U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction. Michelle Keck. University of Texas at Brownsville. PAT-Net Conference 2012

Transcription

1 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction Michelle Keck University of Texas at Brownsville PAT-Net Conference 2012 South Padre Island, Texas

2 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 2 Abstract Border enforcement is a key policy tool adopted by the U.S. to prevent the flow of illegal drugs. The U.S.-Mexican Border has become the frontline in the war on drugs with the U.S. Custom and U.S. Border Patrol the primary drug interdicting organizations along the Southwest border. This raises important questions, specifically regarding illicit global markets and the role of the state in facilitating and regulating the illicit drug trade. I seek to examine the correlation between the illegal drug supply and border enforcement in the United States. More specifically, does U.S. border enforcement along the U.S.-Mexican border influence the illegal drug supply? I seek to examine how state policy and structures shape the illicit drug trade between the two states in an attempt to add to the literature on illicit international political economy. Key words: border enforcement, U.S.-Mexican border, and drug supply reduction

3 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 3 Introduction The U.S. government relies on interdiction, including border inspections and border patrols, to disrupt the flow of drugs. Border enforcement has become a key component in the federal government s interdiction efforts. The size and budgets for agencies related to border enforcement efforts has increased considerably. For example, between 1993 and 1997, U.S. Customs Service funding earmarked for the southwest border grew 72 percent and the size of the U.S. Border Patrol doubled between 1993 and 2000 (Andreas, 2009: 51). This is especially true along the 2000-mile U.S. and Mexican border where, by the end of the 1990s, more U.S. border patrol agents were stationed in Brownsville, Texas than along the entire 4000-mile U.S.-Canadian border (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006:168). Presently, the Department of Homeland Security indicates that the number of boots on the ground along the Southwest border stands at more than 17,700 Border Patrol agents (Department of Homeland Security, 2011). Notable and highly visible interdiction efforts along the U.S.-Mexican border including Operation Hard Line and Operation Brass Ring, as well as involvement of the U.S. military are all part of an effort to reduce the supply of drugs reaching the illicit drug market in the United States. The policy focuses on the border, the so-called source of the problem. Interdiction policy like border enforcement focus on the supply side of the drug problem and are designed to increase the price of drugs, which is thought to reduce availability and demand. In spite of all the resources devoted to the interdiction effort at the border, questions have been raised about its effectiveness. In 1989, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the Senate argued that interdiction had failed with seizures

4 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 4 having little impact on the drug problem. In a 1993 Senate subcommittee hearing on border drug interdiction, it was noted that, interdiction has not had and is unlikely to have a significant impact on the national goal of reducing drug supplies to the United States (Rodriguez, 1993). A number of scholars have examined the effectiveness of supply side reduction efforts (Moore 1979, 1990; Reuter 1988a, 1988b) utilizing various measures. Moore (1990) found that supply side reduction efforts reduce the price of marijuana and heroin, however not the price of cocaine. A study by Reuter (1988a) indicates that interdiction does little to reduce cocaine consumption in the U.S. Studies by Rhodes, Hyatt, and Scheiman (1994) and Nadlemann (1989) find that cocaine and heroin prices fell sharply through most of the 1980s.While these studies provide important information on supply side efforts impacts on the illicit drug trade they fail to isolate the specific affect that border enforcement has on the illicit drug trade. Utilizing line watch data from the U.S. Border Patrol, which represents the number of hours that U.S. Border Patrol agents spend in different lines of activity, including traffic observation, transportation check, and traffic check, I seek to determine the impact that border enforcement has on illegal drug trade. More specifically, I seek to test the relationship between border enforcement, drug seizures, and drug prices in order to gauge if border enforcement is an effective supply side reduction strategy. In the section that follows I will provide a history of U.S. interdiction policy, focusing on effort along the Southwest border. I will then examine theory and policies concerning supply side strategies and introduce my hypotheses in order to

