Game Theory. Uncertainty about Payoffs: Bayesian Games. Manar Mohaisen Department of EEC Engineering
|
|
- Dayna Quinn
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Game Theory Uncertainty about Payoffs: Bayesian Games Manar Mohaisen Department of EEC Engineering Korea University of Technology and Education (KUT)
2 Content Bayesian Games Bayesian Nash Equilibrium How to compute Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 2
3 Auction Uncertainty about payoffs Players don t know the value of the auctioned items to other players 3
4 Bayesian Games So far, agents know the game being played number of players; available actions; and payoffs Bayesian Games All possible games have the same number of agents and the same strategy space for each agent; they differ only in their payoffs. The beliefs of the different agents are posteriors, obtained by conditioning a common prior on individual private signals. 4
5 Bayesian Games All possible games have the same number of agents and the same strategy space for each agent; they differ only in their payoffs. Example o Player 1 does not know whether P2 has 2 or three strategies. P2:A P2:B P1: A 1, 1 1, 3 P1: B 0, 5 1, 13 P2:A P2:C P2:B P1: A 1, 1 0, 2 1, 3 P1: B 0, 5 2, 8 1, 13 o The uncertainty in number of actions is transformed into uncertainty in payoffs by padding P2:A P2:C P2:B P1: A 1, 1 0, , 3 P1: B 0, 5 2, , 13 5
6 Bayesian Games: First Definition Definition I: Information Sets A Bayesian game is a set of games that differ only in their payoffs, a common prior defined over them, and a partition structure over games for each agent. A Bayesian Games is a tuple (N, G, P, I) where 6
7 Bayesian Games: First Definition Example (Normal-form) Known: Players, Games, associated probability for each game, and partition structure for each player 7
8 Bayesian Games: Second Definition Definition II: Extensive Form with Chance Moves Nature randomizes the games in a commonly known way o Information sets indicate that players make their choices without knowing taken actions by other players 8
9 Bayesian Games: Third Definition Definition III: Epistemic Type User s type is used to define the uncertainty A Bayesian game is a tuple (N, A,, p, u) 9
10 Bayesian Games: Third Definition Example {, } 1 1,1 1,2 {, } 2 2,1 2,2 p(, ) 0.3 1,1 2,1 p(, ) 0.1 1,1 2,2 p(, ) 0.2 1,2 2,1 p(, ) 0.4 1,2 2,2 p( ) 0.6 1,1 2,1 p( ) 0.2 1,1 2,2 p( ) 0.4 1,2 2,1 p( ) 0.8 1,2 2,2 10
11 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium How to define agent s strategy space in Bayesian game? Pure strategy s A : i i i o Is a mapping from each type agent i could have to the action he would play if he had that type. Mixed Strategy s : ( A) i i i o Is a mapping from each type agent i could have to a mixed action he would play if he had that type. Probability under mixed strategy sa ( ) i i i o The probability under mixed strategy s i that player i played action a i given that her type is I 11
12 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Three Settings of Expected Utility Ex-ante o An gent does not know anybody's type Ex-interim o Each agent knows her own type but not those of other agents Ex-post o Each agent knows all agents types 12
13 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Ex-post Expected Utility Agent i s ex-post expected utility in a Bayesian game (N, A,, p, u), where the agent s strategies are given by s and the agent s types are given by, is defined as o The uncertainty concerns the other agents mixed strategies; o In a Bayesian game, of course, no agent will know other agents types! o This definition is useful to define other expected utilities 13
14 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Ex-interim Expected Utility Agent i s ex-interim expected utility in a Bayesian game (N, A,, p, u), where i s type is i, and where the agents strategies are given by the mixed strategy profile s, is defined as o Equivalently written as 14
15 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Ex-ante Expected Utility Agent i s ex-ante expected utility in a Bayesian game (N, A,, p, u), where the agents strategies are given by the mixed strategy profile s, is defined as 15
16 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Best Response in a Bayesian Game The set of agent i s best responses to mixed strategy profile s -i are given by Bayes-Nash Equilibrium A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a mixed-strategy profile s that satisfies i s i BR i (s -i ) 16
17 Computing Equilibria Example Each player has 4 pure strategies o UU, UD, DU and DD for P1 o RR, RL, LR, and LL for P2 The normal-form game is 4x4 o The payoffs are the expected payoffs 17
18 Computing Equilibria Example contd. The ex-ante expected utility under the strategy profile (UU, LL) is given by o And so forth all the entries are computed. 18
19 Computing Equilibria Example contd. Ex-ante Ex-interim P1 observes 1,1 19
20 Summary Bayesian Games Bayesian Nash Equilibrium How to compute Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 20
