ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS DATABASE ANALYSIS REPORT

Transcription

1 Ministry of Counter Narcotics ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS DATABASE ANALYSIS REPORT Alternative Livelihoods Investment and Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends October 28

2 Contents Summary 4 1. Introduction 9 2. Background 9 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends Alternative Livelihoods Investment Trends Insecurity Trends Analysis Conclusions Recommendations 36 Annexes 37 Annex 1 UNDSS Regions Annex 2 Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends Annex 3 Security Incidents Annex 4 AL Investment Trends Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 Figure 1 Figure 11 Figure 12 Figure 13 Figure 14 Figure 15 National Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends (ha) Regional Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends (ha) Increasing National Insecurity Regional Insecurity Trends Central Highlands Region (CHR) North Eastern Region (NER) Northern Region (NR) South Eastern Region (SER) High AL Investment Low OPC Central Region (CR) Eastern Region (ER) Southern Region (SR) Western Region (WR) Low AL Investment High OPC National AL Investment and OPC 2

3 Synonyms and Acronyms ADB AL ASAP CHR CN CNTF CR EC ER NER NR OPC MCN MRRD RAMP SDC SER SR WR UNDSS UNODC USAID Asian Development Bank Alternative Livelihoods Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Programme Central Highlands Region Counter Narcotics Counter Narcotics Trust Fund Central Region European Commission Eastern Region North Eastern Region Northern Region Opium poppy cultivation Ministry of Counter Narcotics Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Programme Swiss Development Cooperation South Eastern Region Southern Region Western Region United Nations Department Safety and Security United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United States Agency for International Development Acknowledgements The following organisations and individuals contributed to the preparation of this report: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Kabul) Christina Oguz (Country Representative); Elisabeth Bayer (Deputy Country Representative); Patrick Halewood (Project Coordinator); Mohammad Haseeb Kabiri (AL Database Officer); Andrew Weir (Consultant) Altai Consulting (Kabul) 3

4 Summary Introduction This paper reviews and analyses the relationship between levels of opium poppy cultivation and planned investment in alternative livelihoods programmes (recorded in the Ministry of Counter Narcotics Alternative Livelihoods Database), between 23, when substantial funds for alternative livelihoods became available and 27, the last full year of implementation. The primary purpose of alternative livelihoods investment is to contribute to the sustainable reduction of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan through the provision of licit livelihoods opportunities to farm households currently or formerly engaged in the illicit opium poppy economy. The information in the database represents the funding commitments reported by the donors. There is no information on actual expenditure, let alone information on what is actually spent in rural areas, allowing for such overhead items as management and security costs, expatriate salaries, consultancy fees and material purchased abroad. As donors are frequently reluctant to reveal budget information, many figures are derived from secondary sources. Alternative Livelihoods Investment Trends Since 22, the alternative livelihoods investment funds available have increased every year. However, because of a lack of concomitant conditions, including security and effective governance, in many areas of the country, this investment has not always contributed to a reduction in opium poppy cultivation. Massive investment in the Central Region (US$ 53,444 per ha) and South Eastern Region (US$ 39,728 per ha) has contributed to substantial reductions in opium poppy cultivation of between 6% and 1%. However, in the North Eastern Region a much lower level of investment (US$ 8,69 per ha) has contributed to a 6% reduction in cultivation. In contrast, a similar level of investment in the Northern Region (US$ 9,84 per ha) has contributed to only a 2% reduction. On the other hand, in the Western and Southern Regions where investment in relation to the area of opium poppy has been substantially lower (US$ 3,651 and US$ 882 per ha, respectively) there have been considerable increases in cultivation. Insecurity Trends The high level of security incidents in the South Eastern Region is likely to be related to the position of Khost and Paktika provinces on the border with the tribal areas of Pakistan where there are frequent clashes between Afghan security forces and insurgents. However, in the Southern and Eastern Regions, the high levels of security incidents are positively correlated with high levels of opium poppy cultivation. The high levels of investment in the North Eastern and Northern Regions are linked to low levels of security incidents and hence higher government and development agency penetration than in areas with a higher level of security incidents. At the national level, there has been a substantial rise in the number of security incidents since September 25. The consequences of rising insecurity include reduced government and development agency access to rural areas and reduced licit development investment. Because of the illicit nature of the opium economy, it is likely that increasing insecurity contributes to increasing levels of opium production as: (i) it limits the ability of the government to address opium drivers by reducing access to areas where opium poppy is grown, thus reducing opportunities for investment in the licit economy; (ii) it limits farmers ability to access non-opium farm inputs, including credit; and (iii) it enables opium traders and insurgents to put pressure on farmers to grow opium poppy. Summary 4