5 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 5 determine the effectiveness of border enforcement. The results will follow ending with concluding remarks regarding the findings of my study. A History of US Interdiction Policy U.S. interdiction policy first emphasized border enforcement beginning with Nixon s 1971 war on drugs. One lasting aspect of Nixon s legacy was to shift attention abroad. Nixon s administration set its sights on foreign supply elevating it to a central component in the American war on drugs. Nixon called for a supply side reduction policy, to strike at the supply side of the drug equation-to halt the drug traffic by striking at the illegal producers of drugs, the growing of those plants from which drugs are derived, and trafficking in these drugs beyond our borders (Nixon, 1971: p. 95). Consequently, the administration implemented Operation Intercept, which employed two thousand agents along the U.S.-Mexican border to conduct border patrol efforts described in official reports as, the country s largest peacetime search and seizure operation by civil authorities (Bertram, Blachman, Sharpe, and Andreas 1996: p. 107). The Reagan administration ushered in an intensification of U.S. interdiction policy when he announced a new war on drugs in his second term and classified illegal drugs as a national security threat (Andreas, 2009). Cocaine and marijuana were being trafficked through the Southeast, and in response, the administration, with the creation of the South Florida Task Force, started to target air and sea cocaine smuggling routes from the Caribbean to south Florida in order to reduce supply. The U.S. military was utilized for the first time to assist the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service in their efforts. These activities were able to successfully reduce the flow and the use of radar limited the ability of drug traffickers to smuggle

6 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 6 by air. Although U.S. officials declared the efforts a triumph, Andreas (2009) indicates the actions merely redirected the flow of cocaine to the ground, particularly to the Southwest through Mexico. In response to this unintended consequence, the administration turned its focus to the Southwest executing Operation Alliance to coordinate military and civilian interdiction activities on the U.S.-Mexican border. As Andreas (2009) notes, the strategy from the Southeast was replicated in the Southwest and involved providing additional financing to enhance Border Patrol and Customs presence. As epitomized by Coast Guard Admiral Paul Yost in testimony before the House Select Committee on Narcotics, The more money that you spend on it, the more success you are going to have in the interdiction area (Yost, 1986). The stepped up drug checks occurring at points of entry acted to slow commerce which drew the concerns of many in the private sector. In response the Customs Service initiated the Southwest Border Strategy designed to improve the flow of legal cargo while prohibiting illegal cargo. The 1990s marks a turning point in which enforcement along the U.S.- Mexican dramatically increased. This escalation was directly related to the successful interdiction efforts in the Southeast, which resulted in a significant increase in drug traffic to the Southwest border. In response to the heightened traffic the region was denoted as a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area in Consequently, the size of the U.S. Border Patrol doubled between 1993 and 2000 while the budget of the Immigration and Naturalization Service nearly tripled (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 166). By 2001, there were 9000 agents patrolling the 2000-mile long U.S.-Mexican border compared to 334 agents assigned to police

7 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 7 the 4000-mile long U.S.-Canadian border (Andreas and Nadlemann, 2006). The U.S. military also got involved in border enforcement policy through the Department of Defense s establishment of the Joint Task Force North at Fort Bliss, which provides military support to law enforcement in order stem illegal drug trafficking. In addition, a number of highly concentrated and highly visible border enforcement operations were implemented in order to secure the border from illegal drugs, particularly in light of the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, which provoked fears of increased drug trafficking through commercial cargo into the U.S. In 1995, Operation Hard Line stepped up efforts to limit drug trafficking in commercial cargo. Low cocaine seizure numbers lead to outcry in Congress and resulted in Operation Brass Ring, which was initiated in 1998 in order to substantially increase drug seizure numbers in commercial cargo through an increased reliance on technology, including x-ray machines. Today the presence of law enforcement on the U.S.-Mexican border is at historic levels. The Border Patrol s prevention through deterrence strategy, which involves increased border patrol agents, use of surveillance technology, and fencing, is designed to push dug smugglers and illegal immigrants toward more hostile and difficult terrain. This has resulted in a steady increase in the number of agents stationed at the Southern border. For example, in 1992, there were 3,555 agents on the southern border, by 2000 that number had increased by to 8,580. Since 2000, the number of agents assigned to the southern border has continued to increase, more than doubling again to 20,119 agents at the end of 2009 (Haddal, 2010:12). Prevention through deterrence has also led to an evolution in surveillance technology in the interdiction effort with the use of unarmed drones. The U.S. has

