Wishful thinking in willful blindness

Transcription

1 Wishful thinking in willful blindness Homayoon Moradi 1 Alexander Nesterov 2 1 WZB Berlin Social Science Center 2 Higher School of Economics, St.Petersburg WZB Job market presentation practice

2 People often avoid information about consequence of their actions (called willful blindness). I Willful blindness instances are manifold (Cohen, 2001; Zerubavel, 2007; and Heffernan, 2012) I One of such instances relates to the climate change I Despite the unequivocal evidence(ipcc, 2007) I Many do not believe in climate change (Hobson and Niemeyer, 2013) I Reluctant to learn about it (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Norgaard, 2006a) I More structured evidence comes from experimental economics I We look at the classic experiment of Dana et al. s (2007) (henceforth, DWK)

3 Dictator game treatment (DWK s baseline) Player X s A X:6 Y:1 choices B X:5 Y:5 Figure: 26% choose A Motivated revelation treatment (DWK s hidden information) Player X s A X:6 Y:? choices B X:5 Y:? Reveal Y Conflicting(p=.5) Aligned (p=.5) A X:6 Y:1 A X:6 Y:5 B X:5 Y:5 B X:5 Y:1 Figure: 63% choose A

4 People cultivate uncertainty in order to justify self-interested decisions. DWK s result seems robust. Larson & Capra 2009; Matthey & Regner 2011; Grossman & van der Weele 2013; Feiler 2014 DWK s result did not seem robust in some reciprocity games. Van der Weele et al. (2014)

5 Why do people willfully avoid information in a social context? I To protect the decision-maker s self-image, several authors suggest: I Dana et al., 2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2006, Grossman & van der Weele, Does knowing what is payoff maximizing action drive willful blindness? I A X:6 Y:? B X:5 Y:? Reveal Y

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7 Amodelofwishfulthinking Dictator s A X A Y A choices B X B Y B Reveal Timing: 1. The dictator observes the set of information of possible games and their probabilities I In particular, she observes whether X 2{X, X } and Y 2{Y,Ȳ } is hidden or not where X apple X and Y apple Ȳ 2. The dictator choose whether to Reveal the hidden information or Not Reveal 3. The dictator decides to choose the action mx or my,where I mx := argmax i=a,b X i and my := argmax i=a,b Y i

8 Wishful thinking assumption Subjects know ex ante I P(mx = my R)=p and P(mx 6= my R)=1 p I P(mx = my NR)=p +w and P(mx 6= my NR)=1 p w U = X + by I Where w 2 [0,1 p] I b 2 [0,1] dictator s level of altruism

9 Payoffs in the dictator game treatment (DWK) A X A Y A B X B Y B I U mx = X + by I U my = X + bȳ I The dictator chooses the selfish mx outcomea if her level of altruism is low enough: b < b DG = X Ȳ X Y (1) mx my 0 b DG 1 b

10 Payoffs in the motivated revelation treatment A X Y:? Reveal Y B X Y:? U R mx = X + b(pȳ +(1 p)y) U NR mx = X + b (p + w)ȳ +(1 p w)y = U R mx + bw(ȳ Y) {z } Cost of revealing I U R mx < U NR mx for bw(ȳ Y) > 0 U R my = p X +(1 p)x + bȳ

11 I The dictator chooses the selfish mx outcomeifherlevelof altruism is low enough: b < b MWR = 1 p 1 p w X Ȳ X Y (NR,mx) (R,my) 0 (R-NR,mx) b DG b M 1 b

12 Why do people willfully avoid information in a social context? I To protect the decision-maker s self-image, several authors suggest: I Dana et al., 2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2006, Grossman & van der Weele, 2013 I We test it 1. Does knowing what is payoff maximizing action drive willful blindness? I A X:6 Y:? B X:5 Y:? Reveal Y

