Study 3 additional (process) evidence in support of our theoretical account Study 5 Study 4 with new analysis of decision time

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1 1 SCARLET TANAGER MANUSCRIPT REVIEW HISTORY REVISION NOTES FROM AUTHORS (ROUND 2) We appreciate the opportunity to revise this manuscript, and we want to thank the entire review team for all the thoughtful comments and suggestions. In preparing the revised manuscript, we closely followed the Editor s guidance, and we addressed each of the issues highlighted by the AE. Here is a brief overview of the most significant changes we have made. Most importantly, we now provide a richer exposition and an enhanced theoretical account of the signature effect. Moreover, the paper s positioning has been clarified, and the contribution of the work is now articulated more clearly. We have incorporated additional analyses (of time-based measures) that provide further, more direct evidence in support of our revised theoretical account. As recommended by the Editor, we dropped the original studies 1 and 2. However, we did add a new study that provides further (process) evidence for our theory. The table below summarizes these structural changes: Original Submission Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 4 Study 2 Revised Version no longer included no longer included Study 3 additional (process) evidence in support of our theoretical account Study 5 Study 4 with new analysis of decision time In the remainder of this document, we first discuss how we have addressed the major concerns highlighted by the Editor. After that we respond to each of the specific points raised by the AE and the reviewers (the original comments are presented in a different font), and indicate any corresponding changes we have made in the paper. Responses to the Points Highlighted by the Editor First, thank you very much for inviting us to revise this manuscript. We are especially grateful for your clear guidance for this revision, which we followed closely. Below are our responses to the four key concerns that you highlighted in your decision letter. 1. Gender Identity and (Impulsive) Food Consumption We agree that the interplay between gender identity and impulsive food consumption is quite complex. Although we would have been able to revise our conceptualization of the findings of the original studies 1 and 2 to better align these with our theoretical story, we believe that a substantial amount of residual ambiguity would inevitably have remained. Therefore, and given that the key

2 2 contributions of the paper are not specific to gender, we decided to drop these two studies (which is one of the courses of action you had recommended). 2. Signing vs. Printing One s Name vs. Control We believe that contrasting signing with printing one s name provides a stronger and more dramatic demonstration of the effects we predicted based on our theoretical framework than does the comparison with a control condition. Our findings show clearly that there is something special in terms of affecting subsequent behavior about producing one s signature above and beyond merely writing (i.e., printing) one s name. With regard to the absence of a significant effect of printing one s name relative to control (in what is now study 1), we should point out that it was not our intention to sell this null result as an important finding. We do not rule out that printing one s name might affect behavior in some situations (perhaps in combination with another intervention that facilitates the activation of one s self-identity). What we can say, however, is that signing exerts a much stronger (predictable) influence on behavior than does printing one s name. These points are now articulated more clearly in the paper. In particular, we have expanded the discussion of the importance of signatures in society, and of the differences between signing and printing one s name (see pp. 4-8). Moreover, in the General Discussion section, we now point out that future work should aim to identify boundary conditions for the signature effect. We identify factors that inhibit an individual s opportunity to properly produce a signature as a natural place to start, and we refer to Gao, Wheeler, and Shiv (2009) in discussing possible disruptions of the process of signing one s name. 3. The Polarizing Effect of Signing In revising the manuscript, we have bolstered our theoretical account of the signature effect. The revised account more explicitly accommodates the possibility that signing one s name can have a polarizing effect i.e., that it can reduce consumers engagement when shopping in a domain that is distant from their self-identity. Specifically, we posit that signing makes it more likely that situational affordances activate the relevant aspect of one s self-identity. When shopping in a product category that a consumer does not associate with closely (e.g., dishwashers), activating the relevant aspect of one s self-identity implies invoking the self-schema that one does not identify with the product, and this can cause one to be less engaged than would naturally be the case. Note that we also observe this pattern of results in (what is now) study 2 relative to printing their name, signing led non-runners to try on fewer pairs of shoes and spend less time in the running store. 4. Clarity of Exposition of Study 5 (Now Study 4) We have simplified the presentation of what is now study 4. While this study does have some inherent complexity, we believe that we have been able to increase the clarity of exposition, and consequently also the accessibility of the findings to readers.

