The Role of Prior Learning and Direct Reinforcement in Observational Learning and Vicarious Reinforcement

Transcription

1 Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College The Role of Prior Learning and Direct Reinforcement in Observational Learning and Vicarious Reinforcement Larry D. Olsen Western Michigan University Follow this and additional works at: Part of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Commons Recommended Citation Olsen, Larry D., "The Role of Prior Learning and Direct Reinforcement in Observational Learning and Vicarious Reinforcement" (1977). Master's Theses This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact

2 THE ROLE OF PRIOR LEARNING AND DIRECT REINFORCEMENT IN OBSERVATIONAL LEARNING AND VICARIOUS REINFORCEMENT by L arry D. Olsen A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College in partial fulfillment of the D egree of M aster of A rts W estern Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan D ecem ber 1977

3 ACKNO WLEDGMEN TS I would like to express m y appreciation to several people for their aid in the preparation of this thesis. F irs t of all, I would like to thank m y friend and advisor, Paul Wienir, for his patience and guidance. Subhash Sonnad and G erald M arkle also made significant contributions to the completion of this thesis. Additionally, I would like to thank the faculty and students of the D epartm ent of Sociology. Discussions with these colleagues aided m e in the formulation of my ideas. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Ingrid Erickson, who served as the model in this experiment. Finally, I would like to thank my wife for her endless patience, encouragement, and help. While all of the above mentioned people have significantly contributed to this thesis, its content is the sole responsibility of the author. L a rry D. Olsen

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5 I MASTERS THESIS io - iu,» o o OLSEN, Larry Dee, THE ROLE OF PRIOR LEARNING AND DIRECT REINFORCEMENT IN OBSERVATIONAL LEARNING AND VICARIOUS REINFORCEMENT. Western Michigan U n iversity, M.A., 1977 Psychology, experimental University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I Statem ent of P roblem... 1 II B andura's Social Learning T h e o r y... 3 Attentional P r o c e s s e s... 4 Retention P r o c e s s e s... 4 M otor Reproduction P r o c e s s e s... 6 Motivational P r o c e s s e s... 6 R eciprocal D e t e r m i n i s m... 8 III C ontroversial I s s u e s D em onstrating the O ccurrence of O bservational L e a r n i n g The Function of Response Consequences Explanation of Vicarious R einforcem ent P h e n o m e n o n Explanation of Self-Control of Behavior The Role of Cognitive P ro c e sse s in the Control of Human B e h a v i o r The Issue of D e t e r m i n i s m S u m m a r y IV An A lternative Theory for Observational Learning: Conditional R esponding A Functional Response Class of "Matched" B e h a v i o r s iii

7 Table of C o n ten ts-- Continued CHAPTER PAGE Conditional Responding: Stimulus Control of a Functional Response Class The Role of E xtrinsic Consequences in the Development and Maintenance of the Functional Response C l a s s V R esearch S tr a te g ie s H y p o t h e s e s VI M e t h o d Subjects Experim ental S e t t i n g Modeled T a s k Selection of Stimulus I t e m s P rocedure VII R e s u l t s VIII D is c u s s io n Suggestions for F urther R e s e a r c h Table and F i g u r e s R e f e r e n c e s iv

8 CHAPTER I Statem ent of P roblem In recent years, the results of a plethora of studies subsumed under such titles as observational learning, imitation, identification, and vicarious learning have led many research e rs to question the im portance of directly experienced consequences in the socialization of children. Although extrinsic consequences have been stressed as im portant for one mode of socialization (operant conditioning), a second mode (observational learning) has been proposed which is not dependent upon reinforcers and punishers for its effectiveness. A ronfreed (1969a), for example, states: The first channel of socialization is the shaping of behavior through positive and aversive outcomes which are contingent on the child's overt acts. The second channel of socialization is observational learning which does not require outcomes of a child's overtly emitted behavior. (p. 264) Similarity, Hilgard and Bower (1966) and John, Chesler, Bartlett, and Victor (1968) have argued that observational learning contradicts operant conditioning theory because it does not require overt responding or direct reinforcem ent. Many of the criticism s of an operant conditioning explanation of learning by observation have been based prim arily on the work of 1

9 2 Bandura and his colleagues. In his num erous works detailing Social Learning Theory, Bandura (1962, 1969a, 1969b, 1970, 1971a, 1971b, 1971c, 1977) proposes that the phenomenon of observational learning cannot be accounted for using the conceptions of instrum ental conditioning. Bandura contends that the ability of humans to acquire novel behavior patterns by observation is a prepotent capacity of the human organism which is distinctly different from its capacity to learn by direct experience; i.e., it is innate. In Social Learning Theory, he states: Except for elem entary reflexes, people are not equipped with inborn repertoires of behavior. They m ust learn them. New response patterns can be acquired either by direct experiences or by observation [emphasis added]. (Bandura, 1977, p. 16) The purpose of the present study is to examine, both theoretically and em pirically, the possibility as suggested by Gewirtz (1961, 1968, 1969b, 1 971) that the phenomenon of observational and vicarious learning m ay be m ore parsim oniously ordered by the precepts of instrum ental (operant) conditioning. That is, observational and vicarious learning m ay be explained by presently existing principles of operant (instrumental) conditioning. No new principles or new theory need be employed. Specifically, I will attempt to dem onstrate that when observational learning is considered historically it can be shown that it is an outcome of prior learning rather than an innate learning process.

