea during a tropical storm. The first officer, the pilot monitoring, decided to attempt a go-around in the Airbus A300 at 30 feet above the runway. The captain, the pilot flying, struggled to land the A300. Upon touchdown, the first officer attempted a second go-around while the captain was trying to stop the aircraft with the brakes applied and the engines in full reverse. The A300 ran off the end of the runway hitting a wall and a guardhouse and caught fire. There were no fatalities amongst the 152 passengers and eight crew members. The globalisation of the 25

46 aviation industry shows that there are many multicultural flight decks operating in which there is the potential for reactive behaviours to arise if crew members are incapable of identifying and managing HEA Frustration Maslow (1943) defined the fundamental concept of frustration as a psychological threat or threat to the basic needs of the organism (p. 81). Many theorists define frustration using goal-based performance terms such as interference of goal attainment (Spector, 1978) or delay of goal events (Amsel, 1992) and hindrance of anticipated goals (Fox & Spector, 1999). From earlier readings, we know that goal attainment pressures motivate an individual to perform at a level that will assure attainment of the goal. Conflict arises when attainment of the goal is in doubt, creating a heightened emotional state. A crew member may become frustrated as a result of a threat such as a lengthy ground delay. In this example, the goal is the on-time-performance (OTP) which requires the aircraft to be ready to depart at a certain time and which is under threat by some activity observed by the flight crew. Maier (as cited by Brown and Farber [1951]) wrote that the antecedent for frustration theory is the confounding of problems governing behaviours characterized by a determined, unyielding posture. This may result from a request to delay the pushback from the gate as late passengers are arriving on another flight. The captain, with a schedule to maintain, may refuse the request from the ground staff with intense negotiations resulting in the captain refusing to yield his position. The Dollard-Miller model of organizational behaviour states that an aggression response is a natural consequence of goal interruption frustration and may be expressed or directed internally (Fox & Spector, 1999). In addition, the Dollard- Miller model states that the level of aggression response is predicated on the perceived level of punishment incurred for the aggressive response (Fox & Spector, 1999). The captain will consider how the organization will respond to his refusal to wait for the late connecting passengers. Brown and Farber (1951) stated that this abnormal fixation (p. 476) on the interference is determined by the strength of the emotion driving the frustration state. The captain may respond negatively if the request from the ground staff was made as a demand to wait for the late arriving passengers. 26

47 On the flight deck, the opportunity for goal interference frustration is not seat-specific yet it is situation-specific. Situation constraints are specific to the demands of the situation that is interfering with an individual s willingness to complete the task (Peters & O'Connor, 1980). An example of this is the pre-flight checklist for the Airbus A330. The captain and first officer must complete separate, but sequentially significant, segments of their checklists before they can proceed to the next section. If the captain, leaving the process to attend to an unrelated task, has interfered with the pre-flight checklist, the first officer may not proceed until the captain returns to complete his checklist sections. If additional goals to be obtained, such as OTP, are added to this mix of interferences, the situational constraints of frustration will be much greater (Storms & Spector, 1987). As the overseer of the overall process, the captain s position warrants more opportunities for situational constraint frustration The extent to which frustration can impede performance was demonstrated during an approach to land by a Jetstar flight crew at the Singapore Changi International Airport. The Australian Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) (2010) investigated the incident in which the two-member crew failed to put the landing gear down in time, requiring the crew to abort the landing and fly away to try another approach. The report stated that the captain s mobile phone was signalling that a text message had been received during the descent and that the first officer, the pilot flying, was distracted when several requests to the captain, including using the Jetstar RAISE communication method (p. 2) for bringing attention to a deviation from procedures, went unnoticed. When the captain did not acknowledge requests to assist in configuring the aircraft, the first officer looked over and, on seeing the captain preoccupied with his mobile phone, set the altitude himself (p. 2). The captain then informed the first officer that the autopilot off warning light was on. The first officer had turned the autopilot off at the beginning of the approach so that he could manually fly the aircraft. The preoccupied captain had not noticed. The first officer found the captain bringing this to his attention distracting (p. 2). The captain s behaviour of being a disengaged observer may have been established by a reaction to organizational frustration in which the captain had an emotional response to the first officer s frustration with the captain using his mobile phone (Spector, 1978; Storms & Spector, 1987). The response in itself was negative 27

48 emotions that increased physiological stimuli which might hinder future performance (Spector, 1978). Additionally, the first officer s use of the RAISE communication technique to get the captain s attention may have added to the emotional response. The emotional response is a form of aggression in which the captain is impeding the efforts of the first officer (Storms & Spector, 1987) by failing to act on a known incorrect aircraft landing configuration that required a missed approach (ATSB, 2010). These actions did not conform to the normal flow of responsibility for a twocrew airplane in which one pilot is flying and the other is monitoring progress and conducting all non-flight related tasks. There is a certain expectation that the task will be completed as established by standard operating procedures (SOPs) and as requested in a timely manner. In this sense, the first officer was experiencing situational constraints in that he had work-related goals that were interfered with by observing the captain using his mobile phone (Spector, 1978). This act removed him from the process and, as such, impeded the first officer s expectation of maintaining effective performance on the approach (Storms & Spector, 1987). Flight crews operate at their best when they are working together as a team but they are out of sorts when they perceive that the balance of team harmony is lost Unease There is a paucity of empirical research on clearly defining how the emotional state of unease impacts on human performance. Yet we know that when we feel that something is not quite right, we are experiencing unease (Caruso & Salovey, 2004). Humans worry as a natural function of having goals and expectations that interact with the environment to which they are exposed (Borkovek, Ray & Stober, 1998). If goal attainment is interrupted, it is human nature to respond emotionally to the internal experience that may be based on how much time it will take to search for a successful strategy to attain the goal (Higgins et al., 1997). We are motivated to change the negative perception of who we think we are if it is in conflict with who we would like to be and based on our notion of successful goal attainment. Jansz and Timmers (2002) defined this experience as emotional dissonance which is brought about by failing to accomplish the goal, prompting an initial feeling of anger and the follow-on associated emotion of unease, which is 28

49 experienced as a threat to our identity. This may be internalized as a perceived weakness in the eyes of others if the individual cannot successfully complete a task. Individuals who attempt to accomplish a given task requiring physical or cognitive effort have undertaken an internal emotional assessment of the image of attempting the task (Frijda, 2005). This experience is evaluated against past representations of similar experiences in which we have formed an emotional opinion (Izard, 1977). If the task is remembered as being difficult with a better than average chance of failure, individuals are motivated to increase their awareness of the task to prevent failure (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). If the individual is not motivated to improve, they develop the memory into a sense of worry in which the process has been elaborated as having negative outcomes (Gladstone & Parker, 2003). It is the interaction between the individual and the situation that determines the level of existential fear, interpreted as anxiety-driven awareness of the individual s ability (Walters, 2001). Individual differences in performance are determined by trait anxiety levels which vary depending on the individual s perception of task difficulty (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). A missed approach due to bad weather may be misconstrued by the pilot flying as a perceived weakness in the eyes of their peers creating a sense of unease for the crew members. On 19 February 1996, a Continental Airlines DC-9 landed with the gear up and slid off runway 27 with 82 passengers and five crew members on board at the Houston International Airport in Houston, Texas (NTSB, 1996). The captain was apparently preoccupied with the weather as he considered that it might have impacted on his tennis match later that day and may have missed the master caution illumination as he was looking outside. The first officer was preoccupied with flying the aircraft and, with a history of training troubles and captains reports that put him under review by management, may have lacked the assertiveness to raise the captain s attention to any situation that might upset him (NTSB, 1996). This lack of assertiveness may have been exacerbated by the first officer s emotional dissonance caused by a previous aircraft incident. The NTSB (1996) stated that, by the time both crew members were aware that there was a problem with the flaps, their actions were not adequate to configure the aircraft for landing and with 34 seconds before touchdown, the first officer asked want to take it around? and the captain replied no, that s alright, keep your 29

50 speed up here about, uh (p. 4). The first officer s unease with the approach was noted when he expressed his concern about the excessive speed of the approach to the captain I can t slow it down here now to which the captain replied you re alright even though the airspeed was 84 knots faster than the normal landing speed prompting the first officer to say we re just smokin in here (p. 4). The chain of events that led up to the accident began 15 minutes before the landing when the crew failed to properly complete the in-range checklist (NTSB, 1996). Without hydraulics pressure, the flaps and landing gear would have been inoperable and the crew had received several cues that there was a flap problem (NTSB, 1996). The NTSB (1996) report stated that the first officer called for the landing checklist after the gear-down call. Although he placed the gear handle in the down position, the captain never initiated the checklist (p. 3). The call for the landing checklist should have triggered a series of checks that would have identified that there was a problem with the flaps and that the gear had not gone down. Other cues missed included the absence of aircraft noise associated with gear extension, the lack of a nose-down change in the aircraft pitch attitude associated with landing flap configuration, and the gear unsafe warning horn which was on continuously after flap 25 was selected (NTSB, 1996). CRM training would analyse these events to identify potential threats and errors committed by the crews and to identify where the process breakdowns occurred. Coupled with the CVR transcripts, these provide valuable training that can have an impact on crews understanding of how events can break down within the environment in which they operate. However, CRM does not look at the cues that are present that can identify the beginning of the breakdown in the process, the cues that are creating confusion and unease as to why the flaps aren t working or what is causing the master caution light to illuminate. Recognition of these cues is part of the biological functions in each and every one of us. Our senses can register a change in engine noise or the kinaesthetic shift in pitch with flap activation before we are consciously aware of the change requiring action such as an adjustment of the controls or simply heightened awareness as part of the sequential cause and effect of a process. These emotions actuate within us a need to question everything and give us pause when there is a breakdown in the sequence of events. At the very least, 30

51 we should be able to push the throttles forward and fly away and live to fly another day Stress Defining stress within an aviation context requires an understanding of the various types of stress that are ever present. Staal (2004) stated that the mechanical stresses on the aircraft can be defined as metallurgic strain (p. 1). Selye (as cited by Sanders [1983]) defined stress as a specific response of the body to any demand made upon it (p. 62). This physiological definition does not have the emotional component that we currently understand from the multitude of definitions that cover stress (Lazarus, Deese, & Osler, 1952; Sanders, 1983; Staal, 2004). The emotional component is found within the cognitive definitions of stress as it relates to human performance in that the demands of the task outweigh the perception of ability (Stokes & Kite, 1994). When trying to understand stress, it might be better to develop an understanding of how the body responds to a stressful situation (Lazarus, 1993). This can be done if we consider stimulus, response and transaction as the three models which facilitate an understanding of the physiological and cognitive stressors to which we are exposed within our environment (Stokes & Kite, 1994; Cassidy, 1999; Staal, 2004) Stimulus The stimulus model is associated with the environmental cues such as temperature, workload and on-time pressures which we encounter that have a direct effect on us physiologically and cognitively (Cassidy, 1999). It is important to understand that these stimuli are the daily life experiences that create the stresses in our lives. We barely register most as inconveniences or minor irritants such as missing a green light when driving your car or hearing a loud siren when a fire truck is passing by. However, it is the major events that have a direct impact on individuals creating the most significant physiological and cognitive change to which we pay the most attention (Cassidy, 1999; Dinges, 2001). Using the Tenerife accident to analyse how stress was a major contributor to the worst aviation accident ever recorded, we can identify several direct impact stimuli to which the KLM and Pan Am crews were exposed (for more, see Air Line Pilots Association 31

52 [ALPA] [1978]; Netherlands Aviation Safety Board [NASB] [1977]; and Weick [1990]). Several aircraft including 747s had been diverted from Las Palmas airport to Los Rodeos airport due to an explosion at Las Palmas (ALPA, 1978). The Los Rodeos airport at Tenerife was a small airport, and space was limited and ill suited to handling 747-size aircraft. Additionally, the size of Los Rodeos was further constricted by the number of aircraft that had diverted thus making it difficult for the 747 aircraft to move around (ALPA, 1978). Weick (1990) stated that the Pan Am aircraft had to park behind the KLM aircraft in such a way that it could not depart until the KLM plane left (p. 572). Las Palmas reopened 15 minutes after Pan Am landed at Los Rodeos. However, the Pan Am 747 had to wait 2:30 hours with passengers on board for the KLM plane to be refuelled and reboarded (NASB, 1977; ALPA, 1978; Weick, 1990). The weather at Los Rodeos had begun to deteriorate as fog clouds began to cover the airport adding more pressure to the KLM and Pan Am 747s to depart (NASB, 1977; ALPA, 1978; Weick, 1990). The KLM crew were facing potentially career-ending government sanctions of fines, imprisonment, and loss of pilot license if further delays materialized as they were all about to hit the maximum flight time that they were legally allowed to fly on this trip (NASB, 1977; ALPA, 1978; Weick, 1990). The stimulus in this situation was organizational stress Response The response model is associated with the experience of the stress symptoms that we observe in ourselves as well as in others (Staal, 2004). These symptoms may be observed as emotional or behavioural change in interpersonal exchanges (Cassidy, 1999). Using the Tenerife analysis, we can identify some of the flight crew reactions to the stressors as they were recorded on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). Air Traffic Control (ATC) at Los Rodeos was understaffed and they were not accustomed to speaking English as the universal aviation language given that Spanish was spoken as their native language (NASB, 1977). The controllers slowed down their speech and paused occasionally as if to gather their thoughts before speaking (Weick, 1990). The reactions of the Pan Am crew to the lengthening delays undoubtedly were intensified by the fact that they had originally asked to circle over 32

53 Las Palmas because they had sufficient fuel to do so, a request that was denied by the Spanish controllers (Weick, 1990). After the refuelling and reboarding of the KLM 747 was completed, the aircraft were ready to move. The ALPA (1978) report stated that the Pan Am crew were a little irritated at the delay caused by the KLM crew (p. 14). The Pan Am captain requested to remain in place because the KLM 747 was taxiing down the runway but was told to proceed down the active runway by the ground controller who spoke with a heavy accent and who did not seem to fully comprehend what Pan Am was asking (p. 576). As Weick (1990) stated rather than attempt a potentially more complex negotiation to get permission to hold short, the Pan Am captain chose the more overlearned option of compliance with the controller s directive (p. 576). As part of the section on Behaviour, the NASB (1977) report examined how the weather stresses impacted on the KLM crew stating that the weather undoubtedly caused an increase in subconscious care to the detriment of conscious care, part of which was already directed toward take-off preparation (p. 42). Weick (1990) wrote that, during the take-off preparations, the captain seemed absent from all that was heard in the cockpit (p. 573). The ALPA (1978) report identified a change in the mood of the KLM captain and speculated that this might have been the moment when the captain became loaded up with all of the problems (p. 17) associated with that moment as the aircraft was taxiing to the end of the runway in preparation for take-off. The ALPA (1978) report stated that the CVR indicates that some concern was expressed [by the KLM crew] about the weather and its effect on their impending take-off at which time the captain said, hurry, or else it will close completely (p. 15) Transaction The transaction model is associated with the interaction of the cognitive and physiological adaptation to the stress (Stokes & Kite, 1994), an adaptation process by which the individual is capable of controlling the stress or being controlled by the stress. Using the Tenerife analysis, we can determine that the KLM crew were operating under high stress loads due to the need to depart and remain within the legal duty time limit to operate. The ALPA (1978) report stated that, after the KLM 747 was in position to take off, the captain pushed the throttles up to begin the takeoff roll without a take-off clearance. Under high stress loads, cognition is affected by 33

54 the stress negatively impacting on information processing and human performance (Staal, 2004). High stress environments may affect different crew members differently which can prompt dissimilar levels of cognitive impairment due to the stress (Gohm, Baumann, & Sniezek, 2001) As the demands of the task outweigh the perception of ability, a crew member may become noticeably agitated as the result of threats such as landing with a high crosswind component which creates both cognitive and physiological stress Conclusion Each of these examples reveals just how prevalent human emotions are in the chain of events that lead up to an event. Negative-based emotions due to an emergency or environmental factors impacting negatively on operations will reduce situational awareness (SA) down to the most salient item causing concern or fear. Salvaging a bad situation is difficult for any professional to walk away from, as we do not train for almost getting it right. However, when analysis of these events identified moments when if just one crew member had said stop, we would not be reading about them. As difficult as it has been for crew members to accept hot tub therapy and use it to make flying the safest mode of transportation, we can work to develop an understanding of human emotions that we can regulate to maintain situational awareness (SA) in any situation. 34

55 Chapter 2 Emotions Emotions are much like waves, we can't stop them from coming but we can choose which ones to surf. ~Jonatan Mårtensson~ 35

56 2.1 Introduction This chapter will explore the complex biological processes that precipitate physiological and cognitive change within an individual as a response mechanism to stimuli which has been encountered. Emotions are encountered every day yet they are hard to define and it is even harder to pinpoint where they reside. Scarcely researched until the end of the last century, the study of emotions is an emerging science that will enter the mainstream understanding of how and why individuals use emotions in their daily interactions within their environment. 2.2 What Exactly are Emotions? The world as it is known exists within a socially harmonious environment due to the adaptability of the individual emotional response mechanism. Individuals are quite content interacting within the environment as long as they can maintain emotional homeostasis and avoid change (Rimé, 2007). In interacting with people, places and things on a daily basis, emotions are used to guide behaviours through the multitude of rational decisions and irrational processes that may be encountered (Damasio, 1994; Stemmler & Wacker, 2010). An example of this would be how individuals negotiate with others to complete their portion of a project that is behind schedule. The individual response of the negotiator will be dependent on the degree of success of the goal attainment of the negotiation. This will elicit an emotional response that may range from joy that they are agreeable to working harder to get it done to frustration when they complain that they cannot get it done on time. Emotions can be private, internalized feelings of happiness or sadness generated from a single stimulus yet unconsciously externalized in facial expressions and body language for all to see (Damasio, 1994). We are capable of spontaneous emotional outbursts when we are expressing joy (Kreibig, Gendolla, & Scherer, 2010) as well as expressing anger when we feel threatened (Parkinson, 2008); however, most of us are equipped with emotional safety valves to prevent emotions from going off accidentally (Gross & Thompson, 2007). We would live in a very different world if we did not have emotions or could not control how or when we used them. 36

57 What exactly are emotions and why are they so universal in humans and animals alike? The answer to this question is quite elementary in the most complicated way. Hess and Thibault (2009) defined emotions as relatively shortduration intentional states that entrain changes in motor behavior, physiological changes, and cognitions. Whilst this definition appears to be pretty straightforward, there are a multitude of definitions and opinions as to what emotions are and how many emotions we have (Ben-Zeev, 1987; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 2000; Cowie & Cornelius, 2003; Salovey, Brackett, & Mayer, 2004). 2.3 Emotion Research We know through research that certain areas in the brain are activated by stimuli producing certain emotional responses but we cannot tell exactly where within the brain all emotions reside (LeDoux, 1998, 2003; Izard, 2009; Meyer & Damasio, 2009). We understand the process of emotional responses but we cannot say exactly what part of our unique personalities causes individuals to respond differently to a certain stimulus (Parkinson, 2008; Stemmler & Wacker, 2010). The lack of clarity as to the exact nature of emotions has been identified as the catalyst for the abatement of emotions research during the early part of the last century (Frijda, 1988) as cognitive psychology became the science of the times (Damasio, 1994, 2001). The literature tells us that there was a shift towards cognitive psychology as the primary focus of research during the last century confining emotions inquiry to a select few (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1998; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). Emotions research has, until recently, been omitted from mainstream psychology for the better part of the last century (Frijda, 1988; Damasio, 1994, 1999; Bagozzi, Baumgartner, & Pieters, 1998; LeDoux, 1998, 2000; Salovey et al., 2004). This is an interesting thought, considering that emotions have evolved for millions of years (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). Charles Darwin, Sigmund Freud and William James were some of the early pioneers of emotions research yet interest in their work did not last and emotions research would not resurface until the latter part of the 20 th century (Damasio, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 1998; Salovey et al., 2004). 37

58 Emotions are a fundamental aspect of everyday life as individuals react to significant events (Frijda, 1988). While not exclusive to humans, the motivation is the same for all in a quest for acceptance of pleasure and avoidance of pain (Frijda, 1988; Damasio, 1999; Forgas, Williams, & Laham, 2005). From these two key motivations, several significant emotions have been identified that are essential to our survival. Surprise, disgust, happiness, anger, sadness and fear are primary emotions that can be experienced every day (Darley, Glucksberg, & Kinchla, 1991; Damasio, 1999; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). While not as important to us as they once were to our hunter-gatherer ancestors who used emotions to avoid danger and maintain the social bonds of the familial group, yet emotions still help us to survive as a species (Damasio, 1994; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). 2.4 Biological Response Within emotions, there is a biological function that motivates an individual to action (Damasio, 1994; Hamann, 2001). For example, the physiological changes that occur in response to fear prepare the body for a fight or flight response (Darley et al. 1991; Damasio, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 1998; Levenson, 1999; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). The brain receives information that causes a chemical reaction within the body that triggers a response to the perceived threat (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1998). The heart rate rises, increasing blood flow to the muscles in preparation to fight or run away from the threat (Darley et al., 1991; LeDoux, 1998; Levenson, 1999). The body releases chemicals to feed the muscles and to act as painkillers if needed, and breathing increases to bring in more oxygen (Darley et al., 1991). These physiological processes all happen without conscious effort to regulate the functions or to understand the exact nature of the threat (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1998). Unconscious physiological responses are not exclusively activated by negative emotions but can be triggered by a pleasurable event such as when we smile at the sight of a friend or loved one (Llu, Karasawa, & Weiner, 1992). 2.5 Emotional Response In their basic form, emotional responses reflect the positive or negative outcomes of goal attainment as a function of short-term working memory (LeDoux, 1998; Gross & D'Ambrosio, 2004; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Parkinson, 2008). The 38

59 strength of the response will be determined by the outcome of the goal attainment (Bagozzi et al., 1998; Kreibig et al., 2010). The captain of the notorious flight that almost ended my aviation career may have placed a negative value on flying in the clouds that induced his paralysis at the controls in what may possibly be compared to the extreme fear conditions of catatonia or tonic immobility (TI). At the other end of the emotional spectrum, we find the positive interpersonal approach that can be used to maintain an effective team environment. Emotion regulation (ER) is considered a major component of leadership and is facilitated at levels beyond the basic description to highlight the point of importance to the user/manager. This may be conveyed in a scenario where a first officer is fatigued because of a newborn at home and is not maintaining maximum situational awareness (SA). The captain who may also have children may recognise the difficulty that the first officer may be experiencing while struggling to keep up and the captain may be more attentive and helpful in reminders and requests when workloads increase. The captain can do this without adding an extra burden by admonishing the first officer that he is behind in his duties. Emotion regulation (ER) using empathy is a key component of regulating affect. Fear is pain arising from the anticipation of evil. ~Aristotle~ Neurocognitive Of the many emotions that we will experience, fear and the substrates associated with fear have been keeping us out of trouble for some time (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1998). The brain continuously receives information about our environment, even while thinking about something else (Damasio, 1994). If we feel that something is wrong, we divert attention to it. We internalize the information and, if required, we have an emotional response to this feeling (Damasio, 1994, 1999). Working memory matches past experiences stored in long-term memory (LTM) with environmental stimuli impacting on our senses to trigger the emotional response that spurs the body to action (Izard, 1977; Frijda, 1988; LeDoux, 1998; Endsley &Garland, 2000). Emotions give us information about our surroundings that are key to our survival (Caruso & Salovey, 2004). 39

60 Environmental information must first go through cognitive processing to give it meaning (Morin, 2004). Receptor cells that are part of the sight, hearing, smell and kinaesthetic systems receive information about the environment that is stored as a record in the sensory register (Ellis & Hunt, 1983; Endsley & Garland, 2000). The sensory register is quite large so that it can accommodate the vast amount of environmental information that it receives. This pre-categorical physical energy has no meaning at this point in the process and must go through a pattern recognition procedure to bring understanding (Ellis & Hunt, 1983). Pattern recognition involves an interaction between the sensory register and long-term memory via short-term storage and working memory to find past experiences that match the current input which gives us a sense of what is happening here and now (Ellis & Hunt, 1983; Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996; LeDoux, 1998; Endsley & Garland, 2000). I will try to explain some of the cognitive processes behind this particular flight, beginning with the modal memory model, and explaining why the working memory is a better model for the cognitive processes in aviation. It has been said that pilot training is like trying to drink water from a fire hose. The sensory register is working at full volume from the first day that a pilot enters training. Enormous amounts of rote memorization of information impacting on the short-term memory must be semantically processed to be stored in long-term memory (LTM) (Hunt & Ellis, 2004). Everything from the myriad of FAA regulations and procedures to understanding how to read a weather chart is taught at ground school. Most airlines include company standard operating procedures (SOPs), navigation procedures, communications procedures, aircraft systems, aircraft procedures, emergency procedures, human factors training and flight manoeuvres. All of this occurs before you ever sit in the airplane. Ground school generally lasts around three to four weeks which does not leave much time to understand all that you are taking in. Short-term memory is running overtime trying to process all of this information so that it can end up in long-term memory (LTM) for future use. Once the actual flight training begins, I believe that the concept of working memory is a better description as it is put to the test due to the enormous rate at which information bombards the pilot. From the moment the pilot picks up the checklist to begin the engine start procedures, all sensory systems are receiving vast amounts of information at the 40

61 same time. When the engine start switch is pressed, the central executive will retrieve from long-term memory (LTM) (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996; Matlin, 1998; Hunt & Ellis, 2004) the starter run time limits, oil pressure limits, oil temperature limits, exhaust gas temperature limits and engine RPM limits that will all need to be monitored. The central executive will allocate capacity to the visuo-spatial sketchpad (VSS) (Matlin, 1998; Hunt & Ellis, 2004) to process information from the engine instruments that will show that the pressures and temperatures are operating normally as required. The central executive will also allocate capacity to the phonological loop (PL) (Hunt & Ellis, 2004) to process the engine sound when it is starting in order to detect any abnormalities. If it is a normal start, the central executive will allocate capacity to the episodic buffer (EB) (Hunt & Ellis, 2004) to continue with the other engine starts using the same processes. If there were an abnormal start or an emergency, the central executive would be required to retrieve the emergency procedure from long-term memory (LTM) (Hunt & Ellis, 2004). Once the aircraft is up and running normally, the central executive is processing information as well as allocating capacity (Hunt & Ellis, 2004) in what I will describe as three levels of flight cognition. When the aircraft is on the ground moving towards the assigned runway, three levels of attention are required that will work with all subsystems of the central executive (Hunt & Ellis, 2004). At the lowest level, the central executive can allocate capacity (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996; Hunt & Ellis, 2004) for a subconscious level of monitoring of the aircraft systems. Here, other tasks are performed while the pilot unconsciously monitors the airplane systems until a problem is experienced at which point the pilot consciously raises this to a higher level of attention. At the medium level, the central executive increases capacity (Matlin, 1998; Hunt & Ellis, 2004) so that all subsystems can listen to the radios for Air Traffic Control (ATC) instructions for the aircraft, as well as monitoring the traffic flow around the airport and noting anything, such as another aircraft landing that will taxi off the runway in front of your airplane, that may become a factor. At the highest level of attention, the central executive makes decisions and performs operations that are task specific (Hunt & Ellis, 2004). In this example, these would be the final tasks on the checklist prior to take-off, responding to any radio calls directed to that flight, as well as verbally communicating the progress of the checklist and relaying taxiing or flight instructions from ATC to the 41

