Response to On the empirical proof of archetypes: commentary on Maloney

Transcription

1 Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2000, 45, From Alan Maloney, San Francisco, CA Response to On the empirical proof of archetypes: commentary on Maloney I would like to thank Dr Raya Jones for her interest and her commentary on my contribution Preference ratings of images representing archetypal themes: an empirical study of the concept of archetypes. Her remarks raise many important points: some concerning my study in particular and others concerning the broader question of which methods are appropriate for the investigation of archetype theory. I think it is important to point out that the study under discussion is a preliminary one. Because novel findings lack a well-developed context they are difficult to accurately critique. On one hand it is easy to overstate their implications with the resulting impulse to recast the findings; for example, I never took up the task of either proving or disproving archetype theory. On the other, it is easy to underestimate the significance of the first solid steps in an empiric inquiry. By designing an empiric experiment examining the relevance of archetypal themes in determining adults affective response, I was able to test discretely my experimental hypothesis that images representing archetypal themes would produce a particular, non-random structure in the pattern of subjects responses. Furthermore I generated new experimental hypotheses in the process. While there are risks in operationalizing any concept, it remains a requirement of empirical inquiry. I support Dr Jones s advocacy for the naturalists approach, but quantitative inquiry remains a powerful lens. Currently it is conceptually and methodologically easier than it has ever been to integrate certain aspects of archetype theory with mainstream psychological science. For the past three decades (at least since the classic paper by Garcia & Koelling 1966) psychological science has moved closer to the assumptions of archetype theory. This convergence allows the development of a fuller picture of who we are than either perspective viewed in isolation (Maloney 1999). Dr Jones s paper presents a number of specific methodological and theoretical criticisms. Much of her commentary seems shaped by an approach to the material that is different from my own. She seems concerned with determining whether archetypes should be regarded as 1) biologic, 2) cultural or 3) worthy of consideration on their own merit, and would like to undertake qualitative studies of archetype theory to this end. However, her concern with those particular questions and methods of inquiry has no direct bearing on my approach or my study. In short, the fact that we are interested in different /2000/4504/ , The Society of Analytical Psychology Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

2 608 Alan Maloney questions, or even different methodologies, doesn t relate to the study under discussion. In the remainder of my response I will first discuss a few of the key differences in our conceptual approach to the material, then I will respond to some of her methodological criticisms, and finally I will discuss what I perceive to be two potential limitations of the study which she chose not to explore. There are a number of difficulties in studying archetype theory. To begin, the concept of archetype is highly abstract. Also, the definitions of what archetypes are continued to evolve during the development of archetype theory. In addition, at any given time they have been variably described. For example, archetypes can refer to biologically based psychological structures, psychological analogues of routine activities or natural patterns predating human psychology to name only three renditions. In the paper under discussion I studied archetypes as psychological structures. This definition of archetypes does not require a comment on whether they are either biologic or cultural. This distinction is, to my mind, as barren as arguments of nature versus nurture, or even psychology versus culture. A more fertile question is: In what ways are archetypes shaped by each contributing determinant? Although this is a productive question, it is not the one I took up in the study under review. Rather I examined archetypes as psychological structures in the manner described above. I hypothesized that in so far as archetypes are psychological, and affect adult psychological function, they should be detectable. In my empiric study, using the operationalization I detailed, I found that they were detectable. Rejection of the null hypothesis and acceptance of the experimental hypothesis does not prove archetype theory; it shows that the results of this preliminary study are consistent with archetype theory. In her review Dr Jones states By the standards of mainstream scientific psychology, Jung s discoveries of specific archetypes are reliable in so far as most people agree upon which motifs belong to which archetype. Scientific psychology largely considers this test of inter-judge reliability as serviceable. While face validity (that is, a consensus that something is what it appears to be) is a valuable point of departure, it is never considered as reliable as empiric results. (An example from scientific psychology is the historic assumption that the mind is a blank slate, a tabula rasa. This conviction has since been empirically refuted, but while it was considered valid, by consensus, it made perspectives like archetype theory less widely accessible.) Furthermore, as I detailed in the study s discussion section and notes, there is not even agreement within Jung s writing that archetypal themes revolve solely around the actors; the class of the situation is also presented as central and this second focus is supported by the study s results. The reviewers methodological criticisms fall into two broad categories; those related to the preliminary nature of the study, and those supporting an alternate approach to the inquiry. Her preferred method of investigation is not