5 However, there does not appear to be a direct relationship at regional level between changes in opium poppy cultivation and the increases in security incidents; as large increases in security incidents have occurred both in regions (South Eastern, Central and North Eastern) where there have been substantial decreases in opium poppy cultivation as well as in Regions where there have been substantial increases in opium poppy cultivation (Western and Southern). Other things being equal, increasing levels of investment might be expected to be correlated with decreases in opium poppy cultivation. However, in practice, the data can be either negatively or positively correlated, indicating that other factors are affecting the relationship between alternative livelihoods investment and opium poppy cultivation. High Investment: Reduced Opium Poppy Cultivation In 27, only 7% of the land area devoted to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was in the Central Highland, North Eastern, Northern and South Eastern Regions. Between 23 and 27, these four regions received 51.9% of the alternative livelihoods investment although only 22.2% of national opium poppy cultivation took place there. Although relatively insecure, the South Eastern Region has never been a major opium producing area: in 24, when at its highest level, opium poppy cultivation in the Region was only 1.6% of the national total. However, in the other three regions, where opium poppy cultivation peaked in 26 (25.2% of national cultivation), opium poppy cultivation had fallen to 6.8% of the national total by 27. These three regions are characterised by: Relatively good security; Relatively good accessibility; No long-term history of opium poppy cultivation (with the exception of Badakhshan province in the North Eastern Region) - with the result that alternative livelihoods investment in the four regions has been high in relation to the levels of opium poppy cultivation. Opium poppy cultivation in the four regions peaked in 26 and dropped substantially in 27 with increasing levels of investment in alternative livelihoods. 45,, High AL Investment - Low OPC (CHR, NER, NR, SER) 2, 4,, 18, 35,, 16, AL investment (USD) 3,, 25,, 2,, 15,, 14, 12, 1, 8, 6, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 1,, 4, 5,, 2, Summary 5

6 Low Investment: High Opium Poppy Cultivation Central, Eastern, Southern and Western Regions, in which 93% of the country s opium poppy was cultivated in 27, increasing alternative livelihoods investment is positively correlated with increasing opium poppy cultivation. Thus, although there is increasing investment, opium poppy cultivation is also increasing; indicating that the investment is having no effect on opium poppy cultivation. Opium poppy cultivation in these four Regions decreased in 25 but has since increased in line with growing levels of alternative livelihoods investment. This situation in the country s major opium producing areas indicates that the overall development package which includes improved governance, the development of the licit rural economy, value chains, markets and capacity building is not in place in view of the poor security and lack of government control. 45,, Low AL Investment - High OPC (CR, ER, SR, WR) 2, 4,, 18, 35,, 16, 3,, 14, AL investment (USD) 25,, 2,, 12, 1, 8, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 15,, 6, 1,, 4, 5,, 2, Conclusions As alternative livelihood investment decisions by both government and donors are not based solely on levels of opium poppy cultivation, there are major disparities between opium poppy cultivation and the levels of investment. Nationally, alternative livelihood investment is not correlated with opium poppy cultivation but rather reflects ease of access, political considerations and donor-specific factors. Although regions with relative underinvestment in alternative livelihoods have shown substantial increases in opium poppy cultivation, these areas tend to be insecure with the result that government penetration and development agency access is limited, the licit rural economy is weak and those involved in driving the illicit opium economy including traders, local commanders and insurgents - have extensive control over farmers decisions and options in rural areas. All these factors combine to hinder or, at worst, prevent the implementation of development activities in these areas. At a local level, provinces where opium poppy cultivation has been substantially reduced do rarely receive sufficient follow up investment to provide licit livelihoods options to farmers who have ceased or reduced opium poppy cultivation. Summary 6

7 Although hardly unique to Afghanistan, long lead-in times for donors, as well as the often cumbersome procedures of government, have precluded a rapid response to opportunities to focus investment in areas where opium poppy cultivation has been reduced or eliminated by a combination of investment and other factors (including political pressure, eradication and promises of investment). Current actions, such as the Good Performance Initiative, which seeks to reward provinces where opium poppy cultivation has been eliminated or substantially reduced, have generally become mired in bureaucratic inefficiencies and have, to date, failed in their purpose with the result that the poppy-free provinces are at considerable risk of reverting to opium poppy cultivation. Recommendations The Ministry of Counter Narcotics should encourage donors and government agencies to take greater account of opium poppy cultivation levels when planning programmes and making investment decisions in rural areas The Ministry of Counter Narcotics should work to ensure continued substantial and long-term rural investment in regions / provinces where opium poppy cultivation has been reduced or eliminated, in order to ensure the sustainability of the decrease and to facilitate the reestablishment and development of the licit rural economy. In areas of the country where access and security are good the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, conjunction with line ministries, should encourage and facilitate donors to work with the government on long-term rural development programmes focusing on the key pillars of the National Drug Control Strategy; emphasising local participation and capacity building in the development process. In areas where access and security are poor and alternative livelihoods options and opportunities are limited, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, local NGOs and development agencies should be encouraged by the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and supported by donors to invest in productive infrastructure and the licit rural economy whenever security and other conditions are favourable. Summary 7

8 Map 1 Jawzjan Balkh Kunduz Takhar Badakhshan Faryab Sari Pul Samangan Baghlan Badghis Bamyan Parwan Panjsher Nuristan Kapisa Laghman Kunar Kabul Hirat Ghor Wardak Logar Nangarhar Day Kundi Paktya Ghazni Khost Uruzgan Farah Zabul Paktika UNDSS Regions 1. Central Highlands 2. Central Region Hilmand Kandahar 3. Eastern Region Nimroz 4. North Eastern Region 5. Northern Region 6. Western Region km 7. Southern Region 8. South Eastern Region