62 other pilot. These three levels of flight cognition are required in all phases of flight from engine start to shutdown. Within the human factors field, there is a process for identifying and managing errors which is called the Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM) (Klinect et al., 1999). The purpose of this model is to assist the flight crews with identifying threats to any and all phases of the flight and to manage any situation before it becomes an accident (Klinect et al., 1999). In my case, if I had received this training prior to the flight to Winston-Salem, I could have identified that the captain was a threat to the safety of that flight before we had left the airport. Crew Resource Management (CRM) is another aspect of human factors training and was developed to improve communications between crew members (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). At the time, I had not been through much CRM training and still believed that you spoke to the captain only when he or she spoke to you. I was experiencing severe cognitive dissonance before we even left the crew room because I believed that the captain was not mentally ready for that flight. According to Kahlbaum (as cited by Moskowitz [2004]), the typical signs of the captain s condition may be described as a state in which the individual remains entirely motionless, without speaking, and with a rigid, mask-like face, the eyes focused at a distance; they appear devoid of any will to move or react to any stimuli; there may be fully developed waxen flexibility as in cataleptic states with the general impression expressed by such individuals being one of profound mental anguish, or an immobility induced by severe mental shock. We know this in more general terms as beinh scared stiff (Moskowitz, 2004). I believe that the captain was experiencing this condition before we left the airport and it reached full strength as we entered the cloud layer on the ILS approach into Winston-Salem. This condition, the cataleptic state, may be a fear-based state that closely resembles the animal defence strategy known as tonic immobility (TI) (Moskowitz, 2004). Gallup and Maser (as cited by Moskowitz [2004]) conducted a study that showed that there are numerous parallels between catatonia and TI such as immobility, inability to communicate and an inability to feel pain. According to Krystal (as cited by Moskowitz [2004]), catatonic conditions in humans experienced as a state of profound helplessness are very much like animal immobility as a surrender response in the face of unavoidable danger. I believe this 42

63 to be what I was experiencing on that flight. According to Gallup and Maser (as cited by Moskowitz [2004]), catatonia contains the evolutionary-based fragments of primitive defences against predators and does not function correctly under high stress levels. Kahlbaum (as cited by Moskowitz [2004]) viewed catatonia as a progressive disorder with strong links to affective and organic conditions, usually beginning with a change in mood but sometimes starting abruptly, particularly after a very severe physical or mental stress [such as] a very terrifying experience. Some have previously debated the presence of tonic immobility in humans who have been victims of a sexual assault (Suarez & Gallup, 1979; Galliano, Noble, Travis, & Puechi, 1993) or of an airline disaster (D Johnston, 1984, cited in Gallup and Rager [1996] as cited by Moskowitz [2004]). There are many theories as to where within the brain emotions reside (LeDoux, 1998). Most theories show that emotions develop in several areas of the brain interacting with the various brain functions that we are not consciously attending to and with those that we are (Damasio, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 1998; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). Cognitive processing begins when the body sends the brain information via the peripheral nervous system and through chemicals released into the bloodstream depending on the type of stimulus received (Darley et al., 1991; Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1998). Once the stimulus is identified from past experiences, we associate past emotions with the stimulus. If this is a new experience, we remain neutral emotionally until further information associated with the new experience promotes negative or positive responses. These then become a record in long-term memory (LTM). The amount of environmental information that bombards the sensory register is enormous. While this information is processed unconsciously, we pay more attention to information that is consistent with our current surroundings. This unconscious cognitive process is controlled by the central executive which allocates processing space to items that require more attention. Tompkins (as cited by Izard [1977]) defined this as a neurophysiologic emotional response that, depending on the type of stimulus, would elicit a learned response of startle, fear or interest that are all part of our biological survival skills. Among these responses, fear signals danger and we believe that something is wrong. 43

64 How an individual responds to the situation-driven trigger event depends on the level of pattern recognition of and emotional association with that event. For example, if you lose an engine on take-off, you are startled initially by the suddenness of the failure. The fear response may take over while the emergency is being attended to. Upon successful completion of the emergency response, interest takes over and reflection strengthens the association in LTM. All of the sights, sounds and kinaesthetic feelings are now a record in LTM. The emotional impact of the emergency is also recorded in LTM. Sometimes, the trigger event is not as well defined as an engine failure causing, instead of an increase in awareness, a lack of understanding due to the limited amount of input on the sensory register. This could include a flickering master caution warning light, a certain smell or a subtle change in ambient aircraft noise. The central executive allocates more processing space and attention is diverted to develop an understanding of the situation. We feel that something is not right but we are not sure what that something is. The development of understanding from the cognitive processing of stimuli in working memory and LTM will carry an emotional component as well to assist with decision making. This will register as either a positive or negative emotion from the reward or punishment component of the two most basic emotions, pleasure or pain. The successful landing in bad weather will provide positive valence thereby increasing the confidence of future success, whereas a go-around due to the aircraft being out of the approach parameters will generate a negative valence towards flying in bad weather creating doubt of future success (Solomon & Stone, 2002) Emotional Decision Making Emotions give us information about our surroundings that are key to our survival (Frijda, 1986; Damasio, 2003; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). If we feel that something is wrong, we divert attention to it. We internalize the information and, if required, we have an emotional response to this feeling (Damasio, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 1998). Cognitive processes match past experiences stored in LTM with stimuli to trigger the emotional response that spurs the body to action (Izard, 1977; Frijda, 1988; LeDoux, 1998; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Endsley & Garland, 2000). While this information is processed unconsciously, we pay more attention to information that is consistent with our current surroundings and goals (LeDoux, 44

65 1998, 2000; Matlin, 1998; Damasio, 1999; Baddeley, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007). How an individual responds to a situation-driven trigger event depends on the level of pattern recognition and emotional association to that event (Izard, 1977; Ellis & Hunt, 1983; Frijda, 1988; LeDoux, 1998, 2000; Endsley & Garland, 2000; Baddeley, 2003). In everyday situations, the decision making process is greatly influenced by affective states (Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000; Schwarz, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Decisions made under emotionally-charged conditions could easily result in poor outcomes. Negative emotions result in a bottom-up decision-making process that takes longer and is labour intensive in that it utilizes higher-level cognitive resources (Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Chuah, Dolcos, Chen, Zhen, Parimal, & Chee, 2010), while positive emotion decision-making may be motivated by a previous favourable outcome requiring a top-down limited evaluation of pre-existing patterns (Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Chuah et al., 2010). These affective processes present potentially significant problems in situations that require accuracy in time-constricted environments. The affective processes that are learned biological responses defined by Tompkins (as cited by Izard [1977]) as neurophysiologic emotional responses are known to us as "fight or flight" Emotional Behaviours It is quite natural to react emotionally to certain situations that facilitate activation of the physiological response mechanism without consciously participating in the cognitive processes constructing the response to the event. Biologically inherited from our ancestors, we continue to behave in an atavistic manner to ensure the survival of the species (Frijda, 1986; Damasio, 1994). While not all emotions require a primitive expression of intent, we still behave in a way which is defined by our environment. Emotional responses are based on a match or mismatch of goals or expectations eliciting either positive or negative emotions (Frijda, 1986). Ideally, emotional homeostasis is maintained so as not to experience the emotional highs and lows that we are capable of achieving. When confronted with a situation that is a mismatch of environmental goals, an associated negative emotion is activated. Heightened emotional activity (HEA) is 45

66 defined as an emotional response to perceived threats encountered during high-risk endeavours. In their previous study, Drury et al. (2012) found that airline flight crews responded emotionally to operational threats they encountered some of which were mismanaged leading to errors. While a causal relationship cannot be demonstrated, previous research showed that elevated emotions increase physiological and cognitive responses to threatening situations (Ben-Zeev, 1987) and thus the motivation to negotiate for an understanding or solution to the threat may take precedence as a form of emotion regulation (Lazarus et al., 1952; Gross, 2002). Within the social confines of the flight deck, interpersonal communication is in a constant flux of information negotiation as task-driven normative discourse. The process can be greatly influenced by the emotion of the individuals involved. Positive emotions belay a willingness to exchange information without incident (Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2006). Negative emotions manifest a confrontational style which decreases the likelihood of a mutual agreement or satisfactory conclusion (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). A shift on the part of one member from positive to negative emotions during negotiations marks a lack of goal attainment promoting an aggressive stance towards the other member in an attempt to achieve a goal (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). If the other member is unyielding to the proposed demands, signifying a loss of position or lost goal attainment, an increase in negative emotions facilitates a breakdown in negotiations. A successful outcome requires all parties involved to regulate the level of emotions within the boundaries of the negotiations (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998) Emotion Regulation Gross (1998) defined emotion regulation (ER) as the process by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions. The processes by which these emotions take place are quite autonomic in nature, such as when we see a snake nearby, but can be quite conscious when we recognise a friend (Damasio, 1994; Gross, 2002). The effects of autonomic emotional responses to threatening events range from mild reactions which can increase performance to performance paralysis arising from high levels of anxiety (Lazarus et al., 1952; Druckman & Olekains, 2008). Internal 46

67 conflicts arise when confronted with the threatening situation and the need to complete the task (Lazarus et al., 1952). Threatening situations represent change, facilitating an adaptive approach to recovering psychological as well as physiological homeostasis (Burchfield, 1979). The emotion regulating process begins with an emotional response to a perceived threat. The level of HEA response is directly proportional to the intensity of the threat (LeDoux, 1998). An uncontained engine failure and accompanying fire will generate higher emotions than a single generator failure. An individual crew member s responses will be predicated on a multitude of personal factors impacting on the crew member. Crew member cognitive performance will improve with mild levels of stress but will decline as stress levels increase (Lazarus et al., 1952; Chuah et al., 2010). Crew cohesiveness depends in part on the internal and external locus of control experienced by both crew members (Storms & Spector, 1987) if they are to regulate their emotional response and work together with a common mental model to mediate the threat. If only one crew member is capable of emotion regulation, the team may still be able to achieve marginal or better success at threat mediation. If neither crew member is capable of emotion regulation, the probability of a successful outcome to threat mediation is low. Add to this environment, the probability of fatigue-induced performance decline, associated with the multitude of airline operations that flight crews will encounter, and the need for regulating emotions increases exponentially to ensure safe outcomes Emotional Intelligence Negotiating interpersonal group communications requires the team members to understand the emotional processing by the team and the individual needs for goal attainment (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). This has led to a resurgence in researching the human experience of emotional awareness in the last 30 years (Frijda, 1988). Researching emotions usually begins with a review of the concept of emotional intelligence, broadly developed as a comprehensive assessment of emotional expression (Salovey & Mayer, 1989). To understand emotional intelligence, it is important to understand emotions. As Salovey and Mayer (1989) wrote [e]motions typically arise in response to an event, either internal or external, that has a positively or negatively valenced meaning for the 47

68 individual (p. 186). Understanding the nature of emotions is only part of the overall processes that define group interactions. Salovey and Mayer (1989) defined the process of awareness as emotional intelligence is the ability to monitor one s own and others feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one s thinking and actions (p. 189). Managing the moment when a threat is encountered will require a keen awareness of the emotional levels of the group to regulate the responses to the threat of not achieving a goal (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Internalizing the threat response facilitates control of the individual emotional response which is identified as emotion regulation. 2.6 Emotions The research conducted here shows us that emotions are prevalent within the aviation domain. Historically, we have chosen to ignore the significance of affect as an interpersonal moderator of flight crew interaction. Often considered insignificant and without value, yet we use emotions to negotiate our way towards goal attainment daily. Flight crews acknowledge the presence of emotions while preferring a neutral but fair environment of mutual respect on the flight deck. Crew member skill sets would be enhanced if they were armed with an understanding of how to use emotions to spot potential threats or control a situation by regulating the emotional response. 2.7 Fatigue Airline flight crews are continually exposed to the physiological and cognitive decline associated with extended periods of stress and fatigue. These extended periods increase the probability of negative emotions controlling the decisionmaking process and thus increasing the potential for making errors. The normal flight deck environment can operate between the calm of cruise flight and the intensity of the descent and approach to land. The best example of this can be found in the KAL flight 2322 accident in Cheju, Korea in which the first officer tried to initiate a go-around manoeuvre at 30 feet while the captain was trying to land with a second attempt at a go-around when the aircraft was on the runway in full reverse and braking action (Gooderham, 1994). Short-haul airline operations generally 48

69 operate multiple take-offs and landings as part of a 24/7 operation, sometimes with short layovers (Gander et al., 1998a). Long-haul airline operations are conducted over longer flight sequences, generally with extended layovers in a different time zone disrupting circadian rhythms (Samel et al., 1997; Gander et al., 1998b). Both operational schedules are therefore associated with disrupted sleep patterns and fatigue-related risk. 2.8 Performance Aviation professionals working in high-risk environments are generally quite capable of mitigating emotions, fatigue and technical performance issues as they arise. Emotive moments are by nature short term and can be dealt with as they occur but, during relationship or task conflict, the intensity of the initial emotional response may create additional team conflicts. Fatigue-induced performance decline can be resolved with quality rest and sleep. Technical performance issues may be short in duration, such as those associated with flying in adverse weather, or corrected simply through more flight time to improve the skill sets necessary to manage such issues. The pairing of any two of the three processes may not present insurmountable difficulties for individual management. Problems are more likely to arise when HEA, fatigue and performance decline occur simultaneously creating a considerable challenge in a high-risk environment (Figure 8.1). American International Airways Flight 808, which landed short of the runway in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba can be better understood when using the set theory of overlapping issues to illustrate the three problems that the crew encountered which were exhibited during the accident sequence. 2.9 Set Theory Heightened Emotional Activity The research conducted here shows us that emotions are prevalent within the aviation domain. Historically, we have chosen to ignore the significance of affect as an interpersonal moderator of flight crew interaction. Although often considered insignificant and without value, emotions are used by us daily to negotiate our way towards goal attainment. Flight crews acknowledge the presence of emotions while preferring a neutral but fair environment of mutual respect on the flight deck. Crew member skill sets would be enhanced if they were armed with an understanding of how 49

70 to use emotions to spot potential threats or control a situation by regulating the emotional response Fatigue Flight crews are continually exposed to the physiological and cognitive decline associated with extended periods of stress and fatigue. These extended periods increase the probability of negative emotions controlling the decision-making process and thus increasing the potential for making errors. The normal flight deck environment can operate between the calm of cruise flight and the intensity of the descent and approach to land. Short-haul airline operations generally operate multiple take-offs and landings as part of a 24/7 operation, sometimes with short layovers (Gander et al., 1998a). Longhaul airline operations are conducted over longer flight sequences, generally with extended layovers in a different time zone disrupting circadian rhythms (Samel et al., 1997; Gander et al., 1998b) Performance Aviation professionals working in high-risk environments are generally quite capable of mitigating emotions, fatigue and technical performance issues as they arise. Emotive moments are by nature short term and can be dealt with as they occur but, during relationship or task conflict, the intensity of the initial emotional response may create additional team conflicts. Fatigue-induced performance decline can be resolved with quality rest and sleep. Technical performance issues may be short in duration, such as those associated with flying in adverse weather, or corrected simply through more flight time to improve the skill sets necessary to manage such issues. The pairing of any two of the three processes may not present insurmountable difficulties for individual management. Problems are more likely to arise when HEA, fatigue and performance decline occur simultaneously creating a considerable challenge in a high-risk environment (Figure 2.1). American International Airways Flight 808 (NTSB, 1993), which landed short of the runway in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba can be better understood when using the set theory of overlapping issues to illustrate the three problems that the crew encountered which were exhibited during the accident sequence. 50

71 Figure 2.1: Set Theory of HEA, Fatigue and Performance Difficulty 2.10 Conclusion Emotions are a vital part of everyday existence for individuals negotiating the social environment within which they exist. Whilst we do not know the exact location within the brain where emotions reside, we do know that we could not survive without them. Emotions are biologically inherited for fight or flight responses when encountering threats yet research now shows that we can regulate our responses to minimize their impact in order to maintain control. Emotions assist in the decision-making process during negotiations and yet can hinder performance when a desired goal outcome is unattainable. Understanding emotions and how best to use them will assist in reducing performance decline. Sadness is almost never anything but a form of fatigue. ~Andre Gide~ 51

72 Chapter 3 Research Methods Research is what I'm doing when I don't know what I'm doing. ~Wernher Von Braun~ 52

73 3.1 Overview Conducting research on emotional responses to perceived threats in a highrisk environment like commercial aviation is not without its problems. The first hurdle was to identify and define the emotions that were common enough in aviation yet the literature on research into emotions in aviation was scarce. The second hurdle was deciding the best method for collecting the data from the emotive flight decks. Finally, what would be the best method for analysing the data? It was decided that a mixed-method approach which would look at the issues from different perspectives would be the best way to conduct an exploratory study into emotions on the flight deck. The multiple approach method would provide the data needed to be able to draw conclusions from the triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative approaches. After defining the five emotion behavioural markers, a reliability study was conducted by aviation professionals observing video vignettes of emotive flight deck scenarios to identify any of the five behavioural markers. The next phase of the research was an observation study conducted to observe flight crew in their operational environment with data collected by qualified observers on any threat identified and emotional responses to that threat. Additionally, crew members were questioned during the observation study about their restricted sleep in the previous 24 and 48 hours prior to signing on. Finally, a qualitative study was done to elicit information from the crew members about their experiences with emotions on the flight deck. 3.2 Objectives Study 1 Reliability The aim of Study 1 was to define and establish the reliability of a set of behavioural markers that would provide individuals with the skills to consistently record heightened emotional activity (HEA). The five behavioural markers were identified after a thorough review of the research literature and aviation accident reports in which emotions were identified. The five HEA behavioural markers were: confusion, disagreement, frustration, unease and stress. These markers would be able to be deployed in a range of research and operational contexts to enable a better 53

74 understanding of the relationship between heightened emotional activity (HEA) and performance. 1. Can HEA be identified by other crew members? 2. How consistently are the HEA markers observed? 3. How consistently will the lack of HEA be observed? Study 2 Observation The aim of Study 2 was to establish a relationship between HEA and operational safety. Using the Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM) as a structured framework for analysing crew performance during a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), the study examined whether HEA mediates threat response and outcome. 1. What is the relationship between the observed occurrence of HEA and (in)effective threat and error management by the crew? 2. What is the relative pervasiveness of the five core HEA behavioural markers? Study 3 Restricted Sleep The aim of Study 3 was to examine the relationship between restricted sleep and HEA using recent sleep history (i.e. sleep in the prior 24 hours and 48 hours) and observable markers of emotional activity. 1. Is there a significant relationship between the occurrence of HEA and recent sleep? 2. Does restricted sleep influence HEA thereby causing errors? Study 4 Semi-Structured Interviews The aim of Study 4 was to elicit a working knowledge of HEA on a flight deck from subject matter experts (SMEs). A semi-structured interview process provided a medium in which pilots discussed past experiences and events they had witnessed. The intent was to collect data that comprised first-hand knowledge of HEA on the flight deck. 1. Can pilots identify the events that trigger HEA? 2. What do pilots describe as the nature of HEA on a flight deck? 3. To what level do pilots believe that they manage HEA? 4. To what level do pilots believe that they have resolved HEA? 54

75 3.3 Ethics Approval Studies 1, 2 and 3 The University of South Australia Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) approved these studies: Ethics protocol P114/08 "Development of emotional intelligence (EQ) standards for non-technical skills derived from data taken from a XXXXXXXX Airlines Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA)." Study 4 The University of South Australia HREC approved this study: Ethics protocol P327/09 The management of Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA): an interview study of self-management strategies among commercial aviation crews. 3.4 Participant Recruitment Study 1 Participants in the reliability study comprised 27 qualified commercial airline short-haul and long haul pilots, captains and first officers. Due to the strict anonymity of the study, the data remained de-identified. The airlines approved a request to conduct research with their pilot groups. With the permission of the training facilitator conducting the training, the pilots were asked to participate in the research. All of the participants volunteered to take part in the study. Participants were recruited from airline recurrent and captain upgrade training courses that were being conducted at training facilities in Australia in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne Studies 2 and 3 Prior to the start of the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), the organization sent all employees notification of the commencement of the LOSA and concurrent University of South Australia research associated with the LOSA. Participation was strictly voluntary in either the LOSA or the research component. Flight crews were approached prior to the beginning of each flight sector and were given an opportunity to decline to participate in the observation and research. The flight crews that did participate were asked to read the research participant information form and sign a University of South Australia ethics consent form (Appendices 2.1 and 2.2). 55

76 3.4.3 Study 4 Participants were recruited as subject matter experts (SMEs) for the semistructured interviews using a snowball technique for referrals amongst known associates flying in the industry. The SMEs had to be current commercial airline pilots who had been flying with an airline for one year. A snowball referral technique is used when the topic may be of a sensitive nature amongst individuals who have shared similar experiences (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Noy, 2008). 3.5 Measures Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) Behavioural Markers Affective responses to threats are defined here as heightened emotional activity (HEA). HEA is expressed in the form of questions, statements, utterances and body language that are biologically-evolved responses to changes in perception of the nature of or level of threats in the environment (LeDoux, 1998). Each of the HEA markers had three of the most distinctive features described by Ekman (1992a, 1992b) in that they were universally understood, activated a physiological response and they had antecedent events. The five HEA markers were selected after a thorough search of aviation accident analysis literature as well as official government accident reports in which affect was discussed. The five HEA markers represented unambiguous states that actuate an increase in emotions. They comprise: confusion, disagreement, frustration, unease and stress Inter-Rater Reliability Flight crew members undertake many levels of training to become qualified to operate the controls of a modern airliner. However, once they are flying the line, the training does not stop, as they will continue to be assessed on technical and nontechnical skills every three to six months depending on organizational or regulatory requirements. The difficulty lies in maintaining a training staff that can accommodate continuous training cycles whilst providing the same quality of assessment without variability throughout the group. The organization must have a high level of inter-rater reliability to ensure the assessment process is the same for everyone. It is important for the rating process to be continuously validated amongst the training group to provide consistency in the assessment of all key skills and constancy over time (Holt, Hansberger, & Boehm-Davis, 2002). This is 56

77 accomplished by "training the trainers" to the same high standards that they require of the flight crew members Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) Program Study 2 was conducted as part of a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) which the University of South Australia Human Factors team was asked to conduct for a Regular Public Transport (RPT) airline. The University of Texas Human Factors Research Project developed the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) which has become the international standard for organizations to observe flight crew performance (ICAO, 2002). Described as a programme for the management of human error (ICAO, 2002), the LOSAs are conducted using subject matter experts (SMEs) to observe flight crews technical and non-technical performance during normal operations (ICAO, 2002; FAA, 2006). The LOSAs are detailed observations of flight crews strengths and weaknesses in which the transference of training strategies is identified as viably sound for managing human error on the line (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999; FAA, 2006). The quality, detail and depth of the observations made the LOSA a perfect platform from which to initiate an exploratory study into emotions on the flight deck. The success of the LOSA program has prompted the international regulatory agencies to mandate that airlines include regular audits as a requirement for operating within most global markets Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM) The LOSA method uses the Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM) for observing and evaluating how flight crews may or may not manage the threats and errors they encounter, providing data from which the development of organizational changes to training or standard operating procedures (SOPs) may be required. This will provide the data for spotting trends in the success or failure of crew members in managing HEA. Threat and error management provides organizations with a measureable standard against which flight crew s performance of non-technical skills can be observed and evaluated. Helmreich, Klinect and Wilhelm (1999) stated that TEMM was developed as part of the CRM program to facilitate analysis of all aspects of error, defences and outcome. The failure or success of defences such as CRM behaviours can also be evaluated (p. 3). The University of Texas Human Factors Research Project developed TEMM as a countermeasure for flight crews so 57

78 they could mitigate threats that may impact on operational performance and the safety of flight (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999; ICAO, 2002). Heightened emotional responses to a perceived threat are a threat to interpersonal communications if they diminish team operational performance to the point of distraction. 3.6 Methodology HEA Markers' Reliability Study 1 was conducted to establish the reliability of the HEA markers used in Studies 2 and 3, namely Managing Operational Threats and Restricted Sleep and Negative Affective States. The participants were seated in classrooms located in three different airline training centres. Of the eight video vignettes, six videos included observable HEA and two were emotionally neutral. The participants were provided with an instruction form and a score sheet. The average length of the eight videos was one minute. The participants were asked to identify any behaviour that may be associated with any of the five HEA markers by placing an X in the corresponding box on the HEA Marker Selection Form. If the participants did not observe any behaviour that was indicative of the five HEA markers, they were instructed to leave the corresponding box blank (Appendices 1.1 and 1.2) Observations Observing people in their natural environment is one of the best ways to understand human behaviour. Coolican (2004) stated that the emphasis is on the researcher observing a relatively unconstrained segment of a person s freely chosen behaviour (p. 119). It is the participant s natural behaviour that is observed, at play or work, and it is not manipulated by the researcher (Lipinski & Nelson, 1974). Over time, the participant observer is forgotten and becomes one of the group, establishing a natural routine (Coolican, 2004). However, it must be noted that the very presence of the observer may cause some of the subjects to alter their behaviour to perform for the observer (Harris, 1982). The participants of the LOSA/study knew up front that they were going to participate in a structured observation while doing their job in a non-jeopardy environment. Data were collected by 15 trained observers chosen from the pilot ranks as well as from within the training department of the airline, the University of South 58

