HAPPINESS: CLASSIC THEORY IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT RESEARCH Epilogue

Transcription

1 WOLFGANG GLATZER HAPPINESS: CLASSIC THEORY IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT RESEARCH Epilogue (Received 1 April, 2000; Accepted 1 June, 2000) ABSTRACT. Happiness is an eternal concern of philosophy and social science. Several classic intuitions about happiness get some support by the results of modern empirical research, not least, expectations about positive effects of technological development and individualization. The data do not confirm dismal predictions about anomic unhappiness. Though social development and transformation is ambivalent, the overall balance seems to be positive in modern societies. KEY WORDS: happiness, modernity. Almost everyone has thoughts about happiness and it seems that everybody has created their own, idiosyncratic idea of it. Likewise in science, each discipline has developed its special view on happiness: psychologists see it as a matter of personality, biologists as the result of chemical processes, philosophers see happiness mostly in a moral context, and sociologists think of it as a social condition. Remarkable for that sociologic view is that it counters common understanding. Where happiness is usually defined as a purely individual or psychological phenomenon, sociologists insist that an individual state like happiness is socially grounded. This epilogue is concerned with classical sociological views of happiness which, typical for the time in question, are not sharply separated from philosophical ones. The guiding question is how these notions fit present day research on subjective wellbeing. The sociological classics considered here are Comte, Durkheim, Simmel and the representatives of German anthropological philosophy. These authors have not developed fully elaborated theories of happiness, but we find explicit references to the matter in their work. Morality questions and reality questions are often combined to form one approach. The study of happiness has now advanced for more than a century, and what has changed on the way to modernity is not only a I want to thank Ruut Veenhoven (Rotterdam), who contributed a lot to this article in terms of ideas and research results and to Simon Langlois (Quebec) for critical reading. Journal of Happiness Studies 1: , Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

2 502 WOLFGANG GLATZER differentiation of approaches, but also development of research methods and an elaboration of the databases collected about structure and change in happiness, not the least from representative surveys (Veenhoven, 1991; Bellebaum, 1992; Bellebaum and Barheier, 1994). The social indicators movement of the sixties and seventies especially has contributed to the development of research on happiness (Glatzer, 1992; Noll, 2000). In their approaches happiness is regarded within the broader concepts of subjective well-being (Strack et al., 1991) and quality of life (Glatzer and Zapf, 1984; Zapf, 1987). Especially the request that quality of life should be in the eye of the beholder (Campbell and Converse, 1972) has steered the interest and awareness of the social sciences on happiness. Economists are also joining the footpath of happiness research, which has some roots in economic science (Frey and Stutzer, 2000). In new research approaches, happiness is conceived as subjective wellbeing, more precisely as the overall enjoyment of life (Veenhoven, 1991). There is a long standing discussion about the measurability of this phenomenon. Now, after decades of validation research, it can be concluded that happiness can be measured by self-report. The answers given by individuals have been found to be valid. Survey data from different populations have been replicated and re-analyzed with respect to their theoretical significance. In this epilogue the results of this research are compared to classic notions about happiness. Much of the data are drawn from the German Welfare Surveys, which have been carried out since 1978 to measure quality of life in Germany (Glatzer and Zapf, 1984; Zapf, 1987; Habich et al., 1999). This epilogue also draws on reviews by Diener et al. (2000) and Veenhoven (1991, 1997) both of which are extraordinarily useful to get an overview of the field. It is not possible to confront the classic approaches with modern empirical statements without considering the special historical context, which gave them their meaning. Often enough the classic terms and hypotheses are not sufficiently self-evident and have to be interpreted into present day terms. 1. SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AS A CONDITION OF HAPPINESS When Auguste Comte coined the term sociology it was not only incorporated at the top of the hierarchy into a system of science, it was also