9 1. Introduction This paper reviews and analyses the relationship between levels of opium poppy cultivation and planned investment in Alternative Livelihoods (AL) programmes (recorded in the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) AL database), between 23, when substantial AL funds became available and 27, the last full year of implementation. The primary purpose of AL investment is to contribute to the sustainable reduction of opium poppy cultivation (OPC) in Afghanistan through the provision of licit livelihoods opportunities to farm households currently or formerly engaged in the illicit opium poppy economy The key areas for the analysis are trends in: AL investment; opium poppy cultivation; and, security-related incidents The information in the MCN AL database represents funding commitments on the part of the donors. There is no information on actual expenditure, let alone information on what is actually spent in rural areas, allowing for such overhead items as management and security costs, expatriate salaries, consultancy fees and material purchased abroad. Donors in general and the largest donor USAID in particular are frequently reluctant to reveal budget information with the result that many figures are derived from secondary sources such as the Donor Assistance Database in the Ministry of Finance. 2. Background In 25, UNODC published an analysis of investment in AL projects in Afghanistan 1, based on a database established at the MCN. A follow-up internal UNODC report linked to an updating of the database was completed in This review of AL investment between 23 and 27 aims to identify possible links between such investment and changes in the levels of OPC in different parts of the country. Nangarhar received the biggest share of the total AL funds in 25 (US$ 7 million, 14%), followed by Hilmand (US$ 56 million, 11%), Badakhshan (US$ 47 million, 1%), Uruzgan (US$ 27 million, 6%), Kandahar (US$ 22 million, 4%), Balkh (US$ 16 million, 3%), Ghor (US$ 12 million, 2%) and Kunar (US$ 8 million, 2%). The balance of US$ 258 million was allocated to the remaining provinces. However, as shown in Table 1, the distribution of the provincial allocations in 25 was not closely related to the provincial distribution of opium poppy cultivation. For example, 48% of the total national area under opium poppy was in Hilmand, Kandahar and Balkh, only 18% of the AL investment was allocated to these provinces. Although Nangarhar (with 1% of the national area under opium poppy) received 14% of the allocation, this reflected a tailing off of the substantial AL 1 UNODC (25) Mapping of Alternative Livelihood Projects in Afghanistan. UNODC. Kabul 2 Altai Consulting (28) Mapping of Alternative Livelihoods Projects in Afghanistan. UNODC. Kabul. 9

10 investment in the province which contributed to the reduction in opium poppy cultivation from 28, ha in 24 to 1, ha in 25. Table 1: AL investment in Key Provinces 25 Poppy % AL % (ha) area (mil) AL Kunar 1,59 1% 8 2% Nangarhar 1,93 1% 7 14% Badakhshan 7,37 7% 47 1% Balkh 1,837 1% 16 3% Hilmand 26,5 26% 56 11% Kandahar 12,989 12% 22 4% Uruzgan 2,24 2% 27 6% Ghor 2,689 3% 12 2% Total 64, NATIONAL 13,918 62% 49 53% Source: UNODC/MCN 4% of the total AL funds (US$ 49 million) in 25 was allocated for Infrastructure and Sustainable Employment. The remaining funding was divided among - Agriculture (13%), Rural Finance (13%), Governance (12%), Social Safety Nets (12%) and Economic Regeneration (1%). The data collection for the AL database update in 27 focused on three main criteria: projects defined as AL by the organizations who designed and funded them; the Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Programme (ASAP) - the follow up to the Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Programme (RAMP), which was included in the 25 report, due to its strong agriculture component; and, The Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development s (MRRD) National Programmes, which are designated by the Government as the channel for government mainstreaming of AL. As shown in Table 2, on the following page, the annual donor funding available for AL increased more than 8-fold between 22 and 27 from US$ 64.4 million to US$ million: with 83% of the total coming from just three donors - The World Bank (33.4%), USAID (33.2%) and the Asian Development Bank (16.4%). However, as mentioned in Introduction above, the data need to be treated with caution. Since some major donors, including the largest donor, USAID, do not reveal programme budget and expenditure information, figures have to be collected from other sources the Donor Assistance Database in the Ministry of Finance. There is generally no way of checking the veracity of the data provided by donors. In some cases AL commitments are co-mingled with military expenditure and are often not reported as development expenditure. In summary, the information in the database should be treated with caution and used to provide an indication of commitments rather than an accurate record of what is actually spent in rural areas of the country. 1

11 Table 2: Annual Alternative Livelihoods Funding Commitments by Donor (US$) Total % USAID 4,729,191 36,413,823 93,34, ,891,34 122,547,97 146,621, ,56, CIDA 1,749,712 69,62,847 4,8,199 5,116,92 9,563,621 36,958,546 65,151, DFID 3,68,245 5,589,921 14,914,887 19,196,424 28,121,125 15,116,415 86,619, JICA 1,56, 1,583,29 1,838,58 4,981,717.3 Germany 4,32,567 2,853,333 5,454,435 4,884,52 2,655,153 5,325,83 25,25, Norway 2,52 82, , ,87 1,81,12 6,191,952 9,889,98.5 Italy 41,5 2,395,498 1,453,98 1,63,318 2,3,678 5,174,594 13,32,496.7 ADB 15,367 56,676,7 35,519,228 33,196,465 99,738,773 73,531,81 298,766, EC 1,617,735 2,582,872 8,477,497 7,53,87 23,774,74 23,876,147 67,832, CNTF 2,5,156 12,922,475 15,422,631.8 Denmark 8,75 2,68,567 3,31,23 2,595,74 5,483,775 14,69,999.8 Netherlands 146,36 581, , , ,351 1,764,367 4,16,189.2 SDC 27, , ,66 327, , ,313 2,411,43.1 World Bank 11,719,338 7,494,48 111,211,765 16,923, ,298,53 192,47,599 68,54, Total 64,49, ,983, ,795, ,733, ,673,89 527,454,97 1,819,5,275 1 Source: UNODC/MCN 11