3 Response to On the empirical proof of archetypes 609 mine: she advocates a qualitative study of archetypes which would require very large sample sizes. While this is an interesting proposal, it does not actually relate to my study. Furthermore, as I have stated above, I am interested in how different approaches reveal different aspects of the topic under consideration, rather than choosing between complementary methods. I will detail some of the limitations of my preliminary study, and then return to other specific criticisms. The basic problem with any initial study is that you have to start somewhere. That is not to say that there are no rigorous procedures (for a fairly accessible review relevant to the methods I employed see Switzer et al. 1999) but rather to say that there is very little chance that a first study will be definitive. The reviewer inquires why I did not report whether or not there were gender differences in the responses. The reason is that I did not have enough subjects to comment on a gender difference in a meaningful way. (For the statistically inclined, I would have needed 130 subjects in a single group to detect a 20% difference in mean preference scores with power of 80%.) Now that I know the number of subjects I will need I can refine the follow-up study. The commentator also notes that I do not have a question which is more involved, such as asking the subjects to imagine themselves transported into the images, and that I do not have a selection of so-called non-archetypal pictures: Both of these areas are part of my current follow-up study. This first study makes no prediction about the structure of the archetypal themes. The results reveal that they are organized not according to actor, but around some other motif, perhaps the class of the situation. While this finding sheds empiric light on one aspect of archetype theory (that is, how are archetypal themes of this sort are organized) it also lends itself to formal testing in subsequent studies. The study does not examine the correlation of the archetypal themes with various states such as depression. Nor does it examine the cultural component. The last two inquiries concerning state correlations and cultural contribution will require larger sample sizes and considerable resources. As a rule, it is better to proceed stepwise. If my first study had failed to reject the null hypothesis, I would not proceed with these sorts of refinements. Because my study yielded statistically significant results consistent with the experimental hypothesis, the next steps in the inquiry should be taken. Moving to the commentators specific criticisms, first is the assertion that failure to examine the subjects demographics invalidates the study. This would certainly be the case if I claimed the results proved archetypes were either biologic or environmental. However, as I have stated, I am not invested in eliminating biological or environmental contributors. (If with additional studies these current results are found to be reliable and valid they could then be used, for example, in twin studies to determine the relative contribution of genetic and environmental factors.) She seems to misconstrue my introductory remarks. I did note in my introduction that contemporary research psychology is no longer hostile to non-tabula rasa models of the mind, and that archetype theory is explicitly non-tabula rasa (Jung 1958/1976). However, this was neither presented

4 610 Alan Maloney nor intended to be interpreted as a statement of my experimental hypothesis. I explicitly state my experimental hypothesis later in the introduction: preferences rating of images representing archetypal themes reveal a particular, nonrandom factor structure. The reviewer raises some confusing concerns about the essential features of factor analysis. Factor analysis reveals the correlation of observable variables (the preference ratings) with latent variables, called factors (the archetypal themes). Factor analysis shows which items are commonly related to which underlying factor. When two variables arise from a common factor, knowing one variable allows you to predict the other variable (so, in rough terms, with a highly positive correlation a + always predicts a +, and a always predicts a ). The reviewer states that this mixture might hide response diversity in the sample. Actually, it allows for the efficient expression of that diversity in terms of the factor structure. My study revealed that individuals tended to feel similarly about images organized around certain themes. Whether any specific individual response to the images along a theme was positive or negative overall is not pertinent to the question of the existence of the themes. The results of my study support the assertion that the themes, in fact, exist. The commentator has misgivings about confounding effects in the study. She notes the image aesthetics as a potential confounding factor. While the aesthetic appeal of the images may contribute to the subjects preference ratings, pictorially different examples of the same item produced the same factor structure, and these factors were significantly correlated with each other. Therefore aesthetics alone do not account for the factor structure. Furthermore, the subjects varied demographics would tend to dilute the effect of the underlying factors, biasing against finding a statistically significant structure. So indeed, given the fact that most people are comfortable with images of women gazing lovingly at babies in their lap, including non-christians in the sample with Christian images such as the Madonna makes an even stronger case for the experimental hypothesis. Although only two demographic features were scored, age and gender, the sample was diverse. Additionally as I noted above, the size of this preliminary study is inadequate to formally address even these specific effects by subgroup analysis. The reviewer asks if a preference rating is related to meaning. I maintain that preference is dependent on the meaning an image has for the individual. My assertion is supported by the findings. Each question constitutes a type of environment, albeit a mental one, which frames the subject s preference rating. Only question 3, the one requiring the individuals to imagine a permanent relationship with the image, evokes a significant factor structure. The identical images examined in the light of more mundane questions produce no significant structure. It seems to me that whether or not the images are living symbols for each subject is dependent on context. While the reviewer appears to misconstrue my conceptual premise, her critique also reveals an interest in a different kind of study. I would welcome