13 1. Experiment: Does knowing what is payoff maximizing action drive willful blindness? Motivated revelation treatment (DWK s hidden information) Player X s A X:6 Y:? choices B X:5 Y:? Reveal Y Conflicting(p=.5) Aligned (p=.5) A X:6 Y:1 A X:6 Y:5 B X:5 Y:5 B X:5 Y:1 1. Learn incentives 2. Decide whether to reveal 3. Decide between A or B

14 1. Experiment: Does the information about incentivized action drive willful blindness? Unmotivated revelation treatment (new treatment) Player X s A X Y:? choices B X Y:? Conflicting(p=.5) X:6 Y:1 X:5 Y:5 Reveal Y Aligned (p=.5) X:6 Y:5 X:5 Y:1 Continue 1. Decide whether to reveal 2. Learn incentives 3. Decide between A or B

15 Treatments Stage 1 Not Revealed Revealed -conflicting case Dictator game (DWK) A X:6 Y:1 B X:5 Y:5 - - Motivated revelation (DWK) A X:6 Y:? B X:5 Y:? A X:6 B X:5 A X:6 Y:1 B X:5 Y:5 Unmotivated revelation A X Y:? B X Y:? A X:6 B X:5 A X:6 Y:1 B X:5 Y:5

16 I We followed DWK s design closely I All took a quiz and answers were checked In revelation treatments, players know that... I Payoffs are either conflicting or aligned with equal chances I True payoffs would not be revealed publicly, but Player X could reveal them by clicking a button I Player X s decision of whether to reveal would be kept private from Player Y

17 Treatments mx Wishful thinking predictions my Dictator game (DWK) 0 b DG 1 (NR,mx) (R,my) b Motivated revelation (DWK) 0(R-NR,mx) (R-NR,mx) b DG b M 1 (R,my) b Unmotivated revelation 0 b 1 b

18 Predictions Wishful thinking Self image Treatments mx Not reveal mx Not reveal Dictator game (DWK) - - Motivated revelation (DWK) " " " " Unmotivated revelation - - " "

19 Data I n=628, Technical University of Berlin, July 2016 to March 2017 I Between subject design I Players on average received 9.9 including a show-up fee

20 Results: Selfish choices

21 Results: Not revelation choices

22 Why do people willfully avoid information? I To protect the decision-maker s self-image, several authors suggest: I Dana et al., 2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2006, Grossman & van der Weele, Does the mere knowledge of the incentivized action drive willful blindness? Yes 2. Do people also willfully avoid self-interested information?

23 Q2. Do people also willfully avoid self-interested information? Socially motivated revelation treatment The dictator first observes the receiver payoff s and is uncertain about her own payoff, in which she can reveal it Player X s A X:? Y:1 choices B X:? Y:5 Reveal Conflicting (p=.5) Aligned (p=.5) A X:6 Y:1 A X:5 Y:1 B X:5 Y:5 B X:6 Y:5 Figure: Interface for socially motivated treatment

24 Treatments Stage 1 Not Revealed Revealed Dictator game (DWK) A X:6 Y:1 B X:5 Y:5 - - Motivated revelation (DWK) A X:6 Y:? B X:5 Y:? A X:6 B X:5 A X:6 Y:1 B X:5 Y:5 Unmotivated revelation A B Y:? Y:? A X:6 B X:5 A X:6 Y:1 B X:5 Y:5 Socially motivated revelation A X:? Y:1 B X:? Y:5 A Y:1 B Y:5 A X:6 Y:1 B X:5 Y:5

25 Treatments mx Wishful thinking predictions my Dictator game (DWK) 0 (R,mx) b DG 1 (NR,my) b Socially mot. rev. w > 0 0 b S b DG 1 (R,mx) (R-NR,my) b Socially mot. rev. w = 0 0 b S 1 b

26 Predictions: Self bias ( w > 0) No bias (w = 0) Treatments mx Not reveal mx Not reveal Dictator game (DWK) - - Socially motivated rev. # bigger than mys in DG - bigger than zero

