655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA (650)

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1 Stephanie C. Lin 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA (650) Education Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA Ph.D., Behavioral Marketing, expected 2017 Ph.D. minor, Psychology Williams College, Williamstown, MA B.A., Psychology and Chinese, magna cum laude, 2008 Research Interests The Self and Self-Regulation Prosocial Behavior and Morality Social Influence Joint Goal Pursuit and Sabotage Publications See appendix for selected abstracts of research projects Lin, Stephanie C., Julian J. Zlatev, and Dale T. Miller (2017), Moral Traps: When Selfserving Attributions Backfire in Prosocial Behavior, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 70, Lin, Stephanie C., Rebecca L. Schaumberg, and Taly Reich (2016), Sidestepping the Rock and the Hard Place: The Private Avoidance of Prosocial Requests, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 64, Open Science Collaboration (2015), Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science, Science, 349(6251), aac4716. Mayer, John D., Stephanie C. Lin, and Maria Korogodsky (2011), Exploring the Universality of Personality Judgments: Evidence from the Great Transformation (1000 BCE 200 BCE), Review of General Psychology, 15(1), Under Review Lin, Stephanie C., Taly Reich, and Tamar A. Kreps, When Feeling Good Feels Wrong : Avoiding Hedonic Consumption When it Reflects Immoral Character, under 2 nd round review, Journal of Marketing Research. Lin, Stephanie C. and Taly Reich, Choosing Fate Under Moral Conflict, invited revision, Journal of Consumer Psychology (Special Issue: Marketplace Morality). Liu, Peggy J.* and Stephanie C. Lin*, Lowering Perceived Competence to Justify Avoidance of Prosocial Requests, invited revision, Journal of Consumer Psychology (*equal contribution).

2 Lin, Stephanie C.* and Peggy J. Liu*, Anticipating Dual Ways in Which Upward Social Comparison Will Influence Others, under review (*equal contribution). Working Papers Lin, Stephanie C., S. Christian Wheeler, and Szu-chi Huang, Being Better or Being Good: Sabotaging Others While Maintaining Moral Self-Integrity, revising for Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Lin, Stephanie C. and S. Christian Wheeler (working paper), Have Your Cake and Make Her Eat It Too: Influencing One s Social Influence to Justify Indulgence. Huang, Szu-chi, Stephanie C. Lin, and Ying Zhang, Hurting You Hurts Me More: An Exploration of Sabotaging in Shared Goal Pursuit. Lin, Stephanie C., Uzma Khan, Anna C. Merritt, and Benoît Monin (working paper), The Interpersonal Costs of Indulgence: The Role of Self-Control in Judgment of Indulging Others. Lin, Stephanie C., Julian J. Zlatev, and Dale T. Miller, It Wouldn t Have Mattered Anyway : The Motivated Search for Outcome-Based Justifications. In Progress Lin, Stephanie C. and Tamar A. Kreps. Emotional Entitlement. Lin, Stephanie C., Taly Reich and Tamar A. Kreps. When Descriptive Norms are Prescriptive in Emotion Regulation. Lin, Stephanie C.* and Peggy J. Liu*, Earning vs. Erasing. (*equal contribution) Honors and Awards Best Poster Award 2014 Institute for Research in the Social Sciences Poster Fair, Stanford University Doctoral Support Fellowships (various) Stanford Graduate School of Business Phi Beta Kappa 2008 Williams College Wilmers 1990 Memorial Student Travel Abroad Fellowship 2007 Williams College Conference Presentations and Chaired Symposia (*presenter) Lin, Stephanie C.*, Taly Reich, and Tamar A. Kreps, When Feeling Good Feels Wrong: Avoiding Hedonic Consumption when it Reflects Immoral Character. Paper to be presented at Society for Consumer Psychology Boutique: Motivation and Emotion. New York, NY: June 2017.