3 3 Responses to the AE s Comments Thank you for your thoughtful comments and suggestions. Your input inspired significant improvements both in our theorizing and in the exposition of the paper s substantive findings. In what follows, we address each of your specific comments. Studies 1 and 2... need to be either validated replicated or dropped. We have dropped these two studies. Clarify the meaning of signing vs. printing. Reviewer C correctly sees the contrast between printing and signing as the primary contribution of your paper. However, the theoretical difference requires more clarity. We have significantly strengthened the discussion of how signing one s name differs from other means of identifying oneself (see pp. 4-8). We agree that printing one s name identifies oneself. However, we argue (and provide ample empirical evidence) that there is something special about producing one s signature above and beyond merely printing one s name in terms of activating the particular aspect of one s self-identity that is afforded by the situation. The rationale underlying this theoretical difference is now developed more clearly in the paper. Signing one s name implies a commitment a commitment to pay a charge, to follow an honor code, to do what is said in a letter, or famously in the case of John Hancock, to agree with the other signers of a petition. We agree that signing one s name often implies a commitment, and that this can lead to more careful deliberation (and related consequences). However, the theoretical account that we develop and test in this paper is more nuanced and, we believe, more interesting. For instance, it predicts that signing can cause either an increase or a reduction in consumers engagement in a shopping task, depending on how closely they identify with the product domain. Examine different kinds of signing In this paragraph, you raised a number of interesting questions that merit further investigation. While these issues are beyond the scope of the present work, we now mention several of them as suggestions for future research (see pp ). For instance, we indicate that it would be worth examining how constraining one s signature such as by confining it to a small space might moderate the signature effect. Discuss marketplace implications. Thank you for this excellent suggestion. We have added discussions of the marketplace implications of the signature effect both in the introduction (p. 4) and in the general discussion section (pp ). Make better sense of Study 1. All three reviewers are correct in questioning the logic behind the results of Study 1. The interplay between gender identity and impulsive food consumption is complex. Although we could have revised our conceptualization of the findings of the original studies 1 and 2 to better

4 4 align these with our theoretical story, we agree that further studies would be required to draw definitive conclusions about the influence of signing one s name on behavior in this domain. Therefore, and given that the paper s key contributions are not specific to gender, we decided to drop these two studies. Clarify the tests on page 21. Your tests relating signing and identity product closeness are confusing. You state that a beta of.15 is significantly more positive than one of.20. There may be a typo here. Additionally, you need to test whether the beta of.20 is significantly greater than.15 not that each are greater than zero. There was indeed an error in the specific beta values reported for this analysis (although the substantive conclusion was correct). Thanks for catching this! We have corrected this error, and we now report the significance tests for the differences in betas across conditions (see pp ). Simplify the presentation of Study 5. Study 5 is intriguing, but complicated to analyze and understand. However, the bottom line is quite simple signing leads to more choices consistent with an in group compared to an out group. It may be helpful to examine just within the in group condition first and then go to the out group condition. Your horizontal axis could be the percent of choices consistent with the in or the out group. Currently, it is hard to see the forest for the trees. In response to your suggestion, we have simplified the exposition of what is now study 4, and we have improved the presentation of that study s findings. This includes a better visualization of the key results focusing on the contrast between identity-congruent and identity-incongruent consumption choices (see figures 6 and 7). Reviewers A and B also note the paradoxical result that closeness to both in and out groups decreases with a signature. It is not clear how to interpret that. We have addressed this issue in the new study 3. We had intuited that the reason for the absence