3 HAPPINESS: CLASSIC THEORY AND CURRENT RESEARCH 503 significantly related to happiness. It was bonheur which constituted for August Comte a final reference point for Positivism (see Plé in this issue). Comte s insight is that happiness requires systematic knowledge about the world in which we live, in particular about the things we can change more or less. Positivism will contribute to happiness insofar that it creates the scientific knowledge about the laws of human existence which is necessary for aiming at happiness. The general optimism of positivism also concerns happiness: after overcoming current crises, the future positivistic age will be an age of happiness. Mass happiness Comte wrote this halfway through the 19th century. Did the 20th century bring the envisioned age of happiness? The available data suggest it to a certain degree, at least in the second half of that century. Since happiness surveys started only in the 1950s, we have no representative data on the first half of the 20th century. These data have been gathered in the World Database of Happiness, directed by Ruut Veenhoven (1999a) at Erasmus University, Rotterdam. This catalogue contains a unique selection of happiness surveys from all over the world. A look at these data shows that most people enjoy life. In western nations at least, the proportion of very and fairly happy people is about 80%. Comparison over time shows a slight increase between 1960 and 2000 (Hagerty and Veenhoven, 2001). These findings are in contrast to the continual reports about misery in the media and social research. Technology Comte expected much from science and technology. Did developments in these fields really contribute to happiness? It appears that happiness is indeed higher in nations where science and technology are most developed (Veenhoven, 1996; Heylighen and Bernheim, 2000). Yet, this correlation does not prove that science and technology have really raised happiness, because we can not exclude that this result is due to other factors. Still, there is little doubt that medical technology has substantially increased the number of healthy years of life. Though not all technologies have worked out equally beneficially, the overall impact of technological development seems to be positive. This contrasts with public ambivalence about technology. Time series data for Germany show that trust in technology has

4 504 WOLFGANG GLATZER substantially reduced during the last decades (Noelle-Neumann and Köcher, 1997, p. 1026). The elaboration of science and technology in modern societies is accompanied by new societal conditions that also influence happiness levels. Improvements in material living conditions are surely a factor which contributes to an increase of happiness (Schyns, 1998; Diener and Biswas-Diener, 1999): but at higher levels of industrialization economic growth loses somewhat the capacity to generate happiness, due to the law of diminishing returns. Freedom Comte also expected that freedom would raise happiness. There is empirical support for this thesis using a definition of freedom in terms of opportunity to choose. Though opportunity does not always go with happiness, it does when accompanied by well-developed capabilities to choose. Veenhoven (2000) reports a sizable correlation between freedom and happiness in nations where people are well educated. He also found that freedom leads to happiness under wealthy conditions but does not do so in conditions of poverty. Altogether Comte s optimism seems correct. Though he did not foresee the adverse effects of scientific progress, he was right about the overall balance of effects. His view is currently shared by a few modern authors who maintain that progress objectively occurs (Heylighen and Bernheim, 2000). Yet most sociologists are inclined to highlight the negative aspects of social change and emphasize social and cultural trauma (Sztompka, 2000). 2. ANOMIE AS A DISTURBANCE OF HAPPINESS The optimism with respect to future happiness, which Auguste Comte showed, has mostly disappeared in the approach of Emile Durkheim (see Vowinckel in this issue). His basic concept for disturbances of modern society is anomie and in his thinking too much anomie will reduce happiness. Durkheim claimed that anomie would increase suicide rates and he assumed that anomie increases in modern society due to increased social mobility and enforced social change, and that this will have its consequences, be it unhappiness or suicide. There are three examples from the last decade that can be used as a proof for his thesis. One is the case of Germany during its process of

5 HAPPINESS: CLASSIC THEORY AND CURRENT RESEARCH 505 unification from 1990 onward, the second is South Africa during the process of democratization resulting in the first democratic elections in 1994, and the third is Russia which has been in the process of transformation since the late eighties. The findings give only mixed support for Durkheim s thesis. Testcase Germany Despite a lot of social change in East Germany around 1990 there was not so much anomie as might be assumed, though it was more than in West Germany. All the time the West Germans were happier than the East Germans but on a rather constant level whereas there was a modest rise in the happiness level in East Germany (Glatzer and Boes, 1998; Bulmahn, 2000). Testcase South-Africa In South Africa during the short time of introducing democratic elections there was a peak in happiness among black people, who for a short time overtook white people regarding levels of happiness. Afterwards there followed a convergence of both happiness levels and in recent times the level of happiness of black people has again dropped to a somewhat lower level than that of white South Africans (Moller, 2000). Testcase Russia Durkheim s thesis applies better to the recent development of Russia. It was not possible to study happiness under communist rule. During the nineties there were only minor ups and downs (Boutenko, 2000) but after the 1998 economic collapse a decrease set in (Veenhoven, 2001). That decline of satisfaction is probably a result of the turmoil in Russian society. All in all rapid social change does not always result in unhappiness. There are mostly losers and winners, and the balance can be positive. Durkheim thought that de-modernization will restore happiness. Yet the data rather suggest that people are happier in modern society. As noted, we can see that the most modern societies are in the top of the happiness hierarchy and that there has been a slight rise in happiness in the last decade. Still the yield of happiness from further modernization seems to diminish. Two important components of social transformation, economic growth and the institutionalization of democratic rights, seem