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Econ 400 University of Notre Dame Econ 400 (ND) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 1 / 27 Our last equilibrium concept The last equilibrium concept we ll study after Nash eqm, Subgame
More informationLecture 9: The Agent Form of Bayesian Games
Microeconomics I: Game Theory Lecture 9: The Agent Form of Bayesian Games (see Osborne, 2009, Sect 9.2.2) Dr. Michael Trost Department of Applied Microeconomics December 20, 2013 Dr. Michael Trost Microeconomics
More informationNash Equilibrium and Dynamics
Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics Sergiu Hart June 2008 Conference in Honor of John Nash s 80th Birthday Opening Panel SERGIU HART c 2008 p. 1 NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND DYNAMICS Sergiu Hart Center for the Study
More informationPerfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In the final two weeks: Goals Understand what a game of incomplete information (Bayesian game) is Understand how to model static Bayesian games Be able to apply Bayes Nash equilibrium to make predictions
More informationGames With Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Games With Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Carlos Hurtado Department of Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign hrtdmrt2@illinois.edu June 29th, 2016 C. Hurtado (UIUC - Economics)
More informationEpistemic Game Theory
Epistemic Game Theory Adam Brandenburger J.P. Valles Professor, NYU Stern School of Business Distinguished Professor, NYU Tandon School of Engineering Faculty Director, NYU Shanghai Program on Creativity
More informationSignalling, shame and silence in social learning. Arun Chandrasekhar, Benjamin Golub, He Yang Presented by: Helena, Jasmin, Matt and Eszter
Signalling, shame and silence in social learning Arun Chandrasekhar, Benjamin Golub, He Yang Presented by: Helena, Jasmin, Matt and Eszter Motivation Asking is an important information channel. But the
More informationFull terms and conditions of use:
This article was downloaded by: [148.251.232.83] On: 18 November 2018, At: 10:37 Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) INFORMS is located in Maryland, USA Management
More informationWalras-Bowley Lecture 2003 (extended)
Walras-Bowley Lecture 2003 (extended) Sergiu Hart This version: November 2005 SERGIU HART c 2005 p. 1 ADAPTIVE HEURISTICS A Little Rationality Goes a Long Way Sergiu Hart Center for Rationality, Dept.
More informationLecture 2: Learning and Equilibrium Extensive-Form Games
Lecture 2: Learning and Equilibrium Extensive-Form Games III. Nash Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games IV. Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Passive Learning V. Learning Off-path Play D. Fudenberg Marshall
More informationNash Equilibrium and Dynamics
Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics Sergiu Hart September 12, 2008 John F. Nash, Jr., submitted his Ph.D. dissertation entitled Non-Cooperative Games to Princeton University in 1950. Read it 58 years later,
More informationPublicly available solutions for AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
Publicly available solutions for AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY Publicly available solutions for AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY MARTIN J. OSBORNE University of Toronto Copyright 2012 by Martin J. Osborne
More informationHandout on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Handout on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Fudong Zhang April 19, 2013 Understanding the concept Motivation In general, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is the concept we are using when solving dynamic
More informationBehavioral Game Theory
Behavioral Game Theory Experiments in Strategic Interaction Colin F. Camerer Russell Sage Foundation, New York, New York Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey Preface Introduction 1.1 What
More informationMultiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests *
Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests * Subhasish M. Chowdhury a and Roman M. Sheremeta b a School of Economics, Centre for Competition Policy, and Centre for Behavioral and Experimental Social Science,
More informationEquilibrium Selection In Coordination Games
Equilibrium Selection In Coordination Games Presenter: Yijia Zhao (yz4k@virginia.edu) September 7, 2005 Overview of Coordination Games A class of symmetric, simultaneous move, complete information games
More informationEliciting Beliefs by Paying in Chance
CMS-EMS Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics And Management Science Discussion Paper #1565 Eliciting Beliefs by Paying in Chance ALVARO SANDRONI ERAN SHMAYA Northwestern University March 17, 2013
More informationJ. van Benthem, P. Adriaans (eds): Handbook on the Philosophy of Information INFORMATION AND BELIEFS IN GAME THEORY
J. van Benthem, P. Adriaans (eds): Handbook on the Philosophy of Information INFORMATION AND BELIEFS IN GAME THEORY (Bernard WALLISER, ENPC, EHESS, Paris) September 30, 2006 Game theory is devoted to the
More informationAn Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play
