Time for a New Materialist Account of Learning?

Transcription

1 Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain Annual Conference New College, Oxford 1-3 April 2016 Time for a New Materialist Account of Learning? Dr Mark Hardman King's College London mark.hardman@kcl.ac.uk

2 Introduction Over recent years new forms of materialism have developed, as approaches associated with the socalled cultural turn are increasingly being deemed inadequate (Coole, Frost 2010 p.2-3). New materialisms recognise the importance of meaning making, subjectivity and power relations which dominated cultural discourses, but seek to ground these in the material world. New materialisms have also grown from new science. For example Barad s (2007) detailed engagement with quantum physics situates people as part of the instruments through which we see the material world. DeLanda (2006b, 2006a) links Deleuze s metaphysics with complexity theory to describe a materialist ontology of the social. Arguably, developments in neuroscience further support a materialist account of learning (Freeman 1999, Edelman, Tononi 2000). This workshop will firstly consider to what extent learning is framed as immaterial; secondly, it will evaluate the case for a materialist view of learning; thirdly, it will envisage what a materialist view of learning might entail. Learning as Immaterial The first discussion question is: 1. To what extent is learning currently characterised by a (dualist) separation of mind and matter? To exemplify such a separation, consider Piaget s description of a world of thought : There is certainly present to the child a whole world of thought, incapable of formulation and made up of images and motor schemas combined. Out of it issue, at least partially, ideas of force, life, weight, etc., and the relations of objects themselves are penetrated with these indefinable associations. (Piaget 1929, p. 27) In Piaget s account the relations of objects themselves is mirrored in the world of thought. Furthermore, the manipulation of mental imagery and symbols is the pinnacle of both Piaget s (1951) stage theory of development and Bruner s (1966) categories of representation. These have at their heart a dualist ontology in which mind exists as distinct from the material world and learning is about conceiving of relations in that world. This is not confined to constructivist learning theory however. The current national curriculum for England lists the conceptual understanding that pupils must gain (DfE 2014); this highlights a contemporary focus upon concepts in education. As Biesta, Osberg & Cilliers (2008) argue, curricula are thus premised on children developing a mental representation of the world as it is. I propose that learning is currently characterised by a separation of mental concepts and the world to which those concepts pertain. The Case for a Materialist View of Learning The second discussion question is: 2. How strong is the case for a materialist view of learning? In order to assess the utility of a materialist view we must first consider the limitations of dualist accounts, before discussing how materialism might overcome these. Constructivist views of learning allow for individuals to have different conceptions of the world, based upon their unique experience.

3 However, recent developments in neuroscience and cognitive science show just how context-specific learning is, and this challenges the separation of mind and matter. Researchers are increasingly aware of contextual influences upon learning: children adopt behaviour that they have witnessed (Bandura, Ross et al. 1961); people tend to mimic body language in order to cement relationships (van Baaren, Janssem et al. 2009). Furthermore, neurological correlates are being found which suggest an evolutionary reason for coordinated action (Tognoli, Lagarde et al. 2007, Kelso, Dumas et al. 2013). Jackson et al. (2006) found that observing actions from a firstperson perspective results in a different neurological response to viewing another s actions from a third-person perspective. Apps et al. (2015) found that a specific brain area (the anterior cingulate cortex) responds to seeing other people make incorrect choices. So relationships, position and whether we agree with another s choice all influence how individuals learn. Beyond the individual however, it is increasingly apparent that social memory systems exceed the capacity of individuals to recall information (Wegner, Raymond et al. 1991) and educators have known for some time that the composition of groups of pupils affects learning (Sampson, Clark 2009). The issue at hand though is not that learning is social, or that it is influenced by context, both of which are apparent. The issue is whether or not we can sustain concepts as distinct from the material of brains, bodies and the broader world. I propose that we cannot. A materialist characterisation allows one to see learning from social interaction, textbooks, worksheets, computers and media, without these being ontologically different. It also allows us to see the influence of happenstance on learning in a way which is denied by focusing on individual minds and the acquisition of concepts. A materialist view does not entail reduction however. On the contrary, redefining learning as an aspect of the material world allows us to see the myriad influences upon it. Instead of considering the development of concepts within specific contexts, we can develop accounts of how pupils learn from specific contexts. Barad (2007) has developed a weighty account of how feminist theory can be grounded in a materialist position, illustrating the capacity of materialism to develop so-called cultural concerns. Describing Learning as Material In the last part of the workshop we shall engage with an open question: 3. What might a materialist account of learning look like? Whilst Barad (2007) and DeLanda (2006a) focus upon broader social concerns, a materialist account has yet to be brought to bear on learning directly. However, a century ago Dewey rejected the separation of mind and matter: Dewey s approach conceptualises part and whole in a dynamic interaction, posits the learner as interdependent with the environment, as always in a state of becoming (Olssen 2011, p.9) Furthermore, Osberg (2015) develops a convincing argument for linking Dewey (as well as Deleuze and Derrida) to Bergson s immanent theory of change, which finds contemporary appeal in complexity theory. This offers a tantalising capacity to characterise learning as within the material world. However, such an undertaking is a work in progress and as such I hope the workshop will provide further discussion around how a materialist view of learning might be developed.

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