3 Huang, Szu-chi*, Stephanie C. Lin, and Ying Zhang. Hurting You Hurts Me More: An Exploration of Sabotaging in Shared Goal Pursuit. Paper to be presented at Society for Consumer Psychology Boutique: Motivation and Emotion. New York, NY: June Huang, Szu-chi, Stephanie C. Lin*, and Ying Zhang. Hurting You Hurts Me More: An Exploration of Sabotaging in Shared Goal Pursuit. Paper presented at Society for Consumer Psychology, San Francisco, CA: February Liu, Peggy J., and Stephanie C. Lin*, Lowering Perceived Competence to Justify Avoidance of Prosocial Behavior. Paper presented at Society for Consumer Psychology, San Francisco, CA: February Lin, Stephanie C. and Peggy J. Liu*, Anticipating Dual Ways in Which Upward Social Comparison Will Influence Others. Paper presented at Society for Consumer Psychology, San Francisco, CA: February Lin, Stephanie C., Julian J. Zlatev*, and Dale T. Miller, It Wouldn t Have Mattered Anyway : The Motivated Search for Incidental Justifications. Paper presented at International Society for Justice Research. Canterbury, UK: July Lin, Stephanie C., and Peggy J. Liu*, Anticipating Dual Ways in Which Upward Social Comparison Will Influence Others: When and Why Consumers Display High Self- Control to Others. Paper presented at the Women in Business Academia Conference, University of Pennsylvania The Wharton School. Philadelphia, PA: April Lin, Stephanie C.*, Taly Reich, and Tamar A. Kreps, When Feeling Good Feels Wrong: Avoiding Hedonic Consumption when it Reflects Immoral Character. Paper presented at Society for Personality and Social Psychology. San Diego, CA: January Lin, Stephanie C., and Peggy J. Liu*, Anticipating Dual Ways in Which Upward Social Comparison Will Influence Others: When and Why Consumers Display High Self- Control to Others. Paper presented at the Self-Regulation Pre-conference, Society for Personality and Social Psychology. San Diego, CA: January Lin, Stephanie C., and Peggy J. Liu*, Anticipating Dual Ways in Which Upward Social Comparison Will Influence Others: When and Why Consumers Display High Self- Control to Others. Poster presented at Society for Personality and Social Psychology. San Diego, CA: January Lin, Stephanie C., When Do We Want a Partner in Crime? Chaired symposium, Society for Consumer Psychology. Phoenix, AZ: February Lin, Stephanie C.* and S. Christian Wheeler Have Your Cake (and Make Her Eat Two): Creating Localized Descriptive Norms to Justify Indulgence. Paper presented at Society for Consumer Psychology. Phoenix, AZ: February Lin, Stephanie C.* and Rebecca L. Schaumberg, The Avoidance of Moral Obligation. Poster presented at Association for Consumer Research. Baltimore, MD: October 2014.

4 Lin, Stephanie C.*, S. Christian Wheeler, and Szu-chi Huang, Have Your Cake and Make Her Eat it Too: Sabotaging Others While Maintaining Moral Self-Integrity. Paper presented at Association for Consumer Research. Baltimore, MD: October Lin, Stephanie C.*, S. Christian Wheeler, and Szu-chi Huang, Being Better or Being Good: Conflicting Self-Evaluation Motivations in the Multifaceted Self. Paper presented at Academy of Management. Philadelphia, PA: August Lin, Stephanie C.*, S. Christian Wheeler, and Szu-chi Huang, Have Your Cake and Make Her Eat it Too: Sabotaging Others While Maintaining Moral Self-Integrity. Paper presented at the Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference. London, UK: May Lin, Stephanie C.*, S. Christian Wheeler, and Szu-chi Huang, Have Your Cake and Make Her Eat it Too: Sabotaging Others While Maintaining Moral Self-Integrity. Poster presented at Society for Personality and Social Psychology. Austin, TX: February Lin, Stephanie C.*, S. Christian Wheeler, and Szu-chi Huang, Have Your Cake and Make Her Eat it Too: Sabotaging Others While Maintaining Moral Self-Integrity. Paper presented at the Berkeley-Stanford Organizational Behavior Conference. Stanford, CA: February Lin, Stephanie C.*, S. Christian Wheeler, and Zakary Tormala, But What Do I Know?: The Metacognitive Processes of Those with Low Self-Esteem. Poster presented at Association for Consumer Research. Chicago, IL: October Lin, Stephanie C.* and S. Christian Wheeler, From Grin to Grimace: A Nuanced Test of the Facial Feedback Hypothesis. Poster presented at the Embodiment Preconference, Society for Personality and Social Psychology. New Orleans, LA: January Teaching Stanford Aerobics and Yoga Yoga Instructor, Financial Officer ( ), Stanford University 2014-present Marketing Management 2014, 2015 Course Assistant, S. Christian Wheeler, Stanford GSB Behavioral Decision Theory 2013, 2014 Grader, Itamar Simonson, Stanford GSB Chinese Language (Levels 1, 2, and 3, four sections total) Chinese Instructor, Academic Advisor, Dorm Resident, Phillips Exeter Academy Introduction to Chinese Language 2009 Chinese Instructor, BAE Systems, Merrimack, NH Chinese Language (Level 1, two sections total) Chinese Teaching Intern, Dorm Resident, Phillips Exeter Academy English (8 th grade) 2008 Teaching Assistant, Mount Greylock Regional High School, Williamstown, MA