of an interaction between handwriting task (sign vs. print name) and reference group type (in-group vs. out-group) in study 5 (now 4) may have been due to the fact that the measure of how closely participants identified with the reference group were obtained after the 19 rounds of the choice task. The results of study 3 support this intuition when participants responded to the same measure immediately after the handwriting manipulation, those who had signed identified more closely with in-groups and less closely with out-groups than those who had printed their name. Thus, signing does have a polarizing effect on how strongly individuals identify with the two types of reference groups, in line with our theoretical account. Responses Specific to Reviewer A s Comments Thank you for your kind, thoughtful remarks about this work. We respond to each of your specific comments/suggestions below, and we outline how we have addressed these in the revised version of the manuscript. Why doesn t printing one s name act as a self prime? Signing is more self expressive (you get to choose how big it is, how to write it, etc.) so one could imagine printing would be a weaker prime, but I still would have expected it would have some effect relative to control. To be fair, the authors did test printing vs. control in one study and found no effects, and they could argue that if printing

5 5 has any effect it should make it harder to find a relative boost of signing, but it would still be nice to see some discussion here. Does printing never prime the self? Only in certain situations? We share your view that contrasting signing with printing one s name provides a stronger and more dramatic demonstration of the effects we predicted based on our theoretical framework than does the comparison with a control condition. With regard to the absence of a significant effect of printing one s name relative to control (in what is now study 1), it was not our intention to sell this null result as an important finding. Indeed, we do not rule out the possibility that printing one s name might act as a self-identity prime in some situations. However, we can say conclusively that signing exerts a much stronger influence on subsequent behavior than does printing one s name. In the revised version of the manuscript, we provide a more extensive discussion of the differences between signing and printing one s name, and of the implications of these differences for subsequent behavior (see pp. 4-8). Study 3 does the priming condition affect responses to identity-product closeness? No, the handwriting manipulation did not affect identity-product closeness in this study. in Study 5 the authors mention that there was no significant handwriting task x reference group interaction on either felt similarity or strength of identification, but what about main effects? Seems like the theory would predict people who sign there name should see ingroups as more similar and outgroups as more different. You are exactly right. As expected, there was a main effect of reference group type such that participants saw themselves as more similar to (members of) in-groups than out-groups. This effect is now reported under Preliminary Analyses (p. 30). Study 3/Study 4 in both studies the authors measure frequency of use, but in study 4 they include it in the identity closeness measure while in study 3 they do not. Good point. We fixed this inconsistency by amending the identity-product closeness measure in (what is now) study 1 to also include frequency of use (see p. 15). The modification of this measure had no impact on the results. Study 4 why use 1.5 standard deviations above or below the mean for the spotlight analysis? This seems a little unorthodox as +/- 1 SD seems to be the norm. Do the results hold for +/- 1 SD? The key result here is the significant difference in slopes i.e., signing leads to a slope that is significantly more positive than printing does. The spotlight illustration is marginally significant for +/- 1 SD. Thus, there is a tradeoff between (1) using the more common +/- 1 SD points and having borderline significance for the mean comparison and (2) shining the spotlight at +/- 1.5 SD and being able to report clear-cut significance for the mean comparison. We are leaning towards the latter, but we do not have a strong preference on this. Study 5 while the effect of signing name seems to make sense, the effects in the baseline print condition seem a bit weird. For example, Figure 7D shows that in the print condition, people are equally likely to conform to the ingroup or outgroup in identity relevant domains. This seems in contrast to the work the authors cite at the beginning of the study. shouldn t people be less likely to conform to outgroups in identity-relevant domains?