79 Australia and training captains from other airlines. These observers undertook a formal process of observer training which focused on the standardization of observations and established acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability (Thomas, 2003). The observers were selected according to the criteria of: 1) having recent operational airline experience; and 2) being approved by management and the pilots union. The observers collected data from the flight deck observer seat during normal flight operations. Crew performance data were collected and recorded using the LOSA Collection Form (Appendix 2.3) from 302 flight sectors of normal airline operations of the airline involved in this study. The data were not collected from simulator training sessions. The observers used an international standard framework for coding the threat and error management (TEM) of flight crew, and for rating the non-technical skills used by crew to manage these threats and errors (ICAO, 2002; FAA, 2006). In addition, observers collected data using a new coding framework of behavioural markers for heightened emotional activity (HEA) Semi-Structured Interviews Each of the participants was asked the same series of questions with adjustments made to the question order to facilitate the information stream of their experiences with emotive events (Dearnley, 2005). The semi-structured interview (SSI) is well suited for collecting data on perceptions and impressions of personal experiences that may include sensitive data (Barriball & While, 1993). The participants were asked probing questions (Appendices 3.1 and 3.2.2) which were used to encourage them to speak freely of their experiences; the order of the questions permitted a free-flowing conversational style. The interview permitted follow-on questions to encourage the development of the topic (Dearnley, 2005) by including how did that make you feel? and what did you do next? The interviews were transcribed with four key themes identified. The intent was to collect data that comprised first-hand knowledge of HEA on the flight deck. The four key themes were as follows: Triggers Events that trigger a cognitive attentional control and biological response to stimuli, which are in direct conflict with goal attainment, and can be moderated depending on the strength of the stimuli (Kanske & Kotz, 2011). The emotional state that is retrieved 59

80 from memory will drive behavioural interactions, whether positive or negative, with others and influence future behaviours (Damasio, 2001). Nature of HEA Emotional responses to trigger stimuli, which are goal dependent, are determined by the strength of the perceived value of the goal (Higgins et al., 1997). This may be driven by the effect on safety of a flight event such as a master caution light or a team conflict in terms of the exact nature of the emergency. Management of HEA The participant s actions to regulate emotions in a situation of organizational or interpersonal conflict (Lawrence, Troth, Jordan, & Collins, 2011). Emotions do not regulate the response to an event but make it probable that there will be a response (Gross, 2002). The regulation is generally directed towards maintaining emotional homeostasis. Resolution of HEA The participant s framing of the conflict will influence how they perceive the outcome, whether negatively or positively, which will in turn influence how they resolve the heightened emotional activity (HEA) (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). 3.7 Data Analysis Study 1 analysed the inter-rater reliability data using SPSS v.18 for Cronbach's Alpha for dichotomous data to find the level of agreement between multiple raters. Reliability was established for individual ratings using two-way random single effects, and the mean for all ratings by using two-way random average effects. Analysis of Cronbach s Alpha data for strength of agreement was done using nomenclature labels with the interpretation values of: < 0.00, Poor; , Slight; , Fair; , Moderate; , Substantial; , Almost Perfect (Landis & Koch, 1977). Participants scores were tallied to calculate the percentage of rater agreement with respect to the presence of the HEA markers within the target videos. Study 2 data were analysed using quantitative methods to explore the frequency of the relationship between HEA and TEM. Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS for cross-tabulation and chi-square tests on all 302 sectors for 60

81 associations of categorical data. It was hypothesised that there would be a larger number of HEA events coded at time-critical events associated with take-offs and landings. Study 3 data were analysed using chi-square analyses with SPSS v.18 to examine the relationship between the hours of sleep in the previous 24 and 48 hours, and the wake hours prior to the sector with the five HEA markers. Study 4 data were analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). The recorded interviews were transcribed and classified for general meaning. The analysis of the data looked for themes within each interview that were coded and compared for associations that answered the research questions for this study. Redundant data were noted for the number of times listed and the context which they described. Data were grouped and categorized to develop themes that supported the theory. Additional researchers analysed the findings to strengthen the study and verify the data. Additional follow-up interviews might have been required to clarify any data not fully understood. The critical decision method focused on the events that generated increased levels of HEA as a response to a threat and how that event was managed. With this information, it would be possible to develop an understanding of the context and analytical processes that the experts used to manage the HEA event (Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989). 61

82 Chapter 4 Detection of Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) in Commercial Airline Crews 62

83 Abstract Background: Behavioural markers are used in training and assessment of nontechnical skills (NTS). This study tested the reliability of a set of markers designed to assess heightened emotional activity. Methods: Using five markers of negative emotional states, 27 commercial airline pilots recorded their observations of heightened emotional activity in eight video vignettes of scripted flight deck situations. Results: The raters scores were analysed using Cronbach s Alpha for dichotomous data with the strength of the agreement done using the Landis and Koch nomenclature labels. Conclusion: This study demonstrates that people can reliably identify instances of HEA. 63

84 4.1 Introduction In 1979, NASA conducted a symposium that was heralded as the first event to focus on the human factors (HF) aspect of aviation in a public domain (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Partnering with the US Air Force and several airline industry leaders, research scientists came together to identify why human error caused 80% of all aviation accidents from (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). The symposium resulted in the development of Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) training, later changed to Crew Resource Management training to better reflect the diversity of the flight deck team (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999). CRM was designed to provide flight crews with the necessary training to optimize all resources available to reduce human error and improve the safety of flight (Flin & Martin, 2001; Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). The focus was on interpersonal skill development, later identified as non-technical skills (NTS), which included team building, situational awareness (SA), communications, leadership and decision-making (Flin et al., 2003; Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). CRM/NTS training became the standard in all operations, demonstrating the widespread acceptance of the benefits of the training. Following the introduction of CRM/NTS training, it soon became apparent that tools needed to be developed to measure the effectiveness of the training. This then led to the development of a set of behavioural markers that provided evidence of skill acquisition (Fletcher, Flin, McGeorge, Glavin, Maran, & Patey, 2003). High fidelity flight simulation was used to assess NTS behaviours, and thereby demonstrate that training did indeed lead to a positive transfer of the skills required to operate safely in a team environment. Despite the advances in safety training, it was also apparent that some domains were given greater attention than others, in particular, training that addressed operational as compared to interpersonal factors. The neglect of interpersonal factors has been highlighted as an area for future development (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). Barki and Hartwell (2004), in an analysis of interpersonal conflict, identified that an individual s emotional response to a threat, such as lack of goal attainment, precedes a breakdown in interpersonal interactions. The need for markers that 64

85 identified problematic interpersonal interactions was first introduced by Helmreich at the 1979 NASA symposium. Although considered important at the time, these were neglected in subsequent training development as it was thought that it would be difficult to operationalize. In addition, training in managing interpersonal factors was characteristically perceived to be charm school or hot tub therapy by pilots at that time (Flin, 2003). More recently, Fletcher et al. (2003) once again argued that there is a need for behavioural markers that assess intra/interpersonal factors, for example, the management of stress, as these are known to have a significant impact on safety-related behaviour. Drury et al. (2011) have further argued that the characteristic response to a threat is heightened emotional activity (HEA), which then subsequently influences intra/interpersonal flight deck behaviours. Therefore, measures of intra/interpersonal behaviours can be considered reflective of HEA. HEA is strongly evident in the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcripts of accident reports. Helmreich, Butler, Taggart and Wilhelm (1995) described a marked change in the emotional valence of the language used by the flight crews and indicated that this heightened emotional activity contributes to impaired performance during the accident sequence. For example, in 1996, Continental Airlines Flight 1943 landed with the landing gear up after multiple alarms and several clearly emotionally laced statements from the pilot who was flying that the aircraft was not correctly configured to land. The NTSB report stated that, these ineffective actions suggest that the captain was confused and not able to comprehend the information that was available to him (NTSB, 1996). The impact of a negative affective state on performance is an added threat in an already high-risk environment. It is posited that the early identification of altered or negative affective states and the implementation of appropriate behavioural strategies would provide an avenue for managing the threat through to an inconsequential outcome. The ability of flight crew to better identify negative affective states and to more effectively put in place strategies for the management of HEA may well provide an important new mechanism to enhance flight safety. In sum, there is a great need to develop effective markers of HEA for use by industry, regulators and educators. These markers would then be able to be deployed in a range of research and operational contexts to enable a better understanding of the relationship between HEA and performance. 65

86 The aim of this study was to identify HEA markers and test their reliability. 4.2 Method Sample Twenty-seven qualified commercial airline short-haul and long-haul pilots (25 M, 2 F) participated in the reliability study. The pilots were recruited from an international airline recurrent Crew Resource Management (CRM) training course and one captain upgrade course with the third pilot group coming from a separate multi-airline flight-training centre. Due to industry requirements for strict anonymity, demographic details were not collected. There was a 100% response rate to the request for participation. The study was approved by the management board of the airline and the University of South Australia Human Research Ethics Committee. Participants gave their informed consent. The data were collected at the airline s training facilities during the afternoon. The inclusion criterion was that the pilots were qualified to fly Regular Public Transport (RPT) jet aircraft Design and Procedure Identification of the markers A review of aviation accident literature was used to identify the HEA markers. US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aviation accident reports from 1980 to 2010 were reviewed. This database contains more than 1000 reports. The aviation accident database and synopsis includes the accident synopsis, accident report, event date, report date, location, aircraft type, aircraft identification number, airline and whether the accident was fatal/non-fatal. The aviation accident report includes cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcripts, accident site visit, review of training and maintenance records, and flight crew sleep/wake patterns. The accident reports were reviewed and, following an analysis of content, discursive indicators of a perceived threat were identified. This primarily involved an analysis of: (a) report summaries; and (b) the sections of the CVR transcripts from the point at which the beginning of the accident sequence was signalled (i.e. the point at which records indicated that pilots recognised a threat). These were then used in the following process: Step 1: Review of the report summaries revealed that, where pilots interpersonal communication dysfunction was commented on, terms used were most commonly confusion or heightened stress levels. 66

87 Step 2: Closer inspection of the vocal transcripts relating to the accidents that were at least partially attributed to confusion or stress revealed that the pilot interactions were more complex, and could be classified as sub-components of stress hyperarousal, frustration, unease and disagreement. This resulted overall in five markers of cockpit behaviour that preceded the accident confusion, hyper-arousal (general stress), frustration, unease and disagreement. Step 3: The reports were then re-reviewed looking specifically for the incidence of these five markers. Example 1: Confusion American Airlines Flight 965 underwent a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) while attempting to land in Cali, Colombia. The CVR transcripts indicated that both pilots were confused as to their exact location yet continued to descend into mountainous terrain. Item 6 in the findings section of the accident report stated, the flight crew failed to discontinue the approach despite their confusion regarding elements of the approach and numerous cues indicating the inadvisability of continuing the approach (Ladkin, 1996). The CVR transcripts identified examples of the confusion expressed by the flight crew: 2138:49 First Officer: Uh where are we :49 Cali Approach: Roger. (Air Traffic Control acknowledging a Flight 965 radio call response to a query) 2138:52 First Officer: We goin' out to :54 Captain: Let's go right to uh, Tulua first of all, OK? 2138:58 First Officer: Yeah, where we headed? Example 2: Disagreement and Stress On 10 August 1994, Korean Air Flight 2033 ran off the end of the runway and caught fire in Jeju, South Korea after the first officer, the pilot monitoring, twice attempted a go-around while the captain, the pilot flying, was attempting to land the Airbus A300 in bad weather (Gooderham, 1994). The first attempt to go around was during the landing phase at an altitude of 30 feet. The second attempt occurred on the runway during braking and with both engines in full reverse. Analysis of the CVR transcripts indicated that a disagreement ensued between the captain and first officer in what can be described as a highly emotive flight deck. Voice transcripts identify examples of the flight crew s disagreement: 67

88 11:21:22..Co-pilot...Go around. 11:21:23..Co-pilot...40 (altitude in feet) 11:21:25..Co-pilot...30 (altitude in feet) 11:21:26..Captain...Get your ha... get off... Get off! Tell me what it is. 11:21:32..Co-pilot...20 (altitude in feet) 11:21:33..Captain...Get off! 11:21:34..Co-pilot...Go around! 11:21:35..Captain...No. No! 11:21:37..Co-pilot...10 (altitude in feet) 11:21:39..Co-pilot...5 (altitude in feet) 11:21:43..Co-pilot...Reverse (throttle setting to assist slowing down) 11:21:46..Co-pilot...Brake. 11:21:55..Captain...What are you doing? Don't....What man... you're gonna kill us! Example 3: Frustration and Unease American International Airways Flight 808 stalled and crashed while attempting to land at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (NTSB, 1993). The CVR transcripts indicated that the crew members expressed frustration and unease as well as confusion during the approach-to-land phase. In the analysis of the accident, the NTSB reported that the captain s fatigue and situational stress degraded his situational awareness to the point where he was unable to register the concerns from the other crew members that they weren t going to make it while he continued the unstable, difficult approach to runway 10 (NTSB, 1993). Analysis of the CVR transcripts indicated that the captain appeared to be frustrated by his inability to see the strobe light that separated Cuban airspace and the US Navy airfield while the first officer and flight engineer reported seeing the strobe light, which was in fact not operating. Voice transcripts identify examples of the flight crew s frustration and unease: 16:53:22..Flight engineer..slow airspeed. 16:53:25..First officer. Check the turn. 16:53:28..Captain..Where s the strobe? 16:53:29..Flight engineer.right over there. 16:53:31..Captain..Where? 16:53:33..First officer.right inside there. Right inside there. 16:53:35..Flight engineer.you know we re not getting our airspeed back there. 16:53:37..Captain..Where s the strobe? 16:53:37..First officer.right down there. 16:53:41..Captain..I still don t see it. 68

89 16:53:42..Flight engineer.#(expletive), We re never going to make it. Based on the five themes identified we reviewed archived videos of flight simulation training held at the Centre for Sleep Research. These videos were sourced from materials used in human factors training programs from universities and airline training groups and from film media with scenes of flight deck conflict. To minimize potential confounding factors such as the impact of multinational crews, we excluded such videos but we did include videos with multiple crew members and those with mixed gender in our review and, finally, where the simulation indicated that the scenario was based on Regular Public Transport (RPT) operations (commercial airline). From the review, we identified eight videos that best exemplified instances of the five markers. Three subject matter experts viewed the eight videos, with the final selection based on consensus. Video vignettes Seven of the videos selected for inclusion were used by airlines for training, while one was an excerpt from the movie The High and Mighty (Warner Brothers, 1954). Six videos were selected on the basis that at least one of the five markers was deemed to be present in the video by the author and student supervisors. To check for response bias and as a control we selected two videos which were deemed to not contain any of the five markers. A summary of the eight video vignettes is contained in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 Descriptions of the Eight Video Vignettes Number Type Pilots/Actors Length Markers/Neutral Scenario Video 1 Training video Pilots 50 sec Markers Engine Fire Video 2 Training video Pilots 50 sec Markers Approach Brief Video 3 Training video Pilots 87 sec Markers Cabin Pressure Video 4 Training video Pilots 120 sec Markers Wind Shear Video 5 Training video Pilots 88 sec Neutral Departure Brief Video 6 Movie Clip Actors 31 sec Markers Approach Video 7 Training video Pilots 65 sec Neutral Flight Brief Video 8 Training video Pilots 27 sec Markers Weather Protocol The study was conducted at three training centres. Two of the centres were operated by one airline, while the third was a training centre servicing multiple 69

90 airlines. Thus, for centres A and B, pilots were from the same airline while those from centre C were from multiple other airlines. The study was completed while participants were seated in classrooms. The participants were provided with an instruction form and a score sheet and were asked to identify whether any or all of the five HEA markers (yes/no) were evident in the video. The instruction form contained a brief description of each marker from the Line Operations Safety Audit training handbook (see Chapter 5). The videos were shown in the same order at each location and participants provided their responses while watching the videos with a brief break between each video. Data collection was completed in 15 to 20 minutes. 4.3 Measures Table 4.2 displays the number of participants who identified each marker as being present (yes) or absent (no) for each video. To assess concordance between pilots, each video was then examined to see whether the majority of pilots perceived the marker as being present or absent. The percentage agreement statistic represents the percentage of pilots who indicated this majority direction (i.e. the consistency with which pilots said the marker was present or absent). Cronbach's Alpha (SPSS v.18) was used for each marker to assess reliability between pilots across videos. The alpha statistic indicates high inter-rater reliability such that if one rater indicated that particular marker was present (or absent) in the videos, then it was likely that this would be consistent across raters. 70

91 Table 4.2: Percentage of Pilot Concordance and Inter-Rater Reliability for the Five HEA Markers HEA Marker 1 Confusion Disagreement Unease Frustration Stress Video % Concordance 2 Yes No % Concordance 2 Yes No % Concordance 2 Yes No % Concordance 2 Yes No % Concordance 2 Yes No % Concordance 2 1 Con 100% % % % % % 2 Une 100% % % % % % 3 Fru 89% % % % % % 4 Une 100% % % % % % 5 Neu 98% % % % % % 6 Str 89% % % % % % 7 Neu 98% % % % % % 8 Dis 100% % % % % % Avg. 99% 90% 85% 82% 85% 82% α Notes: 1 = Primary HEA markers that participants agreed were observed in the video. Con = confusion; Une = unease; Fru = frustration; Neu = neutral; Str = stress; Dis = disagreement. 2 = Percentage of concordance for observability of HEA markers. 3 = Cronbach s Alpha value. N =

92 Figure 4.1 Radar plots showing percentage of raters (y-axis) reporting each HEA (radar arms) for each video, numbered 1-8 Note: CONF = confusion; DIS = disagreement; UN = unease; FR = frustration; ST = stress 72

93 4.4 Results In regard to the five HEA markers, concordance for confusion was most consistently rated, at 90% across the eight videos. Concordance for disagreement and frustration was also high at 85%. Concordance for both stress and unease were slightly lower at 82%. Finally, the pilots demonstrated a high level of concordance with respect to the two videos that had an absence of the markers, each at 98%. Inspection of the pilots responses to the individual videos is summarized in Figure 4.1. Inspection of the radar plot for Video 1 indicates that the majority of pilots identified the presence of confusion followed by disagreement. With Videos 5 and 7, the neutral videos, pilots showed a high level of consistency with no HEA observed. However, the pilots showed a high level of unconformity in Video 3 with confusion, disagreement, frustration and stress observed in nearly equal percentages. With Videos 4 and 8, pilots observed a high percentage of disagreement and unease. With Video 6, pilots observed a high percentage of disagreement, frustration and stress with a moderate level of unease. In order to estimate the reliability of the concordance estimates, each of the HEA markers was analysed for an indicator of variability on Cronbach s Alpha statistic using a monte-carlo method (i.e. successively removing one rater in turn from the distribution of the variabilities arrived at a mean variability score). The Cronbach s Alpha for confusion showed little change from a low of to a high of The Cronbach s Alpha for disagreement showed little change from a low of to a high of The Cronbach s Alpha for unease showed little change from a low of to a high of The Cronbach s Alpha for frustration showed little change from a low of to a high of The Cronbach s Alpha for stress showed little change from a low of to a high of As a further measure of concordance, we examined the frequency with which HEA was below the cut-off of 70% for satisfactory concordance across the eight videos. Confusion had zero out of the eight videos below the 70% cut-off followed by frustration which had one out of the eight videos below the 70% cut-off. Disagreement and stress each had two of the eight videos below the 70% cut-off while unease had three of the eight videos below the 70% cut-off indicating the least concordance. 73

94 4.5 Discussion Summary of Results This study demonstrates that pilots can identify instances of HEA and that HEA is consistently, repeatedly and reliably observed. There was a high level of concordance amongst the pilots so that when HEA was present, it was observed. It is also important to note that the pilots were at a high level of concordance when there was no HEA evident. We found excellent concordance in that pilots could identify and differentiate between the five HEA markers. The five behavioural markers provided a means of identifying instances of HEA in flight crews and of specific types of HEA in flight scenarios. Confusion was the most consistently rated HEA quite possibly due to the pilots recognising situations that they had experienced themselves as these are clear and unambiguous behaviours (Endsley & Garland, 2000). Confusion may be vocalized with a higher frequency in the complex system that is commercial aviation. The pilots observed frustration with the next highest frequency possibly due to sympathizing with the pilots in the vignettes as they too may have experienced this situation (Garner, 2009). Unease may have been the hardest for the pilots to define in others, as it may be unclear and ambiguous to some; therefore, it was observed the least (Gross & Levenson, 1997). Unease was internalized by most and rarely vocalized possibly due to the ambiguous nature of this affective state. This suggested that specific types of HEA could be distinguished even in the presence of other HEA Observing Emotions in Context Conducting the day-to-day operations of commercial aviation requires flexibility and patience in order to deal with the multitude of threats that may influence individual and team performance. Events can disrupt the normal processes prompting an increase in negative affect, which may exacerbate the threat and increase the chance of the threat becoming an error. As with normal and competent NTS behaviours, the need exists to identify observable behaviours associated with negative states as a potential risk to safety. Observing emotions in others compels us to make assumptions about the emotion based on our innate ability to cognitively piece together the various cues associated with the moment. Crew members should become more vigilant after observing, or experiencing, an HEA response and assist with identifying the problem 74

95 to relieve the stress of the moment. We can tell when someone is angry or happy based on our understanding of the basic biological attributes of human and certain animals expressive natures. These emotive behaviours are natural responses to positive (success) or negative (failure) attainment of the desired goals of actions for survival (Lazarus et al., 1952; Neese, 1990; Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995). When threats are encountered, crew members can work to manage the negative HEA response and maintain positive homeostatic situational awareness (SA) until the threat has passed. Whilst we are capable of observing and generally understanding emotions in others, we cannot with certainty state what triggered the emotional response or map it to any specific action (Elliot & Ortony, 1992; Barrett, 2006). Yet this does not limit our ability to identify moments when those around us are emotionally expressive in overt or quiescent ways. To understand the meaning of what was said, we must understand how it was said (Nygaard & Queen, 2008). Constructing situational meaning requires some idea of the antecedent event in order to accurately frame the intent of the emotion (Frijda, 1988). Appraisal of the event occurs, initially, at an unconscious level as the brain matches current social stimuli with past episodic events or memories (LeDoux, 1998; Forgas, 2008). The brain activates a reflex system that responds to environmental cues as part of the fight or flight system (Frijda, 1986; Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1998). The cognitive processing renders positive or negative emotional responses that motivate behaviour based on the interpretation of social stimuli (Solomon & Stone, 2002; Laukka, 2005; Forgas, 2008). A positive emotional response to a threat will be activated by previous favourable outcomes based on pre-existing patterns that promote a top-down processing style with limited cognitive performance required (Forgas, 2000; Schwarz, 2000; Forgas et al., 2005). Negative emotional responses use a bottom-up approach requiring time-consuming high-level cognitive processing (Solomon & Stone, 2002). The premise of danger causes attentional tunnelling prompting crews to focus on the most salient cues, such as a master caution warning light. Task shedding may occur, inhibiting any complete response to the task associated with the event, signalling that the team may not immediately return to a normative cognitive state (Lazarus et al., 1952). These changes in crew member behaviour may be subtle or lucidly displayed making them quite observable. 75

96 4.5.3 What can we do with this now? This study provides the catalyst for conducting further research on defining the relationship between HEA and performance and on better understanding the mechanisms that potentiate exposure to uncertainty in any high-risk endeavour. Further research will develop the risk mitigation tools necessary to effectively manage the negative outcomes associated with HEA and will define the method of incorporation of these tools in an enhanced CRM curriculum. Additionally, these risk management strategies will become enabled through the use of simulation and repetition. HEA, as previously discussed, is negatively-primed emotional response behaviour to a perceived threat. As a result, task shedding may emanate from the limited attentional resources that have become focused on the salient threat. This need not be problematic with adaptive automation capabilities managing the tasks until such time when the crew member workload permits a return to the tasks. Research into adaptive technologies aims to regulate the amount of automation based on the pilot s workload by adding more automation as the workload increases and reducing the levels of automation as the workload decreases (Prinzel, Freeman, Scerbo, Mikulka, & Pope, 2001). Stick and rudder skills, while still vital, are no longer the most important talent required on a flight deck but the ability to manage these new technologies will be. 4.6 Limitations It is acknowledged that this study did not specifically measure emotion, but rather that it measured behavioural indicators that are likely to be associated with heightened emotion. Indeed, there is a large amount of literature in psychology that demonstrates a relationship between constructs such as frustration, distress, unease, disagreement and confusion, and physiological indicators of heightened arousal such as increased blood pressure, heart rate and cortisol levels (Rosekind et al., 1994) as well as changes in affect (Dinges et al., 2005). In this study, we asked pilots to review video vignettes of real pilots in simulated aviation emergency situations. Whilst the pilots were observing a dramatization of a flight deck scenario, there was still the possibility of actor observer attribution bias (Fielder et al., 1995). The actors (the pilots in the 76

97 vignettes) responded to external stimulation to portray the event whilst the observer responded to internal stimulation as a response to what they were observing. Fielder, Semin, Finkenauer and Berkel (1995) noted that when considering the actor observer attribution theory, the usefulness of language differences may only reflect what is known by the observer rather than actual communication rules. The tendency is to place meaning based on one s own interpretation of the event rather than placing meaning on what was actually said. The five HEA markers represent negative emotional responses to perceived threats that are applicable within the aviation domain. However definitive these markers are for the purpose of this study, they do not represent all of the potential behaviours that may negatively impact on individual performance. Nevertheless, they are a starting point from which to expand upon the idea that emotional responses have the potential to alter the behaviour of the individual and team, and, in addition, they were reliably observed. The video vignettes used in this study were scripted training videos that often had complex multiple HEAs due to the nature of the situations that were depicted. Observer agreement may well have been improved by conducting training and rater calibration for the specific behaviours (Fletcher et al., 2003). In addition, it should be noted that these video vignettes were scripted for specific emergency events and not emotional behaviours. A focus on emotional behaviours may have resulted in more obvious markers and therefore higher levels of agreement and reliability. The fact that observers could reliably identify HEA despite the absence of training, and in videos scripted to depict specific flight deck scenarios, as opposed to specific emotional behaviours, suggests that our findings are robust. Future research should be conducted using vignettes with only one HEA as multiple HEA make it difficult to interpret. It is key to note that the pilots choices in the videos below the 70% cut-off line may be due to the similarity of emotions in the HEA markers, which may account for the subjective interpretation of the emotion. Whilst humans can identify emotions in others, it is more difficult to distinguish between similar emotions without the benefit of being trained to identify these differences. Where some of the pilots saw frustration, others saw stress, which may be due to individual experiences in similar situations. 77

98 A final limitation is that the research focused on problematic interpersonal factors that precede an incident. An alternative source of literature for understanding factors that precede an incident would be near-miss reports. It would be instructive to investigate interpersonal factors that protect against an event escalating into an incident. That is, a strength approach rather than a deficit approach to understanding safety incidents would be a fertile area for future research. 4.7 Conclusion It is operationally significant that this study has shown that crew members can identify HEA in others. These findings provide an evidence base for the development of training modules as part of a risk management program. By becoming aware of HEA, individuals can respond appropriately by managing HEA within themselves and within the team. This may prevent distractions or events from becoming problematic. Additional training in how to detect and regulate HEA will assist crew members with maintaining emotional homeostasis throughout a threat event. 78

99 Chapter 5 Managing Operational Threats: The Occurrence of Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) and its Relationship to Threat Management and Outcome 79