10 CHAPTER II B andura's Social Learning Theory B andura's Social Learning Theory is a stimulus contiguity theory where the "locus of response integration" occurs at the cognitive level by representational mediation. Specifically, when an ob serv er-learn er is exposed to a model displaying a sequence of novel responses, the o b serv er-lea rn er symbolically represents the sequence of m odeled responses. This is at the cognitive level. This symbolic representation is strengthened by its tem poral contiguity with the modeled events. At some later time, in the presence of appropriate situational stimuli, the symbolically encoded sequence will m ediate the overt perform ance. Thus the control of behavior rests, not with environm ental determ inants, but within the individual at the cognitive level. This is not to say that environmental factors have no affect on behavior. Extrinsic consequences are seen as significantly effecting whether or not a person will choose to perform something which has been learned by observation. Bandura theorizes that learning by observation is governed by four sequentially ordered processes. He schem atically outlines this sequence as in Figure 1. In sert Figure 1 about here 3

11 4 Attentional P ro cesses A varied a rra y of stimuli impinge upon an individual in any modeling situation. F actors which delim it this bom bardm ent of stimulation are re fe rre d to as attentional p ro cesses. Any factor which acts to select which stim uli will be retained as part of the learned response are considered attentional processes. These can range from situational determ inants, such as the "distinctiveness" of modeling stimuli, to characteristics of the le a rn e r such as "arousal level. " Retention P ro cesses After the relevant response components have been selected from the modeling situation, they are integrated into the behavioral repertoires at the cognitive level. It is at this point, Bandura contends, that the response is actually "learned. " When a person views a modeled behavior, h e /sh e sym bolically rep resen ts the events. The tem poral relationship between the m odeled events and this symbolic representation of them strengthens the sym bolic representations. This occurs because of the contiguous association between the events as in a stim ulus-stim ulus (S-S) conception of learning. The symbolic representation of events can be either im aginal or verbal. Bandura (1977) describes the first of these as follows:

12 5 Some behavior is retained in im agery. Sensory stim ulation activates sensations that give rise to perceptions of the external events. As a result of repeated exposure, modeling stimuli, eventually produce enduring, retriev able im ages of modeled perform ances, (p. 25) The second representational system occurs on the basis of verbal coding. The m ore efficient of the two system s, verbal representations involve the cognitive coding of the learning situation into an abbreviated verbal description. Apparently, the two separate representational system s are necessary, first of all to explain the occurance of learning by p re verbal and non-verbal individuals, and secondly to account for the efficiency of observational learning. A person cannot symbolically represent events through verbal coding if he does not command verbal skills, thus the necessity of im aginal representations. But if it w ere necessary to represent everything learned by observation in im aginal form, it would be extrem ely cum bersom e and doubtful whether such a representational system could be efficient. Once the modeled events have been symbolically represented, they can be retained in m em ory and retrieved at som e later point in tim e to guide overt perform ances of behavior. As Bandura (1977) explains: "On later occasions, im ages (centrally aroused perceptions) can be summoned up of events that are physically absent" (p. 25).»

13 6 Motor Reproduction P ro cesses Once a new response has been incorporated at the cognitive level, several factors govern the person's accurate translation of the learned response into overt action. F irst, the physical capabilities necessary for accurate approxim ations of the modeled behavior m ust exist in the person. A person lacking vocal chords cannot p erfo rm an operatic solo. Secondly, the behavioral components which are used in the construction of the new response m ust be available in the person's behavioral repertoire. If these two conditions exist, the m otor reproduction of the response can at least be attempted. E rro rle ss perform ance of the response m ay not occur on the first trial but refinem ents can be m ade in the response with repetition. These refinem ents can be m ade on the basis of feedback from external sources or self-observation. Motivational P ro cesses Even if a person has attended to appropriate modeling stimuli, integrated the response through symbolic representation, and possesses the physical capabilities and n ecessary component responses for m otor reproduction, he still m ay not perform a response acquired observationally. P erform ance of the response m ay be enhanced or inhibited by motivational factors. Anticipated