6 6 This relates to two issues. First, Berger and Heath (2007) have shown that people diverge more from others in identity-relevant domains. We replicate this result in (what is now) study 4 (see pp , Preliminary Analyses). Critically, we find that people generally conform less with (and thus diverge more from) both in-groups and out-groups in preference domains that are relevant to signaling their identity. This result is consistent with Berger and Heath, who have suggested that many of the reasons why people diverge from others apply to both in-groups and out-groups. Second, another key reason (apart from the identity relevance of the preference domain) for diverging from out-groups in the wild is that these are often groups that one dislikes and wants to avoid. We sought to disentangle reference group type and liking by asking participants in all conditions to choose a group whose members they like. Thus, it is not inconsistent with prior work that individuals who had printed their name conformed with out-groups (whose members they like) as much as they did with in-groups (whose members they like). Study 5 people are more likely to diverge from dissimilar outgroups (Berger and Heath 2008), so another way to look the data would be to treat perceived similarity as a factor in the analysis rather than just looking at ingroup/outgroup alone (similar to the domain/identity product closeness analysis done in Study 3). Would be neat to see if people not only diverge more from outgroups than ingroups, but also diverge more to the degree that the group listed is perceived as dissimilar. We ran the analysis that (we believe) you envisioned. Specifically, we estimated a model with choice of option C (indicating divergence) as the dependent variable, and with handwriting task (sing vs. print name), strength of identification with the reference group (as a continuous variable), and their interaction as independent variables. In line with our theoretical account, this analysis reveals a handwriting task strength of identification interaction such that there is a significant negative relationship between how closely one identifies with a reference group and choice of option C for participants who had signed their name, but no such effect for those who had printed their name. We have incorporated these results in the revised manuscript (see pp ). Thanks for suggesting this! The work on priming biculturals seems relevant and might be worth mentioning (e.g., Hong, Benet- Martinez, Chiu, & Morris 2003). There, the prime is different across people, but the idea is that the same people would show different effects depending on the affordances of the situation, so this might be useful to mention. We agree, and we now cite this work (see p. 38). Thanks for bringing it to our attention. Also might be neat to link this work to research on cues in the environment can act as primes (Berger and Fitzsimons 2008; Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, and Ross 2004; North, Hargreaves, and McKendrick 1997). That work would say that environment cues activate related constructs that then affect behavior, but the authors work adds a neat twist. In their cases, signing primes the self for everyone, but then how that prime changes behavior depends on the other things in the environment. In this instance, cues have a secondary role, not influencing behavior directly but influencing how another prime subsequently affects behavior. This is an excellent point. We now cite the papers you mentioned in the introduction leading up to our theoretical framework (see p. 4). Thanks!

7 7 Responses Specific to Reviewer B s Comments Thank you for your many helpful comments. These inspired significant improvements in the paper (including a new study). In what follows, we respond to each of your specific comments and outline how we have addressed these in the revised version of the manuscript. One central concern is that this paper does not make a clear enough case for what underlies the effect Since the paper provides no evidence of any identity activation or heightened selfimportance, I am wondering what is really going on. We have strengthened the paper s theoretical framework considerably. A key aspect of this is that our theoretical account of how signing one s name interacts with situational affordances to activate the relevant aspect of one s self-identity is now more clearly articulated (see pp. 9-11). The revised version of the manuscript also includes direct empirical evidence in support of the mental process characterized by our refined theoretical account i.e., that signing one s name leads to the activation of the specific aspect of one s self-identity that is afforded by the situation. In (the new) study 3, we show that signing causes individuals to respond more quickly to identity-relevant statements, in line with our activation-based account. Moreover, an additional analysis of the data from study 4 (the original study 5) reveals that signing results in shorter decision times for choices that are congruent, as compared to incongruent, with the relevant aspect of one s identity. This provides further support for our theoretical account that the effect of signing on behavior is driven by the activation of the aspect of one s self-identity that is afforded by the situation. Points 1 and 2. The interplay between gender identity and impulsive food consumption is a complex matter. We believe that your concerns about the original studies 1 and 2 are legitimate. Thus, although we could have revised our conceptualization of the findings of these two studies to better align them with our theoretical account, we believe that a substantial amount of residual ambiguity would inevitably have remained. Therefore, and given that the paper s key contributions are not specific to gender, we dropped these two studies (which is also in line with the Editor s recommendation). 