5 Ad Hoc Reviewing Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Other Service Behavioral Marketing Work in Progress Seminar, Organizer, Stanford GSB 2016-present PhD Mentorship Program, Mentor (Melanie Brucks), Stanford GSB 2015-present Society for Consumer Psychology Conference, Yoga Instructor 2015, 2016 Association for Consumer Research Conference, Yoga Instructor 2015 RHH Student Lab Group, Co-founder, Co-director, Stanford GSB X-Lab (Christian Wheeler Lab), Organizer, Stanford GSB Society of Experimental Social Psychology, Student Volunteer, Berkeley, CA 2013 Student Liaison Committee, Psychology Department, Williams College Invited member of a group of psychology majors that advised the department on new hires, student advising, curricular changes, and activities References S. Christian Wheeler Stanford Graduate School of Business 655 Knight Way Stanford, California wheelerc@stanford.edu Dale T. Miller Stanford Graduate School of Business 655 Knight Way Stanford, California dtmiller@stanford.edu Szu-chi Huang Stanford Graduate School of Business 655 Knight Way Stanford, California huangsc@stanford.edu Taly Reich Yale School of Management 165 Whitney Ave. New Haven, Connecticut taly.reich@yale.edu Rebecca L. Schaumberg NYU Stern School of Business 40 West Fourth St., Suite 719 New York, NY 10012Tisch Hall, 7th rschaumb@nyu.stern.edu Appendix Selected Publications and Papers Under Review Moral Traps: When Self-Serving Attributions Backfire in Prosocial Behavior

6 Two assumptions guide the current research. First, people s desire to see themselves as moral disposes them to make attributions that enhance or protect their moral self-image: When approached with a prosocial request, people are inclined to attribute non-compliance to external factors (e.g., I had an appointment then), and compliance to internal factors (e.g., I believe in the cause). Second, these attributions can backfire when put to a material test. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that participants can be induced to behave prosocially if they attribute their initial refusal to an excuse that is later taken away. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that participants can be similarly trapped into prosocial behavior if they commit to it in the presence of an external incentive that is later removed. This research contributes to an understanding of the dynamics underlying the perpetuation of moral selfregard and suggests interventions to increase prosocial behavior. Sidestepping the Rock and the Hard Place: The Private Avoidance of Prosocial Requests For some, facing a prosocial request feels like being trapped between a rock and a hard place, requiring either a resource (e.g., money) or psychological (e.g., self-reproach) cost. Because both outcomes are dissatisfying, we propose that these people are motivated to avoid prosocial requests, even when they face these requests in private, anonymous contexts. In two experiments, in which participants' anonymity and privacy was assured, participants avoided facing prosocial requests and were willing to do so at a personal cost. This was true both for people who would have otherwise complied with the request and those who would have otherwise refused the request. This suggests that anticipatory self-reproach motivates people to avoid prosocial requests, regardless of whether or not this self-reproach would have been strong enough to cause them to comply with a direct request. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for prosocial behavior and the maintenance of moral self-regard. When Feeling Good Feels Wrong : Avoiding Hedonic Consumption When it Reflects Immoral Character The authors provide a framework that helps explain when and why hedonic consumption can feel inappropriate. The authors argue that people are motivated to experience appropriate negative affect in response to negatively valenced moralized stimuli (e.g., a documentary about the effects of bullying; Study 1). Consequently, consumers are more reluctant to repair their moods by engaging in hedonic consumption after being exposed to negatively valenced moralized (vs. nonmoralized) stimuli (Studies 2-4). Study 5 examines how consumers react when their attempts to maintain negative affect are thwarted with exposure to hedonic content. Employing a social media context, the authors find that people feel more uncomfortable when hedonic, frivolous content follows negative moralized (vs. nonmoralized) content. These findings challenge emotion regulation research on hedonic motivation to increase positive and decrease negative affect, as well as judgment and decision making literature on preferences for sequences of events that improve over time. Furthermore, they offer clear prescriptions to marketers regarding when to (not) offer hedonic consumption as mood repair, and how to sequence different types of media content. Choosing Fate Under Moral Conflict Although prior research suggests that people should not prefer random chance to determine their outcomes, we suggest that in the context of prosocial requests, many people prefer to flip a coin. We argue that this is because many people would prefer to engage in selfinterested behavior, but would feel moral self-reproach for actively choosing to do so. Across