100 Abstract Objective: To identify the prevalence of heightened emotional activity (HEA) during normal flight operations and whether HEA mediates threat response and outcome. Background: Investigation reports continue to highlight the relationship between affective states and poor safety outcomes. However, to date we have a limited understanding of this interaction. Methods: A total of 302 sectors of normal airline flight operations were observed, and instances of heightened emotional activity, threat occurrence and management were systematically recorded using an a priori classification system. Descriptive analyses of the occurrence of HEA were undertaken prior to examination of the relationship between HEA and threat outcome. Results: A total of 535 instances of HEA were identified across the 302 sectors of normal flight operations. Significant differences were observed with respect to the occurrence of HEA both as a function of a phase of flight and the types of threat encountered. Instances of HEA were associated with changes in threat response and increased occurrence of error. Conclusion: The findings of this study demonstrate that HEA was observed in association with threats during normal flight operations. Moreover, the occurrence of HEA was associated with increased rates of threat mismanagement and subsequent error. Application: This study highlights the role of HEA in operational safety, and suggests that training in the recognition and management of affective response to threats is a much-needed addition to Crew Resource Management (CRM) programs. 80

101 5.1 Introduction Several key aviation accidents in the 1970s prompted questions within the industry as to why highly qualified pilots were flying advanced modern aircraft into the ground. Analysis of the underlying characteristics of these accidents identified human error as the cause, imputing the performance capabilities of the flight crews as the potential originator (Foushee, 1984; Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999). Factors such as a lack of teamwork, ineffective communications, a steep authority gradient and failure to make sound decisions have been identified as key contributors to these and other accidents (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). In response to these issues, human factors training was introduced as a program to help pilots identify and understand these non-technical issues and the potential impact they may have on the safety of flight. The training program was initially called Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) but over time became Crew Resource Management (CRM) to better convey the team concept. When the first generation of CRM was introduced in the early 1980s, breakdowns in interpersonal interactions on the flight deck had been identified as an integral part of the human error chain of events in aircraft accident investigation (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). At that point in time, however, very little research had been done in the area of human emotions. An example of the criticality of appropriate responses to emotional situations was provided by Continental Flight The captain landed with the gear up after failing to respond to the first officer s expressed discomfort or verbal challenges (NTSB, 1996). This lack of appropriate response was in contravention of the principles of CRM (Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007). Over time, a shift occurred in CRM content from interpersonal relations to what pilots should do to promote team concepts on the flight deck (Salas et al., 1999) possibly due to an inability to operationalise information about emotions for pilots. CRM was combined with technical skills training and designed to focus on specific skill sets to improve teamwork (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Emotions are not as important to us as they were to our hunter-gatherer ancestors yet they still help us to survive as a species (Damasio, 1994; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). While not exclusive to humans, the motivation is the same for all in a 81

102 quest for amenity and the avoidance of pain (Frijda, 1988; Damasio, 1999; Forgas, Williams, & Laham, 2005). Emotions are individual reactions to significant events (Frijda, 1988). Within emotions, there is a biological function that motivates an individual to action (Damasio, 1999) and thus helps to safeguard us from threats to our environment (Caruso & Salovey, 2004). For example, the physiological changes that occur in response to fear prepare the body for a fight or flight response (Darley et al., 1991; Damasio, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 1998; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). A fire warning light and alarm in flight is a priority response event that has the capacity to elevate stress levels potentially causing errors. In everyday situations, the decision-making process is greatly influenced by affective states (Schwarz, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). If we feel that something is wrong, we divert attention to it. We internalize the information and if required we have an emotional response to this feeling (Damasio, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 1998). Tompkins (as cited by Izard [1977]) defined this as a neurophysiologic emotional response that depending on the type of stimulus will elicit a learned response that is part of our biological survival skills. Decisions made under emotionally charged conditions could easily result in poor outcomes. Positive emotion decision-making may be motivated by a previous favourable outcome requiring limited evaluation of pre-existing patterns (Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), while negative emotions result in a decision-making process that takes longer and is more labour intensive in that it utilizes higher-level cognitive resources (Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). These affective processes present potentially significant problems in situations that require accuracy in time-constricted environments. Emotions give us information about our surroundings that are key to our survival (Izard, 1977; Damasio, 2003; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). Cognitive processes match past experiences stored in long-term memory (LTM) with stimuli to trigger the emotional response that spurs the body to action (Izard, 1977; Frijda, 1986; LeDoux, 1998; Bechara et al., 2000; Endsley & Garland, 2000). How an individual responds to a situation-driven trigger event depends on their level of pattern recognition and emotional association to that event (Izard, 1977; Ellis & Hunt, 1983; Frijda, 1988; LeDoux, 1998, 2000; Endsley & Garland, 2000; Baddeley, 2003). While this information is processed unconsciously, we pay more attention to information 82

103 that is consistent with our current surroundings and goals (LeDoux, 1998, 2000; Matlin, 1998; Damasio, 1999; Baddeley, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007). Emotional responses are evident in historical accident reports and analysis of accidents. On 10 August 1994, Korean Air Flight 2033 ran off the end of the runway and caught fire in Jeju, South Korea after the first officer, the pilot monitoring, twice attempted a go-around while the captain, the pilot flying, was attempting to land the Airbus A300 in bad weather (Gooderham, 1994). The first attempt to go around was during the landing phase at an altitude of 30 feet. The second attempt occurred on the runway during braking and with both engines in full reverse. Analysis of the CVR transcripts indicated that a disagreement ensued between the captain and first officer in what can be described as a highly emotive flight deck. American International Airways Flight 808 stalled and crashed while attempting to land at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (NTSB, 1993). The CVR transcripts indicated that the crew members expressed confusion, frustration and unease during the approach-to-land phase. In the analysis of the accident, the NTSB reported that the captain s fatigue and situational stress degraded his situational awareness (SA) to the point where he was unable to register the concerns from the other crew members that they weren t going to make it while he continued the unstable, difficult approach to runway 10 (NTSB, 1993). American Airlines Flight 965 underwent a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) while attempting to land in Cali, Columbia. The CVR transcripts indicated that both pilots were confused as to their exact location yet continued to descend into mountainous terrain. Item 6 in the findings section of the accident report stated that [t]he flight crew failed to discontinue the approach despite their confusion regarding elements of the approach and numerous cues indicating the inadvisability of continuing the approach (Ladkin, 1996). Within aviation, emotions are a fundamental aspect of everyday life. Intrapersonal preparation for leading the team or supporting the team requires assessing current environmental cues associated with the self as a determinant for positive or negative affective states. These can impact on how the interpersonal interaction of in-group and intergroup activities evolve throughout the course of the day. Increased affective responses to threats are usually not a concern for wellrested crews flying in favourable conditions encountering typical stressors 83

104 associated with flight such as delays. The possibility of the crew encountering HEA increases with fatigue and with prolonged stressors induced by bad weather or mechanical problems. Affective responses to threats are defined here as heightened emotional activity (HEA). HEA is expressed in the form of questions, statements, utterances and body language that are biologically-evolved responses to changes in perception as to the nature or level of threats to the environment. Each of the HEA markers had three of the most distinctive features described by Ekman (1992a, 1992b) in that they were universally understood, activated a physiological response and they had antecedent events. The five chosen HEA markers represented unambiguous states that actuated an increase in emotions. They were as follows: Confusion Misulis and colleagues (as cited by Graham [2001]) wrote that confusion is the state of being perplexed, disoriented, or disordered. A crew member may display uncertainty or a general lack of understanding as to the nature of a threat or its potential impact on the operations. A loss of situational awareness (SA) confounds the confusion and may induce other HEA responses such as unease, frustration and stress. States of confusion range from slight to serious and may build up over time or come on suddenly (Lavie, 2005). The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database has shown that pilot confusion was identified in one in 10 reports (Rosenthal, Chamberlin, & Matchette, 1993). Disagreement crew members show a lack of consensus as to the nature or the potential consequence of a threat such as acceptance of a questionable clearance. The basis for this interpersonal conflict stems from a contradiction of goal attainment by both participants (Weider-Hatfield & Hatfield, 1995; Bar-Tal, 2000). Interpersonal conflict is present in all cultures and, while it is readily identifiable as a social behaviour, the individual differences underlying the strength of the goal attainment are not (Gormly, Gormly, & Johnson, 1972; Weider-Hatfield & Hatfield, 1995; Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, & Hair, 1996). Unease a crew member displays anxiety or apprehension as a result of a threat such as a continued flight into adverse weather. Humans worry as a natural function of having goals and expectations that interact with the environment to which they are exposed (Borkovek et al., 1998). 84

105 Frustration a crew member may become upset or annoyed as a result of a threat such as a lengthy ground delay. Frustration is brought about by the hindrance of an anticipated goal (Fox & Spector, 1999). Stress As the demands of the task outweigh the perception of ability, a crew member may become noticeably agitated as the result of a threat, such as landing with a high crosswind component, creating both cognitive and physical stress. With high stress loads, cognition is affected by the stress and this has a major role in degraded information processing and human performance (Staal, 2004). In a high stress environment, both crew members can have different levels of cognitive impairment due to stress (Gohm, Baumann, & Sniezek, 2001). The aim of this study was to establish a relationship between HEA and operational safety. Using the Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM) as a structured framework for analysing crew performance and operational safety, this study examined whether HEA mediates threat response and outcome. 5.2 Methods Sample Data were collected during 302 normal flight operations of a commercial airline flying short-haul jet operations. All flight sectors were crewed by two pilots, namely a captain and a first officer. Due to strict anonymity involved with data collection and the naturalistic nature of the field observations, it was not possible to determine if an individual pilot was observed more than once. The sectors were chosen to represent the diversified route pairings of the airline involved in the study Design and Procedure An observational methodology based on the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) was used which examined in detail the threat and error management (TEM) behaviours of flight crew (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 2001; ICAO, 2002; Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmreich, 2003). The LOSA is a means by which an organization can gauge operational effectiveness. The ICAO (2002) has defined the LOSA process as a critical organizational strategy aimed at developing countermeasures to operational errors. It is an organizational tool used to identify threats to aviation safety, minimize the risks such threats may generate and implement measures to 85

106 manage human error in operational contexts (p. vii). Data were collected by 15 trained observers chosen from the pilot ranks, the training department of the airline, the University of South Australia and training captains from other airlines. The observers undertook a two-day LOSA observer training course (ICAO, 2002) working with the audit forms using flight deck video vignettes. These were used to focus on the standardization of observations and established acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability (Thomas, 2003). The observers were selected according to the criteria of: 1) having recent operational airline experience; and 2) being approved by management and the pilots union. The observers collected data from the flight deck observer seat during normal flight operations. The observer would make a note of the threat and associated HEA if there was one. The observer would transfer the data to the LOSA Collection Form (Appendix 2.3) at which time the details of the threat would be described as a mark would be placed in the associated HEA box along with any notes about the HEA and threat management in the discussion section. 5.3 Measures The observers used an international standard framework for coding the threat and error management of the flight crew and for rating the non-technical skills (NTS) used by the crew to manage these threats and errors (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999; Klinect, Wilhelm, & Helmreich, 1999; ICAO, 2002; Klinect et al., 2003). In addition, observers collected data on affect responses to the threats using a new coding framework for heightened emotional activity (HEA). The five categories of heightened emotional activity (HEA) were defined in the observer s handbook (Table 5.1). 86

107 Table 5.1: Observer Handbook HEAs HEA Confusion Disagreement Unease Frustration Stress Observer Manual Definition A crew member expresses some confusion with respect to the nature of the threat or its potential impact on the operation, such as not understanding the exact nature of a technical problem. Crew members fail to agree with each other as to the nature or the potential consequence of the threat. A crew member expresses unease as a result of a threat, such as not being comfortable with continuation of an approach A crew member expresses anger or frustration as a result of a threat, such as becoming observably frustrated with a ground delay. A crew member becomes noticeably stressed as a result of a threat, such as difficulty responding to and managing a gusty crosswind landing. Observers were instructed to identify all instances of specific behaviours indicative of any of these five categories of HEA. The normal flight deck operational environment can operate somewhere between calm in cruise flight to becoming quite frenetic in the process of flying the aircraft, running checklists and communicating with ATC during the descent-and-approach phase. Observers were instructed to indicate any instance when behaviour was deemed to be indicative of elevated emotional activity when compared to the baseline of an uncomplicated flight. While each of the threats encountered were unique and presented different levels of intensity, so too were the individual responses to those threats. However, simply the presence of the heightened state was deemed a sufficient threshold in this exploratory study rather than attempting to rate the level of emotional response External Threats ICAO (2002) defined threats as external situations that must be managed by the cockpit crew during normal, everyday flights. Such events increase the operational complexity of the flight and pose a safety risk to the flight at some level. Threats may be expected or anticipated and, therefore, the crew may brief in advance. Threats may also be unexpected. As they occur suddenly and without 87

108 warning, there is no possibility for the crew to brief in advance (pp ). Errors originated by non-cockpit personnel are considered external threats (p. 2.3) Validity Understanding emotions in speech and facial expressions is an innate ability that we use every day as we interact with others in the home or workplace (Ekman, 1989; Bachorowski, 1999; de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000). Emotionally aroused speakers use clearly identifiable speech patterns that easily manifest corresponding behaviours in listeners (Bachorowski, 1999; de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Scherer, 2003; Lee & Narayanan, 2005) From auditory cues, we make assumptions based on cognitive representations of emotional speech with a great degree of accuracy identifying the speaker s emotional state (Scherer, 2003). The inability to recognise emotions in others has been associated with individuals who have experienced a brain injury or intellectual disability such as autism, schizophrenia and Parkinson s disease (Damasio, 1994; Loveland et al., 1997; Kohler, Bilker, Hagendoorn, Gur, & Gur, 2000). Accordingly, the concept of HEA was deemed to have inherently strong levels of face validity and reliability The five HEA markers were selected as unambiguous representations associated with common negative emotions, such as fear and anger, which elicit cognitive and physiological change and are specifically relevant to the aviation domain. Data were analysed using quantitative methods to explore the frequency of the relationship between HEA and TEM. Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS for cross-tabulation and chi-square tests on all 302 sectors for associations of categorical data. It was hypothesised that there would be a larger number of HEA events coded at time-critical events associated with take-offs and landings. 5.4 Results The 302 flight sectors resulted in 884 observed threats distributed across five phases of flight. Heightened emotional activity (HEA) was found to occur frequently during normal flight operations. Of the 884 threats, 383 (43%) were associated with at least one HEA (resulting in a total of 535 HEA responses to those threats) (see Figure 5.1, panels 1 and 2). Instances of HEA were observed in 59.6% (N = 180) of the 302 sectors of normal flight operations. There were no instances of HEA observed in 40.4% (N = 122) of the sectors. 88

109 5.4.1 Occurrences of HEA Of the 535 instances of HEA observed during the sectors of normal flight operations, frustration was observed to be the most common, accounting for 37.0% (N = 198) of the observed HEA events, followed by unease, accounting for 25.2% (N = 135) of the observed HEA events. Stress accounted for 19.8% (N = 106). Confusion accounted for 16.1% (N = 86). Lastly, disagreement accounted for 1.9% (N = 10) (see Figure 5.1, panel 2 of pie chart). 89

110 Figure 5.1: Flow chart and pie chart representing the distribution of threats associated with HEA that were detected and managed/detected and mismanaged or ignored/not detected 90

111 5.4.2 Distribution of HEA across Phases of Flight For several of the categories of HEA, differences were observed as a function of the phases of flight. Firstly, the pre-flight phase was identified as having proportionally more threats leading to crew frustration than during other phases of flight (X2 = 62.8, df = 4, p < 0.001). Conversely, the descent, approach and landing phase was also a high threat phase of flight: it was associated with proportionally more threats associated with HEA in the form of stress (X2 = 11.7, df = 4, p = 0.019) Distribution of HEA as a Function of Threat Type Of all threats, the most frequent type was weather (24.8%). These were mainly icing and thunderstorms. Air Traffic Control (ATC) threats were associated with the second highest frequency (23.5%). ATC threats were primarily connected with instructions during the approach-to-land phase of flight. These were recorded as ATC instructions for altitude, airspeed and heading changes. The third most frequent threat type was ground handling (12.1%), including communications with ground crew during the pre-flight phase. These were recorded as interactions with engineering, pit crews and gate agents. The distribution of threat types is illustrated in the pie chart in Figure 5.2. Of each threat type, the category with the largest proportion of threats with at least one HEA was on-time pressure/operations (72.0%), followed by cabin (60.0%), flight planning (55.6%) and ground handling (55.1%) (see Figure 5.2, left panel). Frustration was the most common HEA observed for five of the eight threat types (on-time pressure, cabin, flight planning, ATC and airspace). Unease was most common for three of the eight threat types (traffic, system malfunction and weather). For ground handling, confusion was most common. 91

112 Figure 5.2: Percentage of threats of each type associated with at least one HEA and relative distribution of each type of HEA for each threat type 92

113 5.4.4 Relationship between HEA, Threat Management and Crew Error There were significant differences in detecting and managing threats depending on whether an HEA was present or absent (X2 = 11.0, df = 3, p = 0.012). Overall, threats that were associated with an HEA were more frequently detected. However, they were also more frequently mismanaged or ignored (see Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 right panel). Table 5.2: Ratio of threats detected and managed, detected and mismanaged, detected and ignored and failed to detect depending on whether an HEA was present or absent Threat Detected & managed Detected & mismanaged Detected & ignored Failed detect HEA Present Absent Total Present Absent Present: Absent to Total There were no significant differences in whether an error occurred or not depending on whether an HEA was present or absent (X2 = 1.8, df = 1, p > 0.05). In order to avoid violating chi-square assumptions around lower than expected cell frequencies and in order to investigate differences in threat detection and management for each HEA type, threats that were detected and mismanaged or ignored were collapsed into a single category. Due to the small number of disagreement observations, disagreement did not reach minimum expected frequencies. However, assumptions for the other four HEA categories were met. The only significant difference was found for stress (X2 = 11.1, df = 2, p = 0.004). Interestingly, threats associated with stress were less frequently detected and managed, and more frequently detected and mismanaged, detected and ignored, and not detected (Table 5.3). 93

114 Table 5.3: Ratio of threats detected and managed, detected and mismanaged or ignored and failed to detect depending on whether stress was present or absent Threat Detected & managed Detected & mismanaged or ignored Failed detect Stress Present to Total Absent Total Present Absent Present: Absent Similarly, in relation to errors, the only significant difference was found for stress (X2 = 12.7, df = 1, p = 0.001). Threats associated with stress were more frequently associated with errors (Table 5.4, Figure 5.3). Table 5.4: Ratio of threats resulting in minimal consequence compared to errors depending on whether stress was present or absent Threat Inconsequential Error Total Stress Present Absent Total Present Absent Present: Absent

115 Figure 5.3: Percentage of threats with each type of HEA that resulted in error, sorted from largest (top) to smallest 95

116 5.5 Discussion The study presents an exploratory observational investigation into heightened emotional activity (HEA). This demonstrates a proof of concept that, as a response to threats encountered during flight operations, HEA may be associated with changes in the way that crews manage threats. Two points are key to interpreting the results. Firstly, emotions are a normal human activity. Secondly, HEA is a normal part of everyday work thereby establishing a need for flight crews to understand and manage HEA. The results clearly demonstrate that relationships do exist between threat types and HEA. This research has shown associations between HEA and a decrease in the operational performance of flight crews. Flight crews responded emotionally to threats encountered, some of which were mismanaged and led to errors. This is a recursive system in that a threat may generate HEA, but the HEA may be preexisting. The impact that something as benign as a memo from corporate communications intimating impending change can have on crew performance was identified in this study. While a causal relationship cannot be demonstrated, previous research showed that elevated emotions increase physiological and cognitive responses to threatening situations (Ben-Zeev, 1987) and thus, in the aviation setting, this may prove to be operationally significant (Ben-Zeev, 1987; Damasio, 1999). This study demonstrates the complexity of HEA in the normal work environment with the potential for both positive and negative consequences. HEA was associated with increased threat detection by flight crews in line with previous research highlighting that increased vigilance and appraisal of threatening stimuli occurs as part of the human survival mechanism which identifies the nature and extent of the threat (Mathews, 1990; Calvo & Eysenck, 2000; Brown & Moren, 2003). More specifically, studies have demonstrated that negative affective states are likely to predispose individuals to predominantly bottom-up processing strategies that focus attention on the environmental cues at hand (Schwarz, 2000). The mediation of information-processing strategies associated with affective activation can be suggested as serving a critical evolutionary function as part of the initial fight or flight response. 96

117 In contrast, HEA was also associated with the increased likelihood that the flight crew would mismanage the threat encountered. One likely mechanism behind this association relates to the attentional narrowing impacts of heightened affective states. Emotional stress impairs the working memory s (WM) ability to process information by allocating attention to the most arresting environmental cues (Matthews, MacKintosh, & Fulcher, 1997; Schwarz, 2000) whilst neglecting other collateral task association cues (Wachtel, 1968). This induces a prioritization of tasks and the shedding of tasks outside of the narrowed field of focus (Stokes & Kite, 1994; NTSB, 2010). A bottom-up approach is thereby promoted for processing the threat (Schwarz, 2000) while relying on previously learned tasks recalled from longterm memory (LTM) to manage the threat (Barthol & Ku, 1959). In addition, HEA may impact on the multi-crew functions of communications and collaborative decision making. As previously discussed, many factors determine how any one individual will respond to a threat during moments of heightened negative emotions. The bottom-up process becomes even more problematic when both crew members become focused on the salient cues associated with the threat at the expense of all of the additional tasks required for effectively managing the threat. The natural tendency of the team is to become more dependent upon the captain s ability to identify and manage the threat without providing any assistance nor will the captain ask for any (Driskell & Salas, 1991). The shifting of responsibility reduces the effectiveness of the information collection needed to manage the threat thus reducing the overall performance of the flight crew (Waller, Gupta, & Giambatista, 2004). These theoretical perspectives suggest that elevated emotional responses to significant events may play a role in operational safety in commercial aviation. In particular, frustrated crews responded to threats that are known to impact on preflight activities, such as on-time-performance (OTP). Confusion about ATC instructions represents a plausible hazard to flight crews in congested airspace. The descent, approach and landing phases were associated with higher stress levels. Of the five HEA markers observed, stress was associated with poorly managed threats or threats that led to errors. This could possibly be due to the well-known effects of stress on higher-order cognitive processing. 97

118 Another plausible theory suggests that there may be different levels of trait anxiety amongst the participants. Current research in this field shows that individuals with high trait anxiety respond to perceived threats more emotionally thus reducing attention to the threat and diverting more to the emotion (Russo, Fox, Bellinger, & Nguyen-Van-Tam, 2001). Future studies should include the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) in order to identify within the sample population a correlation between HEA and individuals with high trait anxiety. 5.6 Application From an operational perspective, there will always be emotions and there will always be threats. Therefore, it is imperative that training facilitates a greater understanding of how to manage an emotional response to a threat. By maintaining emotional homeostasis throughout the encountered threat, flight crews may prevent the event from spiralling out of control. By helping pilots to understand the need for emotional control, individuals operating in high-risk environments will develop a self-awareness of how HEA impacts on the decision-making process and why HEA as a function of threat and error management (TEM) is important to the phases of flight. This study can inform the development of training in the recognition and management of affective response to threats as an important component of CRM programs. Understanding emotions is the key to safe practices in high-risk situations where elevated stress levels are frequently encountered. While this study focused on aviation, the results clearly show that HEA is present in high-risk environments, and the need for understanding of emotional awareness and control should be transferable to other industries. Future research should expand on this proof of concept by replicating these studies with an expanded list of potential HEA behaviour markers. Building upon this research will assist in adding validity to the theory that we can use emotions as an indicator of potential performance challenges in a team environment. 98

119 5.7 Limitations When designing an experiment, it is best to mimic the natural environment to get a response as close as possible to the real thing that is being measured. This study was designed as a naturalistic observation to observe the flight crews conducting the business of aviation. Whilst we were observing in as realistic an environment as was possible on a flight deck, there was still the possibility of the Hawthorne Effect or performing for the observer (Lipinski & Nelson, 1974; Adair, 1984). Additionally, with the majority of observed behaviours not contrived, we were not privy to what caused the behaviour and could only record what was observed. There may be as many opinions about emotions as there are types of emotions that we can experience (Frijda, 1986; Ben-Zeev, 1987; Thoits, 1989). Specifically, there are positive and negative emotions that we encounter daily (Lazarus, 1999; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). Strategies for identifying universally accepted methodologies for classifying emotions are not well documented (Cowie & Cornelius, 2003). Some occurrences of natural speech, such as pilot conversations, provide emotional data with high environmental validity (Scherer, 2003; McIntyre & Gocke, 2006). Conducting an observational study of flight crew affective states is quite challenging in many aspects. The observer s seat is located behind the two crew members on the flight deck limiting the observation of the crew members to partial facial expressions during moments of HEA. Using video cameras to record the crews would have assisted with this problem but the logistics during normal flight operations were prohibitive. The observers were tasked with documenting crew member emotions using visual, verbal and kinesics cues. The observations were made without a clear understanding of the intrinsic nature of the emotions prior to the identified HEA. The observers, considered subject matter experts in their perspective roles in aviation, were not selected for having been trained in the science of cognition and it was considered that they would have a working understanding of human emotions. It should be noted that it is quite difficult to ensure that observed behaviours are categorized under one exclusive label. 99

120 5.8 Conclusion Historically, aviation professionals have preferred not to approach such frangible topics as emotions when discussing their actions on the flight deck. This research shows that a flight deck can evoke some very enduring emotive moments. Emotions can increase the level of alertness or they can paralyse as in the fear state, tonic immobility. Crew members need to understand how emotions can help or hinder their capabilities on the flight deck. They need to understand what impact emotions have on decision making and other higher order cognitive functions. Understanding and managing emotions at times of high threat may prevent a crew from making unnecessary errors which can have a direct impact on the safety of flight. 100

121 Chapter 6 Restricted Sleep and Negative Affective States in Commercial Pilots during Short-haul Operations D. Arthur Drury, Sally A. Ferguson, PhD, Matthew J. W. Thomas, PhD Centre for Sleep Research, University of South Australia, GPO Box 2471, Adelaide, South Australia 5001, Australia As published Drury, D. A., Ferguson, S. A. & Thomas, M. J. W. (2012). Restricted sleep and negative affective states in commercial airline pilots during short haul operations. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 45. doi: /j.aap