3. Study 3 I think is neat, but is a bit of a gear shift from the prior two. However, here I was left wondering how this study might fit with other work. Signatures are used in various situations prepurchase. Frequently car dealerships ask customers to sign some (non-binding) form that indicates that if the purchase price is agreeable, the customer will buy the car today. This leads to heightened sales through an increase in commitment, an issue Cialdini has examined thoroughly in his work. This likely underlies the effects on honor codes you mention. How might this fit with your work? For instance, is signing leading to an increased commitment to one s identity and that underlies a desire to behave in a manner consistent with it, in this case by taking more time to search so as not to make an error? While we believe that signing one s name (on a contract, form, etc.) can indeed increase commitment to a particular course of action, the effect we propose and demonstrate is driven by a distinctly different mental mechanism. In the present studies, we isolated the effects of merely signing one s name by always asking participants to sign on a blank sheet of paper, ostensibly for an unrelated study. The key contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the mere act of signing predictably influences behavior, and that it does so above and beyond any behavioral consequences that might arise from the particular document that is being signed.

8 8 A commitment-based account would predict that signing increases engagement (e.g., in a shopping task) across the board. Critically, such an account could not explain the polarizing effects we observe such as a reduction in the number of pairs of shoes tried on and in the amount of time spent in the running store as a result of signing (vs. printing their name) among non-runners in study 2. Moreover, commitment could not account for the moderating role of a preference domain s identity relevance on conformity/divergence in study 4. Although a commitment-based effect of signing one s name is distinct from the one we examine in the present work, the two may well co-occur and combine (e.g., additively) to influence behavior. In the revised manuscript, we now more clearly articulate how the present findings (and theoretical account) fit in with prior work on the effects of signing specific documents (contracts, honor codes, etc.) on subsequent behavior (pp ). (Incidentally, one of us had the exact experience you described at a car dealership a few months ago!) Was the cross-over effect predicted or not? I realize it s marginal in this study, but I don t see why if something is irrelevant it shouldn t just flatline. If I follow the logic for the crossover, shouldn t men have eaten less in the food studies in the signature conditions? Cross-over (or polarizing ) effects such as when signing one s name causes consumers to become (even) less engaged in shopping for products that they do not identify with at all are in line with our theoretical account in that the aspect of one s self-identity that is afforded by the situation can reflect low identity-product closeness (e.g., I am not a runner ) and thus promote behavior consistent with that aspect (e.g., spending even less time in a running store). 57 participants in 6 cells is 9.5 per cell. This is not sufficient. We appreciate your concerns about statistical power. We now report the results of two different analyses for these data a 2 3 ANOVA and an ANCOVA that treats identity-product closeness as a continuous variable (across product categories). In the latter analysis, we compare the slopes for the three handwriting conditions (with 19 participants each, which is more in line with the norm for cell size), and this nicely complements the results of the 2 3 ANOVA (see pp ). All in all, we are quite pleased that the predicted interaction effect is so strong that it turns out to be highly significant even with a sample of only 57 participants. Why shouldn t signing one s name make one feel closer to groups that they identify with and more distant from out-groups? Good point. In (what is now) study 4, participants were asked how strongly they identified with their reference group after they had made choices in 19 different preference domains. As a result, the effect of signing on how closely participants identified with the reference group may have worn off by the time of measurement (and also have been contaminated by the choices made in the interim). In the new study 3, participants responded to this measure right after the handwriting manipulation (sign vs. print name). The results are consistent with your intuition, as well as our theoretical framework signing caused participants to identify even more closely with in-groups and even less closely with out-groups.

