Critical Thinking 2: The Return of The Empirical Analyticals. NOGGINS April 12, 2016

Transcription

1 Critical Thinking 2: The Return of The Empirical Analyticals NOGGINS April 12, 2016

2 Overview Is Seeing Believing? Eyewitness Research CRAAP Test Profound Thought or B.S? Why are Facts Important?

3 Picking Cotton ngful-conviction/eyewitness-misidentificat ion

4 Eyewitnesses Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that the trial court record in this matter is inadequate to test the current validity of our state law standards on the admissibility of eyewitness identification in May 2009 As the Court ordered, the State, the defendant and amici Innocence Project and Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) participated in the remand proceedings. The proceedings were conducted more as a seminar than an adversarial litigation. Participants would submit and exchange whatever published scientific materials they chose.more than 200 published scientific studies, articles and books were ultimately made part of the record. At the evidentiary hearings, which extended over ten days, seven expert witnesses testified.

5 Findings Archival studies conducted in the United Kingdom,using fragmentary data, showed that 39% of some 3100 line-up witnesses identified the person suspected by the police, while 21% identified fillers; since only 60% of the witnesses made an identification, the misidentifications represent at least 35% of the positive identifications. Comparable error rates have been shown in field experiments. Examining a group of four field experiments involving over 500 unwitting store clerk and bank teller witnesses who observed staged events, Penrod found that in target-present lineups 42% identified the suspect, 41% identified a foil and 17% made no identification; almost half of the positive identifications thus were mistaken. In target absent line-ups, 36% picked a foil.

6 Findings The laboratory experiments, which report witness errors resulting from the particular variable under investigation, also show similar results. For example, a 2001 meta-analysis of 30 studies involving a total of 4145 witnesses designed to compare error rates arising from simultaneous and sequential photo arrays shows foil identifications of 24% and 19% in target present arrays, 51% and 28% in target-absent arrays, and no choices ranging from 26% to 72%. A compilation of DNA exculpation cases made by the Innocence Project shows that as of May 13, 2010, 254 wrongfully convicted persons had been exculpated by DNA evidence; 75% of those convictions involved erroneous eyewitness identifications.

7 Findings An analysis of the first 239 DNA exonerations found that over 250 witnesses misidentified innocent suspects; in 38% of the misidentification cases, multiple eyewitnesses identified thesame innocent person; and in 50% of the misidentification cases, the eyewitness testimony was uncorroborated by confessions, forensic science or informants.

8 Witness Test Issues Witness error rates reported in the experimental studies may be higher than those in real cases with real witnesses, perpetrators and suspects. The experiments are commonly conducted with college or graduate students who are paid for their participation as witnesses and know that the exercise has no real-life consequences to anyone in the line-ups; the suggestion is that students are not good or representative witnesses, that the greater stress and intensity of feeling of real witnesses leave stronger memory traces, and that real witnesses are likely to be more cautious in making theiridentifications.

9 Witness Test Issues Meta-analyses indicate, in fact, that the impact of system and estimator variables on eyewitness performance is more profound in real life circumstances than in the laboratory setting. College students are regarded as among the best eyewitnesses; their general health, visual acuity, memory abilities and alertness are exceptional. Studies indicate no significant differences in identification accuracy between witnesses who knew the crime and lineup procedure were staged and those who believed otherwise.

10 Suggested Solutions Fix how Lineups and Photo Arrays are done. Use Double Blind Techniques Officer does not know who the suspect is Witness cannot be guided to right answer Ask witness on scene for level of confidence. Ask witness with lineups or photo arrays for level of confidence Provide Jurors with special instructions

11 Juror Instructions Eyewitness identification evidence must be scrutinized carefully. Human beings have the ability to recognize other people from past experiences and to identify them at a later time, but research has shown that there are risks of making mistaken identifications. That research has focused on the nature of memory and the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Human memory is not foolproof. Research has revealed that human memory is not like a video recording that a witness need only replay to remember what happened. Memory is far more complex. The process of remembering consists of three stages: acquisition -- the perception of the original event; retention -- the period of time that passes between the event and the eventual recollection of a piece of information; and retrieval -- the stage during which a person recalls stored information. At each of these stages, memory can be affected by a variety of factors.