. An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play James C. Cox 1, Jason Shachat 2, and Mark Walker 1 1. Department of Economics, University of Arizona 2. Department of Economics, University
More informationLEARNING AND EQUILIBRIUM, II: EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES. Simons Institute Economics and Computation Boot Camp UC Berkeley,August 2015 Drew Fudenberg
LEARNING AND EQUILIBRIUM, II: EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES Simons Institute Economics and Computation Boot Camp UC Berkeley,August 2015 Drew Fudenberg Extensive-Form Games Used to model games with sequential and/or
More informationIntroduction to Game Theory Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems 2015/2016
Introduction to Game Theory Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems 2015/2016 Ana Paiva * These slides are based on the book by Prof. M. Woodridge An Introduction to Multiagent Systems and the online
More informationMASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY HARRY DI PEI harrydp@mit.edu OFFICE CONTACT INFORMATION 77 Massachusetts Avenue, E52-301 harrydp@mit.edu http://economics.mit.edu/grad/harrydp MIT PLACEMENT OFFICER
More informationTesting models with models: The case of game theory. Kevin J.S. Zollman
Testing models with models: The case of game theory Kevin J.S. Zollman Traditional picture 1) Find a phenomenon 2) Build a model 3) Analyze the model 4) Test the model against data What is game theory?
More informationSelecting Strategies Using Empirical Game Models: An Experimental Analysis of Meta-Strategies
Selecting Strategies Using Empirical Game Models: An Experimental Analysis of Meta-Strategies ABSTRACT Christopher Kiekintveld University of Michigan Computer Science and Engineering Ann Arbor, MI 489-22
More informationIrrationality in Game Theory
Irrationality in Game Theory Yamin Htun Dec 9, 2005 Abstract The concepts in game theory have been evolving in such a way that existing theories are recasted to apply to problems that previously appeared
More informationAmbiguity Aversion in Game Theory: Experimental Evidence
Ambiguity Aversion in Game Theory: Experimental Evidence Evan Calford August 6, 2015 PRELIMINARY Comments welcome. Abstract This paper studies games with ambiguity averse agents, focusing on the relationship
More informationAnswers to Midterm Exam
Answers to Midterm Exam Econ 159a/MGT522a Ben Polak Fall 2007 The answers below are more complete than required to get the points. In general, more concise explanations are better. Question 1. [15 total
More informationBayesian integration in sensorimotor learning
Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning Introduction Learning new motor skills Variability in sensors and task Tennis: Velocity of ball Not all are equally probable over time Increased uncertainty:
More informationGenerative Adversarial Networks.
Generative Adversarial Networks www.cs.wisc.edu/~page/cs760/ Goals for the lecture you should understand the following concepts Nash equilibrium Minimax game Generative adversarial network Prisoners Dilemma
More informationTHE EMPIRICAL CONTENT OF MODELS WITH SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
THE EMPIRICAL CONTENT OF MODELS WITH SOCIAL INTERACTIONS BRENDAN KLINE AND ELIE TAMER NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY Abstract. Empirical models with social interactions or peer effects allow the outcome of an
More informationThe Game Prisoners Really Play: Preference Elicitation and the Impact of Communication
The Game Prisoners Really Play: Preference Elicitation and the Impact of Communication Michael Kosfeld University of Zurich Ernst Fehr University of Zurich October 10, 2003 Unfinished version: Please do
More informationFlip a coin or vote: An Experiment on Choosing Group Decision
University of Mannheim / Department of Economics Working Paper Series Flip a coin or vote: An Experiment on Choosing Group Decision Timo Hoffmann Sander Renes Working Paper 16-11 June 2016 Flip a coin
More informationA Game Theoretical Approach for Hospital Stockpile in Preparation for Pandemics
Proceedings of the 2008 Industrial Engineering Research Conference J. Fowler and S. Mason, eds. A Game Theoretical Approach for Hospital Stockpile in Preparation for Pandemics Po-Ching DeLaurentis School
More informationCORRELATED EQUILIBRIA, GOOD AND BAD: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY. University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A.; University of Aberdeen Business School, U.K.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW Vol. 51, No. 3, August 2010 CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA, GOOD AND BAD: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY BY JOHN DUFFY AND NICK FELTOVICH 1 University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A.; University of Aberdeen
More informationBehavioral Game Theory
Outline (September 3, 2007) Outline (September 3, 2007) Introduction Outline (September 3, 2007) Introduction Examples of laboratory experiments Outline (September 3, 2007) Introduction Examples of laboratory
More informationUncertainty about Rationality.
