Bird Flu: What is it? And how it happen?

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1 Bird Flu: hat is it? And how it happen? Mohamed El-Gazzar, DVM, MAM, hd, DACV Assistant rofessor and oultry Extension Veterinarian The Ohio State University

2 Lay Out hat is Avian Influenza? 2015 outbreak hat can we do about it? Biosecurity

3 Influenza Orthomyxoviridae

4 Influenza Classification Based on N and Matrix Ag (A, B and C) A (Reservoir is water fowl) B (Human and seals) C (Human and swine)

5 Influenza A Infect many species Fastest evolving Shift (Reassortment) Drift (oint mutation)

6 Because of Drift 16 HA (H1 H16) 9 NA (N1 N9) Influenza Diversity Because of Shift All 144 HA-NA combinations exist ild ater fowl hich ones are avian influenza?

7 Nomenclature Type Location Number of isolate A/duck/Germany/1/72 (H2N9) Host Year of isolation Subtype

8 Highly athogenic Avian Influenza Highly pathogenic to what? Definition? H5 or H7 Clinical Molecular ublic health significance?

Avian Influenza in USA Oldest 1924 1925 Biggest H5N2 ennsylvania 1983

9 Avian Influenza in USA Oldest Biggest H5N2 ennsylvania 1983 Over $700 M Few Smaller out breaks California, Texas Most Recent December 2014

10 H5 HAI reports from East Asia September 2014 through February 2015 (OIE) Eastern Asia Reports of H5 HAI subsided in the region during summer Then in September, outbreaks of H5N1, H5N2, H5N6, H5N8 HAI occurred in China. Original H5N8 outbreak occurred January- April, 2014, most intensely in S. Korea and Japan. After 5 months with no reported cases, H5N8 was detected again, 24 September, in S. Korean commercial poultry. It was detected again in Japan in November. H5N2, H5N3, H5N8 outbreaks occurred in Taiwan in early H5N1 in wild birds H5N1 in poultry H5N2 in wild birds H5N2 in poultry H5N3 in wild birds H5N3 in poultry H5N6 in wild birds H5N6 in poultry H5N8 in wild birds H5N8 in poultry

11 H5 HAI reports from Europe, Middle East, and Africa November 2014 through February 2015 (OIE) Eastern Asia estern Europe H5N8 was first isolated 4 November 2014 from commercial poultry in Germany; also isolated in November from a wild duck. By mid-december, H5N8 was isolated from commercial poultry in The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Italy. Reports of H5 HAI subsided in the region during summer Then in September, outbreaks of H5N1, H5N2, H5N6, H5N8 HAI occurred in China. Original H5N8 outbreak occurred January- April, 2014, most intensely in S. Korea and Japan. After 5 months with no reported cases, H5N8 was detected again, 24 September, in S. Korean commercial poultry. It was detected again in Japan in November. H5N2, H5N3, H5N8 outbreaks occurred in Taiwan in early H5N1 in wild birds H5N1 in poultry H5N2 in wild birds H5N2 in poultry H5N3 in wild birds H5N3 in poultry H5N6 in wild birds H5N6 in poultry H5N8 in wild birds H5N8 in poultry

12 H5 HAI reports from Europe, Middle East, and Africa November 2014 through February 2015 (OIE) Migratory aquatic birds likely mode for H5N8 HAI virus spread to Europe in fall 2014 Several migratory flyways overlap extensively in northern Eurasia during the breeding season. H5N8 virus carried there from East Asia in the spring could have been transferred to other birds that migrate south into Europe in the fall. H5N8 may be better suited for longdistance dispersal than most strains of HAI. H5N1 in wild birds H5N1 in poultry H5N2 in wild birds H5N2 in poultry H5N3 in wild birds H5N3 in poultry H5N6 in wild birds H5N6 in poultry H5N8 in wild birds H5N8 in poultry

13 H5 HAI reports from North America November 2014 through 9 March 2015 (OIE) Migratory aquatic birds also the likely mode for H5N8 HAI virus spread to North America Eurasion (EA) H5N8 was likely carried to Alaska by infected birds migrating on the East Asia / Australia Flyway. ithin 3 months, HAI viruses were detected in the acific Americas Flyway and the Mississippi Americas Flyway. EA H5N8 underwent gene reassortment with low pathogenicity avian influenza (LAI) strains endemic to North American wild birds. This means a bird was co-infected at some point with the H5N8 and an American (AM) LAI strain, enabling the 8 gene segments to be mixed and matched in new combinations. EA/AM H5N1 and EA/AM H5N2 isolates in the western and central US were reassortants that contained genes of North American and Eurasian origin. H5N1 in wild birds H5N1 in poultry H5N2 in wild birds H5N2 in poultry H5N3 in wild birds H5N3 in poultry H5N6 in wild birds H5N6 in poultry H5N8 in wild birds H5N8 in poultry