14 7 consequences for the perform ance of a learned response regulate, to a great extent, whether or not the response will be overtly expressed. The perform ance of behavior can be m otivated through the use of incentives. Incentives for perform ance can be derived prim arily from three different sources. The first of these is ex ternal reinforcement. When a person anticipates that he can secure a valued reward, perform ance is facilitated. Conversely, when an aversive outcome is expected, perform ance is inhibited. The consequences which other people receive for perform ance of the response can also serve incentive motivational functions. This is the process labeled vicarious reinforcem ent. Vicarious reinforcem ent derives its motivation capabilities prim arily from the information it provides about conditions existing in the environment. Observation of a m odel's consequences transm its inform a tion to the observer about the probability of favorable consequences for the perform ance of sim ilar behavior. A third source of incentives which can regulate perform ance of the learned response is self-reinforcem ent. People set standards for their perform ances and critically evaluate their perform ances on the basis of these criteria. If a person's perform ance falls short of a standard, his own evaluative reactions can serve to punish such a response. Similarly, if his perform ance m eets or exceeds the self- determ ined goal, he can produce self-rew ards for his behavior.

15 Thus, whether or not a person exhibits a response observed in a modeling situation depends first upon whether the relevant activities w ere attended to, second, whether the information was accurately coded symbolically, third, whether the person possesses the physical and behavioral capabilities necessary for accurate reproductions, and lastly, whether sufficient incentives exist to m otivate the person to perform the behavior. R eciprocal D eterm inism Bandura conceptualizes social learning as a "process of reciprocal determ inism. " Behavior is seen not as the outcome of either environm ental or personal influences, but as a continuous process in which behavior, environm ental factors and personal factors all interact and regulate each other. As Bandura (1971c) states: In the social learning view, m an is neither driven by inner forces nor buffeted helplessly by environm ental influences. Rather, psychological functioning is best understood in term s of a continuous reciprocal in teraction between behavior and its controlling conditions. (p. 2) The basic prem ise of reciprocal determ inism is that the separation of determ inants of social interaction is an artifical and a rb i tra ry separation. If the analysis of a sequence of social interaction begins with the person, it appears that events occurring within the

16 9 person are the determ inants of the behavior which serves to p ro duce a change in the environment. If the analysis begins with environm ental events, it appears that these events are the controlling factors which produce changes in behavior. Social learning theory conceptualizes social interaction, not as an unidirectional process, but as a process in which each of the three factors determ ines the operation of the other. Changing environm ental conditions (E) regulate changes in behavior (B), changes in behavior produce changes in the environment, and both contribute to changes in personal determ inants of psychological functioning (P). This difference in conceptualization between unidirectional theories and reciprocal determ inism is represented schem atically as follows: B = f(e) E = f(b) B<------>E Environm ental P ersonal R eciprocal D eterm inism D eterm inism D eterm inism (Bandura, 1977, pp ) Thus, as Bandura (1977) states: It is not determ inism that is in dispute, but whether determ inism should be treated as a one-way or a twoway process. Due to the interdependence of behavior and environm ental conditions, determ inism does not im ply the fatalistic view that individuals a re only pawns of external influences, (p. 206)

17 CHAPTER III C ontroversial Issues In the course of his writings, Bandura identifies several ''m ajor points of dispute" between social learning theory and in stru m ental conditioning conceptions of observational learning. These will be discussed in the following section. D em onstrating the O ccurrence of O bservational Learning As Bandura (1971b) points out, learning has traditionally been conceived of as occurring in two different ways. In the first of these, term ed stim ulus control, a person's perform ances are brought under the control of a stimulus which previously did not occasion responding. The second form of learning, response learning, involves the combining of elem entary behavioral components into new patterns of responding. Either form of learning can take place observationally. It m ust be dem onstrated, however, that what was presum ably learned on the basis of observation did not already exist in the p e r son's repertoire. As Bandura (1971b) states: Response novelty is defined in te rm s of em pirical criteria rather than a prio ri estim ations. Any behavior that has an extrem ely low or zero probability of occurrence given appropriate stimulus conditions qualifies as a novel response, (p. 30) 10

18 11 Thus, it m ust be established em pirically that the events, presum ably to be learned by observation, have an extrem ely low probability of occurrence, not for the research e r investigating the phenomenon, but for the person to whom the observational learning has been attributed. G ew irtz (1971b) also stresses the point that em pirical a s s e s s m ent of an o b s e rv e r-le a rn e r s behavioral repertoire is essential before the acquisition of an apparently unique response can be attributed to observational learning. He cites two examples which would give the appearance of learning by observation if the person's history of reinforcem ent w ere not adequately assessed. F irst, the observer could have learned the response initially under the sam e situational determ inants that now control the m odel's responding. repertoire. The response m ay have already been in the observer's Thus, there is only the appearance that the response was learned observationally. This is the equivalent of M iller and D ollard's (1941) "sam e-behavior" paradigm as opposed to their "m atched-behavior" paradigm in which the observer's response is functionally related to the m odel's response. In the second example, stimuli in the modeling context may have acquired stimulus control of the observer's responding in other but not very different contexts. These sam e stimuli m ay now rapidly come to control the observer's responses in the modeling

