Mission of the Community Veterinary Emergency Team to Greece

Transcription

1 Mission of the Community Veterinary Emergency Team to Greece SCOPE of the mission: Sheep pox epidemics on the Lesvos Island (21 24 November 2017) 1

2 Terms of Reference The experts should provide assistance to the scientific, technical, managerial and practical on-the-spot aspects required for the development and refinement of the control strategy for Sheep and Goat Pox (SGP) under local conditions taking into account sound scientific basis (including relevant EFSA opinions on SGP) and within the framework of Council Directive 92/119/EEC. The experts should report exclusively to the Commission services and the competent authorities of Greece. Daily reports should be produced and continuous contact should be guaranteed between the team, the Commission services and competent authorities. A final report should be produced by the experts; this report should include recommendations to the competent authorities. 2

3 CVET experts and DG SANTE officials Dr Kris De Clercq - Team Leader - BE Dr Céline Demarez - BE Commission Representative: Dr Dimitrios Dilaveris (DG SANTE) 3

4 Lesvos Island small ruminants (~ holdings) cattle (~ 500 holdings) 4 operational slaughterhouses (+1 seasonal) 43 dairy facilities (dairy plants of various capacities + milk collection stations) 4

5 SGP occurrence on Lesvos Island Since 2007: only a few outbreaks cleared by stamping out of the affected herds December 2016 January 2017: 4 SGP outbreaks on the Southern part of the Island. Cleared by implementation of stamping out of the affected herds June 2017: Implementation of new measures by the Veterinary Authorities of East Macedonia and Thrace following SGP outbreaks in Turkey in order to prevent SGP incursion in Greece (10km surveillance zone along the Turkish borders, enhancement of clinical surveillance, enforced biosecurity measures) September 2017 November 2017: 25 SGP outbreaks in the Northern-East part of the Island 5

6 SGP on the Lesvos Island (24/11/2017) 6

7 SGP on the Lesvos Island (24/11/2017) 7

8 SGP on the Lesvos Island: status on 16/01/2018 8

9 Stamping out Total stamping out of the infected herds Farms cleaning and disinfection under supervision of the Local Veterinary Service Carcasses disposed by sanitary burial on the spot BUT Not clear whether goats were always included Field visits: in some cases incomplete removal of materials some (tools, bedding e.t.c.) Split holdings: in some cases, stamping out implemented only in the facility where the initial cases were detected 9

10 Animal movement Before 10 th October 2017: Inside protection zone (3km of radius): movement allowed only for emergency slaughter Inside surveillance zone (10km of radius): movement authorized after Local Veterinary Service approval Prohibition of the dispatch of live ruminants outside the island (not even for direct slaughter to slaughterhouses) Prohibition of the dispatch of live ovine and caprine animals for commercial activities within the Island, even within the free areas and surveillance zones 10

11 Animal movement 10 th October 2017: Total stand-still declared Official end date of the stand-still was 21 days after killing and destruction of the last outbreak in the Island Due to lambing season and excessive accumulation of animals in the farms, stand-still was in place for 55 days ( ) Only few animal movements authorised under supervision of the Local Veterinary Authorities during a period of 2 weeks (movement from summer to winter facilities) 11

12 Control of animal movement Control of the island roads (by the Local Police Department): Checkpoints on the island roads (locations either randomly selected by the police forces or determined based on Local Veterinary Services suggestions) In case of illegal animal transport, Head of the Local Veterinary Services informed. Actions taken accordingly to the severity of the finding BUT No specialized procedures for the controls No records of the daily controls Large number of roads to be checked (including many mountain roads) Lack of personnel 12

13 Control of animal movement Maritime control: International traffic under supervision of the Customs Office National traffic under supervision of the Coast Guard Control of official transport license for any animal or meat transport at the Mytilini port Import of animals or meat from Turkey prohibited Local Veterinary Services consulted for input and/or advises when needed 13

14 Clinical surveillance Active clinical surveillance Shortage of personnel (staff reduced of 50% since 2007) Official state of emergency declared on 30 th October 2017 (for 45 days): Quick deployment of personnel (12 army veterinarians, 2 private veterinarians and 2 volunteer veterinarians) Allocation of resources Clinical surveillance extended to the healthy zones of the island Thorough and systematic examination and recording of the results by army and private veterinarians Disease underreporting by the farmers 9/25 outbreaks detected by active surveillance Despite the SGP awareness campaign in place not all farmers had received the information 14