12 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends As shown in Figure 1, at the national level, the levels of OPC have risen substantially since the fall of the Taliban. However, the national data masks the regional 3 variations illustrated in Figure 2. Data on OPC trends by region and province are given in Annex 2. Figure 1: National Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends (ha) Source: MCN/UNODC Opium Survey 27 The Regional and provincial variations in OPC from 22 to 27 are illustrated in Figure 2. It can be seen that there is considerable variation within as well as between Regions and that OPC in each Region is generally dominated by one province. 3 In order to accommodate UNDSS security data, the 8 UNDSS regions are used in this document. The details are given in Annex 1 and are shown in Map 1. 12

13 Figure 2: Regional Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends (ha) Figure 2.1: Opium Poppy Cultivation - Central Highlands Region (22-27) 1, 8, 6, Hectares Bamyan Day Kundi 4, 2, Figure 2.2: Opium Poppy Cultivation - Central Region (22-27) 5, 4, Hectares 3, 2, Kabul Kapisa Logar Panjshir Parwan Wardak 1,

14 Figure 2.3: Opium Poppy Cultivation - Eastern Region (22-27) 3, 25, 2, Hectares 15, Kunar Laghman Nangarhar Nuristan 1, 5, Figure 2.4: Opium Poppy Cultivation - North Eastern Region (22-27) 2, 15, Hectares 1, Badakhshan Baghlan Kunduz Takhar 5,

15 Figure 2.5: Opium Poppy Cultivation - Northern Region (22-27) 15, 12,5 1, Hectares 7,5 Balkh Faryab Jawzjan Samangan Sari Pul 5, 2, Figure 2.6: Opium Poppy Cultivation - Southern Region (22-27) 12, 1, 8, Hectares 6, Hilmand Kandahar Nimroz Uruzgan Zabul 4, 2,

16 Figure 2.7: Opium Poppy Cultivation - South Eastern Region (22-27) 2,5 2, Hectares 1,5 1, Ghazni Khost Paktika Paktya Figure 2.8: Opium Poppy Cultivation - Western Region (22-27) 2, 15, Hectares 1, Badghis Farah Ghor Hirat 5,

17 4. Alternative Livelihoods Investment Trends 4 Table 3: Cumulative AL Investment and Opium Poppy Cultivation Investment ($) Poppy (ha) Poppy Change $/ha poppy REGION Central Highlands 92,194,974 2, % 4,457 Central 452,722,97 8, % 53,444 Eastern 241,835,84 91, % 2,648 North - Eastern 58,691,516 67, % 8,69 Northern 569,766,768 57,93-1.9% 9,84 South Eastern 132,69,5 3,34-1.% 39,728 Southern 38,25,67 349, % 882 Western 27,145,174 73, % 3,651 National 2,648,71, , % 4,135 Sources: MCN/UNODC Database and Opium Survey 27 Table 3 indicates the cumulative AL investment and OPC by UNDSS Region from 23 to 27. The penultimate column shows the change in the area under opium poppy cultivation over the period while the final column indicates the AL investment per hectare of opium poppy grown in each Region over the period A key point is that since 22, the AL investment funds available have increased every year. However, the problem appears to be that, because of a lack of concomitant conditions, including security and effective governance, in many areas of the country, this investment has not always contributed to a reduction in OPC. Massive investment in the Central Region (CR) and South Eastern Region (SER) has contributed to substantial reductions in opium poppy cultivation of between 6% and 1%. However, in the North Eastern Region (NER) a much lower level of investment has contributed to a 6% reduction in cultivation. In contrast, a similar level of investment in the Northern Region (NR) has contributed to only a 2% reduction. On the other hand, in the Western Region (WR) and Southern Region (SR) where investment in relation to the area of opium poppy has been substantially lower (US$ 3,651 and US$ 882 per ha, respectively) there have been considerable increases in cultivation over the period. 4 These are illustrated geographically for 25 and 27 in Annex 4 17

18 Table 4: Ranking of Regional AL Investment, Opium Poppy Cultivation and Security Incidents (23-27) Region OPC AL Invest Incidents Central Highlands Central Eastern North Eastern Northern Southern South Eastern Western Note: 1 = high; 8 = low As can be seen from Table 4 above, the levels of AL investment in each region do not correlate with the level of OPC. The Southern, Eastern and Western Regions, which rank 1 st, 2 nd and 3 rd in OPC, rank 4 th, 6 th and 5 th in AL investment. This would suggest underinvestment in these regions. On the other hand, the North-Eastern, Northern and Central Regions which rank 1 st, 2 nd and 3 rd in AL investment, rank only 4 th, 5 th and 7 th in OPC: suggesting relative overinvestment in these regions. The right-hand column in Table 4 ranks the regions by the number of security incidents recorded by UNDSS. With the exception of the South Eastern Region, it appears that there is some positive correlation between the security incidents and the levels of OPC in each region; with some negative correlation between the security incidents and the AL investment. The high level of security incidents in the South Eastern Region which is lowest in terms of OPC - is likely to be related to the position of Khost and Paktika provinces on the border with the tribal areas of Pakistan where there are frequent clashes between Afghan security forces and insurgents, unrelated to OPC and drug trafficking. However, in the Southern and Eastern Regions, the high levels of security incidents are positively correlated with high levels of OPC. The high levels of AL investment in the North Eastern and Northern Regions are linked to low levels of security incidents and hence higher government and development agency penetration than in areas with a higher level of security incidents. 18