14 H5 HAI reports from North America November 2014 through 9 March 2015 (OIE) North America H5N2 first isolated 30 November 2014 from commercial poultry in British Columbia; outbreak continues into Eastern Asia H5N8 first isolated 10 December 2014 from captive wild birds in ashington; later isolated from backyard poultry in Oregon. Similarly, H5N2 identified in US wild birds and backyard poultry. H5N1 first isolated 29 December 2014 from wild duck in ashington. H5N8 isolated 19 January 2015 from commercial turkey farm in California. H5N2 isolated from commercial turkeys in Minnesota and Missouri, March estern Europe H5N8 first isolated 4 November 2014 from commercial poultry in Germany; also isolated in November from a wild duck. By mid-december, H5N8 was isolated from commercial poultry in The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Italy. Reports of H5 HAI subsided in the region during summer Then in September, outbreaks of H5N1, H5N2, H5N6, H5N8 HAI occurred in China. Original H5N8 outbreak occurred January- April, 2014, most intensely in S. Korea and Japan. After 5 months with no reported cases, H5N8 was detected again, 24 September, in S. Korean commercial poultry. It was detected again in Japan in November. H5N2, H5N3, H5N8 outbreaks occurred in Taiwan in early H5N1 in wild birds H5N1 in poultry H5N2 in wild birds H5N2 in poultry H5N3 in wild birds H5N3 in poultry H5N6 in wild birds H5N6 in poultry H5N8 in wild birds H5N8 in poultry

15 redicted Movement of the Outbreak

16 Reassortment in NA EA/AM H5 HAI

17 Ohio and many other States in the Midwest are part of the Mississippi Flyway Migratory Fly ays in NA

18 British Colombia

20 Number of Affected Birds 6/25/2015

21 6/25/2015

22 11/8/2015

23 hy this outbreak is different? HAI have short incubation period This EA/AM H5 HAI unique Long incubation period Makes it difficult to control Southeast oultry Research Laboratory U.S. Department of Agriculture, Athens, GA

24 Control of the Outbreak

25 rogression of the Disease Mortality 2500 Mortality Days

26 Slow rogression of the Disease Observable progression From the back to the front Direct physical contact Very little air transmission Rodents??

28 Depopulation Foaming (broiler and turkey) Layers?? 100, ,000 birds/day

29 Disposal In house composting (turkeys and broilers) 5.7 million birds X 4 lb 23 million lb 100,000 tons of manure Composting Landfill, Burial, Incineration and rendering

30 Using the vaccine in the face of the Outbreak hat do we stand to gain from vaccination? ill vaccination stop the infection?? ill vaccination stop shedding?? hat do we stand to loose? Complicate the control and eradication efforts Commercial implications

31 Summary e didn t really eradicate AI EA/AM H5 HAI unique among all HAI Depopulation and disposal is challenging Vaccination?? Industry response can be better

32 Biosecurity and AI

33 Depopulation and Disposal Bottle Neck in the US

34 British Colombia

35 oultry Diseases Infectious Nutritional Environmental Toxic Developmental Reproductive Behavioral

36 Infectious Causes Viral (Influenza Newcastle) Bacterial (Cholera Coriza) Fungal (Aspergillosis) rotozoal (Coccidiosis) arasitic (Ascarediosis)

37 revent pathogen access Biosecurity Sterility is not the target Control specific pathogens General sanitary practices

38 Specific poultry pathogens Specific poultry pathogens Not all poultry pathogens hat is the source of these pathogens?? oultry Birds Animals Humans

39 Route of Transmission Source of disease Route of Transmission oultry opulation

40 Disease Transmission Direct Transmission: direct physical contact Indirect Transmission: through indirect transportation vehicles

41 Biosecurity rograms Interventions with Direct Transmission Intervention with Indirect Transmission

42 Intervention with Direct Transmission revent Contact: Other poultry ild birds (Open ater Bodies) Captive birds Animals and human Multispecies or multiage Acquire birds from NI Quarantine newly acquired birds Quarantine birds when back from: Show Market Fair

43 Intervention with Indirect Transmission otential vehicles for Indirect Transmission: 1. Human 2. Domestic animals including pets 3. ild animals including varmints and rodents 4. Inanimate objects including equipment 5. Feed 6. ater 7. Environments including shared pastures and water ponds

44 Intervention with Human Transmission 1. No visitors to your flocks Hands and Shoes Cloths 2. ash your Hands 3. lastic shoe covers and sterile gloves 4. Disposable coveralls

45 Intervention with Domestic Animals Transmission No ets Allowed

46 Intervention with ild Animals Transmission Animal-proof houses redators Varmints Rodents Bird-proof houses Rodent Control Insect Control

47 Intervention with Inanimate Objects Transmission Thoroughly clean and disinfect: Equipment (Feeders, Drinkers, egg flats etc.) Bedding Material Housing material Any object contacts birds

48 Intervention with Feed Transmission Feed from trusted sources ellets or crumbled roperly Store: Clean, dry and Cool rotected from wild birds, rodents and animals

49 Intervention with ater Transmission Same quality as human drinking Evaluate ground water (Chemical and biological) Continuous water disinfection 1 part bleach + 15 parts water = 500 ppm (Stock Solution) Recommended 3 5 ppm

50 Intervention with Air Transmission Distance from other poultry (1/2 a mile minimum) Distance from the road Not always possible Keep it in your mind

51 Intervention with Environment Not much we can do Monitory your environment asture ond Determine high risk areas Avoid high risk areas Transmission

52 Biosecurity Movement Control (Biosecurity Line) Fences Gates Movement Directionality Entrances and exits Danish System Shower in/shower out

53 Summary Best Case Scenario orse Case Scenario As close as you can to the former

54 Thank You

High Pathogenic Avian Influenza

High Pathogenic Avian Influenza High athogenic Avian Influenza Dr. Jack Shere Associate Deputy Administrator U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and lant Health Inspection Service Veterinary Services NIAA Annual Meeting 1 HAI History