19 12 situation. Therefore, before the occurrence of a response can be attributed to observational learning, it m ust be em pirically dem onstrated that: (a) The response was not already in the observer's behavioral repertoire (i. e., it is a novel response), and (b) the m odel's responses are the controlling stimuli for (i. e., a re functionally related to) the responses of the observer-learner. The Function of Response Consequences According to social learning theory, consequences delivered contingently to a person derive their ability to regulate behavior prim arily by the inform ation which they convey about the nature of external conditions. Thus response consequences are depicted as producing changes in behavior through the intervening process of cognition. Bandura (1977) portrays the instrum ental conditioning conception of reinforcem ent as "a m echanistic process in which responses are shaped automatically and unconsciously by their im m ediate consequences" (p. 17). This is an erroneous statement. Operant conditioners do not propose any "m echanism " which "autom atically strenghtens" a response which it follows. What is said is that consequences delivered contingent upon a response alter the probability (either increase or decrease) of future occurrences of that response. The exact m echanism which is responsible for this

20 effect is not specified. Instrum ental conditioners contend that cognitive m echanism s which a re postulated to account for reinforcem ent effects (such as Bandura's representational mediation) a re inaccessible for em p irical investigation and m ay be unnecessary. If a concept adds nothing to the explanatory or predictive power of a theory it becom es an unnecessary construct. Environm ental events which occur previous to a response which is consistently reinforced do eventually come to set the occasion for that response. These are what instrum ental conditions refer to as discrim inative stimuli. Thus B andura's "inform ative function" of reinforcem ent appears to be nothing m o re than the process of stim ulus control. B andura's process of "re p re se n ta tional mediation, " which is inaccessible for em pirical investigations, adds nothing in the way of explanatory or predictive power beyond that of the instrum ental conditioner's process of stim ulus control. A second function of response consequences, according to social learning theory, is to m otivate behavior. People learn to anticipate consequences for their behavior. Expectations of desired outcomes thus serve to m otivate persons to act in order to attain these rew ards. Again, Bandura proposes that cognitive processes are n ecessary to explain how this occurs. Bandura reasons that,

21 since the consequences for action m ay be tem porally distant from 14 the perform ance of "foresightful" behaviors, people m ust cognitively rep resen t the possible outcomes to be im pelled to act. The point at which Bandura begins his analysis is what leads him to this conclusion about "foresightful" behavior. Investigation of the events preceding the occurrence of a "foresightful" act would show that the "cognitive representation" of future events, so n e c e s sary according to social learning theory, again adds no increase in explanatory or predictive power over the instrum ental conception. When a person's previous history of reinforcem ent is adequately assessed, it can be shown that "anticipitory" behavior is another instance of stimulus control: an outcome of prior learning. Again after responses are repeatedly reinforced in the presence of consistently associated environm ental stim uli, these stim uli come to set the occasions under which the response is likely to be reinforced. Thus, if the antecedent discrim inative stimuli which occasion an "anticipatory" response are identified, the need to propose symbolic representation of future events to explain anticipatory behavior becom es questionable. As an illustration of the argum ent above, consider the following situation: We enter a room in which a rat is perform ing a task in a lighted Skinner-box. The rat p re sse s a lever and a concave trough containing a sm all amount of w ater is presented. The rat

22 15 im m ediately proceeds to drink from the trough. It appears that the rat is pressing the lever because he "anticipates" that if he does so it will procure for him a drink of w ater. Even a social learning theorist would not be so bold as to propose that the rat m ust have symbolically represented the consequences of his actions and was thus "m otivated" to p ress the bar by the possibility of receiving w ater. He would instead point to the fact that bar pressing had previously been contingently reinforced with the presentation of w ater. A third function of response consequences, which Bandura grudgingly accepts as a possibility, is the ability to produce changes in behavior without aw areness (i. e., presum ably in the absence of symbolic representation of contingencies). In his discussion of the role of aw areness in reinforcem ent effects, Bandura (1971c, 1977) first re fe rs to studies by Spielberger and DeNike (1966) and Dulany (1962, 1968) which perportedly dem onstrated that aw areness of contingencies preceded any increm ent in responses which w ere reinforced. Next Bandura cites studies by Postm an and Sassenrath (1961) and Kennedy (1970, 1971) which dem onstrated that significant increm ents in correct responding preceded aw areness of the contingencies (as m easured by subjects' verbal reports about them). It was dem onstrated that the crucial difference between these studies was the length of the intervals used to a ssess aw areness. When