122 Abstract This study aims to investigate the relationship between restricted sleep and HEA during normal flight operations, and whether sleep patterns influence the strength of HEA as a response to threats. Accident investigation reports continue to highlight the relationship between restricted sleep and poor safety outcomes. However, to date, we have a limited understanding of how sleep and HEA interact. A total of 302 sectors of normal airline flight operations were observed, and instances of HEA were recorded. Crews were asked about their sleep totals in the previous 24 and 48 hours. Chi-square analyses of 535 observed instances of HEA across 302 sectors of normal flight operations and sleep hours were undertaken. The analysis showed a significant relationship between the occurrence of HEA and recent sleep. The relationship between restricted sleep and HEA suggests that there may well be further implications with respect to operational safety. 102

123 6.1 Introduction Optimal performance is critical in high-risk environments such as aviation. Factors in the operating environment such as fatigue can degrade performance (Belenky et al., 2003; Thomas & Ferguson, 2010). Matthews and Desmond (2002) defined fatigue as a transient state associated with difficulties in maintaining taskdirected effort and attention during sustained performance. A high external load, compounded by fatigue, may impact on an individual s affective response to operational threats. These fight or flight reactions associated with affective responses are part of the biologically hardwired survival skills that have evolved over millions of years (LeDoux, 1998; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). Heightened emotional activity (HEA) is defined as the affective responses to perceived environmental threats encountered (Drury, Ferguson, & Thomas, 2010). Expressed in the form of auditory communication and body language, HEAs are biological responses to changes in perception as to the nature or level of threats to the environment (Drury et al., 2010). This has implications for operational performance as higher-order cognitive processing is impaired, and physiological activation increases as a reaction to fatigue-induced emotional responses (Angus, Heslegrave, & Myles, 1985; Pigeau et al., 1995). Airline flight crews are a group that are exposed to the physiological and cognitive decline associated with extended periods of stress and fatigue. The normal flight deck environment can operate between the calm of cruise flight and the intensity of the descent and approach to land. Short-haul airline operations generally operate multiple take-offs and landings as part of a 24/7 operation, sometimes with short layovers (Gander et al., 1998a). Long-haul airline operations are conducted over longer flight sequences generally with extended layovers in different time zones disrupting circadian rhythm (Samel, Wegmann, & Vejvoda, 1997, Gander et al., 1998b). Both operational schedules are therefore associated with the desynchronised patterns of sleep and fatigue issues experienced by shift workers. The impact of fatigue as a major contributing factor is well documented in aviation accident reports. American International Airways Flight 808 stalled and crashed while attempting to land at the US Naval Air Station at Guantanamo Bay, 103

124 Cuba (NTSB, 1993). In the analysis of the accident, the NTSB reported that the captain s fatigue and stress degraded his situational awareness (SA) to the point where he was unable to register the concerns from the other crew members that they weren t going to make it while he continued the unstable, and more difficult, approach to runway 10 (NTSB, 1993; Rosekind et al., 2003). The captain had been awake for 23.5 hours and had slept for five of the previous 28.5 hours prior to the accident (NTSB, 1993; Rosekind et al., 2003). Fatigue issues can be resolved with quality rest and sleep. Performance issues may be short in duration such as those associated with flying in adverse weather or corrected simply through more flight time to improve the skill sets necessary to deal with such issues. The pairing of any two of the three processes may not present insurmountable difficulties for individual management. Problems are more likely to arise when emotions, fatigue and performance challenges occur simultaneously. In the example of the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba accident, the crew exhibited all the signs of fatigue, heightened emotion and performance degradation during the accident sequence. The aim of the current study was to examine the relationship between restricted sleep and heightened emotional activity using recent sleep history (24- and 48-hour) and observable markers of emotional activity. 6.2 Methods Sample Trained observers collected data in 2009 during 302 normal flight sectors of commercial airline jet operations. All flight sectors were crewed by a captain and a first officer. Average flight time for captains was 15.8 years of flying (SD = 8.3). First officers had an average of 8.3 years of flying (SD = 6.8). Due to the strict anonymity involved with the data collection, and the naturalistic nature of the field observations, it was not possible to determine if an individual pilot was observed more than once. The sectors were chosen to represent the diversified route pairings of the airline involved in the study with an average flight time of 1.5 hours. The crews were scheduled to fly the chosen sectors and volunteered to take part in the study. 104

125 6.2.2 Design and Procedure The study utilized an observational methodology based on the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) which examined in detail the error management behaviours of flight crew (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999; Klinect et al., 1999; ICAO, 2002). Data were collected by 15 trained observers chosen from the pilot ranks as well as from within the training department of the airline, the University of South Australia and training captains from other airlines. The observers undertook a 4-day observer-training program which focused on the standardization of observational methods, and established acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability (ICAO, 2002; Klinect et al., 2003; Thomas, 2003). The observers were selected according to the criteria of: 1) having recent operational airline experience; and 2) being approved by management and the pilots union. The observers collected data from the flight deck observer seat during normal flight operations. 6.3 Measures Heightened Emotional Activity: the observers used the five behavioural markers of HEA to document the crews responses to the threats encountered. Previous research has validated the ability of observers to record affective states in normal flight deck discourse (Scherer, 2003; McIntyre & Gocke, 2006). HEA markers were: confusion, disagreement, unease, frustration and stress (Table 6.1). All instances of specific behaviours that were representative of the five behavioural markers were identified and recorded by the observers. These included any behaviour that was deemed to be an elevated emotional response to a threat above what was considered to be a normal, baseline level of emotional activity. Individual responses to the threats were as unique and varied in intensity as the threats encountered. Ekman (1992a, 1992b) stated that emotions must have three distinctive features by which they can be described: 1) they are universally understood, 2) they activate a physiological response; and 3) they have antecedent events. The five HEA markers chosen represent unambiguous states that actuate an increase in emotional responses as defined above. 105

126 Table 6.1: Observer Handbook Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) HEA Observer Manual Definition A crew member expresses some confusion with Confusion respect to the nature of the threat or its potential impact on the operation, such as not understanding the exact nature of a technical problem. Disagreement Unease Frustration Stress Crew members fail to agree with each other as to the nature or the potential consequence of the threat. A crew member expresses unease as a result of a threat, such as not being comfortable with continuation of an approach A crew member expresses anger or frustration as a result of a threat, such as becoming observably frustrated with a ground delay. A crew member becomes noticeably stressed as a result of a threat, such as difficulty responding to and managing a gusty crosswind landing. Prior Sleep/Wake: each crew member was interviewed during the cruise phase of each sector to document how much sleep they had in the previous 24 and 48 hours prior to the start of cruise flight. Restricted sleep was defined as five or less hours of sleep in the last 24 hours or 12 hours or less of sleep in the last 48 hours. The crew members were asked about the number of hours they had been awake prior to the commencement of the cruise flight. Chi-square analysis was used with SPSS 18.0 to examine the relationship between the hours of sleep in the previous 24 and 48 hours, and the wake hours prior to the sector with the five HEA markers. 6.4 Results The captains amount of sleep in the previous 24 hours ranged from three to 10 hours of sleep with an average of 7.04 hours and a standard deviation of First officers ranged from three to 13 hours of sleep with an average of 7.11 hours and a standard deviation of The captains amount of sleep in the previous 48 hours ranged from nine to 18 hours of sleep with an average of hours and a 106

127 standard deviation of First officers ranged from nine to 20 hours of sleep with an average of hours and a standard deviation of The captains awake hours prior to the sector ranged from 1.5 to 21 hours. The first officers wake hours prior to the sector ranged from three to 20 hours. Table 6.2: Chi-square analysis of the relationship between occurrences of HEA in response to threats and restricted sleep reported in the previous 24 and 48 hours Captain Sleep Prior 24 Hr Sleep Prior 48 Hr Prior Wake <5 5+ p < p >12 <12 p Confusion Y 15.6% 9.1% 9.2% 9.8% 16.7% 9.5% Confusion N 84.4% 90.9% < % 90.2% n.s. 83.3% 90.5% n.s. Disagreement Y 1.1% 1.1% 1.5% 1.1% 3.3% 1.1% Disagreement N 98.9% 98.9% n.s. 98.5% 98.9% n.s. 96.7% 98.9% n.s. Unease Y 16.7% 15.1% 26.2% 13.4% 13.3% 15.3% Unease N 83.3% 84.9% n.s. 73.8% 86.6% < % 84.7% n.s. Frustration Y 22.2% 22.4% 23.8% 22.1% 16.7% 22.6% Frustration N 77.8% 77.6% n.s. 76.2% 77.9% n.s. 83.3% 77.4% n.s. Stress Y 21.1% 11.0% 10.8% 12.2% 6.7% 12.2% Stress N 78.9% 89.0% < % 87.8% n.s. 93.3% 87.8% n.s. First Officer Sleep Prior 24 Hr Sleep Prior 48 Hr Prior Wake <5 5+ p < p >12 <12 p Confusion Y 16.7% 8.9% 7.2% 10.4% 11.5% 9.7% Confusion N 83.3% 91.1% < % 89.6% n.s. 88.5% 90.3% n.s. Disagreement Y 1.1% 1.1% 0.6% 1.3% 0.0% 1.2% Disagreement N 98.9% 98.9% n.s. 99.4% 98.7% n.s % 98.8% n.s. Unease Y 10.0% 15.9% 21.1% 13.8% 19.2% 15.2% Unease N 90.0% 84.1% n.s. 78.9% 86.2% < % 84.8% n.s. Frustration Y 34.4% 21.0% 31.1% 20.2% 11.5% 22.7% Frustration N 65.6% 79.0% < % 79.8% < % 77.3% n.s. Stress Y 16.7% 11.5% 12.8% 11.8% 7.7% 12.1% Stress N 83.3% 88.5% n.s. 87.2% 88.2% n.s. 92.3% 87.9% n.s. Notes: - < 5 hours of sleep. 5+ hours of sleep. < 12 hours of sleep. 12+ hours of sleep. > 12 hours awake. < 12 hours awake. Y = yes. N = no. n.s. = no significance. Confusion n = 86: Disagreement n = 10: Unease n = 135: Frustration n = 198: Stress n = Sleep in the Previous 24 Hours For several of the categories of HEA, differences were observed as a function of restricted sleep (< 5). For captains, restricted sleep (< 5) was associated with a higher incidence of confusion (X 2 = 3.87, df = 1, p < 0.049). Additionally, for captains, restricted sleep (< 5) was associated with a higher incidence of stress (X , df = 1, p < 0.005) (Table 6.2). 107

128 For first officers, restricted sleep (< 5) was associated with a higher incidence of confusion (X 2 = 5.49, df = 1, p < 0.019). Additionally, for first officers, restricted sleep (< 5) was associated with a higher incidence of frustration (X 2 = 8.36, df = 1, p < 0.004) (Table 6.2) Sleep in the Previous 48 Hours For captains, restricted sleep (< 12) was associated with a higher incidence of unease (X 2 = 13.9, df = 1, p < 0.001). For first officers, restricted sleep (< 12) was associated with a higher incidence of unease (X 2 = 5.96, df = 1 p < 0.015). Additionally, for first officers, restricted sleep (< 12) was associated with a higher incidence of frustration (X 2 = 9.87, df = 1, p < 0.002) (Table 6.2) Wake Hours prior to Commencement of Cruise Flight Wake hours prior to commencement of the cruise flight did not show any association with HEA (Table 6.2). 6.5 Discussion This paper presents an exploratory observational investigation into the relationship between restricted sleep and HEA as a response to threats encountered during normal operations. The findings demonstrate that when crew members sleep was restricted, there was an increase in HEA. Given the demonstrated relationships between restricted sleep and HEA, the findings have implications for the design and development of fatigue risk management systems in high-risk industries such as aviation, medicine and defence. Research on stress and fatigue demonstrates the negative effects on performance as including physiological as well as cognitive decline in motor skills and mood (Bennett, 2003; Caldwell, Caldwell, Brown, & Smith, 2004; Radley & Morrison, 2005; Russo, Stetz, & Thomas, 2005). Sleep deprivation and circadian disruption are the most common causes of fatigue, and have been shown to increase the probability of negative emotions (Caldwell et al., 2004; Caruso & Salovey, 2004; Russo et al., 2005). Fatigue may therefore further exacerbate negative emotions that could hinder decision-making capabilities impacting on operational safety (Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Negative emotions result in a decision-making process that takes longer and is labour intensive in that it utilizes 108

129 higher-level cognitive resources (Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). These affective processes present potentially significant problems in situations that require accuracy in time-pressured environments. High stress events also trigger biological responses in the form of emotions (Lazarus, 1999; Russo et al., 2005). The combination of stress and fatigue can produce heightened negative affective states and high levels of one can also produce the other (Rosekind et al., 1994; Radley & Morrison, 2005). The impact of prolonged periods of stress and fatigue on higher-order cognitive processing therefore represents a significant potential risk (LeDoux, 1998; Russo et al., 2005). Our current understanding of the relationship between fatigue, performance and emotions is extended by this study. Previous work has shown that fatigue can contribute to degraded performance (Angus et al., 1985; NTSB 1993) and that emotional activity is related to performance (Drury et al., 2010). The current findings demonstrate a relationship between fatigue and emotional responses which may have further implications for performance (Figure 6.1). Future research should establish how feedback from performance might exacerbate emotional activity in fatigued crews. 6.6 Application A Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) could include programs that identify and manage HEA as part of an Operational Performance Protection Strategy (OPPS) embedded within CRM training programs. The purpose of an OPPS program is to develop strategies that facilitate self-assessment as well as crew assessment skills. In the case of HEA, the goal would be to detect the presence of HEA as a potential indicator of increased fatigue-related risk and therefore performance degradation. Heightened emotional activity (HEA) would be the trigger for risk mitigation alerting individuals as well as other crew members to inconsistent behaviour thereby prompting increased vigilance by the crew. Continued inconsistent behaviour should prompt the use of OPP strategies in the form of verbalization of situational awareness (SA) by all crew members. 109

130 6.7 Limitations There may be as many opinions as to the definition of positive and negative emotions as there are researchers investigating them (Frijda, 1986; Ben-Zeev, 1987). Despite the ongoing debates around what constitutes an emotion, the 15 observers in this study were able to use five previously defined markers to record affective responses in pilots. Due to the nature of the airline s network variability, the logistics offered many challenges that necessitated the need to rely on self-reported measures of sleep. This study did not take into account the effects of circadian disruption from crossing multiple time zones. Additionally, this study did not determine whether pilots were carrying an accumulative sleep debt. However, the results clearly indicate the need for further studies to measure the impact of fatigue and emotions on human performance. While objective measures are ideal, self-reports of sleep have been widely used in field settings (Thomas & Ferguson, 2010). 6.8 Conclusion It is operationally significant that this study has shown that crews with restricted sleep display emotional responses. The findings indicated that reduced sleep was associated with increased occurrences of confusion and frustration in response to threats. This has implications for performance on the flight deck suggesting that crews need to be aware of the potential risks associated with emotions and fatigue. Additional training in how to detect and regulate the emotional response to a threat following restricted sleep will assist crews to maintain emotional homeostasis throughout the threat event. Empowering crews with the knowledge to identify and manage restricted sleep and HEA-related issues may allow individuals operating in high-risk environments to understand how to mediate the HEA process and to understand why HEA as a function of threat and error management (TEM) is important to critical phases of flight. 110

131 Chapter 7 The Interviews The most important thing in communication is to hear what isn't being said. ~Peter F. Drucker~ 111

132 Abstract To gain first-hand knowledge of emotions on the flight deck, we used subject matter experts (SMEs) to conduct a semi-structured interview technique to assess the level of understanding within the pilot community. The resulting data answer the following questions: 1) can pilots identify the events that trigger HEA? 2) what do pilots describe as the nature of HEA on a flight deck? 3) to what level do pilots believe that they manage HEA? 4) to what level do pilots believe that they have resolved HEA? This study provides information on how pilots currently manage HEA on the flight deck. The semi-structured interview process allowed pilots to discuss past experiences and events they had witnessed based around four key trigger points, the nature of the HEA, the management of the HEA and the resolution. The emotive triggers were coded in accordance with one of three interpersonal conflict types: relationship, task or affect. The findings showed that there were emotive moments on the flight deck of which the pilots had been a part or that they had witnessed. 112

133 7.1 Introduction Flight crews are highly trained groups of interdependent agents with mutually shared goals and task specific outcomes (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Gibson & Cooper, 2009). However, there is an ever-present difference in the organizational roles that each member has. Thatcher and Patel (2011) defined this as the demographic fault line which divides the team into subgroups of similar demographic attributes of rank, age, sex and race. The captain is highly experienced as the team lead and has the overarching responsibility for the whole process and all of the participants. The first officer and, if required by aircraft type, the second officer, are in subordinate support roles yet with the skills needed to command if required. Technical skills are rarely an issue with flight crews as the training system has vetted each member for entry onto the flight deck. Additionally, flight crews are assessed for how well they operate in a non-technical team environment; however, they are not trained for relationship conflict or breakdowns in interpersonal communications with regard to role differences or conduct (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2011). Flight crews perceptions of emotions were examined as part of a series of studies into HEA in commercial aviation. The purpose of this qualitative study was to gain first-hand knowledge from subject matter experts (SMEs) of their experiences with emotions on the flight deck. Previous quantitative research was conducted using a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) methodology to observe flight crews during normal commercial operations. Another quantitative study was conducted to establish the reliability of the five HEA behavioural markers used in the LOSA observation Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) Heightened emotional activity (HEA) is defined as emotional responses to perceived threats encountered in high-risk environments (Drury et al., 2010). HEA responses have the potential to impede decision making, adding pressures to performance, which represent an added threat in an already high-risk environment. HEAs are biologically-evolved behaviours that manifest as observable responses to changes in the nature or level of threats within the environment (Drury et al., 2010). HEA must have three fundamental features as defined by Ekman (1992a, 1992b) in 113

134 that they have an antecedent event, they activate a physiological response and they are universally understood. Not all emotions are detrimental to performance as some research has shown that mild levels of stress can enhance performance as the body works to compensate as a potential fear-of-failure response (Lazarus et al., 1952; Robert & Hockey, 1997). Other research, such as the Yerkes-Dodson Law and its prediction of the inverted-u, can be generalized to state that as the arousal levels increase so too does the performance level to an optimal point beyond which performance decline begins (Sanders, 1983; Staal, 2004). Flight crews might experience this during bad weather when they successfully execute an instrument approach to land. Flying a precision approach in the clouds with a moderate level of turbulence generates stress, while the experience gained from hours of practice manipulating the controls prevents the moment from getting away from the crew member. Conflict experienced in the team environment is associated with negative emotions (de Wit et al., 2011). Team conflict is characterized and punctuated by stress, friction and disagreements (Shaw, Duffy, Zhu, Scott, Shih, & Susanto, 2011). Resolving team conflict is difficult if other members within the team see the actions of some as interference in goal attainment (Weider-Hatfield & Hatfield, 1995). Group processes bogged down in negative emotions use a bottom-up approach to problem solving that is time consuming and utilizes higher cognitive resources (Forgas, 1990; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). During this process, team members assess their perceived value based on their role within the conflict taking a passive aggressive stance of withholding support from the team (Behfar, Peterson, Mannix, & Trochim, 2008). Team conflicts are considered an internal threat within the TEMM and internal threats have been cited in two-thirds of all human error accidents (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999) Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) Drury et al. (2010) conducted an exploratory study to establish a relationship between perceived threats and emotional responses to those threats. The crew behaviours that underpin effective threat and error management (TEM) are traditionally measured using behavioural markers for the crews non-technical skills (Flin & Martin, 2001). These coded crew behaviour according to pre-defined constructs of such things as vigilance and contingency planning. This research 114

135 was developed to adopt a similar behavioural coding framework for behaviours associated with emotional responses to perceived threats associated with high-risk environments and to explore the relationship between these behaviours and effective threat and error management (TEM) on the flight deck. 7.2 Observation Methodology This study utilized an observational methodology, based on the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), which examined in detail the error management behaviours of commercial flight crews (Helmreich et al., 2001; ICAO, 2002). Through the observation of normal flight operations and the systematic coding of flight crew behaviour using HEA behavioural markers, the potential relationship between HEA and enhanced flight crew performance was examined. Data were collected by 15 trained observers chosen from the pilot ranks as well as from within the training department of the airline, the University of South Australia and training captains from other airlines. The 15 observers were tasked to observe participants of randomly selected two-pilot crews who had volunteered for this study for 302 sectors of normal flight operations. The sectors were chosen to represent the diversified route pairings of the airline involved in the study. The findings show that heightened emotional activity (HEA) was found to occur frequently during normal flight operations. In all, 884 threats were observed during the 302 sectors distributed across five phases of flight. The 884 threats resulted in 535 HEA (59.6%) responses to those threats demonstrating that emotions are prevalent in interpersonal communications on the flight deck Reliability of HEA Behavioural Markers The reliability of the five HEA markers of confusion, disagreement, frustration, unease and stress was established in a study conducted using commercial airline pilots (see Chapter 4). Participants included domestic short-haul and international longhaul commercial airline pilots who volunteered for the study. The participants were asked to view eight video vignettes of various flight deck scenarios. The participants were asked to identify any of the five HEA behaviours in the videos. The aim of this study was to establish a reliable set of behavioural markers that consistently record HEA. 115

136 The findings demonstrate that flight crews can reliably observe heightened emotional activity in other crew members above and beyond normal flight deck stressors. It is additionally significant that the crew members can differentiate between the various emotions and the nature in which they were expressed Flight Crew Perceptions of HEA A key component to this research was to develop an understanding of flight crew awareness of emotions on the flight deck. Phase 3 explored the extent to which flight crews were aware of emotional activity on the flight deck and the relationship between HEA and performance. In addition, this study measured the acceptance of the pilot group for receiving additional training to develop a comprehensive understanding of how emotions impact on flight deck activities. This study will provide information on how pilots are currently managing HEA on the flight deck. The semi-structured interview (SSI) is well suited for collecting data on perceptions and impressions of personal experiences that may include sensitive data (Barriball & While, 1993). The participants were asked the same questions with adjustments made to the question order to elicit more information about their experiences with emotive events (Dearnley, 2005). The questions were used to encourage the participants to speak freely about their experiences, and the order of the questions permitted a free-flowing conversational style. The interviews permitted follow-on questions to encourage the development of the topic (Dearnley, 2005) including how did that make you feel? and what did you do next? The intent was to collect data that comprised first-hand knowledge of HEA on the flight deck. 7.3 Methods Participants The participants for the study (N = 14; 2 women, 12 men) were recruited from three different airlines using a snowball sampling technique which is a sampling method that uses contact information passed on by other study participants to individuals with similar experiences (Noy, 2008). The only stipulation placed on the volunteers was that they were current airline pilots flying as captain, first officer or second officer. The average flight time amongst the participants was 11,429 hours with an average age of 43. The participants flew 116

137 domestic short-haul and international long-haul airline operations. Aircraft types flown by the participants were the A380, B747, B777, A330, B737 and A320. The interviews were conducted in three different cities using face-to-face and Skype Internet video conferencing techniques and they lasted between 35 min to 1 hour 15 min. The interviews were recorded on a hand-held digital recorder and later transcribed for analysis. The sessions began with a brief synopsis of an emotive event that the author had experienced as a commercial airline pilot. Demographic questions on age, hours flown, position and aircraft type were used to begin the exchange of information. The participants were then asked to recount any incidents that they had experienced in which emotions were high on the flight deck. A critical decision method (CDM) was used for knowledge elicitation from the participants who were asked questions to probe the non-routine event that they had initially discussed (Klein et al., 1989). There were 17 potential questions (Appendix 3.2) that were used for the interview in addition to the demographic questions. The participants in the third city began to share similar experiences to those in the other two cities without adding anything that could be defined as unique, thus indicating that data saturation had been reached and any sample size increase would not add any benefit to the data collection Analytic Process Analysis of the data was begun after four key themes of the interviews had been identified. The transcripts were read whilst listening to the audio recordings of the interviews and any discrepancies in the transcripts were corrected. 1. Triggers Events that trigger cognitive attentional control and biological response which are in direct conflict with goal attainment can be moderated depending on the strength of the stimuli (Kanske & Kotz, 2011). The emotional state that is retrieved from memory will drive behavioural interactions, whether positive or negative, with others and influence future behaviours (Damasio, 2001). 2. Nature of HEA Emotional responses to trigger stimuli, which are goal dependent, are determined by the strength of the perceived value of the goal (Higgins et al., 1997). This may be driven by a safety-of-flight event such as a master caution light going on or team conflict as to the exact nature of the emergency. 117

138 3. Management of HEA The participant s actions to regulate emotions in a situation of organizational or interpersonal conflict (Lawrence et al., 2011). Emotions do not regulate the response to an event but make it probable that there will be a response (Gross, 2002). The regulation is generally directed towards maintaining emotional homeostasis. 4. Resolution of HEA The participant s framing of the conflict will influence whether they perceive the outcome negatively or positively which will in turn influence how they resolve the heightened emotional activity (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). 7.4 Findings Over the life of a career in aviation, crew members will experience relationship conflict, task conflict and affect conflict as a function of interpersonal interactions of a team (Simons & Peterson, 2000). Relationship conflict is characterized by acrimonious behaviour that impacts on group performance by limiting cognitive function for decision making as members worry about the other members with whom they are in conflict with and not the task at hand (Simons & Peterson, 2000). Task conflict occurs when crew members disagree as to how best to perform the task (DeChurch & Marks, 2001). Varela, Burke and Landis (2008) defined affect conflict as crew members experience of tension and disunity within the group structure. These constructs are based on the assumption that the team mental model will not maintain the same shared expectancies under certain conditions (Edwards, Day, Arthur Jr., & Bell, 2006). Flight crews with high relationship conflict require additional cognitive resources to administer to the interruptions occurring from negative emotions, depleting the necessary capital required to evaluate task-related processes (Shaw et al., 2011). When the negative emotions are directed at an individual, as opposed to a situation, other crew members will withdraw and withhold input until such time as when they are personally involved (Van Kleef et al., 2006; Shaw et al., 2011). Flight crews experiencing task conflict may resolve the issue and benefit from a greater understanding of the task as the conflict encourages crew members to discuss procedurally the preferred method for completing the task (Simons & Peterson, 2000). This form of conflict resolution is supported by regulatory and 118