Uncertainty about Rationality. Separating Optimality from Cognitive Ability in Models of Strategic Reasoning Marzena J. Rostek This draft: October 2006 Abstract Uncertainty about the rationality of others
More informationA Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox*
Ž. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 20, 25 30 1997 ARTICLE NO. GA970508 A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox* Itzhak Gilboa MEDS KGSM, Northwestern Uni ersity, E anston, Illinois 60201 Piccione and
More informationUsing Experimental Methods to Inform Public Policy Debates. Jim Murphy Presentation to ISER July 13, 2006
Using Experimental Methods to Inform Public Policy Debates Jim Murphy Presentation to ISER July 13, 2006 Experiments are just one more tool for the applied economist Econometric analysis of nonexperimental
More informationIntro to Probability Instructor: Alexandre Bouchard
www.stat.ubc.ca/~bouchard/courses/stat302-sp2017-18/ Intro to Probability Instructor: Alexandre Bouchard Plan for today: Bayesian inference 101 Decision diagram for non equally weighted problems Bayes
More informationCooperation in a Prisoners Dilemma with Losses. Results from an Experimental Study.
Cooperation in a Prisoners Dilemma with Losses. Results from an Experimental Study. Roger Berger Institute for Sociology, University of Leipzig and SNF Venice International University 2006 Rational Choice
More informationSupplementary notes for lecture 8: Computational modeling of cognitive development
Supplementary notes for lecture 8: Computational modeling of cognitive development Slide 1 Why computational modeling is important for studying cognitive development. Let s think about how to study the
More informationConformity and stereotyping in social groups
Conformity and stereotyping in social groups Edward Cartwright Department of Economics Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NP, UK E.J.Cartwright@kent.ac.uk Myrna Wooders Department of Economics,
More informationInformation Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 206, 06(5): 7 http://dx.doi.org/0.257/aer.p206046 Information Design and Bayesian Persuasion Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated
More informationApproximate Solutions For Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Common Payoffs
Approximate Solutions For Partially Observable Stochastic Games with Common Payoffs Rosemary Emery-Montemerlo, Geoff Gordon,Jeff Schneider The Robotics Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh,
More informationEpisode 7. Modeling Network Traffic using Game Theory. Baochun Li Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Toronto
Episode 7. Modeling Network Traffic using Game Theory aochun Li epartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Toronto Networks, Crowds, and Markets, Chapter 8 Objective in this episode
More informationThe Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study Ayala Arad Abstract The paper introduces a new allocation game, related to Blotto games: each tennis coach assigns his four different skilled
More informationSocial norms, social approval, social interaction
Social norms, social approval, social interaction Readings: Young 1998 (Sections 1-4) Nyborg and Rege (2003 JEBO; only cursory reading required for Sections 3-5) Akerlof (1980) Lindbeck (1997) See also:
More informationSocial norms, social approval, social interaction
Social norms, social approval, social interaction Readings: Young 1998 (Sections 1-4) Nyborg and Rege (2003 JEBO; only cursory reading required for Sections 3-5) Akerlof (1980) Lindbeck (1997) See also:
More informationEmanuela Carbonara. 31 January University of Bologna - Department of Economics
Game Theory, Behavior and The Law - I A brief introduction to game theory. Rules of the game and equilibrium concepts. Behavioral Games: Ultimatum and Dictator Games. Entitlement and Framing effects. Emanuela
More informationDominance-Solvable Games
Dominance-Solvable Games Joseph Tao-yi Wang 10/13/2010 Dominance Dominance Strategy A gives you better payoffs than Strategy B regardless of opponent strategy Dominance Solvable A game that can be solved
More informationCARISMA-LMS Workshop on Statistics for Risk Analysis
Department of Mathematics CARISMA-LMS Workshop on Statistics for Risk Analysis Thursday 28 th May 2015 Location: Department of Mathematics, John Crank Building, Room JNCK128 (Campus map can be found at
