Dr John Horgan. The Interna/onal Center for the Study of Terrorism

Transcription

1 Dr John Horgan The Interna/onal Center for the Study of Terrorism

2 Visit us on the web: hbp:// 2

3 PhD in Applied Psychology Main focus Psychology of terrorism Strong engagement in fieldwork N. Ireland (1994 ceasefires) Europe, Middle East, South Asia

4 Why examine disengagement?

5 Some reasons Increasing evidence of inability to stem /de of recruits to terrorist movements Lack of knowledge about underlying processes Lack of discussion about what is possible (or not) Recent aben/on to exit processes Increasing visibility of former terrorists Increased research on group weaknesses Increasing prevalence of de- radicalizaaon programs

6 Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collec/ve Disengagement (with T. Bjørgo) Walking Away from Terrorism Evalua/ng the Effec/veness of De- radicaliza/on Programs 6

7 Published by Routledge, month pilot study Semi- structured interviews 29 former terrorists Addi/onal 23 supporters, friends, family members Intensive and detailed case studies Selec/on published; more s/ll under analysis

8 Schmid and Jongman (1988) Mostly secondary sources About 40% involve interviews Doesn t this seem high? Silke (2002, 2004) Same issue of reliance on secondary sources, but made some v. cri/cal observa/ons E.g. interviewing not really interviewing

9 Interviews represented a very minor feature of the overall effort and contributed to no more than four per cent of the informa/on contained in the ar/cle Only 1% of interviews conducted in a systema/c and structured manner for the rest, the interviews are carried out on an ad- hoc, opportunis/c basis.

10 Access is possible; follows a process Respondents typically coopera/ve and facilita/ve Typically high response rate Rigorous data collec/on possible Interviews should not be seen as more special because they are rarely done Same limita/ons as any other research method Engagement issues academics should not be interviewing ac3ve terrorists

11 Why focus on individuals? Role of individual terrorist poorly understood It is not about explaining terrorism at the individual level (Reich, 1990) It is about understanding individual issues in context Group, organiza/onal, ideological etc. 11

12 How do people become involved in terrorism? What reasons do they give (to themselves and to others) for becoming involved? Are there any a- priori quali/es or traits that might act as risk factors for involvement in terrorism? How does the individual acquire the quali/es inherent in, and necessary for, sustained terrorist membership? What is the meaning of involvement, to: Someone who is thinking about becoming involved? Someone who is involved on the periphery? Someone who is involved in a sustained and focused way? Someone who is thinking about leaving? Someone who has lem? How does the individual make decisions as a member of the movement? What are the ways in which a) ideological content and b) ideological processes impinge upon the individual behavior of the terrorist? Chapter 1, Walking Away from Terrorism

13 What does a psychological approach mean? Thus far, psychological approaches omen synonymous with efforts to profile the terrorist Two main reasons for this 13

14 1. Preoccupation with becoming Dramatic consequences of what terrorists do How could anyone do this? They must be abnormal sick different 17

15 2. The fact that so very few people become terrorists: Not everyone who is radicalized necessarily engages in subversive or terrorist activity 18

16 The problems with profiles We just can t find one that is valid, reliable or useful in any prac9cal way Groups are increasingly sensi/ve to profiles Profiles miss Anything to do with how people become involved in the first place The process of radicaliza/on How people move between different roles How people change as a result of involvement

17 Some key findings Terrorists can and do leave Disengagement a complex, dynamic process Not the same as de- radicaliza/on Major reason for leaving: disillusionment from disparity between fantasy vs. reality

18 Terminology Disengagement Behavioural change, usually the result of breaking off par/cipa/on in terrorism Not necessarily leaving De- radicalizaaon Cogni/ve change, usually the result of re- orienta/on in belief or ideology

19 Disillusionment with (unamainable) goals of the group violent methods and who are vicamised by the group Leaders, social relaaons within the group Loss of posiaon and status within the group Cannot take the pressure any more CompeAng loyalaes between group and family obligaaons

20 Pull factors for individual disengagement Availability of an exit from underground life Amnesty or reduced sentencing for crimes commibed Educa/on and job training Economic support New social networks Establishing a family Longing for a peaceful and ordinary life without the stress and pressure of illegal ac/vism

21 Do de- radicalizaaon programs work? Some do, but not for reasons we assume Vastly different from one another, highly context- specific Implicit and inconsistent criteria for what cons/tutes success Impossible to compara/vely evaluate De- radicaliza/on a vastly over- rated phenomenon (even when it is properly conceptualized)

22 Recent study Assessing the EffecAveness of Current De- RadicalizaAon IniAaAves and IdenAfying ImplicaAons for the Development of US- Based IniAaAves John Horgan and Kurt Braddock To be published in 2010 issue of Terrorism and Poli9cal Violence 22

23 DHS Study: Lessons Learned Need for clear criteria for success (or failure) Need for evalua/on Need for data on recidivism Greater clarity on terminology Need for comprehensive risk assessment framework Need for detainee and returnee policy

24 Policy Issues 1 Vastly increase efforts to understand disengagement numerous pracacal benefits SystemaAcally develop counter- narraaves, using Former terrorists (the right ones) VicAms (with a wider interpretaaon of what consatutes vicamhood)

25 Which group is being described here? Stop the idiots like me that are idealists. Because you aren t going to be able to stop the people with genuine grievances. There is a difference between insurgents and people with real difficulties, and then people that see themselves as being able to handle the problems of the world. There are people who want to fight for their land, and the people who want to internationalize it. I was one of the guys who wanted to internationalize it. I am the guy you need to deal with...the foreign fighters coming from outside trying to make it worse. So, at one level I am the most dangerous one. Excerpt from Horgan, J. (2009) Walking Away from Terrorism 25

26 Policy Issues 2 No magic bullet: PromoAng disengagement from terrorism can only be one element within a comprehensive policy against terrorism Risk of recidivism back into terrorism or other forms of crime. This risk can be reduced by screening out insincere paracipants through a selecaon process monitoring ex- militants aber their release, with severe sancaons for breaching condiaons providing the necessary skills, resources and social networks to enable them to re- integrate into society

27 Ques/ons?