23 16 relatively long intervals w ere used (as in the studies by Spielberger and DeNike), it appeared that aw areness preceded learning; but when aw areness was assessed at shorter intervals, increm ents in responding preceded aw areness. In further support of the evidence that reinforcem ent can p ro duce effects in the absence of aw areness, Bandura reports studies by Hefferline, Bruno and Davidowitz (1970). In these studies the responses to be reinforced (unobservable m uscular contractions) w ere im perceptible without amplification (which the experim enters used to identify their occurrence). It was dem onstrated that these im perceptible responses could be manipulated by the presentation of positive reinforcers (m onetary reward) or the term ination of negative reinforcers (aversive stimulation). Since the responses w ere unobservable, the subjects could not have been aware of the contingent relationship between their behavior and the reinforcers. Bandura is unwilling to accept these data as dem onstrating that reinforcem ent can produce increm ents in responding without the intervening process of symbolic representation. He attributes the observed increases in responding to a partial correlation between the response actually being m easured and hypotheses generated by the subjects in the search to discover the contingencies of the experiment. This appears to be the social learning equivalent of what instrum ental conditioners refer to as adventitious reinforcem ent Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission

24 (Skinner, 1948, 1953). 17 In this case what is adventitiously reinforced is the subject's hypotheses about the "correct" response. Although this is not an im plausible explanation, it is indeed difficult to imagine what hypotheses subjects in the Hefferline et al. studies could have generated which would have been correlated with im perceptible m uscular responses. Bandura (1977) concludes that the controversy over the role of aw areness in reinforcem ent effects is unresolved and states: Even if im proved methodologies established that elem entary responses can be learned without aw areness of what is being reinforced, this would not m ean that com plex behavior can be sim ilarly acquired, (p. 21) Bandura (1977) continues with an illustration of "complex" behavior to support this line of reasoning. Suppose subjects are presented with words of varying length, and told that their task is to respond by providing a correct num ber corresponding to each word. Let us select an arb itrary rule that gives the "correct num ber" by subtracting the number of letters in a given word from 100, dividing the rem ainder by 2, and then multiplying this result by 5. C orrect responses are derived from a higher order rule requiring a three-step transform ation of the external stimulus. To create accurate responses one m ust perform several mental operations in a parti. r sequence. An unthinking organism is unlikely to show any gains in accurate p e r form ance however long its responses are reinforced. (p. 21) Operant conditioners would paraphrase Bandura's last sentence to read: An inexperienced organism is unlikely to show any gains in accurate perform ance however long its responses are reinforced.

25 18 The illustration quoted above is an example of response chain based on prior learning. Accurate perform ance of the task requires the prerequisite m athem atical skills of subtraction, division, and multiplication. All of these a re the outcome of prior learning in volving contingent response consequation. Because a response chain is "complex" or involves a "three-step transform ation" of a discrim inative stim ulus, it does not provide sufficient justification for a process such as representational m ediation to account for reinforcem ent effects. Consider the case of Barnabus, the rat with a college education (P ierrel & Sherm an, 1963). We observe Barnabus begin his "complex" task when a light appears on the first floor of his four level experim ental cham ber. Barnabus im m ediately proceeds to a spiral staircase and ascends to the second level where he pushes down a raised drawbridge which he crosses to reach a third platform. Next, he climbs a ladder, pulls a car to him on an attached chain, drives the car through a tunnel, climbs a flight of stairs, trav e rse s through a tube, steps into an elevator and raises a flag. The raising of the flag activates the elevator which descends to the first level. Next a buzzer sounds and Barnabus p resses a lever which procures for him a pellet of food. This is indeed a complex stim ulus- response chain, but again it is doubtful whether a social learning theorist would find it necessary to propose an intervening cognitive

26 19 process to explain the perform ance. It is simply a sequence of responses which are perform ed in the reverse o rd er from which they w ere learned. The external stim uli serve as discrim inative stimuli for the responses which they precede and as conditioned reinforcers for the responses which they follow. The entire behavior chain is m aintained by the term inal reinforcer: the pellet of food. The component behaviors of a response chain can occur at a covert level (as is the case in B andura's illustration) without invalidating the agrum ents above. Thus, simply because a behavioral sequence is complex and/or occurs on a covert level does not m ean that the principles of operant conditioning are invalid. B andura's proposed inform ational and m otivational explanations of reinforcem ent effects are the result p rim arily of his studies of observational learning. If, as Bandura proposes, le a rn ing by observation (i. e., from models) is a prepotent capacity of the hum an organism, it is easy to see how he derives these conclusions. However, if, as will be argued later, observational learning is the outcome of a routine, instrum ental conditioning process, one begins to question the necessity and utility of cognitive constructs proposed to explain reinforcem ent effects. Bandura (1971b) schem atically explains the role of reinforcem ent in observational le a rn ing as follows:

