Evaluating and Improving the Safety of Building Layouts for Active Assailant Threats Priority Subject Matter: Architecture, engineering & design

Transcription

1 Evaluating and Improving the Safety of Building Layouts for Active Assailant Threats Priority Subject Matter: Architecture, engineering & design

2 Introduction Evaluating and Improving the Safety of Building Layouts for Active Assailant Threats

3 Tim Brewer, CEng MICE Professional structural engineer Specializing in physical protective security design Focus on terrorism: structural & human vulnerability Government and commercial projects Industries: education, sport, energy, transportation

4 Abstract Hypothesis: the application of risk-based analytical approaches can improve the way in which we evaluate alternative security designs. Approach: Leveraging occupant egress simulations to compare and contrast different building layout options for credible active assailant threat scenarios.

5 Learning Outcomes 1. Discover potential shortcomings of purely experience-based design decisions 2. Understand egress analysis and its application to active assailant scenario problems 3. Recognize optimum design layouts and identify other ways to improve safety such as areas of refuge and mass notification systems

6 Business Impact Improve the means and methods for security practitioner evaluation of building layouts for armed assailant threat scenarios. Panicking people will not listen to a person yelling: everybody stay calm!, so a solution may be to redesign the architecture to maximize building occupant egress. Ideally, this improvement would be incorporated from the initial design of a building, but the exercise is also useful during remodeling and even assessment work (i.e., maybe occupancy should be reduced, or changes made to the current layout) I recognize that architects/designers are often best placed to effectuate these changes, but as Security Professionals, you are best placed to provide, advice, guidance, and SME input.

7 ..some clarifications I am going to discuss the movement of individuals and groups in a state of panic and the implications of the physical layout of buildings and floor plans on this movement in the context of an armed aggressor / active assailant scenario. Whilst acknowledging the relevance to architects and engineers, much of the material will be useful and interesting to security practitioners. You will be viewing this subject from a new perspective. Although the narrative may often consider schools, this briefing is meant to address a broad spectrum of building use types. Often these principles are best applied in high-density occupied spaces and crowds (e.g., sporting stadia and transportation hubs)

8 Psychology Access Control Alert System Engineering Building Layout Intrusion Detection Video Surveillance Security Gunshot Detection Hardened Shelters Active Shooter / Armed Assailant: A complex problem requires an integrated security solution: Training & Drills Mass Notification

9 Some reasons not to leave! Not a software or consultancy sales pitch Some videos later Real-life quantitative case-studies and examples Excellent references and data sources Please feel free to ask questions throughout and make this interactive

10 Format Data & Statistics what s it telling us? Current & Future Guidance Event what happens? Leveraging Modeling to Support Security Design Lessons for Security Design Conclusions

11 Data & Statistics what s it telling us? Evaluating and Improving the Safety of Building Layouts for Active Assailant Threats

12 Terminology Terminology Agency Definition Mass Shooting Congressional Research Service (CRS) More than four people are killed with a firearm within one event, and in one or more locations in close proximity Mass Killing Congress Three or more killings in a single incident Active Shooter FBI An individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area Armed Assailant Armed Aggressor

13 Number of Active Shooter Events* How many? *As defined by the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation

14 Where? Source: FBI, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2016 and 2017 Schools 39, 24% Government properties 16, 10% Businesses 73, 46% Open spaces 15, 9% Residences, 7, 4% Houses of worship, 6, 4% Health care facilities, 4, 3%

15 Source: FBI, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2016 and 2017 What happens? 57% of attackers are known to the victims 74% of attackers walked through the main entrance 63% of the attacks were over in under 15 minutes 37% of the attacks were over in under 5 minutes 0 5 National Average Police Response Time 7-15 Min So, we need to facilitate survival or escape (Nobody has been shot behind a locked classroom door) 10 15

16 Current & Future Guidance Evaluating and Improving the Safety of Building Layouts for Active Assailant Threats

17 NFPA released the world s first active shooter/hostile event standard with guidance on whole community planning, response, and recovery Developed with insight from law enforcement, fire, EMS, medical providers, facility managers, private industry, DHS, the CIA, FBI and others The scope of this standard is limited to the necessary functions and actions related to preparedness, response, and recovery from an active shooter/hostile event response (ASHER). This standard applies to any community, authority having jurisdiction (AHJ), facility, and member of any organization who responds to or prepares for ASHER incidents. Excellent procedural advice Limited information regarding physical security

18 ASTM Standard for Armed Aggressors (Mass Violence) in Educational Institutions Risk Assessment Perimeters Layouts Building Components Operations Drills & Exercises Coming in 2019

19 Event what happens? Evaluating and Improving the Safety of Building Layouts for Active Assailant Threats

20 Basically Security 101 Get out! Threat Shelter (protect)

21 Decision making On the evening of 1 March 2014, a terrorist attack occurred inside the Kunming Railway Station in Kunming, Yunnan, China. At around 9:20 p.m., a group of eight knifewielding men and women attacked passengers at the city's railway station. Both male and female attackers pulled out long-bladed knives and stabbed and slashed passengers. At the scene, police killed four assailants and captured one injured female. The incident left 31 civilians and 4 perpetrators dead with more than 140 others injured. Attackers (circled) General Panic Watch him

22 Individuals tend to develop blind actionism (unevaluated activity) Escape is slowed down by fallen or injured people turning into obstacles People show herding behavior, i.e., interacting agents transfer contagious effects People move considerably faster than normal The magnitude and direction of the forces can change rapidly, pushing people in an uncontrollable way Alternative exits are not efficiently used or overlooked during escape situations Individuals start pushing, and interactions among people become physical in nature Physical interactions in crowds can cause pressures up to 650psi, enough to bend steel People try to escape from the source of panic, which can be dynamic and often not related to the threat Moving and in particular passing through a bottleneck becomes uncoordinated At doors and exits, clogging and arching are observed Event what happens?