27 No bias for self payoffs (Trees here)

28 Fraction of selfish choices in full information Player X s A X:6 Y:1 choices B X:5 Y:5 (Trees here)

29 Sum up People may willfully avoid information in a social context.. I not to protect their self image I but perhaps to wishfully think: less of chances of harm I Self serving manipulation of uncertainties -when motivatedworks (policy implication). Interestingly, people do not wishfully think when their own payoff is at stake I Limitations of not revealing the self payoff

30 To do: Potential follow ups 1. Self selection into motivated vs unmotivated: How do people self-select into our revelation treatments? I Player X s A X:? Y:? choices B X:? Y:? Reveal X Reveal Y I Reveal X first: Motivated revelation treatment I Reveal Y first: socially motivated treatment I Connecting people s type (b) to their self selection? I Consistency of our measurements through games I Policy implication

31 2. Is there really a bias (w > 0)? Or the wishful thinking model happened to be predictive of the data? I Cost of revealing when choosing selfishly:bw(ȳ Y) where w < [0,P(conflict)] I The bias of wishful thinking, w: I Do motivated people in a social context form beliefs (perceive facts) differently compare to unmotivated? I Motivated perception Player X s A X:? Y:? choices B X:? Y:?

32 Subjects learns which action maximize the receivers payoff I Aif50A,40B I Bif50B,40A (cf. Caplin & Dean 2016; Ambuehl 2017)

33 3. Experiment: Is there really a bias? To measure the perception of reality Information Motivated perception treatment Player X s A X:? Y:? choices B X:? Y:? 1. Learn incentives 2. View picture 3. Choose between A and B 4. Elicit subjective expectation that picture was good (12 bins, incentivized with probabilistic BDM)

34 3. Experiment: Is there really a bias? To measure the perception of reality Information Motivated perception treatment Player X s A X:? Y:? choices B X:? Y:? 1. Learn incentives 2. View picture 3. Choose between A and B 4. Elicit subjective expectation that picture was good (12 bins, incentivized with probabilistic BDM)

35 3. Experiment: Is there really a bias? Contribution: I Motivated perception in a social setting I Ambuhl (2016): More incentives, more biased perception! for self payoff I Science and policies are a few instances where motivated perception in a social setting matters

36 Appendix 14 X :6 Y :1 S PlayerX 48 A 34 X :5 Y :5 Figure: Dictator game Notes: Player X observes all payoffs and chooses the action: either Selfish (S), i.e, maximizing his own payoff, or Altruistic (A), i.e, maximizing Player Y s payoff. The number inside each node shows the number of subjects. (Back)

37 Conflict Nature 88 No conflict PlayerX Reveal Not Reveal Reveal Not Reveal PlayerX S NS S NS S NS S NS X :6 Y :1 X :5 Y :5 X :6 Y :1 X :5 Y :5 X :6 Y :5 X :5 Y :1 X :6 Y :5 X :5 Y :1 Figure: Motivated revelation Notes: Actions:Selfish(S),i.e,maximizinghis own payoff, or Not Selfish (NS). The number inside each node shows the number of subjects.

38 Conflict Nature 89 No conflict PlayerX Reveal Not Reveal Reveal Not Reveal PlayerX S NS S NS S NS S NS X :6 Y :1 X :5 Y :5 X :6 Y :1 X :5 Y :5 X :6 Y :5 X :5 Y :1 X :6 Y :5 X :5 Y :1 Figure: Unmotivated revelation Notes: Action:eitherSelfish(S),i.e, maximizing own payoff, or Not Selfish (NS). The number inside each node shows the number of subjects.

39 Conflict Nature 89 No conflict PlayerX Reveal Not Reveal Reveal Not Reveal PlayerX NA A NA A NA A NA A X :6 Y :1 X :5 Y :5 X :6 Y :1 X :5 Y :5 X :5 Y :1 X :6 Y :5 X :5 Y :1 X :6 Y :5 Figure: Socially motivated Notes: Action: either Altruistic (A), i.e, maximizing Player Y s payoff, or Not Altruistic (NA). The number inside each node shows the number of subjects. (Back)