9 9 Mazar et al never manipulated signatures so I am not sure it is cited appropriately to support the proposition that signing a code increases ethical behavior. We double-checked our two references to Mazar et al. (2008) to make sure we cite that work correctly. We do. Their results show that signing an honor code (as compared to doing nothing) promotes ethical behavior. Importantly, however, signing was confounded with exposure to an honor code in Mazar et al. (2008). That article is one of several that have investigated how signing a particular document might influence behavior, always confounding the act of signing with other factors (e.g., information). The present work differs from all of these in that it is the first to pinpoint the behavioral consequences of merely signing one s name. (See the discussion on pp. 7-8 of the revised manuscript.) Responses Specific to Reviewer C s Comments Thank you for your kind remarks about this work, as well as for your thoughtful comments and suggestions. We respond to your specific points below, and we outline how we have addressed these in the revised version of the manuscript. One thing I found surprising about the experiments is that signing one's name had such different effects from printing one's name. I did not understand how this follows from the theoretical conceptualization, though it was clearly observed repeatedly. There is little doubt that one's signature should activate one's identity. However, why should not printing one's name do the same?... We do not rule out the possibility that printing one s name might affect behavior in some situations. However, we argue that there is something special in terms of priming one s sense of self and affecting subsequent behavior about producing one s signature above and beyond merely writing (i.e., printing) one s name. In revising the manuscript, we significantly expanded the discussion of the importance of signatures in society, and in particular of the differences between signing and printing one s name (see pp. 4-8). In addition, we now provide new evidence in support of our hypothesis that signing leads to greater activation of the relevant aspect of one s self-identity than does printing one s name. (See also our response to the next point.) A second, and related general issue concerns what really is being activated and how it affects behavior. The assumption here is an ideomotor process whereby people merely act in line some activated identity component that is related to situation-relevant behaviors. This is possible, but there are certainly other possibilities.... These comments were very helpful in refining our theoretical account of the signature effect, and they also inspired us to examine the underlying mental process more closely with new data (study 3) and an additional analysis of the data from study 4. In our revised theoretical framework, we no longer discuss the theory of ideomotor action, which is not essential to our (refined) account. We now focus more squarely on the role of situational affordances specifically, on how signing one s name makes it more likely that affordances activate the salient aspect of one s self-identity.

10 10 We now also report new process evidence in support of our prediction that signing leads to greater activation of the aspect of one s self-identity that is afforded by the situation. In (the new) study 3, we show that signing causes individuals to respond more quickly to identity-relevant statements, in line with our activation-based account. Also, an additional analysis of the data from study 4 (the original study 5) reveals that signing results in shorter decision times for choices that are congruent, as compared to incongruent, with the relevant aspect of one s self-identity, thus providing further support for this theoretical account. A third general issue concerns the notion of affordances.... One problematic aspect of this theorizing, again not unique to the authors, is in detailing exactly how affordances operate.... Some identities are clearly more consistent with the results than others, but I have no reason, a priori, to believe that the proposed identities should be the only ones operating. Perhaps all of these were in fact at work and the authors were only able to detect the variance that they measured and looked for. As this argument shows, though, it is likely overly simplistic to say that identity was generally activated and that only one identity was afforded by the situation and that identity affected behavior. At a bare minimum, it would benefit the paper to have some greater detail about how this whole process is hypothesized to play out and how one might determine which identities are operable in any given situation. You raise two issues here. 1. What is the role of affordances in the activation of specific aspects of one s self-identity? We have refined our theoretical framework, which now includes the notion that identity-relevant situational affordances can serve as cues, and that a general self-identity prime makes individuals more likely to respond to these cues. For instance, entering a running store with its omnipresent running shoes and running gear affords one s identity as a runner (or non-runner). 2. Can we be certain that the specific aspect of people s self-identity that is (hypothesized to be) afforded by the situation is the only one that is operating? No. What our theoretical account does assert, however, is that candidate aspects of one s self-identity are differentially activated in a predicable manner. Thus, what is essential is not that the predicted aspect is the only one activated, but rather that it is activated more strongly than competing aspects (and that this is reflected in subsequent behavior). We have clarified this in the revised manuscript (see p. 11). Moreover, realworld situations (particularly complex ones) may afford more than one aspect of one s self-identity, and this may well lead to the joint activation of different aspects. While we have been careful to avoid such situations in the present studies, we believe that enhancing our understanding of what happens when multiple aspects of one s identity are simultaneously afforded could is an important area for further research (see p. 40). A final general issue concerns the overall theoretical contribution of the paper. On the one hand, this paper may be thought of as providing insight into how behaviors follow from identity activation, though the paper did not delve deeper or modify understanding of how that operates. Rather, the contribution seems to be in the use of signatures. The paper s primary contribution is to enhance our understanding of how signatures influence behavior. Our theoretical account of the mental mechanism underlying this effect is centered on the notion of a general self-identity prime (which leads to behavior congruent with the specific aspect of one s identity that is afforded by the situation), and the revised manuscript now provides process evidence that supports this account (studies 3 and 4).