More informationUNIVERSITY OF OSLO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Take home exam: ECON5200/9200 Advanced Microeconomics Exam period: Monday 11 December at 09.00 to Thursday 14 December at 15.00 Guidelines: Submit your exam answer
More informationReasoning, games, action and rationality
Reasoning, games, action and rationality August 11-15, ESSLLI 2008 Eric Pacuit Olivier Roy August 10, 2008 This document contains an extended outline of the first lecture including a bibliography. The
More informationTilburg University. Game theory van Damme, Eric. Published in: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
Tilburg University Game theory van Damme, Eric Published in: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences Document version: Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.71048-8
More informationThe Common Priors Assumption: A comment on Bargaining and the Nature of War
The Common Priors Assumption: A comment on Bargaining and the Nature of War Mark Fey Kristopher W. Ramsay June 10, 2005 Abstract In a recent article in the JCR, Smith and Stam (2004) call into question
More informationStrategic Interdependence, Hypothetical Bargaining, and Mutual Advantage in Non-Cooperative Games
The London School of Economics and Political Science Strategic Interdependence, Hypothetical Bargaining, and Mutual Advantage in Non-Cooperative Games Mantas Radzvilas A thesis submitted to the Department
More informationClicker quiz: Should the cocaine trade be legalized? (either answer will tell us if you are here or not) 1. yes 2. no
Clicker quiz: Should the cocaine trade be legalized? (either answer will tell us if you are here or not) 1. yes 2. no Economic Liberalism Summary: Assumptions: self-interest, rationality, individual freedom
More informationEmpirical game theory of pedestrian interaction for autonomous vehicles
Empirical game theory of pedestrian interaction for autonomous vehicles Fanta Camara 1,2, Richard Romano 1, Gustav Markkula 1, Ruth Madigan 1, Natasha Merat 1 and Charles Fox 1,2,3 1 Institute for Transport
More informationProcedural Concerns in Psychological Games
Procedural Concerns in Psychological Games Alexander Sebald September 8, 7 Abstract One persistent finding in experimental economics is that people react very differently to outcomewise identical situations
More informationULTIMATUM GAME. An Empirical Evidence. Presented By: SHAHID RAZZAQUE
1 ULTIMATUM GAME An Empirical Evidence Presented By: SHAHID RAZZAQUE 2 Difference Between Self-Interest, Preference & Social Preference Preference refers to the choices people make & particularly to tradeoffs
More informationAdjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games
Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games Jordi Brandts Charles A. Holt ABSTRACT This paper examines the relation between adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection
More informationWhat Happens in the Field Stays in the Field: Professionals Do Not Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments
What Happens in the Field Stays in the Field: Professionals Do Not Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments Steven D. Levitt, John A. List, and David H. Reiley American Economic Review July 2008 HELLO! I
More informationGame theory for playing games: sophistication in a negative-externality experiment
: sophistication in a negative-externality experiment John M. Spraggon and Robert J. Oxoby. Economic Inquiry, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July., 2009), pp. 467 81 September 4, 2013 Introduction Observed di erences
More informationSequential Decision Making
Sequential Decision Making Sequential decisions Many (most) real world problems cannot be solved with a single action. Need a longer horizon Ex: Sequential decision problems We start at START and want
More informationWhen Mendel crossed 2 plants that were different in a single trait, he called that a monohybrid cross. The resulting offspring were called the F1
Genetics Gregor Mendel The father of Genetics Genetics- the study of heredity Heredity- the passing of characteristics or traits from parents to offspring Mendel chose pea plants to research. Pea plants
More informationbehavioural economics and game theory
behavioural economics and game theory In traditional economic analysis, as well as in much of behavioural economics, the individual s motivations are summarized by a utility function (or a preference relation)