139 organizational controls which clearly define the steps of the task. Relationship conflict resolution is theorized as best to avoid even while running the risk that it increases negative emotions (Behfar et al., 2008). One must consider the hierarchical structure and working environment of the flight crew team when considering how best to resolve relationship conflict. Affect conflict is not as easily resolved as it does not follow any predefined methodology or social norms (Izard, 1977; Frijda, 1988, 2005; Steinel et al., 2006). Kelly (as cited in Jehn (1994)) stated that crew members will either concentrate on resolving the interpersonal issues creating the affect conflict or ignore them to the detriment of performance. The transcript passages were analysed and identified as belonging to any of the four key themes, which were colour-coded and later collated by colour under the theme heading. The Trigger events and Nature of HEA were coded for relationship conflict (RC), task conflict (TC) and affect conflict (AC). The Management of HEA was coded for relationship management (RM), task management (TM) and affect management (AM). The Resolution was coded for avoidance; avoidance respect; management interaction; HEA training; improved situational awareness; operational standards/adjustments; safety management systems (SMS); relationship recovery; and acquisitive cognition (AC) Triggers The participants were asked to describe an event that they observed or in which they had participated where emotions were involved. They were then asked to describe what they believed the trigger was that escalated the emotions. Using the team conflict coding of the participant s trigger comments helped to identify some key themes that further distinguished the conflict. Task conflict (TC) was identified as having the most influence on creating emotive events on the flight deck. These events ranged from a light comes on to well, I was committed and there was no way I could get the power off so we just overstressed the aircraft to buggery. There were many examples given in which the TC was identified as having been impacted by operational demands such as an OTD (on time departure) you know they got a 30 minute turn around. The participants described events in which the operating environment often created the conflict: we re coming in somewhere, there s weather, we re getting stepped down bit by bit cause it s early in the morning, there s traffic everywhere... I recall an extreme wind 119

140 shear encounter. There are examples of the system design creating conflict such as with the Airbus checklist process I can t do something until he s done it then he can t do it until I ve done it, you know. Relationship conflict (RC) was identified by the participants as containing some examples of dysfunctional teams operating at the very limits of tolerance. They identified cockpit gradients that were very steep which created a toxic flight deck. The captain yelled what are you fucking doing, it s my cockpit, you know, cause the second officer had leaned forward and selected, he knew what the next frequency was going to be, it was getting real busy No, especially things got out of hand quickly. One participant described the captain s response to an event in which he performed checklist items by memory he literally threw it in my face sideways and went read it from the fucking checklist. The RC mainly appeared between the captain and first officer (FO) or the captain and second officer but not the first officer and second officer. We d been away 10 or 11 days with the same crew and the FO and the captain did not get along well... he was a bully. You know he was a big guy too, six foot six, you know, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. These events usually appeared as an overbearing captain or an experienced first officer withdrawing support. The captain was riding him, I think he was tired, the FO was biting back and it was, you know, quite an uncomfortable feeling Affect conflict was identified as being very prevalent on the flight deck amongst the flight crews. He came back to me and he said look he s obviously under a lot of pressure and a lot of stress at the time No, he was scared. The participants noted that these events didn t happen every day which makes them easily identifiable. If someone is acting what s the word, irrationally, inappropriately, you ve got to think what s all that about. Just let me look at this That s not right Well he d been, he d been yelling at that stage for about two minutes. The participants identified moments when the AC response bordered on the ridiculous; a captain refused to push back from the gate until someone had put a special pillow in the crew rest berth, no, I want a big fluffy pillow like the ones you put in. The participant s responses indicated that the nature of the AC on most occasions was external to the flight deck; it s usually external factors that I, this is what I observed and these are not things that overtly or obviously affect safety. 120

141 Coding of the triggers was not as black and white as all or none fitting into one of the three conflicts (Figure 7.1). Some of the statements were coded using a combination of one or more of the conflicts. These were the responses that provided robustness to the discussion. There were statements that were coded RC TC AC with all three conflicts identified: I ve had a captain who has had a dummy spit, usually the cause you can see, you know, you ve got pushed back in the queue for takeoff or, you know, there was confusion as to which way you were going to taxi because it was non-standard or, you know, usually you can see a visual reason for the dummy spit. It s the reasons you can t see, yeah. An RC TC statement was coded as such for having a relationship and task conflict component, He was riding me. He was, I had come off leave and was just getting back into the seat, he d probably hadn t had leave for the best part of eight, 12 months, so he was right on his game and I was a little slow for him so he started riding me An RC AC statement was coded as such for, as you would if you re having to deal with an airport manager or someone on the ground who s trying to push your buttons and get you to do something you don t want to do. A TC AC statement was coded as such for having a task and affect conflict component, But what drove it at the time was quite a strong feeling of survival and probably a fear of the unknown if we d have decided to reject the take-off... Well, it s a bit the same as terrain, terrain, or whoop, whoop pull up! I mean to me that s someone shouting at you. 121

142 Figure 7.1: Conflict flow chart non-exclusive pathways Nature of HEA The nature of HEA was recorded as the emotional response to the trigger events previously described and coded as conflict. During the interviews, the participants discussed their understanding of emotions and how they approached them on the flight deck: There s a lot of guys out there who just seem to be, you know, so in place when faced with a problem, my initial reaction is, you know, I guess fear So I think stress is one of those things that s insidious. It comes on you slowly and without you knowing. You don t know what it is that makes you go what are you doing? These comments showed that the participants were quite capable of expressing a clear understanding of the HEA processes that they encountered. The participants were able to discuss the emotional responses to the triggers without questioning their ability to openly discuss what was considered by many in aviation as a frangible topic: Frustration, I think was the initial one because I wasn t allowed to operate the aircraft which I m quite experienced in my role Well, I mean I m of the view that the argument that a heightened emotional sort of gets your adrenalin going and brings your attention into, you know a heightened sense of alert 122

143 and readiness. Openly discussing emotions experienced on a flight deck will never truly become common within the public domain; however, they may be within a confidential forum. The participants clearly understood how interpersonal conflict impacted on the team and performance, So my hands were already full with all those tasks and having him yell at me like that really essentially took me out of the loop for, you know, the minute that he was yelling and carrying on like a pork chop this breaks your attention, I had such a physical reaction. I was nearly unable to operate the airplane cause I knew what was going on. I got the shakes and, you know, like it was terrible. I was an FO and new so he just sat there and it was his sector but you know, that stuff shouldn t happen... I just got really tense and what I noticed was that once he started in on me like that I actually couldn t think. Emotive events experienced on the flight deck should become part of the CRM curriculum in as much as the repeat offenders need to be reminded that this type of behaviour does have limits. Some of the HEA that was reported within the three interpersonal conflicts had built up over time causing some of the participants to contemplate the cause and their role in the conflict when the trigger was not clearly defined. I think when people react that way you ve got to ask yourself first and foremost is he reacting because of something that I have done, am I impacting on the safety of the operation, and then the second question I d ask is why is he reacting in that way? Self-evaluation of individual performance is quite natural and as it is based on negative emotion, it requires time and cognitive resources to ascertain the cause of the conflict. When the conflict trigger was not clearly defined, yet one team member was singled out, the results could be somewhat predictable. I can think of several times as a junior crew member when I have actually withdrawn support and probably reduced the safety level of the operation by doing so after having been handled badly. Withdrawal of support appeared to be a common strategy amongst crew members who perceived their involvement in the conflict to be unwarranted. There appeared to be a great deal of interpersonal conflict initiated from the left seat as reported by the participants: he was yelling at me at one point he absolutely gave me a rip-roaring arse chewing for that, yelled at me Him yelling at me and being, and berating me, left, I was basically, he was yelling at me while we were rolling onto the high-speed taxi way... These are the things that I see that are, 123

144 you know, they re not physical incapacitations but they are aberrations due to arrogance and ego. This clearly demonstrated that, for some, a steep authority gradient was the preferred method of command which goes against everything that CRM has been set up to correct for over 30 years. However, there were some who understood the relationship rules of the road and tried to stay as neutral as possible to minimize the conflict: You wouldn t, you wouldn t respond, you wouldn t get as emotionally involved in the flare-up on the flight deck My attitude was as a first officer you re an international diplomat. So I never saw myself on equal terms with the guys in the left-hand seat. I never thought the gradient should be level but obviously it shouldn t be so steep as to cause problems. Maintaining a neutral stance may not sway the opinion of the individual who started the conflict but it may reduce the time spent in opposition. The two female participants understood that in a male-dominant industry they might be held to different standards, yet they and other women crew members would prefer to be treated fairly. It s a bloke s world so we strap on our balls Yeah what a bitch or, you know, and if you make a mistake, it s almost like she s female or she s blonde or just a dumb bitch or whatever they say he got me in tears and that takes a lot because, you know, I don t cry easily. I got to the point where I couldn t think because I was so, I suppose I was disgusted at his behaviour, I couldn t believe it, I m happy to have an instructor be hard on me and strict. Entry onto the flight deck is not gender specific but at times the perception of ability needlessly is. Respect for the position is a common theme addressed by many of the participants Management of HEA Management of HEA focuses on how the participants were able to manage the emotions once they were expressed and return to emotional homeostatic levels of normalcy. Sometimes this was easier said than done: I think he d settled down by about a third of the way through the sector. So well and truly into the cruise It took me weeks to stop the feeling of anger and frustration with what went on. Human emotions can be unpredictable as noted by some of the participant s recovery times. When travelling at.85 Mach having a crew member out of the loop for a third of a sector can present some safety issues concerning situational awareness (SA). Sometimes, the management of the HEA was delayed in hopes that the event would correct itself especially when it was a junior first officer correcting a captain. 124

145 He put me in this sort of curly position and I don t like it. It was getting to the point where I was nearly going to have to take control off him or at the very least call for him to go around I think I probably would have gone into harder warnings earlier. The participant s respect for the left seat prevented most from engaging in interpersonal conflicts that would call into question the captain s abilities determining that it was detrimental to their position if they were wrong. The participants all stated that, if possible, the best way to avoid further interpersonal conflict was to bring the focus back to the task at hand. I just try to be really professional, really supportive and really focused on the task to try to keep things at that level. So that I find works well for me, basically help them keep their eye on the ball first and foremost we re trained to focus on the safe operation of the aircraft and I guess that s the first thing you think about is: are we in a safe place? Conflict brings negative emotions out in the open without a set of rules of engagement that each member can follow. It is, therefore a lot easier to disengage from the conflict to a position which has an operational focus on safety. The participants discussed withdrawal of service as a means of protest against conflict directed at them. And that s what happens to me. I thought well if the shit hits the fan, he s not going to get the best from me because, you know, part of me is not going to want to give it to him Sadly I wish I could say that I don t withdraw services but I do withdraw services. The participants clarified this by stating that they did their job but did not assist beyond SOP callouts for prompts but always maintained safety first. If the other individual from whom they were withdrawing service was heading towards a minor event that would be embarrassing for the other person, they would not assist in correcting that individual. The participants stated that they participated in another common form of self-preservation known in various parts of the world as The Blue Flu or Personal Roster Adjustment. And I thought I don t want to be a part of something which goes wrong and I removed myself from duty I actually was due to fly with him about three weeks after this and I called in sick. I just did not have the energy to deal with him again and I didn t have the energy to start and say, look are we going to have a good day today? This form of avoidance was manifested when a first or second officer was paired with an overbearing captain and they reached a point during the trip that they claimed was their personal limit for abusive behaviour directed at them. 125

146 Claiming a sick day has a ripple-down economic effect on the airlines that can range from hundreds of dollars for a domestic reserve pilot call-out to thousands of dollars for an international reserve pilot call-out Resolution Resolution discusses how the participants resolved the HEA either personally or as a team. The easiest way for the participants to resolve most of the interpersonal conflict was to use the avoidance method. The participants stated that: in a situation where my gut feeling was I don t feel I can operate this aircraft safely with this personality, with this guy. So I thought the best thing I could do was just get out of there I really didn t want to fly with him again and I probably would be speaking to him before I fly with him again, he was that bad. I think it is safe to assume here that, due to the hierarchical nature of the flight deck structure plus the time constraints that most flight crews are under, it is easier to walk away than to stand and engage in the interpersonal conflict and risk the wrath of management. The participants reported that as long as they did their job when interpersonal conflict arose they felt justified that they had done nothing wrong and only wanted some respect for their position. Are we going to have a good day today you know, are you going to treat me with respect today, are we going to have a happy day or are you going to use me as a punching bag again? But you know when somebody puts you in that awkward situation where you re really starting to feel a bit stressed and they don t even acknowledge it and say mate, sorry I did that, I should have flown it down quicker or something like that, he had every opportunity to make amends and I d say yeah, no worries, mate. This relates back to the withdrawal of service in that, after some time, the participants felt that any mistake the captain made was well deserved. The participants discussed the lack of management involvement or intervention with dealing with interpersonal conflict. No, that s right, there isn t, there isn t a very established relationship amongst individual crew members with the fleet managers or the, you know, people above them or even the people below them really. You don t interact with them so I did it through the old boy system. Mate of Dad s was a senior check captain, I got on the phone and said hey, this is what happened and he said leave it to him and that guy retired only about six months after. 126

147 This represents the participants level of expectation for input from an effective management process to intercede in these events. The participants reported that interpersonal conflict was not discussed in training and they believed that many of these issues could be resolved by teaching good communication skills as part of a good CRM program. They stated, but there s something that they, you know they don t focus on in CRM [which] is, and to put this so basically, how to treat each other with respect But the older crewman positions in corporations like we hold, you would have gone through numerous communicative courses, we did none But these days, non-technical markers and technical markers and whatever, they ve got to have bloody nutcase arsehole marker. These are the interpersonal skills that were removed from the initial CRM program. Teaching flight crews about affect and proper interpersonal communications skills are the key to removing toxic flight decks. 7.5 Discussion (Overarching Themes) In this study, we have examined emotions on the flight deck through the eyes of the subject matter experts (SMEs), the captains, first officers and second officers. To understand their working perspective of the emotive processes that take place, we formulated a series of questions that would elicit four key points of interest: trigger, nature of HEA, management of HEA and resolution. By having them relate an emotive event that they had witnessed on the flight deck, we were able to establish what triggered the emotive event, what the nature of the emotion was, how they managed the emotive event and whether they resolved the event. Each event was coded for relationship, task or affect conflict or any combination of the three. The trigger contained more task conflict-coded events that would suggest non-standard techniques were observed in the operation of the aircraft. Commercial aviation is a highly complex operating environment regulated down to the proper wearing of the uniform. The tasks required to operate the aircraft safely are completed as an algorithm from start to finish with very little, if any, grey area open for discussion. When the manipulation of the controls exceeds the benchmark levels defined in the operating manuals, the other crew members will make note of the discrepancy and, if not corrected, will begin a series of procedural inquiries as to why the aircraft was operating outside of the defined parameters with these most 127

148 notably from the captain as the participants in the study reported. However, when it was the captain operating outside of the preferred operational limits, the other crew members did not feel that it was their place to bring this to the captain s attention unless it was a safety-of-flight issue. This did trigger many emotions such as frustration as was noted with affect conflict rated high at second to task conflict. Relationship conflict was rated the least of the three conflicts and triggered what was generally observed as a withdrawal of cooperation from the first officer stemming from an emotionally-charged berating from the captain to the first or second officer. This form of avoidance was common in quiet protests when there was a perceived injustice. The nature of HEA coded affect conflict with the highest number of conflict events which identified the tension and friction between some of the participants as observed on the flight deck. Most notably were the emotions experienced by the crew members on the receiving end of an overbearing captain s diatribe. These behaviours presented a safety-of-flight issue as noted by some of the emotional recovery times reported by the participants. Cognitive processes are greatly reduced when burdened by negatively-charged emotions directed at them or against another crew member. In addition to the cognitive impairment, there is also a reported physiological impact on the crew members. Having the ability to remove themselves from the flight deck, albeit temporarily, granted some relief; however, this was only permissible during cruise flight which was considered to be a non-critical phase of flight. It should be noted that while toxic flight decks are the minority, it does show that there are still some crew members whose behaviour is quite corrupt even after many years of CRM training and informed human factors science. Individuals who appear unhappy do so for many reasons, some of which they can control and others they cannot. The breakup of a marriage or the death of a loved one can foster feelings of a deep sadness that only time can heal. Others may be unhappy with their position in life. A first officer who has been in the right seat for a number of years may resent flying with new captains. A senior captain flying yesterday s best aircraft may resent being passed over to fly the new larger aircraft. As a professional courtesy to the other crew members, these perceived injustices should not be brought onto the flight deck; however they do make it there, impeding sound interpersonal communications. CRM training was designed to introduce good 128

149 interpersonal skills and reduce the internal team conflicts that appeared to be the norm back in the late 1970s as human error was the main cause in most accidents (Cooper et al., 1979). In 1986, NASA conducted a second workshop as a follow-on to measure the progress of CRM training (Chidester, 1993). They discovered that, even with a majority buy-in from the pilot group, there was and probably always would be a small minority of pilots who would continue to reject the CRM ideology (Orlady & Foushee, 1986). Although not receiving training in this area, coping skills for crew members who encounter these individuals have evolved over time. When it came to managing the HEA, the participants statements were mostly coded under task management, for example, returning to the task of flying the aircraft. This may have been the one aspect of any flight deck conflict that they could control. The standard operating procedures (SOPs) are written to remove any questions as to the best way to operate a jumbo airliner half way around the world. The hard parts to manage are the human aspects of relationship and emotional conflict. The participants stated that they managed the relationship conflict by referring to the SOPs if the conflict was task-related and distancing themselves from the argument as a means of defusing any flight deck friction. The participants reported that the heightened level of emotion that they experienced at times impacted on their performance and they did not know how to regulate the emotional response other than with time to let the moment pass. CRM does not cover the management of relationship conflict or the regulation of emotion conflict in its training for flight crews. What crew members know to do is biologically inherited from our prehistoric ancestors. How the HEA is triggered by an event and becomes the trigger for other crew members is shown in Figure 7.2. An example could be if the captain becomes impatient with the ground crew causing a delay. The captain s HEA response triggers the first officer's HEA which produces a momentary performance decline that is either managed by the team or the crew members begin to cope with the lingering event or HEA. This may lead to further complications such as the captain making an error in the paperwork due to his performance decline. The crew may manage the event for satisfactory results. 129

150 Figure 7.2: HEA is triggered and is the trigger 130

151 Resolution of the team conflicts did identify a need from the participants for respect for their position. They felt that their active participation in the operation of the aircraft was not acknowledged from the left seat, right seat or observer seat. The participants also reported that a good safety program was key to resolving and preventing most team conflicts. However, avoiding the situation was the preferred active response to resolve the team conflict, as the participants believed that they were not trained in how to resolve these issues. The avoidance technique extended to future flights with certain individuals when they were scheduled to fly together again. This identifies an operational need to improve the reporting systems between the flight deck and flight crew management to identify individuals who may be experiencing a personal tragedy or an individual who may require some time off to reflect on how best to improve his/her interpersonal behaviours. The participants resolved some of the conflict within themselves with acquisitive cognition or by projecting how they would take a stand to resolve the team conflict with an individual if they had the chance to speak to them in the future. Once again, these are the fight or flight skills that humans are hard wired for in dealing with a perceived threat. 7.6 Conclusion Flight crew training goes to great lengths to ensure that the individual crew members are technically proficient to operate within an organizational operating environment. Human factors CRM training identifies certain behaviours that are acceptable on a flight deck. Neither of these training programs covers how best to deal with the kinds of HEA on the flight deck as identified by the participants in this study. The conflicts are real as are the emotions that the participants reported feeling. Providing the necessary emotion regulating skills to flight crews would improve the effectiveness of the team and reduce the unnecessary expense of dysfunctional team behaviour to the organizations. 131

152 Chapter 8 General Discussion How use doth breed experience in man. ~William Shakespeare~ 132

153 8.1 Summary of Research My aviation career began on a high note and almost ended on one spectacular near miss event that involved extreme emotional reactions that I could not define. The extraordinary event that has propelled me to undertake a PhD to research why the event took place is introduced in the preface. The concept of researching the interpersonal interactions of the team that makes up the flight crew gained momentum in the late 1970s as part of a program to reduce human error that was identified as the major causal factor in aviation accidents. This was introduced and discussed in Chapter 1. One of the key findings of the initial research identified the importance that affective states have on human interaction on the flight deck. Emotions were not widely researched at the time and therefore misidentified as psychobabble by the pilot group and over time the affect component was written out of the curriculum: this was discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 discussed the theoretical questions and the nuts and bolts of the research methods. Chapter 4 examined the reliability of having experienced airline pilots identifying HEA in other pilots using video vignettes of flight deck emotional activity. Study 2 (Chapter 5) was conducted to explore the relationship between HEA and perceived threats to the safety of the flight by observing flight crews during normal airline operations as part of a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). Study 3 (Chapter 6) examined the relationship between restricted sleep (RS), HEA and threat and error management (TEM). Study 4 (Chapter 7) was conducted using subject matter experts (SMEs) in semi-structured interviews to discuss the prevalence of emotions on the flight deck and the methods they used to regulate their emotions. The aim of this research was to establish a relationship between HEA and perceived threats encountered on the flight deck thereby demonstrating through the scientific evidence contained within the study that further research was warranted. The results of these exploratory studies, and their implications, will be discussed in the rest of this chapter. 8.2 Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) Heightened emotional activity (HEA) is defined as the affective responses to the perceived environmental threats encountered (Drury et al., 2012). Expressed in the form of auditory communication and body language, HEAs are biological 133

154 responses to changes in perception as to the nature or level of threats to the environment (Drury et al., 2012). An example of this which has implications for operational performance is when fatigue-induced emotional responses to threats are encountered in the operational environment impairing higher-order cognitive processing as more energy is required to process negative emotions in a fatigued state (Angus et al., 1985; Pigeau et al., 1995; Forgas, 1999). 8.3 Observing Flight Crews When conducting a Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), the only way to successfully collect the data is by observing the crews from the jump seat on the flight deck (FAA, 2006). This is due to the banning of video recording devices on the flight deck (Stewart, 2003). This needs to be changed to permit recording for research in accident and incident prevention without it being used in litigation matters. The purpose of a LOSA is to identify threats from the airline operating environment and within the airline operations itself (FAA, 2006). The LOSA provides a unique opportunity to observe flight crews emotional responses to the perceived threats they encounter during normal flight operations. Conducting an observational study of flight crew interaction with the main task of identifying emotional responses is quite challenging in many ways. Increasing the number of emotional markers that replicate the myriad of human emotions experienced when encountering threats will add greater precision in future studies. The observers collected data from the flight deck jump seat located behind the two crew members, also known as the observer seat, during normal flight operations. The position of the observer s seat on the flight deck limits the observation of the crew members to only seeing partial facial expressions during moments of HEA. The proximity of the observer seat to the flight crews increased the togetherness on the flight deck, influencing the crew members reactive nature and thus creating the Hawthorne Effect. This can be minimized if the crew members can be put at ease with the observer behaving in a professional manner while on board. Reactive behaviour is common for the minor threats that are encountered when the crew members would respond in a predictable manner or not respond at all. However, when the threat was significant, the crew member s response was 134

155 genuine and without any pretence. This was significant as the observer was able to see the full emotional response to the threat and the corresponding actions, right or wrong, to mitigate the threat. In addition, the interpersonal interaction of the team was conducted without any thought of acting for the observer. Conducting an observation study into emotional responses to threats in a controlled environment has its merits yet not the same robustness as naturalistic observations might encounter. More observational studies are warranted to validate the science and to map the threat, response and action chain of events to include video recording of the events for a more detailed evaluation of the HEA response. 8.4 Operational Significance This research has shown associations between HEA and a decrease in the operational performance of flight crews. Flight crews responded emotionally to threats encountered, some of which were mismanaged and led to errors. This is a recursive system in that a threat may generate HEA, but the HEA may be preexisting such as from high trait anxiety. The study identified that something as benign as a memo from corporate communications intimating impending change can have a significant impact on crew performance. While a causal relationship cannot be demonstrated, previous research has shown that elevated emotions increase physiological and cognitive responses to threatening situations (Ben-Zeev, 1987) and thus, in the aviation setting, this may prove to be operationally significant (Ben-Zeev, 1987; Damasio, 1999). 8.5 Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) A Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) should include programs that identify and manage fatigue-induced HEAs as part of an Operational Performance Protection Strategy (OPPS) embedded within CRM programs. The purpose of an OPPS program is to develop strategies that facilitate intrapersonal assessment as well as interpersonal assessment skills by all team members. In the case of restricted sleep-induced HEA, the goal would be to detect the presence of out-ofcharacter HEA responses to perceived threats as a potential indicator of increased fatigue-related risk and therefore performance degradation. Identification of the HEA would be the trigger for risk mitigation alerting individuals as well as other 135

156 crew members to inconsistent behaviour, thereby prompting increased vigilance by the crew. Continued inconsistent behaviour should prompt the use of OPP strategies in the form of verbalization of situational awareness (SA) from all crew members. 8.6 Training We cannot identify, with certainty, which emotional response we may have when placed in a demanding situation. We cannot train for each potential reaction to a threat that we may encounter as a team but we can train to recognise when an emotionally-laden response may indicate that individual performance is in decline thus requiring additional vigilance or assistance. Our ability to recognise a change in behaviour may happen before the individual recognises it. Extraordinary events can trigger heightened emotional behaviours that may be considered irrational (Adler et al., 1998). Emotions are a human response mechanism to a stimulus that is perceived to be either positive or negative (LeDoux, 1998). The change in behaviour is registered and, as such, observed as an early warning system for drawing attention to a perceived threat that may impact on performance. Training individuals to recognise HEA as part of the Threat and Error Management Model (TEMM) would add the additional layer of identifying emotional activity before it became problematic within the TEMM. Using emotional awareness, flight crews would be able to understand when their emotions were trying to tell them that something was not quite right. This could be facilitated in a classroom using video vignettes of flight deck situations that have been commonly experienced. The development of a further awareness of HEA could be achieved by discussing the behavioural markers to be observed. This could be followed by open discussions of events that the group has experienced. Additionally, having an in-depth understanding of the emotional process would assist in regulating the emotional response when a threat was encountered. Maintaining a homeostatic emotional level would assist flight crews to capture and manage the threat in a more efficient and less exhaustive manner before the threat could become an error. Facilitation during debriefs could benefit crew members by developing an understanding of how a threat was mismanaged if the flight crews were aware of how the HEAs could impede the decision-making process causing them to incorrectly assess corrective actions when threats are encountered. 136

157 Flight crews bring to the classroom a wealth of knowledge on a variety of topics which include emotions. The facilitation of emotions should be done in such a way as to not offend the intelligence of the audience by explaining what is already understood. Everyone has emotions. The key would be to develop an understanding of how we use them in decision making and in communicating goals to others. Using what crew members bring to the classroom would build their understanding of regulating conflict and improving performance. Flight crews would be able to identify when team conflict had developed HEA levels between crew members that had the potential to become a safety-of-flight issue. Flight crews would understand how team conflict degrades situational awareness (SA) by HEA levels that are driven by negative emotions which would hinder the overall understanding of operational control. Crew members would be able to use emotion regulation techniques to assess and reduce the HEA on an intrapersonal and interpersonal level when conflicts arose. CRM/HF training would include negotiation skills to deflect negative emotions and maintain professionalism between crew members to achieve a mutual satisfaction for goal attainment. Facilitation of crew member emotion resilience and emotion regulation skills should include mindfulness meditation techniques as an intrapersonal defence against performance decline. 8.7 Emotion Resilience Spinoza (as cited by Damasio [2003]) stated that the only way to remove a negative emotion is with a positive one. It is part of our biological fight or flight system to be reactive to perceived threats generating negative emotions as the HEA response. Homeostatic levels maintain a positive to neutral emotion focus as we interact with our environment. Positive emotions put our minds and bodies at ease while the effects of negative emotions create tension and are detrimental to health and well-being (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003). Research has shown that these detrimental health effects of negative emotions can be reversed by positive emotions (Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000). The benefits of a positive outlook far outweigh a negative mindset any time. Decision making under positive emotions does not require time-consuming cognitive resources to process the information (Schwarz, 2000). It requires less 137