23 Psychology of the Event From a game theory perspective - staying calm is not a stable strategy. Egress under panic is often compared to the prisoner s dilemma that shows why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so common goods dilemma The dilemma arises when members of a group share a common good (e.g., the ability to exit a building). Anyone can use the resource but there is a finite amount of the resource available and it is therefore prone to overexploitation, where in a non-iterated game, it is reasonable for the players to take selfish actions rather than cooperate

24 Development of crowd behavior theories 1895 The Irrationalist Approach (Le Bon, 1895) The Panic Model 1960 Emergent Norm Theory (Turner R., 1974) More rationalist approach Present The Social Identity Model (Reicher, 2001) In emergencies, people seek out attachment figures: social norms rarely break down But, such ties can have fatal consequences- people escape (or die) in groups

25 Some crowd modeling myths Myth of Irrationality : the idea that individuals in a crowd lose rational thought Myth of Emotionality : the idea that individuals in a crowd become more emotional Myth of Suggestibility : the idea that individuals in a crowd are more likely to obey or imitate Myth of Destructiveness : the idea that individuals in a crowd are more likely to act violently Myth of Spontaneity : the idea that in a crowd violence occurs more suddenly Myth of Anonymity : the idea that individuals in a crowd feel more anonymous Myth of Uniformity/Unanimity : the idea that all individuals in a crowd act in the same way

26 Decision-making and behavior model for the onset of an attack Layout of the Area Destination Selection Threat Information Initial Judgement Assessment of Threat Strength Path Cost Calculation No Evacuate Decision Yes Path Choice Initial Judgement Stage Global Assessment Stage Path Choice Stage S. Li, J. Zhuang, and S. Shen, A three-stage evacuation decision-making and behavior model for the onset of an attack, Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, vol. 79, pp , Jun

27 How can we incorporate all this during security design/assessment? 1. Understand how the environment (e.g., building) effects the movement of people in a state of panic crowd modeling 2. Identify potential problem areas (e.g., choke points) 3. Provide mitigating measures 1. Operational control 2. Engineering works

28 Leveraging Modeling to Support Security Design Evaluating and Improving the Safety of Building Layouts for Active Assailant Threats

29 Can we model crowd movement effectively? Inputs: Individual physical characteristics of crowd members (e.g., size) Behavior under conditions of panic (e.g., proximity comfort levels, force of movement, speed, route selection etc.) Phenomenology: Crowd self organizing effects when building occupants at risk or under evacuation conditions: Striping effect Zipper effect Herding effect Faster-is-slower effect

30 EXIT EXIT IN IN

31 IN EXIT IN EXIT

32 Lessons for Security Design Evaluating and Improving the Safety of Building Layouts for Active Assailant Threats

33 EXIT EXIT Example 1: Optimal door location, mid-wall or corner? 10% faster evacuation time, 30% lower risk of injuries

34 EXIT EXIT Example 2: Filtering methods for egress, safer/faster? 7% faster evacuation time, 70% lower risk of injuries

35 Example 3: Classroom/office desks can we optimize egress with desk layouts?

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37 % Increase / Decrease in Evacuation Time

38 Example 4: Door availability and location

39 Example 5: Office floor plan availability of exits, proximity to attackers

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43 Conclusions 1. Identified potential shortcomings of purely experience-based design decisions 2. Understand egress modeling and application to active assailant scenario problems 3. Recognize some optimum design layouts Architects/designers are often best placed to building changes, but as Security Professionals, you are best placed to provide, advice, guidance, and SME input. Hypothesis: the application of risk-based analytical approaches can improve the way in which we evaluate alternative security designs.

44 References A. Cuesta, E. Ronchi, S. M. V. Gwynne, M. J. Kinsey, A. L. E. Hunt, and D. Alvear, School egress data: comparing the configuration and validation of five egress modelling tools: School Egress Data, Fire and Materials, vol. 41, no. 5, pp , Aug S. Chen, Y. Di, S. Liu, and B. Wang, Modelling and Analysis on Emergency Evacuation from Metro Stations, Mathematical Problems in Engineering, vol. 2017, pp. 1 11, 2017.

45 Evaluating and Improving the Safety of Building Layouts for Active Assailant Threats Priority Subject Matter: Architecture, engineering & design

46 Armed Aggressor Threat within a Terminal Building Modeling of a potential armed aggressor scenario facilitates the calculation of egress times, and occupant risk, as well as identifying potential choke points and supporting emergency response planning.

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