12 Juror Instructions Relying on some of the research that has been done, I will instruct you on specific factors you should consider in this case in determining whether the eyewitness identification evidence is reliable. In evaluating this identification, you should consider the observations and perceptions on which the identification was based, the witness s ability to make those observations and perceive events, and the circumstances under which the identification was made. Although nothing may appear more convincing than a witness s categorical identification of a perpetrator, you must critically analyze such testimony. Such identifications, even if made in good faith, may be mistaken. Therefore,when analyzing such testimony, be advised that a witness s level of confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of the identification.

13 Juror Instructions (1) The Witness s Opportunity to View and Degree of Attention: In evaluating the reliability of the identification, you should assess the witness s opportunity to view the person who committed the offense at the time of the offense and the witness s degree of attention to the perpetrator at the time of the offense. In making this assessment you should consider the following [choose appropriate factors from (a) through (g) below]: (a) Stress: Even under the best viewing conditions, high levels of stress can reduce an eyewitness s ability to recall and make an accurate identification. Therefore, you should consider a witness s level of stress and whether that stress, if any, distracted the witness or made it harder for him or her to identify the perpetrator. (b) Duration: The amount of time an eyewitness has to observe an event may affect the reliability of an identification. Although there is no minimum time required to make an accurate identification, a brief or fleeting contact is less likely to produce an accurate identification than a more prolonged exposure to the perpetrator. In addition, time estimates given by witnesses may not always be accurate because witnesses tend to think events lasted longer than they actually did.

14 Juror Instructions (c) Weapon Focus: You should consider whether the witness saw a weapon during the incident and the duration of the crime. The presence of a weapon can distract the witness and take the witness s attention away from the perpetrator's face. As a result, the presence of a visible weapon may reduce the reliability of a subsequent identification if the crime is of short duration. In considering this factor, you should take into account the duration of the crime because the longer the event, the more time the witness may have to adapt to the presence of the weapon and focus on other details.

15 Juror Instructions (d) Distance: A person is easier to identify when close by. The greater the distance between an eyewitness and a perpetrator, the higher the risk of a mistaken identification. In addition, a witness s estimate of how far he or she was from the perpetrator may not always be accurate because people tend to have difficulty estimating distances. (e) Lighting: Inadequate lighting can reduce the reliability of an identification. You should consider the lighting conditions present at the time of the alleged crime in this case.

16 Juror Instructions (f) Intoxication: The influence of alcohol can affect the reliability of an identification. An identification made by a witness under the influence of a high level of alcohol at the time of the incident tends to be more unreliable than an identification by a witness who drank a small amount of alcohol. (g) Disguises/Changed Appearance: The perpetrator s use of a disguise can affect a witness s ability both to remember and identify the perpetrator. Disguises like hats, sunglasses, or masks can reduce the accuracy of an identification. Similarly, if facial features are altered between the time of the event and a later identification procedure, the accuracy of the identification may decrease.

17 Juror Instructions (2) Prior Description of Perpetrator: Another factor for your consideration is the accuracy of any description the witness gave after observing the incident and before identifying the perpetrator. Facts that may be relevant to this factor include whether the prior description matched the person picked out later, whether the prior description provided details or was just general in nature, and whether the witness's testimony at trial was consistent with, or different from, his/her prior description of the perpetrator. [Charge if appropriate: You may also consider whether the witness did not identify the defendant at a prior identification procedure or chose a different suspect or filler.] (3) Confidence and Accuracy: You heard testimony that (insert name of witness) expressed his/her level of certainty that the person he/she selected is in fact the person who committed the crime. As I explained earlier, a witness s level of confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of the identification. Although some research has found that highly confident witnesses are more likely to make accurate identifications, eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of accuracy.

18 Juror Instructions (4) Time Elapsed: Memories fade with time. As a result, delays between the commission of a crime and the time an identification is made can affect the reliability of the identification. In other words, the more time that passes, the greater the possibility that a witness s memory of a perpetrator will weaken. (5) Cross-Racial Effects: Research has shown that people may have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race. You should consider whether the fact that the witness and the defendant are not of the same race may have influenced the accuracy of the witness s identification.