15 Biosecurity measures discussed: Emphasis put on biosecurity measures related to : Farms Slaughterhouses Animal dealers/ transporters Ports Milk collection points 15

16 Slaughterhouses (2 visited by CVET) Animal transport Authorization to load animals: disinfection certificate (signed by the dealer) + permission of loading (signed by the veterinarian after inspection of the cleanliness of the truck) Slaughtering practices BUT Clinical examination before and after slaughter Actions to be taken in case of SGP suspicion within the slaughterhouse unclear to the local veterinary authorities and the slaughterhouse personnel Same truck can carry slaughter animals from different origins Recording of data can be improved to assist traceability (e.g. plate number of trucks) 16

17 Possible Supplementary Measures (e.g. vaccination) No SGP vaccination carried out no SGP vaccines available Central Authorities have decided not to use vaccination for the moment based on several factors. Local Authorities support this decision If needed, SGP vaccines procurement (needs estimated at doses) would take more than 4 months and vaccination would require at least another 2 months. However Recent evolution of the disease raises concerns Authorities should be prepared and develop action plans for possible supplementary measures (including vaccination) The longer SGP remains on the Island, the more the risk that SGP becomes endemic in Lesvos and/or spreads to mainland of Greece increases 25 th November 2017 Today: 7 outbreaks 17

18 Visit to the NRL for Capripox viruses in Athens Skin samples of suspicious animals sent to the NRL mostly within 1 day No sample receipt during week-end Time between SGP suspicion and confirmation sometimes exceeds 24 hours Detection of CaPV by real-time PCR. Results within 1 day Good staff competency Identified weaknesses: Lack of real-time PCR thermocyclers Limited number of staff 18

19 Recommendations 1) Enforced biosecurity measures should be implemented at all levels: Farms - Disinfection of the wheels of all vehicles entering and leaving the holding - Keep visits to farms to a minimum and provide all visitors with clean protective clothing and footwear Slaughterhouses - Ensure effective cleaning and disinfection of trucks - Disinfection certificate and permission of loading to be checked - Disinfectant in disinfection pits should be regularly renewed Animal transporters should comply with biosafety measures in place in the holdings and in the slaughterhouses Ports - Biosecurity measures applied for national transport should be similar to those applied for international transport - Disinfectant should be regularly renewed Milk collection points - Proper disinfection of all vehicles entering or leaving the facility - Random controls should be implemented on biosecurity measures - Collection zone (tank, floor, walls, etc.) should be regularly cleaned and disinfected 19

20 Recommendations 2) Animal movement Clinical controls should be more systematic Mixing of animals from different origins should be avoided during transport to slaughterhouses Enforcement of traceability from farms to slaughterhouses should be reassured, improved and controlled by organizing adequate random (or targeted) checks Clear instructions about animal transport control procedures should be provided to the police. Daily reports of the controls are needed 3) Stamping out procedures Cleaning and disinfection of holdings should be properly enforced The full stamping out of split holdings should be maintained Goat stamping out should be mandatory upon SGP confirmation in a holding. 20

21 Recommendations 4) Slaughterhouses Local authorities and slaughterhouses personnel should be aware of actions to be taken in case of disease suspicion detected inside the slaughterhouse. In case of confirmed SGP case and before re-opening, effective cleaning and disinfection should be acknowledged by the Local Veterinary Services. Ante-mortem clinical examination should be re-enforced, especially during high demand period, to ensure disease detection. Involvement of sufficient additional (army) veterinarians could be essential. 21

22 Recommendations 5) Vaccination A scenario for possible implementation of vaccination should be envisaged: administrative preparations to ensure swift and effective launch of vaccination campaign if needed Possibility and logistic involved to establish a national vaccine bank at mid- or long-term should be discussed and a specific plan be drafted The EC with the MS could investigate the possibility for the creation of alternative vaccine supply mechanisms in parallel with National procurement procedures (e.g. an European sheeppox Vaccine Bank as an additional tool for the control of sheeppox in Europe) 22

23 Recommendations 6) Time between SGP suspicion, confirmation and stamping out should be as short as possible and no more than hours 7) Exchange of information and coordination of the control programme to be strengthened across the different authorities. Regular evaluation with proposal of corrective actions is recommended 8) Simulation exercise to be set regularly in the future to maintain preparedness in case of new SGP outbreaks 9) Stand still should remain in place for as long as needed, provided this is sustainable and does not lead to overcrowding within the small ruminant farms 10) Disease awareness among the farmers should be improved 23

24 Thank you for your attention! 24