27 ANTICIPATED SR e in f > ATTENTION > SModeling stimuli \Symbolic Coding / > <Cognitive Organization) ^ R /R ehearsal \ (p. 45) If, as proposed earlier, anticipation of reinforcem ent is r e conceptualized as stim ulus control acquired through prior in stru m ental conditioning, the necessity for cognitive constructs is elim inated. Thus the observational learning schem a above can be r e diagram ed as: SD > R attending > s reinf responses (modeling stimuli) SD > R m a rc h in g -----> s reinf respons es The diagram above represents a stim ulus-response chain acquired through p rio r reinforcem ent. The initial discrim inative stim ulus (SD) sets the occasion for attending-orienting responses by the o b serv er-lea rn er. This SR could possibly be the presence of a potential model. The attending responses of the observing person a re reinforced by the perform ance of the m odeled behaviors and other external stim uli relevant to the m odeled task. The behavior of the m odel and the relevant stim uli of the modeling situation also serve as S-^'s setting the occasion for reinforcem ent of matching responses by the observer. The term inal reinforcer, possibly consequences sim ilar to those received by the model, m aintains the

28 entire response chain. Thus, the probability of future occurrences of im itative behaviors is increased. As with any stim ulus-response chain, observational learning chains are acquired through prior learning using extrinsic reinforcem ent. Bandura (1971b, 1971c, 1977) contends that the standard instrum ental conditioning paradigm outlined above cannot explain m any cases of learning by observation. As he describes it: It is difficult to see how this schem e (instrum ental conditioning) applies to the observational learning that takes place without overt perform ance of the m odel's responses during the acquisition phase, without reinforcers adm inistered to the m odel or to the observer and in which the first appearance of the acquired response m ay be delayed for days, weeks or even months. (Bandura, 1971b, pp ) In this illustration both the observer's matching responses and the reinforcem ent of them are absent during the modeling situation and the m odel's actions (S-^'s) are absent when the response is p e r form ed. The example of delayed im itation is not as damaging to in stru m ental conceptions of learning as it appears to be. As Gewirtz (1969b) points out:... all imitative behaviors occur after the m odel's perform ance, providing the relevant cues, has te rm i nated and often while the child is not looking at the model, and in that sense they are always perform ed in the absence of the model, (p. 151) Thus the length of the tem poral delay between the m odel's

29 perform ance and that of the observer is a misleading point. Tem poral delays between the presentation of an S-^ and the p e r form ance of the response which it occasions in many cases m ay even be part of the reinforcem ent contingencies. This is true not only for responses learned by observation, but for many behaviors learned by direct tuition. As Skinner (1953) illustrates: A response m ay also be reinforced only if it is delayed by a given interval of tim e after presentation of the stimulus. Thus, a pigeon is reinforced for pecking a key only if it waits, say six seconds after the key is presented, (p. 126) As in the case of the pigeon, reinforcing agents in the natural environm ent often require, as part of behavioral contingencies, the elapse of intervals of tim e and/or the absence of a specified stim ulus. This may be especially true of m any behaviors learned through modeling. For instance, exhibition of initative behavior in the m odel's presence m ay lead to punishing consequences for the o b serv er-learn er if the supply of reinforcers is such that it would require competition between the model and the learner for their acquisition. The point which m ust be stressed here, again, is the role of prior learning. The observer has learned through prior experiences to delay the perform ance of matching responses until the model is absent. The absence of the model does not m ean that there is a total absence of discrim inative stimuli when the matching responses are

30 23 perform ed. Other situational determ inants which set the occasion for the m odel's response m ay rapidly come to control the p erfo rm ance of the observer. Bandura would contend that the above analysis does not adequately explain how a person retains the behavioral components observed in the modeling context through the tem poral delay between the observation and perform ance of matching behaviors. This objection stem s from B andura's misconception about how reinforcem ent produces its effects. As mentioned earlier, Bandura believes that instrum ental conditioners have proposed a m echanism whereby reinforcers automatically strengthen behaviors which they follow. Again, what the instrum ental paradigm says is that contingent delivery of response consequences alters the probability of future occurrences of responding. The m echanism s responsible for this phenomenon are inaccessible for em pirical study. P re-scientific speculation about the possible m echanism s responsible for reinforcem ent effects are not verifiable by indicies independent of the behaviors they are purported to explain. Retention of learning is necessary for the future perform ance of any behavior. Any organism m ust be able to "rem em b er" from one trial to the next what is being reinforced in order for response consequences to affect behavior. This is true not just for the human organism but for all living organism s. What is not clear are the