More informationRepresenting Bayesian Games Without a Common Prior
Representing Bayesian Games Without a Common Prior Dimitrios Antos and Avi Pfeffer Harvard University 33 Oxford Street Cambridge, MA 01239 ABSTRACT Game-theoretic analyses of multi-agent systems typically
More informationHindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values
Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values Asen Ivanov Dan Levin James Peck Abstract We experimentally test an endogenous-timing
More informationKnowledge in economics: game-theoretic vs market-process
Knowledge in economics: game-theoretic vs market-process Lawrence A. Boland CRISTINA BICCHIERI, Rationality and Coordination, New York; Cambridge University Press 1993, pp. xiii + 270 ESTEBAN F. THOMSEN,
More informationComplex Disclosure. Ginger Zhe Jin 1 University of Maryland, NBER, & FTC. Michael Luca Harvard Business School
Complex Disclosure Ginger Zhe Jin 1 University of Maryland, NBER, & FTC Michael Luca Harvard Business School Daniel Martin Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management December 2015 Preliminary
More informationA Belief-Based Account of Decision under Uncertainty. Craig R. Fox, Amos Tversky
A Belief-Based Account of Decision under Uncertainty Craig R. Fox, Amos Tversky Outline Problem Definition Decision under Uncertainty (classical Theory) Two-Stage Model Probability Judgment and Support
More information1 Introduction and Background
1 Introduction and Background 1.1 ERRARE HUMANUM EST That humans do not always optimize perfectly is not the least bit controversial, even among economists and game theorists. In games of skill, we often
More informationIntroduction to Machine Learning. Katherine Heller Deep Learning Summer School 2018
Introduction to Machine Learning Katherine Heller Deep Learning Summer School 2018 Outline Kinds of machine learning Linear regression Regularization Bayesian methods Logistic Regression Why we do this
More informationPure and Utilitarian Prisoner's Dilemmas
Pure and Utilitarian Prisoner's Dilemmas Steven T. Kuhn Department of Philosophy Georgetown University Washington, D.C. 20057 Telephone: (202)687-7487 Serge Moresi Department of Economics Georgetown University
More informationKnowledge is rarely absolutely certain. In expert systems we need a way to say that something is probably but not necessarily true.
CmSc310 Artificial Intelligence Expert Systems II 1. Reasoning under uncertainty Knowledge is rarely absolutely certain. In expert systems we need a way to say that something is probably but not necessarily
More informationLesson 87 Bayes Theorem
Lesson 87 Bayes Theorem HL2 Math - Santowski Bayes Theorem! Main theorem: Suppose we know We would like to use this information to find if possible. Discovered by Reverend Thomas Bayes 1 Bayes Theorem!
More informationLeadership, Followership, and Beliefs About the World: Theory and Experiment
Leadership, Followership, and Beliefs About the World: Theory and Experiment Eric S. Dickson Assistant Professor Department of Politics and Center for Experimental Social Science NewYorkUniversity January
More informationBayesian Inference. Review. Breast Cancer Screening. Breast Cancer Screening. Breast Cancer Screening
STAT 101 Dr. Kari Lock Morgan Review What is the deinition of the p- value? a) P(statistic as extreme as that observed if H 0 is true) b) P(H 0 is true if statistic as extreme as that observed) SETION
More informationConcepts and Connections: What Do You Expect? Concept Example Connected to or Foreshadowing
Meaning of Probability: The term probability is applied to situations that have uncertain outcomes on individual trials but a predictable pattern of outcomes over many trials. Students find experimental
More informationWorking paper n
Laboratoire REGARDS (EA 6292) Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne Working paper n 6-2014 Against the Eliminativist View of Institutions in Economics: Rule-Following and Game Theory Cyril Hédoin* * Professeur
More informationBimodal Bidding in Experimental All-Pay Auctions
Games 2013, 4, 608-623; doi:10.3390/g4040608 Article OPEN ACCESS games ISSN 2073-4336 www.mdpi.com/journal/games Bimodal ding in Experimental All-Pay Auctions Christiane Ernst 1 and Christian Thöni 2,
More informationUnlike standard economics, BE is (most of the time) not based on rst principles, but on observed behavior of real people.