8 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 8 begun to make use of high altitude Global Hawk drones along the U.S.-Mexico border. The use of drones permits the U.S. and Mexico to gather intelligence on drug cartels, allowing them to locate and follow drug smugglers activities. Additionally, the Custom and Border Protection have built barriers to stem the flow of drugs as a result of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). Policies in SBI include the construction of a $3 billion, 670 mile long wall along the southwest border from Brownsville, Texas to San Diego, California as well as the creation of a $1.6 billion virtual fence, known as SBInet, in Arizona (Perez-Trevino, June 19, 2010) in an effort to reduce the flow of people and drugs across the border. As of 2005, just over 80 miles of federally enforced barriers and fencing were at strategic points on the border, mainly in Texas and California. Supply Side Reduction The primary theory that underscores U.S. drug policy is the economics of supply. The economics of supply theory seeks to determine the impact that crop eradication, legal prohibitions, and enforcement has on the illegal drug supply (Wisotsky, 1983; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). Utilizing comparative statics, this approach compares the structure, conduct, and performance of the drug industry in an illegal market with its performance in a legal market. The level of enforcement or legal barriers in an illegal market is expected to alter the supply and price. Given its economic roots, this theory is informed by the basic laws of supply and demand such that an illegal market will supply fewer drugs for any given price and charge a higher price when compared to a legal market. These forces will become even more prevalent with elevated enforcement due to the fact that suppliers will drive up prices as a result of greater risk. Since this

9 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 9 theory relies on supply and demand, there is always the potential that actors in the market will adjust to enforcement or legal restrictions making it difficult to assess the long term impact of supply side reduction efforts. This is very apparent regarding border enforcement with successful U.S. interdiction efforts in the Southeast eventually relocated drug traffic to the U.S.-Mexican border. Several policies currently undertaken by the US government utilizing the logic of the economics of supply include striking at the source, arresting drug traffickers and users, and stopping drugs at the border. All policies concentrate on the three stages in the illegal drug trade and are designed to reduce production and the availability of drugs. A brief examination of these policies will highlight variations between them. At the source supply reduction policies concentrate on striking at the root cause of the drug problem. This includes crop eradication, crop substitution, and treaty negotiation. Several scholars criticize these types of policies arguing that they are unable to affect prices in a reliable manner. Moore (1990) contends that strike at the source policies are ineffective due to the fact that the U.S. must rely on the actions of foreign governments. Nadlemann (1989) argues that eradication efforts are problematic because marijuana, opium, and coca can be grown in a large number of places creating new producers and that growers will utilize guerillafarming methods to plant crops in inaccessible areas. A second commonly used supply reduction policy involves law enforcement efforts targeting traffickers and users. A number of scholars (Reuter and Kleiman 1986; Caulkins and Reuter 2010) have examined how enforcement efforts can affect price. Reuter and Kleiman (1986) argue that enforcement imposes costs on drug

10 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 10 dealers and these costs are passed to the consumer. Caulkins and Reuter (2010) find that a base level of enforcement drives prices up above the legalized price, however they conclude that in established markets expanding enforcement past the base level is a costly way to drive up the price. The final supply reduction policy, interdiction, essentially stopping drugs at the border, is the subject of this study. U.S. Border Patrol and Custom officials engage in border patrol and inspections in order to interdict dug shipments headed to U.S. markets. Interdiction is expected to increase the price of illegal drugs by reducing the amount available for consumption. Of all the supply reduction policies utilized by the U.S., Moore (1990) indicates that interdiction has grown the fastest. The border does allow for unique legal powers regarding searches and seizures with seizures being one of the ways in which success of interdiction is measured. One would expect that regardless its ability to influence price, border enforcement should be positively related to illegal drug seizures. Scholars have raised questions regarding the ability of interdiction to disrupt the drug supply and price, resulting in mixed findings. Seizures are deemed to be ineffective at disrupting the market, and thus price, unless they are very large due to the fact that suppliers can typically replace the lost product at wholesale costs (Nadlemann 1989). Reuter (1988a) argues that in spite of an increase in cocaine seizures in the 1980s, the total imports continued to increase and the price of cocaine at the import and retail level fell by a significant amount. His study indicates that even a fifty percent reduction in the Latin American cocaine supply would increase the street price only three percent due to the fact that the value added to drugs occurs after the drugs cross the border highlighting the impact of local law