6 506 WOLFGANG GLATZER to have lost something of their charisma and their capacity to make people happier than they have been. 3. INDIVIDUALISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF HAPPINESS Georg Simmel developed the modern idea of individuality and placed it as a characteristic of modernity. In Simmel s thinking happiness is connected to individuality and he demonstrates this to a certain degree: For Simmel happiness is incommensurable individuality (see Zingerle in this issue). He also began to differentiate between distinctive aspects of well-being for example happiness and pleasure. He regarded happiness as a relative goal, the concepts of morality and freedom stood above happiness. The view that people need to develop their individuality to be happy has been challenged by the opposite view that individualism will create an unlivable society. Simmel s intuition is supported by the results of two lines of empirical research. Firstly, comparison across nations shows higher levels of happiness in individualistic societies. In a study by Veenhoven (1999b) individualization was measured by (1) moral appreciation of individualism, (2) opportunity to choose, (3) capacity to choose. In addition to these aspects overall individualization was measured by expertestimates. Veenhoven concludes: Although life in individualistic societies is not without problems, the costs of individualism are clearly outbalanced by its benefits (p.180). Secondly, individual level studies within nations show clearly that happy people tend to be more autonomous and self-directed than the unhappy (Veenhoven, 1989; Diener et al., 2000). The search for explanations of happiness is still going on and especially cohort analysis seem to offer new insights (Easterlin, 2000). 4. SCEPTISM OF HAPPINESS Philosophers are generally more interested in misery than in happiness, and German philosophers are even characterized by a deep scepticism about happiness. This scepticism manifests first of all in the conceptualization of happiness. As we have seen Schopenhauer reduces happiness to the

7 HAPPINESS: CLASSIC THEORY AND CURRENT RESEARCH 507 absence of misery. Happiness is if at all to think of as a painless condition (cited in Rehberg). In modern wellbeing research there is still an emphasis on misery counting. Most studies in the field deal with matters of anxiety, alienation and mental disturbance and measure in fact prevalence of ill-being rather than overall well-being. The early utilitarian philosopher conceived happiness as the sum of pleasures and pain (Bentham). In modern empirical research this is implemented by affect-balance-scales, such as Bradburn s (1965). These scales assess affective experiences and then subtract the number of positive experiences from the number of negative ones. This balance of affect appears to be highly correlated to self-reports of overall happiness and life-satisfaction. Overall well-being is currently distinguished from specific ill-being. The matters are related, but not the same. In empirical studies there is a clear negative relationship between anxiety and happiness: the more anxiety the less happiness. Still, it is true that many people who are happy show a remarkable amount of anxiety and some people who do not report having anxiety also do not feel happy (Glatzer and Zapf, 1984). It can be said therefore that the existence of a certain degree of misery does not necessarily imply the absence of overall happiness. Moreover it seems possible to develop happiness also under bad conditions. This can be seen as a confirmation of two philosophical statements that indeed pain can be compound with happy states and that man is not able to renounce to happiness as far as he cannot renounce being (see Rehberg in this issue). Possibility of happiness The sceptical tradition sees little chance for enduring happiness. Since suffering is inevitable in human life we can only taste happiness in short moments of delusional ecstasy. Herewith we find a clear answer in many studies: there are, at least in modern societies, more people happy than unhappy. According to a usual four-step scale of happiness some people are very happy, a big share rather happy, a certain share rather unhappy and another, small share very unhappy (see as one example Glatzer, 1991). There are different ways to prove these ratings. For example by means of a broader life course interview or by asking friends for their evaluation. These studies suggest that self-reports of happiness are quite valid.