7 four studies, when faced with a choice between self-interested and prosocial behavior, many people preferred to be randomly assigned one of the two outcomes rather than to make their own choice. This preference was evident among both those who would have complied with and those who would have refused a traditional prosocial request, and was higher when participants felt particularly conflicted. Furthermore, the presence of the random option (vs. no random option) decreased moral self-reproach after decision-making, thus increasing consumer welfare. Our findings speak to the nature of the trap that prosocial requests set for consumers, and suggest an intervention that increases consumer welfare without harming rates of prosocial behavior (and potentially raising it over time). Lowering Perceived Competence to Justify Avoidance of Prosocial Requests People care strongly about being viewed as competent, to the extent that they even overestimate their skills and abilities. Indeed, displaying competence can often make someone a more attractive acquaintance, as people predominantly seek out competent people for help. In this research, we suggest that the desire to avoid engaging in prosocial behavior while simultaneously maintaining the impression that one is moral leads people to lower their projected competence. Across five studies and a pilot study, people indeed downplayed their competence to sidestep a prosocial request. This effect occurred across both self-reported competence and behavioral displays of competence (e.g., task persistence). The final study showed that displaying self-interested modesty can may sometimes ironically backfire, contributing to decreased likelihood of engaging in a subsequent self-interested opportunity that requires the same skills as the prosocial task. These findings underscore that even though people care strongly about being viewed as competent, they are willing to trade-off on competence evaluations if warmth evaluations, such as evaluations of moral character, are at risk. Anticipating Dual Ways in Which Upward Social Comparison Will Influence Others Much prior research demonstrates that observing another person s successes can have a wide-ranging impact on observers. Yet little is known about what factors affect whether people choose to make their goal-related successes observable to others in the first place. In this research, we examine whether people display their successes to lower-performing others. We propose a conceptual model identifying two opposing other-focused motives: the desire to avoid hurting lower-performing others feelings and the desire to motivate lowerperforming others. On the one hand, people decrease display of their successes to protect low-performing (vs. similarly high-performing) others from hurtful upward social comparisons. On the other hand, people increase display of their successes to motivate lowperforming friends. This model was tested across five studies. Studies 1A and 1B revealed that these two opposing motivations coexist and can sometimes even statistically counteract one another. Studies 2, 3A and 3B then identified factors affecting the relative strength of these two motives, ultimately shaping people s display decision. Selected Working Papers and Work in Progress Being Better or Being Good: Sabotaging Others While Maintaining Moral Self-Integrity We propose that people frequently experience conflict between two motivations: the motivation to outperform others and the motivation to be a good person. We show that, when threatened, people exploited convenient moral rationalizations to sabotage their friends performance. In Studies 1A and 1B, threatened participants sabotaged their friends