11 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 11 enforcement. Additionally, Nadlemann (1989:940) notes that since cocaine and heroin are worth more than their weight in gold, the incentive to smuggle the drugs to the U.S. is likely to continue unabated in spite of the risks. Moore (1990) indicates that interdiction appears to affect the price of marijuana due to the fact that it is bulkier and more likely to be shipped in noncommercial vehicles. Nadlemann (1989) also indicates that interdiction has been successful at reducing the supply of marijuana and has increased its price, however, this has resulted in smugglers switching from trafficking marijuana to the less bulky cocaine. The mixed findings in the literature give rise to this paper. I seek to assess the effectiveness of interdiction efforts by examining the relationship between border enforcement, drug seizures, and drug prices. Using U.S. Border Patrol linewatch data as a measure of border enforcement, which records the number of hours agents spend policing land borders and ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexican border, the following hypotheses are proposed: H1: Border enforcement will be positively related to the amount of cocaine seized. H2: Border enforcement will be positively related to the amount of marijuana seized. H3: Border enforcement will be positively related to the amount of heroin seized. H4: Border enforcement will be positively related to the price of marijuana. H5: Border enforcement will be negatively related to the price of cocaine. H6: Border enforcement will be negatively related to the price of heroin.

12 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 12 Data and Methods To determine the impact that border enforcement has on the illegal drug market, I will analyze data from These dates are important for a number of reasons. As noted earlier, interdiction efforts along the Southwestern border increased dramatically in the early nineties, making the period an important test for border enforcement policies. In addition, these years include September 11 th and its aftermath, an effect that resulted in increased appropriations for border patrol funding. The variables of interest in this analysis include border enforcement, which is operationalized using U.S. Border Patrol data on linewatch hours on the U.S.- Mexican border. Linewatch hours provide a good proxy for border enforcement since they are a measure of the number of hours per year the U.S. border Patrol spend in activities including traffic observation, transportation check, and traffic check. A log of the variable is taken to account for extreme values in order to improve interpretability. Data on drug seizures is taken from the 1997 Office of National Drug Control Policy Report on the Southwest border region and a 2007 GAO report on U.S. interdiction efforts on the Southwestern border. The data sources provide the annual amount of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana seized along the Southwest border in metric tons. A log of the variable is taken to account for extreme values in order to improve interpretability. Data on cocaine, heroin, and marijuana prices is obtained from the 2005 National Drug Control Strategy Data Supplement and is measured in grams. In order to control for inflation, the price data has been converted to 2003 U.S. dollars.

13 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 13 To assess the relationship between my variables of interest, I utilize bivariate regression analysis. The choice of method will limit my findings since I am not considering possible control variables that could also influence my dependent variables, resulting in omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, this study is attempting a first cut into understanding how border enforcement impacts critical variables related to the illegal drug trade. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the study. Table 1. Summary Statistics Variables Observations Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Dev. Linewatch Cocaine seizures Marijuana seizures Heroin seizures Total drug seizures Cocaine price Marijuana price Heroin price Results The results, provided in the tables below, reveal some interesting findings regarding the affect of border enforcement on the illegal drug market. Table 2: Bivariate Analysis of Border Enforcement and Cocaine Seizure Cocaine seizure P value Border enforcement ** (.1678) Constant (2.647) Observations F R ** ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p>0.10; two-tailed tests; Robust standard errors in parentheses. The results in Table 2 reveal a positive relationship between border enforcement and cocaine seizures. A one-unit increase in the number of linewatch hours spent by