19 5. Insecurity Trends The rising insecurity in Afghanistan is illustrated in Figure 3. The data, disaggregated by the eight UNDSS Regions are presented graphically in Figure 4 5. Figure 3 illustrates, at the national level, the substantial rise in the number of security incidents which started from September 25 and has continued since. The consequences of rising insecurity include reduced government and development agency access to rural areas and reduced investment in licit development. In Figure 4 it can be seen that, with the exception of the CHR, the numbers of security incidents have increased in every region since 23 with the major increases in the SR, SER, ER and CR. Together with the WR, the SR, ER and CR are the main OPC areas (93% of OPC in 27) and are the most insecure areas in the country. Although the numbers of security incidents is also high in the SER in which very little OPC takes place, as mentioned above, these incidents are likely to relate to military action in the border areas with Pakistan rather than to insurgency within the provinces of the Region. 5 The numerical data on security incidents are given in Annex 3. 19

20 Figure 3: Increasing National Insecurity - Security Incidents (January 23 to September 28) 12 1 No. of Incidents Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 2

21 Figure 4: Regional Insecurity Trends - Security Incidents 23 to No. of Incidents NER NR WR SR SER ER CR CHR 21

22 As shown in Table 5, and illustrated graphically in Figures 3 and 4 above, the numbers of security incidents recorded at the regional level by UNDSS increased nationally by 1,236%; from 58 in 23 to 6,786 in 27. Although there is a considerable variation among the regions, ranging from a 31% increase in the Central Highland Region to a 248% increase in the Eastern Region, there is an upward trend throughout the country. Table 5 Security Incidents by UNDSS Regions (23 28) REGION (i) Central Highlands Annual Change (%) -25% 19% 25% 18% Change 23-7 (%) 31% Central Annual Change (%) 1% 69% 128% 69% Change 23-7 (%) 123% Eastern Annual Change (%) 119% 92% 27% 66% Change 23-7 (%) 248% North - Eastern Annual Change (%) 347% -24% 182% 8% Change 23-7 (%) 1627% Northern Annual Change (%) 97% 117% 111% % Change 23-7 (%) 83% South Eastern Annual Change (%) 119% 143% 172% -13% Change 23-7 (%) 1156% Southern Annual Change (%) 93% 53% 25% 38% Change 23-7 (%) 1142% Western Annual Change (%) 132% 39% 128% 13% Change 23-7 (%) 1594% National Annual Change (%) 16% 8% 172% 33% Change 23-7 (%) 1236% (i) 28 Total Jan to Sep Source: UNDSS, Afghanistan 22

23 Because of the illicit nature of the opium economy, it is likely that increasing insecurity contributes to increasing levels of opium production as: (i) it limits the ability of the government to address opium drivers by reducing access to areas where opium poppy is grown, thus reducing opportunities for investment in the licit economy; (ii) it limits farmers ability to access non-opium farm inputs, including credit; and (iii) it enables opium traders and insurgents to put pressure on farmers to grow opium poppy. 6 However, as can be seen from Table 6 there does not appear to be a direct relationship at regional level between changes in opium poppy cultivation and the increases in security incidents; as large increases in security incidents have occurred both in regions (South Eastern, Central and North Eastern) where there have been substantial decreases in OPC as well as in Regions where there have been substantial increases in OPC (Western and Southern) Table 6: OPC changes and Security Incidents (SIs) REGION (UNDSS) OPC Change 23-7 (%) Increase in SIs 23-7 Central Highlands 1% 31% Central -6% 123% Eastern -16% 248% North Eastern -6% 1627% Northern -2% 83% South Eastern -1% 1156% Southern 432% 1142% Western 282% 1594% Total 14% 1236% Sources: UNDSS and MCN/UNODC 6. Analysis Other things being equal, increasing levels of AL investment might be expected to be correlated with decreases in OPC. Figures 5 to 15 illustrate the relationship between the levels of AL investment and the levels of opium poppy cultivation at the regional and national levels. It can be seen from these figures that the data can be either negatively or positively correlated, indicating that other factors are affecting the relationship between AL investment and OPC. 6 Clearly, there are many other drivers of the opium economy. See for example, research and publications carried out by AREU ( ) and David Mansfield, among others. 23