19 CRAAP Test Used by Librarians to Teach Evaluation Skills Currency Relevance Authority Accuracy Purpose

20 CRAAP Test Currency: The timeliness of the information. When was the information published or posted? Has the information been revised or updated? Does your topic require current information, or will older sources work as well? Are the links functional? Relevance: The importance of the information for your needs. Does the information relate to your topic or answer your question? Who is the intended audience? Is the information at an appropriate level (i.e. not too elementary or advanced for your needs)? Have you looked at a variety of sources before determining this is one you will use? Would you be comfortable citing this source in your research paper?

21 CRAAP Test Authority: The source of the information. Who is the author/publisher/source/sponsor? What are the author's credentials or organizational affiliations? Is the author qualified to write on the topic? Is there contact information, such as a publisher or address? Does the URL reveal anything about the author or source? examples:.com.edu.gov.org.net Accuracy: The reliability, truthfulness and correctness of the content. Where does the information come from? Is the information supported by evidence? Has the information been reviewed or refereed? Can you verify any of the information in another source or from personal knowledge? Does the language or tone seem unbiased and free of emotion? Are there spelling, grammar or typographical errors?

22 CRAAP Test Purpose: The reason the information exists. What is the purpose of the information? Is it to inform, teach, sell, entertain or persuade? Do the authors/sponsors make their intentions or purpose clear? Is the information fact, opinion or propaganda? Does the point of view appear objective and impartial? Are there political, ideological, cultural, religious, institutional or personal biases?

23 B.S. Study

24 On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit Abstract Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation. Here we focus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no discernible meaning (e.g., Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena ). Across multiple studies, the propensity to judge bullshit statements as profound was associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural belief). Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more conventionally profound (e.g., A wet person does not fear the rain ) or mundane (e.g., Newborn babies require constant attention ) statements. These results support the idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our results also suggest that a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. Keywords: bullshit, bullshit detection, dual-process theories, analytic thinking, supernatural beliefs, religiosity, conspiratorial ideation, complementary and alternative medicine.

25 B.S. Study The following instructions were used for the scale: We are interested in how people experience the profound. Below are a series of statements taken from relevant websites. Please read each statement and take a moment to think about what it might mean. Then please rate how profound you think it is. Profound means of deep meaning; of great and broadly inclusive significance. Participants rated profoundness on the following 5-point scale: 1= Not at all profound, 2 = somewhat profound, 3 = fairly profound, 4 = definitely profound, 5 = very profound. A bullshit receptivity score was the mean of the profoundness ratings for all bullshit items.

26 Sample Statements Hidden meaning transforms unparalleled abstract beauty. (2.99) Consciousness is the growth of coherence, and of us. (2.88) Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena. (2.71) We are in the midst of a self-aware blossoming of being that will align us with the nexus itself. (2.69)

27 Results The Bullshit Receptivity (BSR) scale had good internal consistency. The mean profoundness rating was 2.6, which is in-between somewhat profound and fairly profound on the 5-point scale. Indeed, the mean profoundness rating for each item was significantly greater than 2 ( somewhat profound ), indicating that our items successfully elicited a sense of profoundness on the aggregate. Moreover,only 18.3% (N = 51) of the sample had a mean rating less than 2. A slight majority of the sample s mean ratings fell on or in-between 2 and 3 (54.5%, N = 152) and over a quarter of the sample (27.2%, N = 76) gave mean ratings higher than 3 ( fairly profound ). These results indicate that our participants largely failed to detect that the statements are bullshit. Next we investigate the possible association between reflective thinking and bullshit receptivity. BSR was strongly negatively correlated with each cognitive measure except for numeracy (which was nonetheless significant). Furthermore, both ontological confusions and religious belief were positively correlated with bullshit receptivity.