14 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 14 U.S. Border Patrol on the U.S.-Mexican border results in a.452 increase in cocaine seizures. This finding confirms hypothesis one. Scholars such as Moore (1990) have argued that cocaine traffickers may be less likely to face seizure due to their ability to utilize other smuggling methods including shipments through commercial ships and planes, however the results here suggest that border enforcement leads to an increase in cocaine seizure. Although border enforcement is positively related to cocaine seizure, questions remain regarding how effective seizures are regarding cocaine prices, which is the primary reason why the policy is pursued. The General Accounting Office notes this issue concluding in a report that, The enormous profits in cocaine trafficking make interdiction loses relatively inconsequential Given this huge profit margin, it appears unlikely that interdiction will be a significant cost deterrent to traffickers (Rodriguez, 1993). Table 3. Bivariate Analysis of Border Enforcement and Marijuana Seizure Marijuana seizure P value Border enforcement ** (.3485) Constant ** (5.446) Observations F R ** ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p>0.10; two-tailed tests; Robust standard errors in parentheses. The results in table 3 support hypothesis 3, which contends that border enforcement will be positively related to marijuana seizures. A one unit increase in the number of linewatch hours increase marijuana seizures by 1.68 metric tons. Marijuana has historically been the most intercepted illegal drug far exceeding the amounts of cocaine and heroin. Data from this study presented in table 4 reveals the

15 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 15 large disparities in the amount of drugs seized. Moore (1990) argues that one of the weaknesses of U.S. interdiction policy is the considerable focus on marijuana, which does appear to affect the price of marijuana more than other illegal drugs giving interdiction policies a semblance of success in regard to marijuana. In spite of this perceived success, Nadlemann (1989) argues that marijuana interdiction has lead to unintended consequences, particularly in light of the fact that the U.S. has emerged as one of the world s leading producers of marijuana and is believed to produce some the best and most potent strains in the world. Additionally, Nadlemann (1989) indicates that this increased focus on marijuana has shifted traffickers focus to cocaine. Table 4. Drugs Seizures along Southwestern Border, in Metric Tons 1 Year Cocaine Heroin Marijuana Results regarding the influence of border enforcement on heroin were not significant. Heroin has often been touted as the least likely drug to be seized and the most difficult drug to interdict given the ease in the ability for it to be hidden, avoiding seizure by border patrol authorities (Betram, Blachman, Sharpe, and Andreas 1996). Data in table 4 indicate the small amount of heroin seized along the 1 Data taken from The Office of National Drug Control Policy at and a 2007 GAO report at

16 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 16 U.S.-Mexican border annually, particularly when compared to cocaine and marijuana interdictions. Table 5. Bivariate Analysis of Border enforcement and Heroin seizure Heroin seizure P value Border enforcement (.1758) Constant * (1.084) Observations F * R ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p>0.10; two-tailed tests; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results regarding the relationship between border enforcement and illegal drug prices are presented in Tables 6-8. The results regarding the relationship between border enforcement and its impact on the prices of illegal drugs provide some interesting results. Although marijuana has been heralded as the most interdicted and, as a result, the most likely drug to been influenced in terms of price by border enforcement efforts, the results from this study disconfirm hypothesis 4 with no statistically significant relationship found between border enforcement and the price of marijuana. Table 6. Bivariate Analysis of Border enforcement and Marijuana Price Marijuana price P value Border enforcement (1.666) Constant (26.194) Observations F R ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p>0.10; two-tailed tests; Robust standard errors in parentheses.

17 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 17 The results regarding the impact that border enforcement has on the price of cocaine and heroin do support hypotheses 5 and 6 and portend negative consequences for interdiction in regards to its ability to affect prices of cocaine and heroin. As indicated in Table 7, a one-unit increase in the number of linewatch hours reduces the price of cocaine in the U.S. by $9.54. This result supports the findings of Reuter (1988a) who argues that up to ninety percent of the street value of cocaine is added after it crosses the border making interdiction efforts an ineffective policy in regard to its influence on cocaine price. Table 7. Bivariate Analysis of Border Enforcement and Cocaine Price Cocaine price Border enforcement (4.379) Constant (67.892) Observations F R * P value 0.072* 0.023** ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p>0.10; two-tailed tests; Robust standard errors in parentheses. The results for heroin support hypothesis 6 and indicate that a one unit increase in the number of hours spent by U.S. Border Patrol agents in linewatch duties acts to decrease the price of heroin by $ Scholars including Betram, Blachman, Sharpe, and Andreas (1996) attribute the failure of interdiction policies to influence the price of heroin to advanced smuggling techniques that make detection difficult.