24 High AL Investment: Reduced OPC 7 Central Highland Region (Figure 5) North Eastern Region (Figure 6) Northern Region (Figure 7) South Eastern Region (Figure 8) In these four Regions, which, in 27, included only 7% of the land area devoted to OPC in the country, increasing levels of AL investment are directly correlated with decreases in OPC. Between 23 and 27, these four regions received 51.9% of the AL investment although only 22.2% of national OPC took place there. Although relatively insecure, the South Eastern Region has never been a major opium producing area: in 24, when at its highest level, OPC in the Region was only 1.6% of the national total. However, in the other three regions (CHR, NER, NR), where OPC peaked in 26 (25.2% of national OPC), OPC had fallen to 6.8% of the national total by 27. These three regions are characterised by: Relatively good security; Relatively good accessibility; No long-term history of OPC (with the exception of Badakhshan in NER) - with the result that AL investment in the four regions has been high in relation to the levels of OPC. As illustrated in Figure 9, OPC in the four regions peaked in 26 and dropped substantially in 27 with increasing levels of AL investment. Low AL Investment: High OPC Central Region (Figure 1) Eastern Region (Figure 11) Southern Region (Figure 12) Western Region (Figure 13) In the other four regions, in which 93% of the country s opium poppy is cultivated, increasing AL investment is positively correlated with increasing OPC. Thus, although there is increasing AL investment, OPC is also increasing; indicating that the AL investment is having no effect on OPC. 7 In this analysis high AL investment means high in relation to the levels of OPC and low AL investment means low in relation to the levels of OPC. 24

25 35,, Figure 5: Central Highland Region - AL Investment and OPC (22-27) 8, 3,, 7, 25,, 6, AL Investment (USD) 2,, 15,, 5, 4, 3, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 1,, 2, 5,, 1, ,, Figure 6: North Eastern Region - AL Investment and OPC (22-27) 2, 18,, 18, 16,, 16, 14,, 14, AL investment(usd) 12,, 1,, 8,, 12, 1, 8, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 6,, 6, 4,, 4, 2,, 2,

26 18,, Figure 7: Northern Region - AL investment and OPC (22-27) 25, 16,, 14,, 2, 12,, AL investment (USD) 1,, 8,, 15, 1, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 6,, 4,, 5, 2,, ,, Figure 8: South Eastern Region - AL investment and OPC (22-27) 2,5 45,, 4,, 2, 35,, 1,5 AL investment (USD) 3,, 25,, 2,, 1, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 15,, 5 1,, 5,,

27 Figure 9: High AL Investment - Low OPC (CHR, NER, NR, SER) 45,, 2, 4,, 18, 35,, 16, 3,, 14, AL investment (USD) 25,, 2,, 12, 1, 8, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL assistance poppy cultivation 15,, 6, 1,, 4, 5,, 2,

28 16,, Figure 1: Central Region - AL investment and OPC (22-27) 4,5 14,, 4, 12,, 3,5 3, AL investment (USD) 1,, 8,, 6,, 2,5 2, 1,5 Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 4,, 1, 5 2,, ,, Figure 11: Eastern Region - AL investment and OPC (22-27) 4, 7,, 35, 6,, 3, AL investment (USD) 5,, 4,, 3,, 25, 2, 15, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 2,, 1, 1,, 5,

29 Figure 12: Southern Region - AL investment and OPC (22-27) 12,, 16, 1,, 14, 12, AL investment (USD) 8,, 6,, 4,, 1, 8, 6, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 4, 2,, 2, ,, Figure 13: Western Region - AL investment and OPC (22-27) 25, 8,, 7,, 2, AL investment (USD) 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, 15, 1, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 2,, 5, 1,,

30 Although producing a negligible amount of opium (1.3% of national OPC between 23 and 27), the Central Region received 17.1% of national AL investment over the same period. However, the data for the region are distorted by Kabul province which received 51% of the AL investment (13% of regional OPC). In contrast, Wardak province (45.5% of OPC) received only 6.8% of the AL investment. The region has no long-term history of OPC. Although the Western Region is not traditionally a major producer, in recent years, there have been substantial increases in OPC: particularly in Farah province which borders the volatile Southern Region and has been facing increasing insecurity in recent years. However, Farah received only 8% of the AL investment in the region between 23 and 27 although 43.6% of the regional OPC took place in the province. In contrast, Ghor Province, which is relatively more secure, received 24.4% of the AL investment although only 2.9% of the regional OPC took place in the province. Also, in contrast to Farah, where OPC increased by 774.4% over the period, OPC decreased by 6.3% in Ghor. The Eastern and Southern Regions are traditionally opium producing areas. However, over the period 23-27, OPC reduced by 16% in ER and increased by 432% in SR. The ER has been the recipient of substantial investment over the period, particularly in Nangarhar which received 5.2% of the AL investment in the region while being involved in 6.9% of the OPC. However, in spite of this investment, OPC in Nangarhar has not changed, the substantial but unsustained decrease in 25 and 26 notwithstanding. The Southern Region received 11.6% of the AL investment between 23 and 27 although it was involved in 51.9% of the OPC. The 432% increase in OPC in the region over this period is, in part, a reflection of this underinvestment. OPC in the region is dominated by Hilmand Province where 75% of the OPC took place. In 27 over 53% of the OPC in Afghanistan was in Hilmand province which, between 23 and 27, received only 2% of the AL investment in the region and only 2.4% of the national AL investment over the same period. As shown in Figure 14, OPC in these four UNDSS Regions decreased in 25 but has since increased in line with growing levels of AL investment. This situation in the country s major OPC areas indicates that the overall development package which includes improved governance, the development of the licit rural economy, value chains, markets and capacity building is not in place in view of the poor security and lack of government control. The national picture, illustrated in Figure 15, dominated by OPC in the Eastern and Southern Regions, mirrors the positive correlation between OPC and AL investment in the main OPC areas. The reduced OPC and the high OPC zones discussed above are marked on Map 2. Apart from the Western and South Eastern Regions, the high OPC areas are in the high and extreme risk areas of the country and the reduced OPC areas are in the low and medium risk areas. 3