8 508 WOLFGANG GLATZER Societies differ in respect to their amount of happiness. The results of many studies show that there exists a social structural distribution pattern of happiness in each society which scarcely changes over the course of time. This does not imply that the individual keeps a certain position, in fact there is a lot of change from the extremes to the middle and back (Ehrhardt et al., 2000). In a certain time span improvements and deteriorations of individual happiness positions mostly sum up to nearly no net change and this explains the structural stability of happiness measures. Desirability of happiness Sometimes philosophical critiques concerned with happiness as a goal for the masses or as it is also called the democratization of happiness. Modern societies have been characterized by the overstatement of the fact that everybody should live well and have a long life on earth (Sombart cited according to Rehberg in this issue). Others have interpreted this as a phenomenon of decadence, especially Arnold Gehlen (see Rehberg in this issue). A certain fear of mass happiness cannot be neglected. Yet mass happiness in reality did not give rise to moral and societal decadence (Veenhoven, 1989; 1997). The happiest nations of today have strong democracies, they keep up moral principles and they are productive and innovative. People can be happy without destroying their social order; they can elaborate democracy, welfare state and political participation. 5. MODERN STUDY OF HAPPINESS Throughout the centuries the study of happiness was largely theoretically oriented. The old roman text of Senecas (1972) Of blissful life did not lose much of its significance for the search for happiness in the course of the centuries. Knowledge about happiness grew and was differentiated. Nowadays the emphasis is on theoretically guided empirical happiness research. The following points can typify the current tradition of empirical happiness research. Happiness is currently conceived as subjective well-being. In a narrow sense happiness is regarded as one component of subjective well-being, that is: the overall appreciation of life-as-a-whole. There is a differentiation of positive aspects of well-being into specific

9 HAPPINESS: CLASSIC THEORY AND CURRENT RESEARCH 509 satisfactions and pleasures. Subjective well-being is ambivalent in the sense that for many individuals positive and negative aspects of happiness are present at the same time. Some individuals can be satisfied though they are exposed to a lot of misery. Overall happiness depends much on satisfaction in different life domains. Satisfaction in life domains constitute a somewhat stable hierarchy of satisfaction levels in which private life domains, for example the marriage, are in the upper, public domains, for example environmental protection, are in the lower area. Changes in these domain satisfactions are a signal for what has improved or deteriorated in a nation. An essential component of happiness is also the future perspective. Future perspectives are rather sensible and respond more intensively to societal changes than do measures of current happiness. Happiness can be measured adequately by self-reports. Though not very precise, current interview techniques seem to measure happiness reasonably validly (Veenhoven, 1991, p. 24). Despite their deficits, and keep in mind that no statistics are without problems, happiness measures can be used; incomplete measurement is mostly better than no measurement. This is the crucial point of the no measurement situation: everybody can assume what he or she thinks independently of empirical facts; but if we want to get an empirically supported view of happiness in our societies than happiness research must be elaborated and improved. One of the great surprises of happiness research is that average happiness in nations is quite stable over time. Throughout decades the nations scarcely vary in respect to their own happiness scores and dramatic events or rapid social change show only a small influence. Between the countries we find a rather stable stratification, which is different on the level of individuals who show more fluctuation (Ehrhardt et al., 2000). Overall-happiness is influenced by many factors and the search for its determinants is still going on. In respect to theoretical arguments there are two different lines of thinking: the level of living and social comparisons. On average, but not in each single case, it can be found that a better level of living is accompanied by a higher level of wellbeing. Next, we know that individuals compare their living conditions to others in order to evaluate them. Many different people can constitute the reference individuals, for example family members,