11 11 As you correctly point out, this work also provides insight into how behavior is driven by identity activation more generally. We believe that this sets the stage for further research aimed at investigating what other actions or interventions (i.e., apart from signing) might serve as general self-identity primes and, thus, influence how individuals respond to identity-relevant environmental cues particularly in a consumption context (see pp ). It would be useful to see both sets of contrasts (e.g., also those across gender) for all of the studies. Across studies, we report all contrasts that pertain to our predictions. Expertise does not seem identity relevant In fact, it seems like a confound. If one lacks the expertise to adequately compare alternatives, then it makes little sense to spend time doing so. Our view is that (subjective) expertise is an aspect of identity relevance. People who identify closely with a particular domain (e.g., avid runners) typically spend a significant amount of time on activities in that domain and, consequently, tend to (believe that they) have greater expertise. This is supported by our empirical evidence in that self-reported expertise is highly positively correlated with the three other measures of the identity-product closeness construct used in studies 1 and 2. Moreover, the substantive results of these two studies remain unchanged when we replace the current 4-item measure of identity-product closeness with a 3-item version that excludes expertise. There was quite a large effect of product category on identity relevance. Given this, it was surprising that there was no overall effect of product category on processing. This is a good observation. The lack of a main effect of product category on the amount of information inspected is likely due to an inherent (albeit unanticipated) difference between the two product categories in terms of the number of attribute dimensions that participants felt they needed to consider before making a product choice (i.e., more for dishwashers than for cameras), which offset the identity-driven opposing main effect (i.e., greater identity closeness for cameras than for dishwashers). We view this as a stimulus calibration issue that is not of theoretical concern. It is not easy to be confident to know what looking at lots of attributes represents. The intended meaning of this measure and its differentiation from other possible meanings should be clarified and established. In studies 1 and 2, we used various measures of engagement in a shopping task the number of pieces of product information inspected, the number of products tried on, and the amount of time spent either attending to product information or shopping in a retail store. There is a high degree of convergence across these measures. All of them are indicators of the amount of effort a consumer exerts in a particular shopping task. It would have been nice to have equated the product categories a little more. As the index indicates, people differ in their perceived expertise across the two categories. They likely also differ in things like their interest in the product category. We purposely chose two products (cameras and dishwashers) that people use frequently and that have a similar level of technical complexity, but that differ in how closely people associate them with their identity. You are correct in pointing out that interest and expertise are correlated with

12 12 identity-product closeness indeed, we argue that both are aspects of this construct (see also above). Please note that we now also report the results of an ANCOVA that treats identity-product closeness as a continuous variable (across product categories) for study 1. These additional results also provide clear support for our theoretical account. there is quite a bit of research on how one's identity salience affects a wide variety of behaviors, so the statement at the bottom of page 26 is not accurate. You are right. We have corrected this, and now refer to this prior work on identity salience (see p. 38). Thanks for pointing this out.