31 Figure 14: Low AL Investment - High OPC (CR, ER, SR, WR) 45,, 2, 4,, 18, 35,, 16, 3,, 14, AL investment (USD) 25,, 2,, 12, 1, 8, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 15,, 6, 1,, 4, 5,, 2,

32 Figure 15: National - AL investment and OPC (22-27) 9,, 25, 8,, 7,, 2, 6,, AL Assistance (USD) 5,, 4,, 15, 1, Poppy Cultivation (ha) AL investment poppy cultivation 3,, 2,, 5, 1,,

33 Map 2 Badakhshan Jawzjan Balkh Kunduz Takhar Faryab Sari Pul Samangan Baghlan Badghis Bamyan Panjsher Nuristan Parwan Kapisa Kunar Laghman Kabul Hirat Ghor Day Kundi Ghazni Wardak Logar Paktya Nangarhar Khost Uruzgan Farah Zabul Paktika Nimroz Hilmand Kandahar HIGH AL INVESTMENT, LOW OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION LOW AL INVESTMENT, HIGH OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION km

34 7. Conclusions As AL investment decisions by both government and donors are not based solely on levels of OPC, there are major disparities between OPC and the levels of AL investment in regions / provinces. Nationally, AL investment is not correlated with OPC but rather reflects ease of access, political considerations and donor-specific factors. Although regions with relative underinvestment in AL have shown substantial increases in OPC, these areas tend to be insecure with the result that government penetration and development agency access is limited, the licit rural economy is weak and those involved in driving the illicit opium economy including traders, local commanders and insurgents - have extensive control over farmers decisions and options in rural areas. All these factors combine to hinder or, at worst, prevent the implementation of development activities in these areas. At a local level, provinces where OPC has been substantially reduced do not always receive sufficient follow up investment to provide licit livelihoods options to farmers who have ceased or reduced OPC. The classic example is Nangarhar where OPC was reduced from 28, ha in 24 to 1, ha in 25; only to rebound to 18,7 ha in 27. Although AL investment in the province increased by 33% from 24 to 25, it fell back by 43% in 26. Current examples are Balkh and Badakhshan where OPC was virtually eliminated in 27 by a combination of threats, promises of future investment and eradication. In Balkh, where OPC was virtually unknown before the mid-199s, there is considerable donor interest and investment in the province which has relatively good infrastructure, a long tradition of trade and commerce, relatively good access to international markets and, both potentially and in practice, many licit livelihoods opportunities available to former OPC farmers. In sharp contrast, farmers in Badakhshan, who have a long tradition of OPC, have few, if any, alternatives readily available. Furthermore, donor interest in the province, which is isolated and not overtly involved in any insurgency, is limited by what are seen by donors as higher priorities for investment elsewhere in the country. There is therefore a considerable risk that, in the absence of adequate rural investment, former OPC farmers in Badakhshan will revert to OPC. Although hardly unique to Afghanistan, long lead-in times for donors, as well as the often cumbersome procedures of government, have precluded a rapid response to opportunities to focus investment in areas where OPC has been reduced or eliminated by a combination of AL investment and other factors. Current actions, such as the Good Performance Initiative, which seeks to reward provinces where OPC has been eliminated or substantially reduced, have generally become mired in bureaucratic inefficiencies and have, to date, failed in their purpose with the result that the poppy-free provinces are at considerable risk of reverting to OPC. 34

35 8. Recommendations MCN should encourage donors and government agencies to take greater account of OPC levels when planning programmes and making investment decisions in rural areas MCN should work to ensure continued substantial and long-term rural investment in regions / provinces where OPC has been reduced or eliminated, in order to ensure the sustainability of the OPC decrease and to facilitate the re-establishment and development of the licit rural economy. In areas of the country where access and security are good MCN, conjunction with line ministries, should encourage and facilitate donors to work with the government on long-term rural development programmes focusing on the key pillars of the National Drug Control Strategy; emphasising local participation and capacity building in the development process. In areas where access and security are poor and AL options and opportunities are limited, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, local NGOs and development agencies should be encouraged by MCN and supported by donors to invest in productive infrastructure and the licit rural economy whenever security and other conditions are favourable. 35

36 Annexes Annex 1 Annex 2 Annex 3 UNDSS Regions Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends Security Incidents Annex 4 AL Investment Trends

37 ANNEX 1: UNDSS REGIONS UNDSS REGION Central Highlands Central Eastern North - Eastern Northern Southern South Eastern Western PROVINCE Bamyan Day Kundi Kabul Kapisa Logar Panjshir Parwan Wardak Kunar Laghman Nangarhar Nuristan Badakhshan Baghlan Kunduz Takhar Balkh Faryab Jawzjan Samangan Sari Pul Hilmand Kandahar Nimroz Uruzgan Zabul Ghazni Khost Paktika Paktya Badghis Farah Ghor Hirat 37