18 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 18 Table 8. Bivariate Analysis of Border enforcement and Heroin Price Heroin price P value Border enforcement *** (13.207) Constant *** ( ) Observations F *** R ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p>0.10; two-tailed tests; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Conclusion This study represents a first attempt at determining the influence that border enforcement has on the illegal drug market in the U.S. The results reveal some interesting findings regarding the affect of border enforcement on the seizure and price of illegal drugs. A positive significant relationship was found between border enforcement and cocaine and marijuana seizures with no significant affect found regarding heroin seizures. No statistically significant relationship was found between border enforcement and the price of marijuana, contrary to assumptions in the literature; however, the results indicate that border enforcement is statistically significant and negatively related to cocaine and heroin prices with an increase in border enforcement reducing the price of both drugs. There are numerous difficulties in relying on border enforcement alone to fight illegal drugs and the literature reveals the mixed record of success that interdiction has had on the illegal drug market. U.S. government officials have admitted the difficulty with President Reagan noting that, With borders like ours, [interdiction] as the main method of halting the drug problem is virtually impossible like carrying water in a sieve (Reagan, 1981:10). In spite of these difficulties interdiction efforts

19 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 19 have not only continued they have escalated making it important to study the effectiveness of such an expensive supply side reduction policy. This study represents a first cut at this question on which I hope to build upon. Future research on this topic would involve expanding the model to consider the effectiveness of border enforcement alongside other supply side reduction policies such as law enforcement. Furthermore, future plans include collecting data on border enforcement, drug prices, and drug seizures for a longer period of time in order to determine the historical relationship utilizing a bivariate time series VAR analysis.

20 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 20 Works Cited Andreas, P. (2009). Border games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Andreas, P. and Nadelmann E. (2006). Policing the Globe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Betram, E, Blachman, M, Sharpe, K, and Andreas, P. (1996). Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial. Berkeley: University of California Press. Caulkins, J. and Reuter, P. (2010). How Drug Enforcement Affects Drug Prices. Crime and Justice, 39, Haddal, C. (March 3, 2010). Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from Moore, M. (1979). Limiting Supplies of Drugs to Illicit Markets in the United States. Journal of Drug Issues, 9, Moore, M. (1990). Supply Reduction and Drug Law Enforcement. Crime and Justice, 13, Nadelmann, E. (1989). Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives. Science, 245, Nixon, R. (1971). President s Message on Drug Control Programs, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 26, 95A. Perez-Trevino, E. (June 19, 2010). Costly efforts to secure border not paying off. The Brownsville Herald. Retrieved from Reagan, Ronald. (March 7, 1981). Transcript of the President s News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters. New York Times, 10. Reuter, P. (1988a). Can the Borders be Sealed? Public Interest, 92, Reuter, P. (1988b). Quantity Illusions and Paradoxes of Drug Interdiction: Federal Intervention into Vice Policy. Law and Contemporary Problems, 51, Reuter, P. and Kleiman, M. (1986). In Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, vol. 7. M. Tonry and N. Morris, (Eds.). Chicago: Chicago University Press. Rhodes, W., Hyatt, R and Scheiman, P. (1994). The Price of Cocaine, Heroin, and Marijuana, Journal of Drug Issues, 24,

21 U.S. Border Enforcement and Illegal Drug Supply Reduction 21 Rodriguez, L. (1993). Statement before the Legislation and National Security Committee Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations. Wisotsky, S. (1983). Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition. University of Wisconsin Law Review, United States Department of Homeland Security. (July 20, 2011). Secure and Manage Our Borders. Retrieved from United States General Accounting Office. (2007). U.S. Assistance has helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but the Flow of Illicit Drugs into the United States Remains High. Retrieved from United States National Drug Control Strategy. (2005). Data Supplement. Retrieved from United States Office of National Drug Control Policy. (1997). The Southwest Border Region in Context. Retrieved from Yost, P. (1986). Testimony before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 99 th Congress.