28 Chopra Statements We are not an emergent property of a mechanical universe but the seasonal activity of a living cosmos. (2.94) Every material particle is a relationship of probability waves in a field of infinite possibilities. You are that. (2.93) Mind and matter are subtle and dense vibrations of consciousness (spirit). (2.89)

29 Mundane Statements Human cultures often differ from each other quite a bit. (1.62) Higher rates of unemployment typically follow economic downturns. (1.58) People often have very bizarre dreams. (1.54)

30 Motivational Quotes A river cuts through a rock, not because of its power but its persistence. (3.37) Only those who will risk going too far can possibly find out how far one can go. (3.32) The creative adult is the child who survived. (3.13) I

31 Conclusions Most importantly, we have provided evidence that individuals vary in conceptually interpretable ways in their propensity to ascribe profundity to bullshit statements; a tendency we refer to as bullshit receptivity. Those more receptive to bullshit are less reflective, lower in cognitive ability (i.e., verbal and fluid intelligence, numeracy), are more prone to ontological confusions and conspiratorial ideation, are more likely to hold religious and paranormal beliefs, and are more likely to endorse complementary and alternative medicine. We proposed two mechanisms that explain why people might rate bullshit as profound. The first is a type of response bias wherein some individuals are simply more prone to relatively high profundity ratings. Although this mechanism is not specific to bullshit, it may at least partly explain why our pseudo-profound bullshit measure was so consistently positively correlated with epistemically suspect beliefs. Some people may have an uncritically open mind.

32 Conclusions As a secondary point, it is worthwhile to distinguish uncritical or reflexive open-mindedness from thoughtful or reflective open-mindedness. Whereas reflexive openmindedness results from an intuitive mindset that is very accepting of information without very much processing, reflective open-mindedness results from a mindset that searches for information as a means to facilitate critical analysis and reflection. Thus, the former should cause one to be more receptive of bullshit whereas the latter, much like analytic cognitive style, should guard against it. The foregoing highlights what appears to be a strong general susceptibility to bullshit, but what cognitive mechanisms inoculate against bullshit? We proposed that people may vary in their ability to detect bullshit. Our results modestly support this claim. Namely, we created a bullshit sensitivity measure by subtracting profundity ratings for pseudoprofound bullshit from ratings for legitimate motivational quotations. Increased bullshit sensitivity was associated with better performance on measures of analytic thinking. This is consistent with Sagan s famous claim that critical thinking facilitates baloney detection.

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34 Lynch Quotes I think that there are two things that need defending: the value and efficacy of reasongiving in a democratic culture, and the idea that the sorts of reasons we should give are those that emerge from broadly scientific methods of inquiry. The thought that everyone's first principles are arbitrary undermines a key principle of a civil society: that we owe our fellow citizens explanations for what we do. Civil societies are not necessarily polite or homogeneous; but they are societies that value reason-giving, inquiry, questioning, and hashing out one's differences with others. In so doing, they take seriously the idea that there are better and worse ways of doing these things. If you give up on the idea that there are standards of this sort, you give up on the idea that giving reasons has any real point. Public deliberation becomes a game played for the joy of manipulation, and politics becomes war by other means. Skepticism about reason undermines our commitment to civil society, and that is why it is important to understand its causes and answer its arguments. Reason matters and appeal to reasons matter, and not just for the noble ideals of the academy, but for the down-to-brass-tacks, mud-on-your-boots world in which we all live.

35 Lynch Quotes Democracy is, or should be, to use Sellars ringing phrase, a space of reasons. Democratic politics isn t war by other means. In a properly functioning liberal democracy, mutual deliberation proceeds through the exchange of public reasons reasons that can be assessed by the common point of view. And here we encounter what I think is a very deep and overlooked problem. In order to even have a common point of view we have to have a shared set of epistemic principles principles that tell us what methods and sources of belief to trust. Without those shared principles, policy disagreements stall out. After all, if we can t agree on the best methods for identifying the facts, we won t be able to agree on what the facts are, and if we can t agree about what the facts are, we will hardly be able to agree on what to do in light of the facts. We won t be able to agree on policy. This is just the situation in the US. We live in isolated bubbles of information pulled from different sources that only reinforce our prejudices. No wonder that political action grinds to a halt. Increasingly we lack the common principles of rationality that would allow us to engage in meaningful dialogue.

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