In his essay The Truth in Psychological Egoism, Hugh Lafollette uses a modified version

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1 Ashton Payne Moral Psychology: PHIL2550 July 25 th, 2014 Part I: In his essay The Truth in Psychological Egoism, Hugh Lafollette uses a modified version of psychological egoism (henceforth PE) to explain what motivates human behavior. This essay aims to present his criticisms of traditional PE and his altered thesis dubbed egoism; and possible weaknesses in his new theory. Lafollette introduces PE as the idea that intentional action in humans is usually promoted self-interest (Lafollette, 1998). Then he goes on to say that Egoism's appeal arises primarily from its ambiguous formulation My initial task, then, will be to specify these ambiguities (Lafollette, 1998) (501). Lafollette then goes on to outline four ambiguities which he presents as follows: The first ambiguity problem Lafollette dubs as the problem of motives or consequences, and says it arises out of the egoist's tendency to blur or ignore the distinction between the motive for an action and the consequences of it (Lafollette, 1998). Lafollette argues that all actions have consequences which the actor is either ignorant of, or not in pursuit of (Lafollette, 1998). He gives the example of a woman be motivated to cook a special meal for her spouse in order to make him happy, though she would doubtless be satisfied subsequently (Lafollette, 1998). Basically like giving a gift; one does not give a gift to make yourself feel

2 good. Lafollette uses these examples to make the point that PE should be concerned with the motivation of actions and not the consequences (Lafollette, 1998). The second ambiguity Lafollette dubs as one self s vs. one s self interests. Which he simply states as the idea that Some of a person's interests may be self-interests, interests merely in her own welfare; other interests, though, may be interests in other people does not imply that the motivating interest was self-interest. Lafollette uses the example of the woman cooking and argues, the first person wants to make [her spouse] feel cherished: she wants him to be happy. The second individual wishes to promote her own interest; she "helps" others only as a means to that end (Lafollette, 1998) 502. The third ambiguity is dubbed real vs. perceived interests which Lafollette states as the ambiguity between the claim that individuals always act (whether they realize it or not) to promote what is in their interests and the claim that they act to promote what they take to be in their interests (Lafollette, 1998). The fourth and final ambiguity he dubs as always or only self-interest (Lafollette, 1998). Lafollette describes this as the ambiguity between the claim that people always acts to promote their self-interest to some degree or another, and the claim that they only choose that action which will promote their self-interest better than any known available option 503. One may think of this as a sort of utilitarian calculus; where the problem becomes: do we always seek to maximize benefits, or simply take small amounts here and there? Lafollette then states he agrees somewhat with the embedded insight in psychological egoism: a person will continually engage in an activity only if it has the effect of satisfying what she perceives to be in her self-interest (Lafollette, 1998). He then states his three part altered thesis as follows:

3 I: [egoism] only claims [a person] will not continually act in ways that do not have the effect of promoting her self-interest (Lafollette, 1998). II: some of a person's interests are nonself-interests (Lafollette, 1998). III: does not require that self-interest be the decisive, most weighty interest. Her nonselfinterests will at least sometimes predominate (Lafollette, 1998) Lafollette finally goes on to stress the importance of intelligently controlled habit in explaining human motivation; and the psychological process of habituating behaviours which satisfy selfinterest. Then he touches on the implications of habituation and self interest in morality; going as far to say that humans could not have survived as a species without this psychological mechanism (Lafollette, 1998) 506. Part II: With Lafollette s egoism thesis in mind, let us begin to think of possible counterexamples to the egoism argument; one of which could be self-destructive behavior. Think of someone who has suffered a tragedy; widowers, divorcees, those grieving a loss, etc. Many people who have experienced tragedy would probably admit, counterintuitively to egoism, that they went through a period of self-destructive behavior, where promoting their self/general-interest was the last thing of their mind. This self-destructive behavior can take the shape of alcoholism/addiction, physical abuse to oneself, risk taking behavior, forgoing responsibilities, anhedonia, or outright depression. Though the person is fully aware that whatever behavior they are engaging in is bad for them, they are nonetheless compelled to continue. These examples have no problem dispensing with premise I of the egoism thesis; where one discontinues action which does not promote self-interest. One is also arguably hard

4 pressed to find how the motivation behind these behaviours even falls under the category of nonself-interests. If there are motivations which satisfy neither premise I nor III of egoism, then it fails to be a comprehensive theory of human motivation. Also, it appears egoism cannot deal with the concept of psychological disorders/chemical imbalances in humans. If there are known physiological conditions that can motivate people in the exact opposite direction of egoism than it appears there needs to be some sort of physiological element in the theory of human motivation. Also, one may also like to think about the chicken-or-egg nature of these physiological changes, and how continued negative behavior can cause the larger physiological problems. In addition, self-sacrifice/suicide, martyrs, and altruism pose issues to egoism as well. It appears to me under this view that, though one is not always motivated by self-interest, generally the self-interest outweighs the cost of the action. For example, waiting on a friend at the bus stop will only last as long as the cost in time doesn t conflict with one s self-interest and nonselfinterest in that person. This model, like PE inherently, has a hard time explaining how someone could make the ultimate self-sacrifice for anything. Part III: In response to tragedy, the egoist could reply that most people do in fact suffer this period, let it run its course, and return back to normal healthy behavior after a given time. This is completely compatible with egoism. The penance or particular grieving response someone goes through could also be framed as perceived self-interest deemed necessary by the individual. Continued self-destructive behavior could very well be a psychological/genetic disorder.

5 In response to psychological disorders the egoist could say that egoism is a theory of healthy rational thought; and obviously genetic predisposition is a fairly large factor in having a psychological disorder. Also, given modern neuroscience, brain structures could most likely be pinpointed which cause/help explain this mechanism in a new way. In response to martyrs, suicides, altruism, self-sacrifice etc. The egoism thesis only states that people will pursue perceived interest, and it is not a difficult task to imagine how a martyr, altruist see their sacrifice as a perceived interest for what they believe is larger than themselves. These and suicides may also be attributed to mistaken beliefs about oneself, or an improper value analysis. In conclusion, Lafollette s egoism thesis is a relatively attractive one; which sufficiently addresses the shortcomings of traditional PE. That being said, it does genuinely seem like there might be some counterexamples which pose some trouble for this view. It may be the case that egoism just needs more of a utilitarian contingency element to it, which also takes environment, situation, and disposition of the individual into account. In personal opinion maybe a more comprehensive scale of value analysis could also provide clearer understandings of motivation.

6 Bibliography 1. Lafollette, H. The Truth in Psychological Egosim. Reason and responsibility, 7, Retrieved, from