38 ANNEX 2: OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION TRENDS BY UNDSS REGION (Part 1 of 2) Trends in Provincial Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan (hectares), UNDSS REGION PROVINCE Central Highlands Bamyan Day Kundi 2,445 3,715 2,581 7,44 3,346 Total 3,55 4,518 2,77 7,61 3,346 Central Kabul Kapisa Logar Panjshir Parwan 1, Wardak 2,735 1,17 16 Total 265 3,298 3, ,335 Eastern Kunar 972 2,25 4,366 1, Laghman 95 1,97 2, Nangarhar 19,78 18,94 28,213 1,93 4,872 18,739 Nuristan ,554 1,516 21,72 23,484 36,99 3,98 8,3 19,746 North - Eastern Badakhshan 8,25 12,756 15,67 7,37 13,56 3,642 Baghlan ,444 2,563 2, Kunduz Takhar ,364 2,178 1,211 Total 9,26 13,782 18,497 11,572 18,78 5,524 Northern Balkh 217 1,18 2,495 1,837 7,232 Faryab ,249 2,665 3,4 2,866 Jawzjan ,673 1,748 2,24 1,85 Samangan ,151 3,874 1,96 Sari Pul 57 1,428 1,974 3,227 2, Total 539 4,291 1,542 22,351 16,58 4,211 38

39 ANNEX 2: OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION TRENDS BY UNDSS REGION (Part 2 of 2) UNDSS REGION PROVINCE Southern Hilmand 29,95 15,371 29,353 26,5 69,324 12,77 Kandahar 3,97 3,55 4,959 12,989 12,619 16,615 Nimroz ,69 1,955 6,57 Uruzgan 5,1 4,698 7,365 2,24 9,73 9,24 Zabul 2 2,541 2,977 2,53 3,21 1,611 Total 39,52 25,691 44,769 45,256 96, ,77 South Eastern Ghazni 62 9 Khost Paktika Paktya ,2 Total 38 1,96 2, Western Badghis ,967 3,25 4,219 Farah 5 1,7 2,288 1,24 7,694 14,865 Ghor 2,2 3,782 4,983 2,689 4,679 1,53 Hirat ,531 1,924 2,287 1,525 Total 2,776 5,786 1,416 17,82 17,865 22,112 NATIONAL 74,46 8,483 13,72 13, , ,981 39

40 ANNEX 3: SECURITY INCIDENTS RECORDED BY UNDSS National Summary and Regional Totals (Data for 28 from January to September) REGION NER NR WR SR SER ER CR CHR National North Eastern Region Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total Northern Region Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

41 Western Region Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total Southern Region Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total South Eastern Region Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

42 Eastern Region Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total Central Region Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total Central Highland Region Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

43 ANNEX 4 Geographical Comparisons: Map 1a Committed Funds by Programme Type, 1 priority Provinces, 25 Map 1b Committed Funds by Programme Type, 1 priority Provinces, 27 Map 2a Committed Funds by Province, 25 Map 2b Committed Funds by Province, 27 Map 3a Committed Funds by Province by Hectares of Opium, 25 Map 3b Committed Funds by Province by Hectares of Opium, 27 Map 4a Committed Funds by Thematic Area, for 1 Priority Provinces, 25 Map 4b Committed Funds by Thematic Area, for 1 Priority Provinces, 27 Map 5a Bilateral Programmes, funded by Thematic Area, in 1 Priority Provinces, 25 Map 5b Bilateral Programmes, funded by Thematic Area, in 1 Priority Provinces, 27 Map 6a Bilateral Programmes, funded by Donor, in 1 Priority Provinces, Map 6b 25 Bilateral Programmes, funded by Donor, in 1 Priority Provinces, 27 Map 7a NSP Committed Funding by Province, 25 Map 7b NSP Committed Funding by Province, 27 Map 8a NABDP Committed Funding by Province, 25 Map 8b NABDP Committed Funding by Province, 27 Map 9a MISFA Committed Funding by Province, 25 Map 9b MISFA Committed Funding by Province, 27 43

44 Map 1a Committed Funds by Programme Type, 1 priority Provinces, 25 44

45 Map 1b Committed Funds by Programme Type, 1 priority Provinces, 27 45

46 Map 2a Committed Funds by Province, 25 46

47 Map 2b Committed Funds by Province, 27 47

48 Map 3a Committed Funds by Province by Hectares of Opium, 25 48

49 Map 3b Committed Funds by Province by Hectares of Opium, 27 49

50 Map 4a Committed Funds by Thematic Area, for 1 Priority Provinces, 25 5

51 Map 4b Committed Funds by Thematic Area, for 1 Priority Provinces, 27 51

52 Map 5a Bilateral Programmes, funded by Thematic Area, in 1 Priority Provinces, 25 52

53 Map 5b Bilateral Programmes, funded by Thematic Area, in 1 Priority Provinces, 27 53

54 Map 6a Bilateral Programmes, funded by Donor, in 1 Priority Provinces, 25 54

55 Map 6b Bilateral Programmes, funded by Donor, in 1 Priority Provinces, 27 55

56 Map 7a NSP Committed Funding by Province, 25 56

57 Map 7b NSP Committed Funding by Province, 27 57

58 Map 8a NABDP Committed Funding by Province, 25 58

59 Map 8b NABDP Committed Funding by Province, 27 59

60 Map 9a MISFA Committed Funding by Province, 25 6

61 Map 9b MISFA Committed Funding by Province, 27 61

62 Country Office for Afghanistan House 3 and 4 Kolola Pushta Main Road Kabul, Afghanistan Tel: +93 () fo.afghanistan@unodc.org