158 energy and reaps more benefit to support an individual effort than it does to bring them down. Interpersonal communications break down when negative emotions drive the HEA responses consuming vital cognitive resources (Forgas, 1999). Anger and frustration hinder access to and evaluative processes of vital information during the decision-making process (Schwarz, 2000). It is vital during any decision or communication process in a high-risk environment to maintain a positive outlook to conserve cognitive resources. It is equally important that individuals operating in high-risk environments understand the environment in which they are operating to know when emotions may impede performance and thus they can intervene to minimize any negative HEA response. 8.8 Mindfulness Mindfulness is a meditation method that does not require the traditional meditative practice of quiet surroundings to think of nothing to forget nothing. Mindfulness is a dual-purposed meditation practice with the formal component of a breathing focus and body scan attention, and an informal component of situational sensory focus (Goldin & Gross, 2010). Within aviation, both formal and informal components would be beneficial in reducing stress and assisting with emotion regulation. Mindfulness is self-regulating in nature with the primary focus on the events presently becoming the centre of awareness without blocking them as they unfold (Carlson & Garland, 2005). HEA can occur at any time during any phase of flight making it necessary to de-conflict the HEA event. Mindfulness can be as effective in a critical phase of flight, with the focus on controlling physiological responses such as breathing, as it is in a non-critical phase, such as in cruise flight when there is time to focus on a team conflict event that happened earlier. Mindfulness initially focuses on the physiological changes within the individual which can assist in reducing the strength of the HEA response. This brief respite opens up all channels of attention to focus on why this is a problem in a nonjudgemental acceptance of the experience (Carlson & Garland, 2005). 138

159 8.9 Emotion Regulation Reactive in nature, emotion regulation (ER) strives to minimize the emotional response to a specific stimulus-driven event. Gross (2002) defined ER as the heterogeneous set of processes by which emotions are themselves regulated (p. 7). The more that flight crews understand about emotions, the better equipped they will be to control any emotive situation. Emotions may be consciously controlled, for instance, by refusing to argue with someone, or they may be automatic unconscious processes, such as when we see a loved one (Gross, 2002; Beer & Lombardo, 2007). There are two main strategies for ER given the nature of how we experience emotions. Gross (2002) stated that the first strategy is an antecedent-focused approach in which we make changes in our response before the full extent of the emotion is experienced. This approach requires less energy and provides the most control over the HEA. The second strategy is a response-focused approach in which we adapt after the emotion is in full form (Gross & Thompson, 2007). This approach requires more energy to control the HEA when it is under way. The ability to maintain cognitive self-control will decline over time due to the energy-sapping nature of negative emotions (Hockey & Wiethoff, 1993). Research conducted by Gross on intrapersonal regulating processes contrasted the outcomes of cognitive reappraisal, adapting new assessment techniques, and expressive suppression, withholding comment (Loewenstein, 2007; Lawrence et al., 2011). The research found that expressive suppression generated more negative emotions and that cognitive reappraisal decreased the negative emotions (Bargh & Williams, 2007; Lawrence et al., 2011). Teaching individuals to analyse an event before reacting will assist in maintaining control of the interpersonal process Accident/Incident Investigation Accident investigations can benefit from understanding how HEAs can impact on decision making and impact on the overall performance decline during the accident sequence. Having this data can help to establish patterns involving HEA that can be used to develop new technologies that can be used to prevent a total hull loss event and help to establish regulatory change to educate the flying community. 139

160 Safety teams incident investigations would benefit by understanding how HEA assisted with flight crew cohesiveness in preventing the incident from becoming an accident. Additionally, the investigation can identify how HEAs interrupted effective flight crew communications thereby mismanaging the threat as it became an error. HEA information would assist in regulatory change and defining training parameters to assist flight-training departments in the development of human factors training with the inclusion of emotion regulation Future Directions (Science Fiction Vision) Future technologies will be able to identify and understand HEA and adapt, depending on the strength of the HEA. These technologies will cover flight deck, cabin crew work areas and passenger compartments. They will automatically identify a need for change or assistance until HEA levels are maintained near predefined homeostatic levels. Once these levels are maintained for a period of time, full control will be returned to the crew Adaptive Automation Adaptive automation will become more robust when new technologies can identify the moment when a crew member has lost SA and is operating at predefined HEA levels that range from paralysis to criminal intent to deviation from normal ops. As with regular adaptive automation methods when an aircraft has maintained an out-of-parameter flight path for an extended period, the aircraft automation would begin to take over certain tasks to alleviate the workload and assist with returning to normal flight parameters. If the new technologies identified a situation in which the HEA levels were increasing as the out-of-parameter level reached a certain altitude, the automation would take control of the aircraft and fly the predefined missed approach to a holding pattern to assist the crew in returning to homeostatic levels of control. If these levels were not achieved after assessment of the crew HEA, the aircraft would communicate with ATC and fly the approach with minimal crew assistance to a full stop off the active runway. These new technologies would use psychophysiological measures to identify HEA levels that exceeded defined levels using flight control sensors to measure grip strength and excessive control inputs. Additional sensors would conduct breath 140

161 analysis for increased levels of cortisol, infrared technology to record physical body movement within a defined space, eye movement, heart rate/variability, and skin perspiration and body temperature levels. If the aircraft altitude level was above 10,000 feet, the cabin and flight deck oxygen level would be checked for proper O2 levels. Voice analysis would be measured for pitch and variability with the baseline measurement done using a specific communications check conducted during the first flight pre-flight check of the day. The individual crew member would have an HEA scale added to the instrumentation. This scale would give a percentage of perceived HEA and, when the percentage drops or increases to a certain level, it would issue a warning for the crew member to make changes to bring the HEA level back to normal levels. The HEA scale would measure fatigue levels and issue a warning when levels were in a caution zone. The adaptive systems would have direct knowledge of where the aircraft was and what crew input was required at any given time. The system would monitor workload levels just as adaptive automation does and if the system sensed an out-ofparameter situation with increased HEA, an alarm system would be initiated that would include, depending on altitude, flashing front windscreen and instrument panel. This would start out in a cautionary yellow and advance to red with a pulse pattern to notify the crew of the out-of-parameter situation. If the crew does not acknowledge the initial alarm system, a seat shaker would initiate along with flashing cautionary lights. The last chance to acknowledge the alarm would include an aural warble which would increase in intensity until acknowledged. If the system registered an out-of-the-loop performance situation, it would immediately take control of the aircraft and initiate instructions to enter a holding pattern or land the aircraft Cabin Crew Assistance Cabin crew should receive two unique approaches to understanding themselves, the team and passengers HEA. Firstly, new technologies would assist with the use of in-seat sensors to monitor and track passenger HEA to identify problem passengers and inform cabin crew when an intervention was warranted. These technologies would identify cabin crew overload situations and allow the head purser to make changes as necessary. Cabin crew training would include topics 141

162 like intrapersonal/interpersonal emotion control techniques and would include mindfulness, emotion resilience and emotion regulation to assist in maintaining emotion homeostasis Other High-Risk Environments Any industry with an element of risk additionally has a human factors need as the risk is borne by the human conducting the task. History is replete with stories of human endeavour requiring great skills and courage. The success and failures are documented in great detail without any discussion on how they fared from a human factors perspective. Each of the following industries has for years been actively seeking to understand the human element in its success and, more importantly, its failures in undertaking the tasks at hand. Aviation s success in developing a human factors program has been shared with each of the following industries. The list of high-risk industries is not exclusive and these skills are transferable to others Medicine Medicine, as the first industry to fully embrace the human factors program, has made significant inroads in manipulating the aviation program to better suit its industry. The Anaesthetist Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) program is one such success story defining behavioural markers that have been researched and defined as a best fit for anaesthetist training (Fletcher et al., 2003). Fletcher and colleagues (2003) pointed out that the research identified a need to define behavioural markers for personal factors (e.g. stress management (p. 584). The five HEA markers identified in this research fulfilled their requirements for personal behaviours Maritime Like medicine, maritime training has adapted the aviation human factors model to train crews who are generally associated with large cargo or commercial passenger cruise lines. Maritime teams operate at the whim of Mother Nature. Large cruise ships have a passenger manifest with over 3000 people and a crew roster of 1000 or more employees. While there aren t many disasters at sea, there are many opportunities to experience weather-related unease. Cargo ships experience everything from weather to pirates and most of the time have a multinational crew on board. 142

163 Rail Rail organizations are no longer staffed with 40-year veterans driving the trains. Mobility seems to be the way that the younger, year old, workforce operates these days (Wilson & Norris, 2005). With a fraction of the qualifications and experience of the 40-year veterans who they are replacing, these engineers should be the focus of human factors training. CRM training designed around the rail industry should pay particular attention to the demographics of the customer base. Operating heavy iron without the benefit of experience means that the engineer is reliant on their knowledge of SOPs or on their individual perception to maintain good SA. If, at any time, goal attainment is interfered with, the event may become an HEA event. Rail CRM would benefit from enhanced HEA-based human factors training Police Police officers are put in harm s way on a regular basis. Never knowing for sure exactly who or what they are facing at any given time makes them prime candidates for human factors training. Whether they are working in small-team patrol car operations or large-scale crowd control operations, emotions are prevalent with the individuals with which they are dealing. Police officers are trained to identify situations that are simmering just below the surface. These situations may put them in danger and would provide many opportunities to experience HEAs. Police officers experience HEA on a regular basis when they are dealing with the drinking public. Understanding emotions and HEA events would make it easier to defuse an emotive moment Fire Whether they are volunteers in a small town battling the Black Saturday fires in Victoria, Australia in 2009 or the paid team members who walked into the World Trade Centre on 9/11 in New York, the individuals who work to keep fires at bay understand the nature of fires and the emotions that they experience as they do their job. A fire follows no script and has a mind of its own depending on environmental conditions. Firefighters respect this ever-changing platform and work very hard as they strive to control the shifting dangers of the job. Understanding the intrapersonal nature of emotion control will help them minimize 143

164 fear states when they are placed in dangerous places where good SA and accurate decision making is vital Military Soldiers experience the full emotional gambit over the course of their careers, ranging from boredom associated with the monotony of standing guard to conducting a precision rescue in a war zone. Interpersonal communications require fact without distracting emotive discourse as precision and timing rule the day. Soldiers encounter many opportunities to experience HEA yet they learn by instinct to channel the response. There is an unfortunate side effect in the form of Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) which impacts upon many who have experienced continuous combat without relief. Learning the mindfulness meditation techniques would assist soldiers on the long and emotive struggle to return to a life without PTSD Conclusion This exploratory research opens the door on the interesting phenomenon of the emotions that are ever present in complex team environments. More research is needed to explore why team dynamics in high-risk areas ebb and flow between conflict and cohesiveness. Development of techniques for individual recovery from heightened emotional activity (HEA) is needed to minimize downtime. High-risk environments may operate across a spectrum ranging from boredom to paralyzing fear. Normal operation is in the middle where threats and the emotions that may result from them are manageable. In a team setting when the threat experience exceeds individual comfort levels, the emotional response may impede the cognitive functioning needed for good decision making and may trigger HEA in others creating less than optimal performance within the team. Many examples cited in this research have detailed team breakdowns resulting from a threat that had unfortunate outcomes. These breakdowns occur as a result of a natural deference to authority and experience or as a reduction of focus due to task saturation and an inability to delegate tasks to others. The key to improving successful recovery from threat-driven performance decline is found in intrapersonal and interpersonal emotional development. Individuals may be better prepared to handle threatening situations if they 144

165 understand the emotional processes that may be associated with an event. Regulating the emotion before it becomes unmanageable will prevent individual and team performance decline. Training individuals to recognise the onset of HEA will permit changes in tactics when responding to a threat. It may even assist in reducing HEA in others by keeping the focus on the task at hand. Such training can only be successful if conducted in an open and honest forum to change the mindset of the high-risk operator away from a negative association with the expression of emotions. This is but one step in a journey of enlightenment! 145

166 References Adair, J. G. (1984). The Hawthorne effect: A reconsideration of the methodological artifact. 69(2). doi: / Adler, R. S., Rosen, B., & Silverstein, E. M. (1998). Emotions in negotiation: How to manage fear and anger. Negotiation Journal, 14(2). Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). (1978). Human factors report on the Tenerife accident. Accident Report, 97. Retrieved from website Amsel, A. (1992). Frustration theory Many years later. Psychological Bulletin, 112(3), doi: / Angus, R. G., Heslegrave, R. J., & Myles, W. S. (1985). Effects of prolonged sleep deprivation, with and without chronic physical exercise, on mood and performance. Psychophysiology, 22(3), doi: /j tb01601.x Atkinson, J. W. & Reitman, W. R. (1956). Performance as a function of motive strength and expectancy of goal-attainment. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53(3), doi: /h Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). (2010). Incorrect aircraft configuration, vh-vww singapore changi international airport. (AO ). Canberra: ATSB Retrieved from Bachorowski, J. (1999). Vocal expression and perception of emotion. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8(2), Baddeley, A. D. (2002). The psychology of memory. In A. D. Baddeley, Kopelman, M. D., Wilson, B. A. (Eds.), The Handbook of Memory Disorders: John Wiley & Sons. Baddeley, A. D. & Della Sala, S. (1996). Working memory and executive control. Philisophical Transactions of The Royal Society of London, 351(1346), doi: /rstb Banks, A. P., & Millward, L. J. (2000). Running shared mental models as a distributed cognitive process. British Journal of Psychology, 91, Banks, A. P. & Millward, L. J. (2007). Differentiating knowledge in teams: The effect of shared declarative and procedural knowledge on team performance. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 11(2), Bagozzi, R. P., Baumgartner, H., & Pieters, R. (1998). Goal-directed emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 12(1), Bar-Tal, D. (2000). From intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: psychological analysis. [Psychology]. Political Psychology, 21(2), Bargh, J. A. & Williams, L. E. (2007). The nonconsious regulation of emotion. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation (654). New York: The Guilford Press. Barki, H. & Hartwick, J. (2004). Conceptualizing the construct of interpersonal conflict. International Journal of Conflict Management, 15(3), doi: /eb Barrett, L. F. (2006). Are emotions natural kinds? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1,

167 Barriball, K. L. & While, A. (1993). Collecting data using a semi-structured interview: A discussion paper. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19(2), doi: /j tb01088.x Barthol, R. P. & Ku, N. D. (1959). Regression under stress to first learned behavior. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59(1), Bass, B. M. (1990). Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, & Managerial Applications (3 rd edn.). New York: The Free Press. Baumeister, R. F., Zell, A. L., & Tice, D. M. (2007). How emotions facilitate and impair self-regulation. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation (654). New York: The Guilford Press. Beard, R. L., Salas, E., & Prince, C. (1995). Enhancing transfer of training: Using roleplay to foster teamwork in the cockpit. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 5(2), doi: /s ijap0502_1 Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion, decision making and the orbitofrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10, Beer, J. S. & Lombardo, M. V. (2007). Insights into emotion regulation from neuropsychology. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation (654). New York: The Guilford Press. Behfar, K. J., Peterson, R. S., Mannix, E. A., & Trochim, W. M. K. (2008). The critical role of conflict resolution in teams: A close look at the links between conflict type, conflict management strategies, and team outcomes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(1), doi: / Belenky, G., Wesensten, N. J., Thorne, D. R., Thomas, M. L., Sing, H C., Redmond, D. P., Russo, M. B., & Balkin, T. J. (2003). Patterns of performance degradation and restoration during sleep restriction and subsequent recovery: A sleep dose study. Journal of Sleep Research 12 (1), Ben-Zeev, A. (1987). The nature of emotions. Philisophical Studies, 52, Bennett, S. A. (2003). Flight crew stress and fatigue in low-cost commercial air operations: An appraisal. International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management 4 (2/3), Biernacki, P. & Waldorf, D. (1981). Snowball sampling: Problems and techniques of chain referral sampling Sociological Methods & Research, 10(2), doi: / Bjugstad, K., Thach, E. C., Thompson, K. J., & Morris, A. (2006). A fresh look at followership: A model for matching followership and leadership styles. Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management, 7(3). Blau, P. M. (1956). Social mobility and interpersonal relations. American Sociological Review, 21(3), Bolstad, C. A. & Endsley, M. R. (1999). Shared mental models and shared displays: An empirical evaluation of team performance. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 43 rd Annual Meeting. Borkovek, T. D., Ray, W. J., & Stober, J. (1998). Worry: A cognitive phenomenon intimately linked to affective, physiological, and interpersonal behavioral processes. [Research]. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 22(6), British European Airways (BEA). (2012). Final Report On the accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A registered F-GZCP operated by Air France flight AF 447 Rio de Janeiro Paris. Bourget: BEA Retrieved from 147

168 Brown, J. S. & Farber, I. E. (1951). Emotions conceptualized as intervening variables: With suggestions toward a theory of frustration. Psychological Bulletin, 48(6). Brown, N. M. & Moren, C. R. (2003). Background emotional dynamics of crew resource management: Shame emotions and coping responses. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 13(3), Bruce, K. D. & Jensen, D. (1986). Cockpit resource management training at people express: An overview and summary. Paper presented at the Cockpit Resource Management Training, San Francisco. Burchfield, S. R. (1979). The stress response: A new perspective. Psychosomatic Medicine, 41(8). Cacioppo, J. T. & Gardner, W. L. (1999). Emotion. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, doi: /annurev.psych Caldwell, J. A., Caldwell, J. L., Brown, D. L., & Smith, J. K. (2004). The effects of 37 hours of continuous wakefulness on the psychological arousal, cognitive performance, self-reported mood, and simulator flight performance of f-117a pilots. Military Psychology 16 (3), Calvo, M. G. & Eysenck, M. W. (2000). Early vigilance and late avoidance of threat processing: Repressive coping versus low/high anxiety. Cognition and Emotion, 14(6), Campos, J. J., Walle, E. A., Dahl, A., & Main, A. (2011). Reconceptualizing emotion regulation. Emotion Review, 3(1), Cannon-Bowers, J. A. & Salas, E. (2001). Reflections on shared cognition. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, Carlson, L. E. & Garland, S. N. (2005). Impact of mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) on sleep, mood, stress and fatigue symptoms in cancer outpatients. International Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 12(4), doi: /s ijbm1204_9 Caruso, D. R. & Salovey, P. (2004). The emotionally intelligent manager: How to develop and use the four key emotional skills of leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Cassidy, T. (1999). Stress, cognition, and health. London: Routledge. Chidester, T. R. (1993). Critical Issues for CRM Training and Research. In E. L. Wiener, B. Kanki & R. L. Helmreich (Eds.), Cockpit Resource Management ( ). San Diego: Elsevier. Chuah, L. Y. M., Dolcos, F., Chen, A. K., Zheng, H., Parimal, S., & Chee, M. W. L. (2010). Sleep deprivation and interference by emotional distractors. Sleep, 33(10), Cohen, P. R. & Levesque, H. J. (1991). Teamwork. Nous, 25(4), Cohen, S. G. & Bailey, D. E. (1997). What makes teams work: Group effectiveness research from the shop floor to the executive suite. Journal of Management, 23(3), doi: / Coolican, H. (2004). Research Methods and Statistics in Psychology (4 th edn.): Hodder & Stoughton. Cooper, G. E., White, M. D., & Lauber, J. K. (1979). Resource Management on the Flight Deck. Paper presented at the NASA/Industry Workshop, San Francisco. Cowie, R., & Cornelius, R. R. (2003). Describing the emotional states that are expressed in speech. Speech Communications, 40,

169 Cron, W. L., Slocum, J. J. W., VandeWalle, D., & Fu, Q. (2005). The role of goal orientation on negative emotions and goal setting when initial performance falls short of one's performance goal. Human Performance, 18(1), Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' Error Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Penguin. Damasio, A. R. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. San Diego: Harcourt, Inc. Damasio, A. R. (2001). Emotion and the human brain. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 935(1). Damasio, A. R. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. Orlando: Harcourt. Darley, J. M., Glucksberg, S., & Kinchla, R. A. (1991). Psychology (5 th edn.). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Darwin, C. (1872). The expression of emotion in man and animals. 1 st edn, John Murray, London (140). Davidson, R. J., Jackson, D. C., & Kalin, N. H. (2000). Emotion, plasticity, context, and regulation: Perspectives from affective neuroscience. Psychological Bulletin, 126(6), Dearnley, C. (2005). A reflection on the use of semi-structured interviews. Nurse Researcher, 13(1), DeChurch, L. A., & Marks, M. A. (2001). Maximizing the benefits of task conflict: The role of conflict management. The International Journal of Conflict Management, 12(1), doi: /eb de Gelder, B. & Vroomen, J. (2000). The perception of emotion by ear and by eye. Cognition and Emotion, 14(3), Dekker, S. W. A. (2002). Reconstructing human contributions to accidents: The new view of human error and performance. Journal of Safety Research, 33(3), doi: org/ /s (02) Dekker, S. W. A. (2006). The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error. Hampshire: Ashgate. de Wit, F. R. C., Greer, L. L., & Jehn, K. A. (2011). The paradox of intragroup conflict: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97(2), doi: /a Dinges, D. F. (2001). Stress, fatigue, and behavioural energy. Nutrition Reviews, 59(1). Dinges, D. F., Rider, R. L., Dorrian, J., McGlinchey, E. L., Rogers, N. L., Cizman, Z., & Metaxas, D. N. (2005). Optical computer recognition of facial expressions associated with stress induced by performance demands. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 76(6), Dismukes, R. K. (2010). Understanding and Analyzing Human Errors in Real-World Operations. In E. Salas & D. Maurino (Eds.), Human Factors in Aviation (2 nd edn., San Diego: Academic Press. Dismukes, R. K., Berman, B. A., & Loukopoulos, L. D. (2007). The limits of expertise: Rethinking pilot error and the cause of airline accidents. Hampshire. Ashgate Publishing. Driskell, J. E. & Salas, E. (1991). Group decision making under stress. Journal of Applied Psychology, 76(3), Druckman, D. & Olekains, M. (2008). Emotions in negotiation. Group Decision Negotiation, 17(1). 149

170 Drury, D. A., Ferguson, S. A., & Thomas, M. J. W. (2010). Effects of restricted sleep on heightened emotional activity. In: Proceedings of the 9 th International Symposium of the Australian Aviation Psychology Association, Sydney, Australia, Drury, D. A., Ferguson, S. A., & Thomas, M. J. W. (2012). Restricted sleep and negative affective states in commercial airline pilots during short haul operations. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 45. doi: /j.aap Edwards, B. D., Day, E. A., Arthur Jr., W., & Bell, S. T. (2006). Relationships among team ability composition, team mental models, and team performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(3), doi: / Ekman, P. (1989). The argument and evidence about universals in facial expressions of emotions. In H. Wagner & A. S. R. Manstead (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychophysiology ( ): John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Ekman, P. (1992a). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion 6 (3/4), Ekman, P. (1992b). Are there basic emotions? Psychological Review, 99(3), Elliot, C. & Ortony, A. (1992). Point of view: Modeling the emotions of others. Proceedings of the 14 th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Ellis, H. C. & Hunt, R. R. (1983). Fundamentals of Human Memory and Cognition (3 rd edn.). Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Company. Endsley, M. R. (1995). Measurement of situational awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 37(1), Endsley, M. R. & Garland, D. J. (2000). Situation Awareness Analysis and Measurement. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Endsley, M. R. & Kiris, E. O. (1995). The out-of-the-loop performance problem and level of control in automation. Human Factors, 37(2), doi: / Evans, R. W. & Davis, W. D. (2005). High-performance work systems and organizational performance: The mediating role of internal social structure. Journal of Management, 31(5), Eysenck, M. W. & Calvo, M. G. (1992). Anxiety and performance: The processing efficiency theory. Cognition and Emotion, 6(6), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (1991). Advanced Qualification Program. (AC a). Washington: FAA. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (2006). Line Operations Safety Audits. (AC ). Washington: FAA Retrieved from OSA/LOSA.html. Fielder, K., Semin, G. R., Finkenauer, C., & Berkel, I. (1995). Actor-observer bias in close relationships: The role of self-knowledge and self-related language. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(5), Fletcher, G., Flin, R., McGeorge, P., Glavin, R., Maran, N., & Patey, R. (2003). Anaesthetists' non-technical skills (ANTS); Evaluation of a behavioural marker system. British Journal of Anaesthetist, 90(5), doi: /bja/aeg

171 Flin, R. & Martin, L. (2001). Behavioral markers for crew resource management: A review of current practice. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 11(1), Flin, R., Martin, L., Goeters, K.-M., Hormann, H.-J., Amalberti, R., Valot, C., et al. (2003). Development of NOTECHS (non-technical skills) system for assessing pilots' CRM skills. Human Factors in Aerospace Safety, 3(2), Flin, R., O'Connor, P., & Crichton, M. (2008). Safety at the Sharp End: A Guide to Non- Technical Skills. Aldershot: Ashgate. Forgas, J. P. (1990). Affective influences on individual and group judgements. European Journal of Social Psychology, 20, Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgement: The affective infusion model (AIM). Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), Forgas, J. P. (1999). Feeling and speaking: mood effects on verbal communication strategies Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(7), doi: / Forgas, J. P. (2000). Feeling and thinking; The role of affect in social cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Forgas, J. P. (2008). Affect and cognition. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3. Forgas, J. P., Williams, K. D., & Laham, S. M. (2005). Social Motivation; Conscious and Unconscious Processes (Vol. 3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foushee, H. C. (1984). Dyads and triads at 35,000 feet: Factors affecting group process and aircrew performance. American Psychologist, 39(8), Fox, S. & Spector, P. E. (1999). A model of work frustration aggression. [Psychology]. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20(6), Fredrickson, B. L., Mancuso, R. A., Branigan, C., & Tugade, M. M. (2000). The undoing effect of positive emotions. Motivation and Emotion, 24(4), Fredrickson, B. L., Tugade, M. M., Waugh, C. E., & Larkin, G. R. (2003). What good are positive emotions in crisis? A prospective study of resilience and emotions following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11th, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(2). doi: / Frijda, N. H. (1986). The Emotions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: Frijda, N. H. (1988). The laws of emotion. American Psychologist, 43(5), Frijda, N. H. (2005). Emotion experience. Cognition and Emotion, 19(4), Funk, K., Lyall, B., Wilson, J., Vint, R., Niemczyk, M., Suroteguh, C., & Owen, G. (1999). Flight deck automation issues. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), Galliano, G., Noble, L. M., Travis, L. A., & Puechi, C. (1993). Victim reactions during rape/sexual assault: A preliminary study of the immobility response and its correlates. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 8: Gander, P. H., Gregory, K. B., Graeber, R. C., Connell, L.J., Miller, D. L., & Rosekind, M. R., (1998a). Flight crew fatigue v: Short-haul air transport operations. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 69, B8-B15. Gander, P. H., Gregory, K. B., Miller, D. L., Graeber, R. C., Connell, L. J., & Rosekind, M. R., (1998b). Flight crew fatigue v: Long-haul air transport operations. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 69, B37-B48. Garner, H. C. L. (2009). Empathy: A true leader skill. Military Review, 89(6). 151