10 510 WOLFGANG GLATZER friends, average people in the country, people in foreign countries and so on. Though we now have some knowledge about the processes of how happiness is emerging and developing, this is a point where there are many open questions (Diener et al., 2000). REFERENCES Bellebaum, Alfred (ed) (1992) Glück und Zufriedenheit Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen. Bellebaum, Alfred and Klaus Barheier (eds) (1997) Glücksvorstellungen Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen. Bradburn, Norman M. (1969) The Structure of Psychological Well-Being Aldine Publishing, Chicago. Boutenko, Irina (2000) The Russian Style Happiness and its Social and Political Outcomes Moscow, Unpublished paper. Bulmahn, Thomas (2000) Modernity and Happiness The Case of Germany. Journal of Happiness Studies, 1(3), pp Campbell, Angus and Philippe Converse (1972) The Human Meaning of Social Change New York, Russell Sage Foundation. Diener, Ed and Don R. Rahtz (2000) Advances in Quality of Life Theory and Research, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht/Boston/London. Diener, Ed, Eunkook M. Suh, Richard E. Lucas and Heidi L. Smith (2000) Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress Psychological Bulletin (in press). Diener, Ed and Robert Biswas-Diener (1999) Income and Subjective Well-Being: Will Money Make us Happy? Unpublished paper. Ehrhardt, J., Saris W. and Veenhoven R. (2000) Stability of Life-Satisfaction over Time, Journal of Happiness Studies, 1(2), pp Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Sutzer (2000) Maximising Happiness? German Economic Review, 1(2), pp Easterlin, Richard A. (2000) Life Cycle Welfare: Trends and Differences Journal of Happiness Studies, 2(1) (in press). Glatzer, Wolfgang Zapf and Wolfgang (1984) Lebensqualität in der Bundesrepublik. Objektive subjektives Wohlbefinden Campus, Frankfurt/NewYork. Glatzer, Wolfgang (1992) Lebensqualität und subjektives Wohlbefinden. Ergebnisse sozialwissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen In: Bellebaum 1992, Glatzer, Wolfgang (1991) Quality of Life in Advanced Industrialised Countries: The Case of Germany. In: Strack/Argyle/Schwarz 1991, pp Glatzer, Wolfgang and Mathias Bös (1998) Subjective Attendants of Unification and Transformation in Germany. Social Indicators Research, 43(1 2), pp Habich, Roland, Heinz-Herbret Noll and Wolfgang Zapf (1999) Subjektives Wohlbefinden in Ostdeutschland nähert sich dem westdeutschem Nievau. Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren (ISI) 22/1999. Hagerty, Michael R. and Ruut Veenhoven, 1999: Wealth and Happiness Revisited. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization (in preparation).

11 HAPPINESS: CLASSIC THEORY AND CURRENT RESEARCH 511 Heylighen, Francis and Jan Bernsheim (2000) Global Progress: Empirical Evidence for Ongoing Increase of Quality Of Life Journal of Happiness Studies, 1(4), pp Moller, Valerie (2000) Happiness Trends under Democracy: Where Will the New South African Set Level Come to Rest? Grahamstown/South Africa, Manuscript. Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth and Renate Köcher (1997) Allensbacher Jahrbuch für Demoskopie Allensbach am Bodensee. Noll, Heinz-Herbert 2000: Social Indicators and Social Reporting Schyns, Peggy 1998 Crossnational Differences in Happiness: Economic and Cultural Factors Explored Social Indicators Research, vol. 43, pp Seneca 1978: Vom glückseligen Leben Kröner, Stuttgart. Sztompka, Piotr 2000 Social and Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change Featured Speaker at ISA 2000 RC-Conference: Social Transformation at the Turn of the Millenium. Montreal Strack, Fritz, Michael Argyle and Norbert Schwarz 1991 Subjective Well-Being, an Interdisciplinary Perspective Pergamon Press, Oxford. Veenhoven, Ruut (1989) How Harmful is Happiness? Consequences of Enjoying Life or Not. Universitaire Press, Rotterdam. Veenhoven, Ruut (1991) Questions on Happiness: Classical Topics, Modern Answers, Blind Spots In: Strack, Argyle and Schwarz 1991, Veenhoven, Ruut (1996) Happy Life-Expectancy. A Comprehensive Measure of Quality of Life in Nations Social Indicators Research, vol. 39, pp Veenhoven, Ruut (1997) Advances in Understanding Happiness Revue Quebecoise de Psychologie, vol. 18, pp Veenhoven, Ruut (1999a) World Data Base of Happiness Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Veenhoven, Ruut (1999b) Quality of Life in Individualistic Society: A Comparison of 43 Nations in the Early 1990 s. Social Indicators Research, vol. 48, no.2, pp Veenhoven, Ruut (2000) Freedom and Happiness. A Comparative Study in 44 Nations in the Early 1990 s. in: Diener, E and Suh, E, (eds.) Subjective wellbeing across nations, MIT press, Boston. Veenhoven, Ruut (2001) Are the Russians as unhappy as they say they are? Journal of Happiness Studies, vol. 2, in press. Zapf, Wolfgang (1987) German Social Report Living Conditions and Subjective Well-Being Social Indicators Research, vol. 19, No. 1. Address for Correspondence: Professor Dr. WOLFGANG GLATZER J.W. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main Institut für Gesellschafts- und Politikanalyse P.O. Box D Frankfurt am Main, Germany glatzer@soz.uni-frankfurt.de