5 Response to On the empirical proof of archetypes 611 such a complementary approach, and would encourage her pursuit of such investigations. However I strongly contest her claim that the study under discussion produces no significant results. First, the study shows that the themes underlying these archetypal images are not organized around the actors, but around other themes. I propose these themes be related to the class of the situation (Quest, Attachment, and Conflict) in keeping with archetype theory. Second, the study reveals, consistent with archetype theory, a clear question effect: Question 3, the one that requires the subjects active imagination, and is the most fantastic (requiring the consideration of forever), is the only question that evokes a statistically significant structure. Finally, and most fundamentally, the study shows that archetypal effects can be empirically detected in adults. While these results are preliminary, they are nevertheless a solid step forward in one approach to studying archetype theory. There are a few minor clarifications that should be made. The commentator expresses concern that all negative mother images are non-western; in image set B the negative mother image is Hellenistic. She also describes the use of different subjects as the experimental manipulation. These different subjects actually comprise the study s sample population; the experimental manipulation was asking subjects to rate their response to the image. The reviewer also suggests a false dichotomy between genetics and physiology; they may operate at different levels but biologists agree that physiology is strongly genetically determined. There are two potential limitations I see to my study which the reviewer did not mention. First, it is possible that the recurrent factor structure was determined by the question, and not by archetypal themes thought to underlie the images. While this seems to fly in the face of common sense (one version of face validity), it needs to be formally studied. Second, only a small number of items were employed, producing factors with as little as one item. At some point a larger selection of images will need to be studied. Dr Jones reviews in careful detail many aspects of my study, but fails to grasp my premise and is concerned with rebutting assertions I never made. It is absolutely true that this is a first study, and like all good first studies it raises even more questions than it answers. This is, as she stated, impetus for further study. Picking one version of a multifaceted phenomenon is a Faustian bargain. While it may be expedient to approach archetypes as solely biologic or cultural in origin, we lose something of great value a more complete understanding of archetype theory in the trade-off. In the study s introduction I hoped to make the point that psychological science is converging with many aspects of archetype theory (specifically, that there are biologically based, evolved psychological structures). Given that these perspectives (experimental psychology and archetype theory) approach the same (or at least related) phenomena from different viewpoints, there exists the opportunity to develop a more complete picture of who we are than is afforded by either alternate view. I am not advocating a choice amongst archetypes as biologic

6 612 Alan Maloney or cultural or autochthonous. In time, with further investigation, it may be possible to comment on the relative weight of the contributing factors. In the interim, I heartily endorse Dr Jones s call for more studies. References Garcia, J. & Koelling, R. (1966). Relation of cue to consequence in avoidance learning. Psychomonic Science, 4, Jung, C. G. (1958/1976). Preface to Laszlo: Psyche and Symbol. CW 18. Maloney, A. (1999). Darwin and Jung in a new psychiatry. The San Francisco Jung Institute Library Journal, 18, Switzer, G., Wisiniewski, S., Belle, S., Dew, M. & Schultz, R. (1999). Selecting, developing, and evaluating research instruments. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 34,