172 Gibson, C. B., & Cooper, C. D. (2009). Do you see what we see? The complex effects of perceptual distance between leaders and teams. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(1), doi: /a Ginnet, R. C. (2010). Crews as groups: Their formation and their leadership. In B. Kanki, Helmreich, R., Anca, J. (Eds.), Crew Resource Management (2 nd edn., 511). San Diego: Academic Press. Gladstone, G. & Parker, G. (2003). What's the use of worrying? It's function and it's dysfunction. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 37(3), doi: /j x Gohm, C. L., Baumann, M. R., & Sniezek, J. A. (2001). Personality in extreme situations: Thinking (or not) under acute stress [Emotion and Stress]. Journal of Research in Personality, 35, Goldin, P. R. & Gross, J. J. (2010). Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) on emotion regulation in social anxiety disorder. Emotion, 10(1), doi: /a Gooderham, M. (1994, Aug 30, 1994). Treatment of Canadian by Koreans angers pilots. Captain involved in crash could face prison term, The Globe and Mail, p. 0. Retrieved from Gormly, J., Gormly, A., & Johnson, K. (1972). Consistency of sociobehavioral responses to interpersonal disagreement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24(2), Graham, P. (2001). Confusion. American Journal of Electroneurodiagnostic Technology, 41(2), 170. Graziano, W. G., Jensen-Campbell, L. A., & Hair, E. C. (1996). Perceiving interpersonal conflict and reacting to it: The case for agreeableness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(4), Gross, J. J. (1998). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review. Review of General Psychology, 2(3), Gross, J. J. (2002). Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences. Psychophysiology 39, Gross, J. J. & Levenson, R. W. (1997). Hiding feelings: The acute effects of inhibiting negative and positive emotions. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106(1), Gross, J. J., & Thompson, R. A. (2007). Emotion regulations: Conceptual foundations. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation (654). New York: The Guilford Press. Gross, K., & D'Ambrosio, L. (2004). Framing emotional response. Political Psychology, 25(1), Hackman, J. R. (1986). Group-level issues in the design and training of cockpit crews. Paper presented at the Cockpit Resource Management Training, San Francisco. Hamann, S. B. (2001). Cognitive and neural mechanisms of emotional memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(9), Harris, F. C. (1982). Subject reactivity in direct observational assessment: A review and critical analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 2(4), doi: / (82)

173 Helmreich, R. L. (1986). Theory underlying CRM training: Psychological issues in flight crew performance and crew coordination. Paper presented at the Cockpit Resource Management Training, San Francisco. Helmreich, R. L., Butler, R. W., Taggart, W. R., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1995). Behavioral markers in accidents and incidents:reference list (No. 95-1): NASA/University of Texas. Helmreich, R. L. & Foushee, H. C. (2010). Why CRM? Empirical and Theoretical Bases of Human Factors Training. In B. Kanki, R. L. Helmreich & J. Anca (Eds.), Crew Resource Management (2 nd edn., 511). San Francisco: Academic Press. Helmreich, R. L., Klinect, J. R., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). Models of threat, error, and CRM in flight operations. Proceedings of the 10 th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Helmreich, R. L., Klinect, J. R., & Wilhelm, J. A. (2001). System safety and threat and error management: The line operations safety audit (LOSA) Proceedings from the 11 th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Helmreich, R. L. & Merritt, A. C. (1998). Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine: National, Organizational and Professional Influences. Aldershot: Ashgate. Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A. C., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). The evolution of crew resource management training in commercial aviation. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(1), Hess, U. & Thibault, P. (2009). Darwin and emotion expression. The American Psychologist, 64(2). Hewstone, M. & Greenland, K. (2000). Intergroup Conflict. International Journal of Psychology, 35(2), Higgins, E., Shah, J., & Friedman, R. (1997). Emotional responses to goal attainment: Strength of regulatory focus as moderator. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(3), doi: / Higgins, E., Shah, J., & Friedman, R. (1997). Emotional responses to goal attainment: Strength of regulatory focus as moderator. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(3), doi: / Hockey, G. R. J. & Wiethoff, M. (1993). Cognitive fatigue in complex decision-making. Advances in Space Biology and Medicine, 3, doi: /S (08) Hofstede, G. (1984). Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values (Abridged edn.). Newberry Park: Sage Publications, Inc. Hofstede, G. & Hofstede, G. J. (2005). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival (2 nd edn.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Holt, R. W., Hansberger, J. T., & Boehm-Davis, D. A. (2002). Improving rater calibration in aviation: A case study. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 12(3), Howell, J. M. & Shamir, B. (2005). The role of followership in the charismatic leadership process: Relationships and their consequences. Academy of Management, 33(1), Hunt, R. R. & Ellis, H. C. (2004). Fundamentals of Cognitive Psychology (7 th edn.). New York: McGraw-Hill. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2002). Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). (Doc 9803 AN/761). ICAO Retrieved from 153

174 Doc9803alltext.en.pdf. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2003). Crew Resource Management (CRM) TrainingHuman Factors Training Manual: ICAO. Retrieved from FactorsTrng-Manual-Rev-9-03-Chapt-2-CRM-TEM download. Izard, C. E. (1977). Human Emotions. New York: Plenum Press. Izard, C. E. (2009). Emotion theory and research: Highlights, unanswered questions and emerging issues. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, doi: /annurev.psych Jansz, J. & Timmers, M. (2002). Emotional dissonance: When the experience of an emotion jeopardizes an individual s identity. Theory & Psychology, 12(1), doi: / Jehn, K. A. (1994). Enhancing effectiveness: An investigation of advantages and disadvantages of value-based intragroup conflict. International Journal of Conflict Management, 5(3), doi: /eb Joslyn, S. L. & LeClerc, J. E. (2012). Uncertainty Forecasts Improve Weather-Related Decisions and Attenuate the Effects of Forecast Error. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 18(1), doi: /a Kaminski-Morrow, D. (2012). Lanzarote 737 overran as first officer struggled to cope investigators. Flight International, 2. Retrieved from Flightglobal.com website: overran-as-first-officer-struggled-to-cope-investigators / Kanki, B. G. (2010). Communication and Crew Reasource Management. In B. G. Kanki, R. L. Helmreich & J. Anca (Eds.), Crew Resource Management (2 nd edn., ). San Diego: Elsevier. Kanske, P. & Kotz, S. A. (2011). Emotion triggers executive attention: Anterior cingulate cortex and amygdala responses to emotional words in a conflict task. Human Brain Mapping, 32(2), doi: /hbm Klein, G. A., Calderwood, R., & MacGregor, D. (1989). Critical decision method for eliciting knowledge. Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 19(3). Klinect, J. R., Murray, P., Merritt, A., & Helmreich, R. L. (2003). Line operations safety audits (LOSA): Definition and operating characteristics. Proceedings of the 12 th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Klinect, J. R., Wilhelm, J. A., & Helmreich, R. L. (1999). Threat and error management: Data from line operations safety audits. Proceedings of the 10 th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Kohler, C. G., Bilker, W., Hagendoorn, M., Gur, R. E., & Gur, R. C. (2000). Emotion recognition deficit in schizophrenia: Association with symptomatology and cognition. Biological Psychology, 48(2). Kreibig, S. D., Gendolla, G. H. E., & Scherer, K. R. (2010). Psychophysiological effects of emotional responding to goal attainment. Biological Psychology, 84(3), doi: /j.biopsycho Ladkin, P. B. (1996). AA965 Cali Accident Report, Near Buga, Columbia, Dec 20, University of Bielefeld Retrieved from Landis, J. R. & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. Biometrics, 33(1),

175 Lauber, J. K. (1986). Cockpit resource management:background and overview. Paper presented at the Cockpit Resource Management Training, San Francisco. Laukka, P. (2005). Categorical perception of vocal emotion expressions. Emotion, 5(3), Lavie, N. (2005). Distracted and confused?: Selective attention under load. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), doi: /j.tics Lawrence, S. A., Troth, A. C., Jordan, P. J., & Collins, A. L. (2011). A review of emotion regulation and development of a framework for emotion regulation in the workplace. Research in Occupational Stress and Well-being ( ). Lazarus, R. S. (1993). From psychological stress to the emotions: A history of changing outlooks. Annual Reviews Psychology, 44, Lazarus, R. S. (1999). Stress and emotion: A new synthesis. Springer Publishing Company, New York. Lazarus, R. S., Deese, J., & Osler, S. F. (1952). The effects of psychological stress on performance. Psychological Bulletin, 49(4). LeDoux, J. E. (1998). The Emotional Brain. Phoenix, London. LeDoux, J. E. (2000). Emotion circuits in the brain. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23(1), doi: /annurev.neuro LeDoux, J. E. (2003). The emotional brain, fear, and the amygdala. Cellular and Molecular Neurobiology, 23(4/5), doi: /A: Lee, C. M. & Narayanan, S. S. (2005). Toward detecting emotions in spoken dialogs. IEEE Transactions on Speech and Audio Processing, 13(2), Levenson, R. W. (1999). The intrapersonal functions of emotion. Cognition & Emotion, 13(5), Lipinski, D. & Nelson, R. (1974). Problems in the use of naturalistic observation as a means of behavioral assessment. Behavioral Therapy, 5, doi: /S (74) Llu, J. H., Karasawa, K., & Weiner, B. (1992). Inferences about the causes of positive and negative emotions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(5), doi: / Loewenstein, G. (2007). Affect regulation and affective forecasting. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation (654). New York: The Guilford Press. Loewenstein, G., & Lerner, J. S. (2003). The role of affect in decision making. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of Affective Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Longridge, T. M. (1997). Overview of the advanced qualification program. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomic Society Annual Meeting, 4(2). Loveland, K. A., Tunali-Kotoski, B., Chen, Y. R., Ortegon, J., Pearson, D. A., Brelsford, K. A., & Gibbs, M. C. (1997). Emotion recognition in autism: Verbal and nonverbal information. Development and Psychopathology, 9, Mathews, A. (1990). Why worry? The cognitive function of anxiety. [Research]. Behavior Research Therapy, 28(6), Matlin, M. W. (1998). Cognition (4 th edn.). Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace & Company. Matthews, A., MacKintosh, B., & Fulcher, E. P. (1997). Cognitive biases in anxiety and attention to threat. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 1(9), Matthews, G. & Desmond, P. A Task-induced fatigue states and simulated driving performance. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 55A (2),

176 Maslow, A. H. (1943). Conflict, frustration, and the theory of threat. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 38(1), doi: /h Mathieu, J. E., Goodwin, G. F., Heffner, T. S., Salas, E., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (2000). The influence of shared mental models on team process and performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(2), McIntyre, G. & Gocke, R. (2006). Researching emotions in speech. In P. Warren & Watson, C. I (Eds.), Proceedings of the 11 th Australian International Conference on Speech Science & Technology. Auckland: Australian Speech Science & Technology Association Inc, Merritt, A. C. & Helmreich, R. L. (1996). Human factors on the flight deck: The influence of national culture. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 27. Meyer, K. & Damasio, A. (2009). Convergence and divergence in a neural architecture for recognition and memory. Trends in Neurosciences, 32(7), doi: /j.tins Moran, S. (2009). Purpose: Giftedness in intrapersonal intelligence. High Ability Studies, 20(2), Moray, N., Inagaki, T., & Itoh, M. (2000). Adaptive automation, trust, and selfconfidence in fault management of time critical tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 6(1), doi: // Morin, A. (2004). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 130(3), Mosier, K. L., Skitka, L. J., Heers, S., & Burdick, M. (1998). Automation bias: Decision making and performance in high-tech cockpits. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 8(1), Moskowitz, A. K. (2004). "Scared stiff": Catatonia as an evolutionary-based fear response. Psychological Review, 111(4). doi: / X Mummendey, A. & Wenzel, M. (1999). Social discrimination and tolerance in intergroup relations: Reactions to intergroup difference. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3(2), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (1985). Aircraft Accident Report: Midwest Express Airlines, INC. DC-9-14, N100ME General Billy Mitchell Field Milwaukee, Wisconsin September 6, (AAR-87/01). Washington: NTSB. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (1993). Aircraft Accident Report Uncontrolled Collision With Terrain, American International Airways Flight 808, Douglas DC-8-61, N814CK, U.S. Naval Air Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, August 18, (NTSB/AAR-94/04). (NTSB/AAR-94/04). Washington, DC: Retrieved from In: Board, N.T.S. ed., Washington, DC. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (1996). Aircraft Accident Report. Wheels-up Landing, Continental Airlines Flight 1943, Douglas DC-9 N10556, Houston, Texas, February 19, (NTSB/AAR-97-01). (NTSB/AAR-97-01). Washington DC: Retrieved from National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (2009). Aircraft Accident Report: Crash During Approach to Land, Empire Airlines Flight 8284, Avions de Transport Regional Aerospatiale Alenia ATR , N902FX Lubbock, Texas January 27, (NTSB/AAR-11/02 PB ). Washington: NTSB. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (2010). Loss of Thrust in Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson 156

177 River US Airways Flight 1549, Airbus A , N106US, Weehawken, New Jersey, January 15, (AAR-10/03). Washington: NTSB Retrieved from Neese, R. M. (1990). Evolutionary explanations of emotions. Human Nature, 1(3), Netherlands Aviation Safety Board (NASB). (1977). Final report and comments of the Netherlands aviation safety board of the investigation into the accident with the collision of KLM flight 4805, boeing b, ph-buf and Pan Am flight 1736, boeing , n736pa at Tenerife airport, Spain on 27 March (ICAO 153-AN/56). Amsterdam: ICAO Retrieved from Northouse, P. G. (2004). Leadership: Theory and Practice (3 rd edn.). Thousand Oaks: Sage. Noy, C. (2008). Sampling knowledge: The hermeneutics of snowball sampling in qualitative research. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 11(4), doi: / Nygaard, L. C. & Queen, J. S. (2008). Communicating emotion: Linking affective prosody and word meaning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 34(4), Orasanu, J. (1997). Shared problem models and flight crew performance. In N. Johnston, N. McDonald & R. Fuller (Eds.), Aviation Psychology in Practice ( ). Aldershot: Ashgate. Orasanu, J. & Fischer, U. (1991, April 29 May 02, 1991). Information transfer and shared mental models for decision making. Paper presented at the 6 th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, OH. Orlady, H. W. & Foushee, H. C. (1986). Cockpit Resource Management Training. Paper presented at the NASA/MAC Workshop, San Francisco. Ortony, A. & Turner, T. J. (1990). What's basic about basic emotions? Psychological Review, 97(3), Parkinson, B. (2008). What holds emotions together? Meaning and response coordination. Cognitive Systems Research, 10(1), doi: doi: /j.cogsys Peters, L. H. & O'Connor, E. J. (1980). Situational constraints and work outcomes: The influences of a frequently overlooked construct. Academy of Management Review, 5(3), doi: / Pettigrew, T. F. (1958). Personality and sociocultural factors in intergroup attitudes: A cross-national comparisson. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(1), Pigeau, R., Naitoh, P., Buguet, A., McCann, C., Baranski, J., Taylor, M., Thompson, M., & Mack, I. (1995). Modafinil, d-amphetamine and placebo during 64 hours of sustained mental work. I. Effects on mood, fatigue, cognitive performance and body temperature. Journal of Sleep Research 4 (4), doi: /j tb00172.x, Pinkley, R. L. & Northcraft, G. B. (1994). Conflict frames of reference: Implications for dispute processes and outcomes. The Academy of Management Journal 37(1), doi: / Prinzel, L. J., Freeman, F. G., Scerbo, M. W., Mikulka, P. J., & Pope, A. T. (2001). A closed loop system for examining psychophysiological measures for adaptive task allocation. [CRM]. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology,

178 Radley, J.J. & Morrison, J.H., (2005). Repeated stress and structural plasticity in the brain. Ageing Research Reviews 4, Rahim, M. A. (1986). Reference role and styles of handling interpersonal conflict. The Journal of Social Psychology, 126(1), doi: / Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rice, S. & McCarley, J. S. (2011). Effects of response bias and judgment framing on operator use of an automated aid in a target detection task. Journal of Experimental Psychology:Applied, 17(4), doi: /a Rimé, B. (2007). Interpersonal emotion regulation. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation (654). New York: The Guilford Press. Robert, G. & Hockey, J. (1997). Compensatory control in the regulation of human performance under stress and high workload: A cognitive energetical framework. Biological Psychology, 45(1-3), doi: /S (96) Roney, C. J. R., Higgins, E. T., & Shah, J. (1995). Goals and framing: How outcome focused influences motivation and emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(11), Rosekind, M. R., Gander, P. H., Miller, D. L., Gregory, K. B., Smith, R. M., Weldon, K. J., Co, E. L., McNally, K. L., & Lebacqz., J. V. (1994). Fatigue in operational settings: Examples from the aviation environment. Human Factors 36 (2), Rosekind, M. R., Gregory, K. B., Miller, D. L., Co, E. L., Lebacqz, J. V., & Brenner, M. (2003). Examining fatigue factors in accident investigations: Analysis of Guantanamo Bay aviation accident. Alertness Solutions, NASA Ames Research Center and National Transportation Safety Board. Rosenthal, L. J., Chamberlin, R. W., & Matchette, R. D. (1993). Confusion on the flight deck. Paper presented at the 7 th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Ohio State University. Russo, M. B., Stetz, M. C., & Thomas, M. L Monitoring and predicting cognitive state of performance via physiological correlates of neuronal signals. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 76 (7), Russo, R., Fox, E., Bellinger, L., & Nguyen-Van-Tam, D.P. (2001). Mood congruent free recall in anxiety. Cognition & Emotion, 15, Salas, E., Burke, C. S., Bowers, C. A., & Wilson, K. A. (2001). Team training in the skies: Does crew resource management (CRM) training work? Human Factors, 43(4). doi: / Salas, E., Prince, C., Bowers, C. A., Stout, R. J., Oser, R. L., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (1999). A methodology for enhancing crew resource management training. [CRM]. Human Factors, 41(1), Salovey, P., Brackett, M. A., & Mayer, J. D. (2004). Emotional Intelligence: Key Readings on the Mayer and Salovey Model. Port Chester: Dude Publishing. Samel, A., Wegmann, H.-M., & Vejvoda, M., (1997). Aircrew fatigue in long-haul operations. Accident Analysis and Prevention 29 (4), Sanders, A. F. (1983). Towards a model of stress and human performance. Acta Psychologica, 53, Sasou, K. & Reason, J. (1999). Team errors: Definition and taxonomy. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 65,

179 Scherer, K. R. (2003). Vocal communication of emotion: A review of research paradigms. Speech Communication, 40, Schwarz, N. (2000). Emotion, cognition, and decision making. Cognition And Emotion, 14(4), Shappell, S. A. & Wiegmann, D. A. (2009). A methodology for assessing safety programs targeting human error in aviation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 19(3), doi: / Shaw, J. D., Duffy, M. K., Zhu, J., Scott, K. L., Shih, H.-A., & Susanto, E. (2011). A contingency model of conflict and team effectiveness. Journal of Applied Psychology, 96(2), doi: /a Sherry, L. & Polson, P. G. (1999). Shared models of flight management system vertical guidance. The International Journal of Aviaion Psychology, 9(2), doi: /s ijap0902_4 Simons, T. L. & Peterson, R. S. (2000). Task conflict and relationship conflict in top management teams: The pivotal role of intragroup trust. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(1), doi: // Smith, R. H. P. (1979). A simulator study of the interaction of pilot workload with errors, vigilance, and decisions /H.P. Washington: NASA. Solomon, R. C. & Stone, L. D. (2002). On "positive" and "negative" emotions. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 32(4), Spector, P. E. (1978). Organizational frustration: A model and review of the literature. Personal Psychology, 31(4). doi: /j tb02125.x Staal, M. A. (2004). Stress, Cognition, and Human Performance: A Literature Review and Conceptual Framework (NASA/TM ). Moffett Field: NASA. Steinel, W., Van Kleef, G. A., & Harinck, F. (2006). Are you talking to me?! Separating the people from the problem when expressing emotions in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(2), Stemmler, G., & Wacker, J. (2010). Personality, emotion, and individual differences in physiological responses. Biological Psychology, 84(3), doi: /j.biopsycho Stewart, V. (2003). Priviledged communications the bright line rule in the use of cockpit voice recorder tapes. CommLaw conspectus, 11. Stokes, A. & Kite, K. (1994). Flight Stress: Stress, Fatigue, and Performance in Aviation (1 st edn.). Aldershot Hants: Avebury Aviation. Storms, P. L. & Spector, P. E. (1987). Relationships of organizational frustration with reported behavioural reactions: The moderating effect of locus of control. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 60, Suarez, S. D. & Gallup, G. G. (1979). Tonic immobility as a response to rape in humans: A theoretical note. The Psychological Record. Tajfel, H. (1982). Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 33, Thatcher, S. M. B. & Patel, P. C. (2011). Demographic faultlines: A meta-analysis of the literature. Journal of Applied Psychology, 96(6), doi: /a Thoits, P. A. (1989). The sociology of emotions. Annual Review Sociology, 15, Thomas, M. J. W. (2003). Improving organisational safety through the integrated evaluation of operational and training performance: an adaptation of the Line 159

180 Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) methodology. Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, 3(1), Thomas, M. J. W. & Ferguson, S. A., (2010). Prior sleep, prior wake, and crew performance during normal flight operations. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 81 (7), Thompson, L. & Loewenstein, G. (1992). Egocentric interpretations of fairness and interpersonal conflict. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51, Vaes, J., Castelli, L., Giovanazzi, A., Paladino, M. P., & Leyens, J.-P. (2003). On the behavioral consequences of infrahumanization: The implicit role of uniquely human emotions in intergroup relations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28(6), Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., Pietroni, D., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2006). Power and emotion in negotiation: Power moderates the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness on concession making. European Journal of Social Psychology 36, Varela, O. E., Burke, M. J., & Landis, R. S. (2008). A process model of emotional conflict: Emergence and dysfunctional effect in groups. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 12(2), doi: / Wachtel, P. L. (1968). Anxiety, attention, and coping with threat. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 73, Waller, M. J., Gupta, N., & Giambatista, R. C. (2004). Effects of adaptive behaviors and shared mental models on control crew performance. Management Science, 50(11), Walters, G. D. (2001). State-trait anxiety and existential fear: An empirical analysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, doi: /S (00) Weick, K. E. (1988). Enacted sensemaking in crisis situations. Journal of Management Studies, 25(4), doi: /j tb00039.x Weick, K. E. (1990). The vulnerable systems:an analysis of the Tenerife air disaster. Journal of Management, 16(3), doi: / Weider-Hatfield, D. & Hatfield, J. D. (1995). Relationships among conflict management styles, levels of conflict, and reactions to work. The Journal of Social Psychology, 135(6), Weiner, B. (2000). Intrapersonal and interpersonal theories of motivation from an attributional perspective. Educational Psychology Review, 12(1), Wiegmann, D. A. & Shappell, S. A. (2001a). A human error analysis of commercial aviation accidents using the human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS). (DOT/FAA/AM-01/3). Oklahoma: US Government. Wiegmann, D. A. & Shappell, S. A. (2001b). Human error analysis of commercial aviation accidents: Application of the human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS). Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 72(11), Wiegmann, D. A. & Shappell, S. A. (2001c). Human error perspectives in aviation. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 11( ). Wiener, E. L., Kanki, B. G., & Helmreich, R. L. (Eds.). (1993). Cockpit Resource Management. San Diego: Harcourt Bruce Jovanavich. 160

181 Wiener, E. L. & Nagel, D. C., (Eds.). (1988). Human Factors in Aviation. San Diego: Academic Press. Wigfield, A. & Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy-value theory of achievement motivation. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25(1), Wilson, J. R. & Norris, B. J. (2005). Rail human factors: Past, present and future. Applied Ergonomics, 36(6). doi: /j.apergo

182 Appendix 1.1 HEA Markers Consent Form University of South Australia CONSENT FORM Project Title: Reliability of HEA Markers Researcher s name & contact details: Douglas A Drury druda001@mymail.unisa.edu.au Supervisor s name & contact details: Dr Sally Ferguson I have read the Participant Information Sheet, and the nature and the purpose of the research project has been explained to me. I understand and agree to take part. I understand that I may not directly benefit from taking part in the project. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any stage and that this will not affect my status now or in the future. I confirm that I am over 18 years of age. 162

183 I understand that the data will be stored in a secure location at the University of South Australia. The researchers will have the only access available to the data. Name of participant Signed Dated I have explained the study to subject and consider that he/she understands what is involved. Researcher s signature and date This project has been approved by the University of South Australia s Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have any ethical concerns about the project or questions about your rights as a participant please contact the Executive Officer of this Committee, Tel: ; Vicki.allen@unisa.edu.au 163

184 Instructions: Appendix 1.2 HEA Markers Reliability Form Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) Markers You will be shown eight different video clips that represent emotional behavior on the flight deck. As you watch each video, if you observe any of the HEA markers defined here, place a mark (X) for that HEA marker in the space provided. You may observe more than one, or none, of the defined HEA markers. Please read the following definitions carefully so that you understand their meaning. HEA Confusion Disagreement Unease Frustration Stress Definition A crewmember expresses some confusion with respect to the nature of the threat or its potential impact on the operation, such as not understanding the exact nature of a technical problem. Crewmembers fail to agree with each other as to the nature or the potential consequence of the threat. A crewmember expresses unease as a result of a threat, such as not being comfortable with continuation of an approach. A crewmember expresses anger or frustration as a result of a threat, such as becoming observably frustrated with a ground delay. A crewmember becomes noticeably stressed as a result of a threat, such as difficulty responding to and managing a gusty crosswind landing. 164

185 Heightened Emotional Activity (HEA) Markers Confusion Disagreement Unease Frustration Stress