8 when they could construe the act as benign or helpful. In Study 2, threatened participants sabotaged friends when the consequences of the act were only moderately certain to occur, thereby making the act more justifiable. In Study 3, participants sabotaged their friends when their friends had unfairly (vs. fairly) outperformed them, allowing participants to feel that their act to restore balance was justified. Importantly, we also show that people sabotage across domains (Studies 2 and 3) that is, when they are threatened in one domain (e.g., academics), they sometimes sabotage in another (e.g., dieting). Have Your Cake and Make Her Eat It Too: Influencing One s Social Influence to Justify Indulgence People often use social norms to infer whether certain behaviors, such as littering or eating unhealthy foods, are acceptable, and are more likely to engage in those behaviors if others are engaging in them as well. Whereas previous research treats social influence as an exogenous factor that influences behavior, we propose that people play a role in influencing their social influence. We argue that people can manipulate social norms around them to justify their own behavior. We examine this phenomenon in the context of indulgence. In study 1A we demonstrate that for indulgent (vs. non-indulgent) consumption, people feel more justified when others match their behavior than when they engage in that behavior alone. In study 1B, we find that people are more likely to encourage their friends to match indulgent (vs. non-indulgent) consumption. Study 2 shows that this encouragement is explained by anticipated feelings of justification. Studies 3A and 3B demonstrate that this feeling of justification stems from the comfort that one has a partner-in-crime (i.e., that someone else is doing something equally bad), rather than by changing the perceived harmfulness of the action. Finally, study 4 shows that people serve themselves a larger quantity of indulgent food when they can first serve someone else. Hurting You Hurts Me More: An Exploration of Sabotaging in Shared Goal Pursuit The present research examines sabotage behavior in shared goal pursuit. We find that upon making significant progress toward their own goal, consumers start to treat the individualistic pursuit as a competitive one and engage in sabotaging behaviors that undermine others pursuits (studies 1 and 2); these sabotage behaviors produce negative motivational consequences on the saboteur (studies 2-5). Through five experiments in shopping, nutrition, gaming, and dieting contexts, we capture a variety of sabotage behaviors (e.g., sharing tips of lower quality, selecting games of lower payoffs for others, and misreporting calorie content of snacks for fellow dieters) as well as their motivational consequences on the saboteur. Importantly, we show that saboteurs reduction of effort is a result of gaining an upper hand over others in shared pursuit, such that it occurs for those who view others failure as their success (i.e., high zero-sum belief), only in the domain of the shared goal (not an overall depletion across domains), and does not occur when the sabotage attempt fails to bring down the pseudo-competitor relative to one s own performance. A single paper meta-analysis estimated the effect size at.37, accounting for 88.24% of variance across manipulations and studies. The Interpersonal Costs of Indulgence: The Role of Self-Control in Judgment of Indulging Others Although much research has demonstrated negative intrapersonal experiences with luxury spending (e.g., low self-control, guilt), most of the extant literature on the interpersonal consequences of luxury consumption has focused on positive outcomes (e.g., higher

9 perceived competence, power and status). We find that, although luxury consumers can be viewed as more competent, they can also be judged as less trustworthy. That is, the negative intrapersonal associations with luxury spending and indulgence extend to interpersonal judgments specifically, people judge others who indulge as having lower self-control, and thus as being less trustworthy. We found evidence of this pattern in four studies in which participants reported judgment of others who indulged or not, across a variety of indulgent products, including luxury (1, 2, and 4) and non-luxury indulgence (study 3). Furthermore, we found this effect to be insensitive to whether the consumer was relatively justified in a luxury purchase (study 2), but was exacerbated when the consumer specifically breached a self-control goal when indulging (study 3). In addition to reported judgments, participants trusted luxury consumers less in an economic trust game, demonstrating the interpersonal consequences of this finding (study 4). Thus, we find that luxury consumption can have unintended negative consequences on the consumer, and in doing so, contribute to literature on indulgence, character-based moral judgment, and symbolic decoding (i.e., judgment of based on symbolic aspects of their consumption). It Wouldn t Have Mattered Anyway : The Motivated Search for Outcome-Based Justifications People often want to engage in self-interested or self-indulgent behaviors without the corresponding guilt. Thus, people engage in psychological strategies to reduce guilt after making these bad choices, such as rationalizing or justifying their behavior so that the behavior no longer reflects poorly on their virtuousness. We suggest that, after engaging in such vice behaviors, people also seek to justify their actions based on the outcomes of the action, despite the fact that the action still reflects negative intentions. That is, we propose that, when feeling guilty, people seek to confirm whether the negative consequences of their intentions came to fruition or not (e.g., checking whether the homeless shelter was closed after deciding not to volunteer), and that discovering that their behavior did not lead to negative consequences (e.g., the shelter was closed) alleviates guilt. However, we argue that because people primarily base judgments of virtue on intention rather than on its outcome, this behavior is biased. As evidence, we show that there is a self-other discrepancy such that people believe incidental justifications excuse their own self-control failures, but not others, and people admit to engaging in such behavior even though they realize it is illegitimate.