High Path Avian Influenza. October 14, 2015 Reservoir Migrating Wild Waterfowl

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Transcription:

High Path Avian Influenza October 14, 2015 Reservoir Migrating Wild Waterfowl 1

Most Severe Animal Disease Outbreak in US History 232 Domestic Poultry Flocks Small flocks (21) to large commercial (211) Hardest Hit Industries Turkeys Laying Hens/Pullets Iowa, Minnesota Also Nebraska, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Arkansas, Missouri, North Dakota 49.6 million birds lost 2

Economic Impacts Elsewhere 10% of nation s egg-laying hens killed Iowa (#1 in U.S. egg production): o 33 million-plus birds killed worth $84 million o Lost 24 million, or over 40%, of its egg-laying hens o Loss estimates exceed $1 billion o Expect 1,500 lost jobs Minnesota: o $310 million - direct poultry industry loss o $1.8 billion loss by allied industries 3

Cost of Disease Eradication $700 from Commodity Credit Corporation $500 million to control spread $190 million in direct indemnity payments Industry Costs $1.6 million in turkey and laying hen industry losses $3.3 billion loss to broader economy International trade bans (including partial and regional) 38 at the peak 4

Current Disease Status A lull in newly infected flocks in the Upper Midwest since late June warm weather conditions. HPAI is expected to return with cooler weather this fall. Possibly to major poultry production regions in the Southeast and East that were previously untouched. Worst case scenario is 500 additional flocks nationwide. 5

6 Poultry Density and Risk

Potential Costs and Losses Costs Include Loss of birds farmer/integrator indemnity Depopulation (estimates from $6-$26 per bird) Disposal of dead birds and contaminated materials (litter, feed, manure, eggs, bedding) Cleaning and disinfection of premises Down time of production facilities Losses to allied industries (poultry service companies, feed providers, the poultry and egg processing industries, etc.) 7

Indemnity For birds that must be euthanized those alive at time of disease confirmation Fair market value of inventory based on calculator that takes into consideration age and intended use of birds. Indemnity is not paid for: - Birds that die prior to HPAI confirmation. - Lost income from idled facilities Indemnity is not restorative 8

Public Health Most HPAI strains are not transmissible to humans. - Exception Asian H5N1 with limited infectivity for humans. Causes severe disease in limited number of human cases. According to the Centers for Disease Control no human infections have been associated with the ongoing US HPAI outbreak. Personal protective equipment recommendations for all responders. 9

HPAI Vaccination A possible strategy as an emergency measure for disease containment and elimination. Considered a last resort under extreme conditions in severe outbreaks. - Protect susceptible population. - Reduce severity of disease. Inactivated vaccine is under development - Field isolate genetically modified by USDA, ARS - Recent contracts to two manufacturers for vaccines to be held in the National Veterinary Stockpile (10-13-2015) Concerns: - International trade - Re-establishing the nation s disease-free status. - Testing differentiating vaccinated poultry from naturally infected poultry. 10

Disease Eradication HPAI is a foreign animal disease dealt with by stamping out procedures per Federal requirements. Federal financial assistance to producers Indemnity for birds alive at time HPAI diagnosis is laboratoryconfirmed. Testing, Depopulation, Disposal, Cleaning and Disinfection assistance. Small flocks compliance agreement with producer Larger firms cooperative agreement with producer Based on flock plan agreement signed by Federal officials, State officials and producer once HPAI is confirmed. 11

Control & Surveillance Zones Infected Zone (IZ) - at least 3 kilometer (1.86 mi.) perimeter to extend from infected premises. Initially encompasses infected (IP), suspect (SP), contact (CP), at risk (ARP), and monitored premises (MP). Within infected zone - IP, SP, and CP subject to quarantine ARP and MP subject to movement controls. Buffer Zone (BZ) at least 7 kilometer (4.35 mi.) perimeter beyond infected zone to surround infected zone. Within buffer zone any CPs are subject to quarantine, ARPs and MPs are subject to movement controls. Control Area (CA) = Infected Zone + Buffer Zone. Shape is subject to change depending on outbreak circumstances. 12

Virus Inactivation on Infected Premises Takes a minimum of about 30 days in decomposing carcasses. Disposal options: - Composting preferably in-house - Burial - Incineration - Landfill 13

Repopulation/Restocking Minimum of 21 days after: - Cleaning and Disinfection - Negative confirmatory environmental testing - Generally restocking criteria are met 2 6 months after disease outbreak depending on conditions. - Phased restocking of laying operations takes longer (18 mo. +/-) Restocking must be approved by USDA, APHIS - Farms that restock without APHIS approval will not be indemnified if they become re-infected. 14

Current Status of Midwest Recovery USDA HPAI Status Report 10-9-2015 All control areas have been released The last newly infected flocks were identified in late June 197 of 211 infected commercial flocks approved for restocking 15

Exercise Real Time September 12, 2015 Franklin County Meat Turkey Flock 7000 birds 18 weeks old September 11 6 mortalities normal September 12 100 mortalities Ongoing mortalities through the day Emergency notification to PDA. Emergency testing at PVL. Initial steps in notification/activation. PCR test results negative for HPAI at 7:00 PM, 9-12-15 Further testing in PADLS Fowl Cholera Diagnosed 16

USDA Epidemiologic Analysis 81 Turkey Farms 17 Common biosecurity practices audited biosecurity protocols Spraying vehicle tires. PPE for visitors/employees coveralls and shoe covers. Disinfectant foot baths. Establishment of clean/dirty lines of separation. Identified risk factors Fomites shared equipment. Mechanical transfer of virus by wild birds, rodents and personnel. https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/do wnloads/epidemiologic-analysis-july-15-2015.pdf

Epidemiologic Analysis Layer operations in Iowa and Nebraska Risk Factors Being located within a 10 KM control zone. Rendering of dead birds risks associated with rendering company pick-ups. Equipment sharing trucks, trailers, other vehicles, egg racks, pallets and flats. Lowered risk of infection Being > 100 yards from a public gravel or dirt road. Having vehicle wash stations. Being > 100 miles from the egg processing facility used by the farm. 18

19 Questions