31 24 m echanism s responsible for this phenomenon. It is doubtful if social learning theorists would bridge the gap between present p e r form ances and relevant prior experience in sub-human species with cognitive p rocesses like "sym bolic coding. This issue will be developed m o re fully in later sections of this analysis. Finally, Bandura (1977) concludes that reinforcem ent is "a facilitative rather than a n ecessary condition" for the learning of behavior. As he points out: One does not have to be reinforced, for example, to hear compelling sounds or to look at captivating visual displays. When attention is draw n to modeled activities by the events them selves, the addition of positive incentives does not increase observational learning, (pp ) Again it m ust be pointed out that Bandura reaches this conclusion based on the assum ption that observational learning is a prepotent process. If observational learning is re-conceptualized as the outcome of prior learning, reinforcem ent again becom es a n ecessary condition. It is highly probable that "compelling sounds" and "captivating visual displays" have acquired the ability to command attention because m any tim es in the past they have occasioned reinforcing consequences. That is, they are discrim inative stimuli. It is not surprising to find that the "addition of positive incentives" does not increase learning in their presence. Again consider the example of the rat which has previously learned to press a bar in the presence

32 of a light. Once the response is well learned (i. e., the rat is 25 responding at an asym ptotic level), the provision of additional rein fo rcers will not further in crease the rate of responding. In conclusion, it is argued that Bandura's m isconception of instrum ental conditioning and his repeated failure to adequately a sse ss the role of prior learning have led him to the erroneous conclusion that reinforcem ent is not a necessary condition for learning. Explanation of Vicarious R einforcem ent Phenomenon Bandura suggests that social learning theory is m ore co m p rehensive than instrum ental conditioning approaches to learning p a r tially because it includes vicarious reinforcem ent effects in analysis of basic learning m echanism s. It will be argued in the following section that vicarious reinforcem ent effects (like observational learning) are an outcome of prior learning rather than a basic learning m echanism. Bandura (1971a) defines vicarious reinforcem ent as, "a change in the behavior of observers as a function of witnessing the consequences accompanying the perform ance of others" (p. 230). Bandura em phasizes that the term vicarious reinforcem ent is sim ply descriptive of response changes as a function of observed consequences and is not m eant to explain these behavioral changes. However, Bandura (1969a, 1969b, 1971a, 1971b, 1971c) does propose

33 several explanations to account for how vicarious reinforcem ent produces its effects. The first of these is in term s of an inform a tive function sim ilar to that proposed earlier to explain extrinsic reinforcem ent effects. According to Bandura, the observed outcom es for a m odel convey inform ation to an observer about the types of behaviors that are likely to be reinforced or punished. As I argued earlier in the examination of direct reinforcem ent effects, this "inform ative function" of vicarious reinforcem ent is simply stimulus control acquired through p rio r learning. That is, consequences delivered to m odels come to serve a S-^'s setting the occasion for the extrinsic reinforcem ent of matching behaviors p e r form ed by the observer. Evidence that the "informative function" of vicarious reinforcem ent m ay be the equivalent of stim ulus control is suggested by Bandura (1971a) when he states: "It should also be noted that studies have not dem onstrated that vicarious reinforcem ent alone can sustain effortful behavior over a long period" (p. 235) Although Bandura would undoubtedly argue that the cessation of responding is due to the fact that the observed consequences have lost their inform ational value, a m ore parsim onious explanation is that a discrim inated operant has been extinguished. The second explanation of vicarious reinforcem ent proposed by Bandura is a "stim ulus enhancement effect" (Bandura, 1971a). That is, consequences delivered to the m odel m ay highlight critical

34 features of the environment which occasion reinforcem ent. If a 27 model is reinforced in the presence of a given set of situational stimuli and not consequated or punished under different environm ental conditions, the consequences delivered to the model m ay aid the observer in discrim inating the critical features of the situation. Again, this is an example of stimulus control. Unlike the previous examples of stimulus control where a single stimulus set the occasion for reinforcem ent, this paradigm involves what operant conditioners refer to as conditional responding (Lashley, 1938). As Gewirtz (1971b) explains: In simple discrim ination learning (involving simultaneous of successive com parisons), the presence of a single discrim inative stimulus attribute (S^) sets the occasion for reinforcem ent of the "correct" response, and its absence ("S delta") sets the occasion for nonreinforcement. In a conditional discrim ination situation (like m atching-to-sam ple), however, the response that could be reinforced on each trial is defined on the basis of the relationship of the attributes of two sets of stimuli: the conditional or standard stimulus, and the discrim inative com parison stimuli. The discrim inative stimulus thus varies across discrim ination trials, changing relative to the (concurrent or preceding) conditional stimulus. (p. 282) In the case of vicarious reinforcem ent it is the relationship between situational stimuli and the observed consequences for the model which sets the occasion for reinforcem ent of matching responses by the observer. The third possible explanation that Bandura advances for