Behavioral Economics Lecture 1. Introduction and the Methodology of Experimental Economics 1. Introduction Characteristica of Behavioral Economics (BE) Unlike standard economics, BE is (most of the time)
More informationA PRIZE TO GIVE FOR: AN EXPERIMENT ON PUBLIC GOOD FUNDING MECHANISMS*
The Economic Journal, 120 (September), 944 967. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02314.x. Ó The Author(s). Journal compilation Ó Royal Economic Society 2009. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington
More informationarxiv: v1 [cs.gt] 14 Mar 2014
Generalized prisoner s dilemma Xinyang Deng a, Qi Liu b, Yong Deng a,c, arxiv:1403.3595v1 [cs.gt] 14 Mar 2014 a School of Computer and Information Science, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400715, China
More informationThe Keynesian Beauty Contest: Economic System, Mind, and Brain
The Keynesian Beauty Contest: Economic System, Mind, and Brain Rosemarie Nagel (ICREA-UPF-BGSE) Felix Mauersberger (University Bonn) Christoph Bühren (University Kassel) Prepared for the Conference on
More informationWishful thinking in willful blindness
Wishful thinking in willful blindness Homayoon Moradi 1 Alexander Nesterov 2 1 WZB Berlin Social Science Center 2 Higher School of Economics, St.Petersburg WZB Job market presentation practice People often
More informationPre-trip Information and Route-Choice Decisions with Stochastic Travel Conditions: Experiment. Abstract
Pre-trip Information and Route-Choice Decisions with Stochastic Travel Conditions: Experiment Amnon Rapoport, Eyran J. Gisches, Terry Daniel 3, and Robin Lindsey 4 Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management,
More informationPhilosophy of Science Association
Philosophy of Science Association Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory Author(s): Brian Skyrms Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 503-528
More informationBayesians methods in system identification: equivalences, differences, and misunderstandings
Bayesians methods in system identification: equivalences, differences, and misunderstandings Johan Schoukens and Carl Edward Rasmussen ERNSI 217 Workshop on System Identification Lyon, September 24-27,
More informationEECS 433 Statistical Pattern Recognition
EECS 433 Statistical Pattern Recognition Ying Wu Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Northwestern University Evanston, IL 60208 http://www.eecs.northwestern.edu/~yingwu 1 / 19 Outline What is Pattern
More informationUncertainty Aversion in Game Theory: Experimental Evidence
Uncertainty Aversion in Game Theory: Experimental Evidence Evan M. Calford Purdue University Economics Department Working Paper No. 1291 April 2017 Abstract This paper experimentally investigates the role
More informationTransparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information
Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information Antonio Cabrales, Michalis Drouvelis, Zeynep Gurguc and Indrajit Ray 28th September 2017 Abstract We consider an
More informationBayesian Game Theorists and non-bayesian Players
Bayesian Game Theorists and non-bayesian Players Guilhem Lecouteux To cite this version: Guilhem Lecouteux. Bayesian Game Theorists and non-bayesian Players. 2018. HAL Id: halshs-01633126
More informationTopic 3: Social preferences and fairness
Topic 3: Social preferences and fairness Are we perfectly selfish and self-centered? If not, does it affect economic analysis? How to take it into account? Focus: Descriptive analysis Examples Will monitoring
More informationSelf-Esteem, Shame and Personal Motivation
Roberta Dessí 1 Xiaojian Zhao 2 1 Toulouse School of Economics 2 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Literature In psychology, a large literature documents people s need for positive self-view.
More informationGame theory and epidemiology
Game theory and epidemiology Biomathematics Seminar Fall 2016 Fan Bai Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Texas Tech University September 13, 2016 Outline Why apply game theory in vaccination? Theory
More informationBe My Guinea Pig: Information Spillovers in a One-Armed Bandit Game
Be My Guinea Pig: Information Spillovers in a One-Armed Bandit Game John R. Boyce David M. Bruner Michael McKee December 16, 2008 Abstract: This paper tests the Nash equilibrium predictions of a two-period,
More informationThe Power of Sunspots: An Experimental Analysis
No. 13-2 The Power of Sunspots: An Experimental Analysis Abstract: Dietmar Fehr, Frank Heinemann, and Aniol Llorente-Saguer The authors show how the influence of extrinsic random signals depends on the
More informationBehavioral Game Theory
School of Computer Science, McGill University March 4, 2011 1 2 3 4 5 Outline Nash equilibria One-shot games 1 2 3 4 5 I Nash equilibria One-shot games Definition: A study of actual individual s behaviors
More information