35 28 vicarious reinforcem ent is an incentive-m otivational effect. That is, persons who observe a model receive favorable consequences are "motivated" to perform matching behavior by the "expectation" of sim ilar outcomes. This "incentive-m otivational" function was discussed in the previous section of this article dealing with the controversy about extrinsic reinforcem ent effects. In that previous discussion it was pointed out that the cognitive m echanism s proposed by Bandura and im plied by the te rm s "expectation" and "anticipation" w ere unnecessary for a functional analysis of behavior. At that juncture it was proposed that the "incentive-m otivational" function of response consequences could be m ore parsim oniously ordered by the instrum ental conditioning conception of stim ulus control. Again it is argued that the "incentive-m otivational" function of vicarious reinforcem ent amounts to nothing m o re than an illustration of this process. In the preceding analysis of the m otivational function of direct reinforcem ent, any antecedent stimulus could have acquired discrim inative properties. With vicarious reinforcem ent a specific antecedent stim ulus, the consequences delivered to a model, set the occasion for consequation of initative behaviors. The basic process involved, however, is still one of stimulus control. The fourth explanation of vicarious reinforcem ent proposed by Bandura is the vicarious conditioning of emotional responses. As

36 Bandura observes, the exhibition of emotional responses by m odels 29 in response to contingent delivery of consequences can elicit sim ilar (or dissim ilar) reactions in persons observing the modeled p e rfo rm ance. Bandura proposes that these emotional reactions are acquired through classical conditioning. In this process, previously neutral stim uli (i. e., those that form erly elicited no emotional reactions) come to elicit emotional responses after repeated pairing with an unconditioned stimulus (i. e., a stim ulus which elicited emotional responses). In vicarious emotional conditioning the emotional reactions of the model have acquired the ability to elicit emotional reactions in observers through their associative pairing with unconditioned stimuli; the consequences actually experienced on prior occasions by the observer. However, as with his treatm ent of instrum ental conditioning, this classical or respondent conditioning of emotional responses is seen by Bandura as occurring through the intervening process of cognition. As he explains:... when a stimulus is paired with aversive experiences, the stimulus alone produces emotional responses, not because it is invested with emotional properties but because it tends to elicit em otion-arousing thoughts. In other words, the emotional responses are to a large extent cognitively induced rather than automatically evoked by the conditioned stimuli, (p. 246) As was pointed out in the earlier discussions about in stru m ental conditioning, there is a sense in which all organism s m ust somehow correlate p rio r occurrences of an event with the

37 30 probability of future occurrences of that sam e event. This is true not only of behaviors considered operant, but also respondent behaviors. What is still unclear are the m echanism s through which this learning takes place. P re-scientific speculation about the "cognitive" p rocesses involved are of limited utility for theories of le arn ing, w hether they are based on instrum ental or classical conditioning precepts. Thus, B andura's "anticipatory self-arousal" seem s to be of lim ited value in the explanation of suppressive or facilitative effects of vicarious reinforcem ent. F ro m a m ore traditionally operant perspective, classical conditioning of physiological responsiveness (i.e., emotional behavior) can be observed for alm ost any stimulus which has acquired d iscrim inative properties. This does not reduce the process involved to anything other than stim ulus control. Again Bandura's explanation of vicarious reinforcem ent seem s to add nothing to the understanding of behavior beyond that entailed in the instrum ental conditioning process of discrim ination. The final explanation of vicarious reinforcem ent which Bandura proposes is "modification of m odel status. " As Bandura (1971a) observes: Punishm ent devalues the model and his behavior, w hereas the sam e model assum es emulative qualities when his actions a re rew arded. These changes in model status, in turn, are accom panied by corresponding differences in the degree to which observers im itate the m odel's

38 31 behavior. Indeed, in the behavioral analysis of what is involved in the conferring of "status" two things stand out. The "status" of the model is inferred from the frequency with which the model is imitated and the diversity of situations in which the m odel is im itated. Models who are observed to be punished with regularity will be imitated less frequently and under fewer conditions (i.e., will be conferred with low status) than will models who a re observed being reinforced for their actions. Again the process involved seem s to be nothing m ore than stim ulus control. Models who are frequently reinforced in diverse situations come to set the occasion for the reinforcem ent of im itative behavior in diverse situations. P ersons learn through differential reinforcem ent that emulation of frequently rew arded (i. e., high status) models frequently results in reinforcing outcomes and that im itation of unsuccessful m odels m ay have deleterious consequences. The preceding analysis dem onstrates that vicarious re in forcem ent effects can be parsim oniously ordered by the operant conditioning paradigm of stimulus control. Thus, there appears to be little justification for proposing that vicarious reinforcem ent represents a basic learning process which is discontinuous with instrum ental conceptions of learning.