Society, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952, p. 25. Levy pleads for the

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1 KARL-DIETER OPP THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE RANGE AS A STRATEGY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A GENERAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY A Critique of a Sociological Dogma * If sociologists want to construct a true, general theory with high explanatory power, they can resort to two strategies. First they could propose such a theory, test it and - depending on the results of the rests -- leave it unchanged, modify it or, if the theory proves altogethei wrong, eliminate it and formulate a new general theory. This procedure may be called a direct strategy. Most sociologists, however, prefer an mdirect strategy: This strategy consists of building theories of a lower theoretical level before going to the construction of a general theory In this paper we would like to discuss the fruitfulness of one such indirect strategy that seems to be accepted by almost dl sociologists, It says that sociologists should be concerned almost entirely with the construction of "theories of the middle range" before dealing with the construction of a general theory. The main proponent of this thesis -- who also formulated it first in the domain of sociology -- is Robert K. Merton 1. This proposition has been cited again and again in the literature. To my knowledge there is no systematic effort to analyse in detail the arguments for and against the fruitfulness of this * I am very grateful to F. Heckmann, M. A., who helped in editing the final English version of this paper. I Cf. Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1957 (henceforth cited as Merton 1957), pp In 1967 Merton extended these remarks to a paper. See his book: On Theore!ycal Sociology, New York, Free Press, 1967 (henceforth cited as Merton 1967), oh. II (<~ On Sociological Theories of the Middle Range ~). In this paper he cites a great number of positive comments to his strategy of theories of the middle range. The number of such comments could be increased. Cf., for example, MARION J. LEVY, The Structure of Society, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952, p. 25. Levy pleads for the construction of a theory of social systems of the middle range -- i.e. for a theory of societies; from such a "base" a theory valid for all social systems could be found easier in the opinion of Levy. See also JAMES S. COLEMAN, Introduction to Mathematical Sociology, New York, The Free Press, 1964, p. 1. There are only extremely few negative evaluations of Merton's strategy.

2 244 Karl-Dieter Opp strategy. This is an astonishing fact, because the further development of sociology depends on which strategies are chosen for realizing the goals of this discipline. To avoid any misunderstanding I would like to stress that it is not the aim of this paper to discuss the fruitfulness of theories of the middle range in general. The topic of this paper is the relevance o~ theories of the middle range as a strategy for the construction of a general sociological theory. 1. An explication of the thesis What precisely does "theories of the middle range" mean? Merton defines "theories of the middle range" as "theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social 'behavior, social organization and social change" 2 First it is not clear what Merton understands by "minor working hypotheses". Are these singular statements, i.e. sentences describing particular facts occurring at certain places at a certain time, or theories of a not specified kind, i.e. a certain kind of general statements without reference to certain times and places? Thus, we cannot decide whether a particular theory is to be designated as a "minor working hypothesis" or not. It seems useful to regard "minor working hypotheses" as singular statements. The reason is that Merton's examples for "theories of the middle range" can explain very special as well as very general events. For instance, he mentions Emile Durkbeim's theory of suicide and Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance as "theories of the middle range". Thus, if we define "minor working hypotheses" as a certain kind of theory, it seems very difficult to find a criterion to distinguish between the class of theories called "minor working hypotheses" and the complement class. Merton himself gives no hint to find such a criterion. Furthermore, it does not seem to be worthwile to search for such a criterion: If we explicate "minor working hypotheses" as singular statements, the resulting thesis is -- as we shall see -- worth a discussion for sociologists. In Merton's definition of "theories of the middle,range" it is 2 Cf. Merton 1967, p. 39. In the following analysis we use mainly Merton's paper from 1967, because he modified his opinion expressed in 1957 somewhat.

3 On the theories of the middle range 245 second not clear what it means that the "unified theory" can "explain" other theories ("empirical uniformities"). "Explanation" could mean "logical deducibility'. From this definition it would follow that there would never exist a "unified theory", because -- as we shall see -- existing theories are often modified if general theories are discovered and because some existing "theories of the middle range" are contradictory. (If contradictory theories are derivable from the "unified theory" this theory is itself contradictory and without any empirical content. But just this we want to avoid.) Thus, we can explicate Merton in this way: "Theory A explains theory B" means "theory B can be deduced in its original or in modified form from theory A". If a unified theory can explain -- in the sense just defined -- at least 3 all existing theories of a science, then it can also explain at least all particular events which the existing theories can explain. If, for example, a theory of suicide Ts, a theory of role conflict Tr, and a theory of consumer behavior Tc can be explained by a unified theory, then this theory can also explain particular suicides, particular solutions of role conflict and particular behaviors of consumers 4. We can now define the concept "theories of the middle range" more precisely as "theories, each of which can explain a certain class of particular ('sociological') events". As we saw, a "unified theory" can be explicated as "a theory from which at least all existing theories of the middle range can be deduced in their original or in modified form". From this last definition follows that a unified theory can explain at least the same particular events as all existing theories of the middle range. It is Merton's thesis "that sociology will advance insofar as its major (but not exclusive) concern is with developing theories of the middle range, and it will be retarded if its primary attention is focussed on developing total sociological systems" s. Presently "not enough preparatory work has been done" 6 for constructing a "unified theory". According to our explication of this thesis the unified theory is empirically testable and has an extremely high explanatory power. Otherwise it could not explain the particular events and theories which it is designed to explain. It seems necessary to stress this, because many sociologists associate with the term "general theory" a concept system 3 It would be.possible that also new theories can be deduced from the "unified theory". 4 More technically: The explananda of the theories explained are included in the explananda of the explaining theory. 5 Cf. Merton 1967, p Cf. Merton 1967, p. 45.

4 246 Karl-Dieter Opp or a "speculative" system, i.e. sentences which cannot explain anything. Thus, Hans L. Zetterberg mentions as an example for a "grand theory" Pitirim Sorokin's "theory" of cultural and social change which is -- as Zetterberg himself writes- not testable 7. Such "theories" are even favoured by certain formulations of Merton 8 It is, of course, possible to define "general theory" in another way -- for example as a conceptual system. This has the consequence that firstly the goals of a unified theory cannot be fulfilled, i.e. explanation of empirical theories and particular facts; and that secondly no empirically oriented sociologist will ever construct a theory of the middle range, because it promotes a goal which he does not wish to be realized. 2. A critique of the thesis Before discussing in detail the arguments relevant for the acceptance or refutation of the thesis mentioned, let us characterize shortly the kind of these arguments. There are no logical rules which permit the inference of a general sociological theory from theories of the middle range. Because there is no logical way from theories of the middle range to the general theory, the following discussion can only point to empirical consequences of the indirect strategy in relation to the goal to be rea]ized or to problems which arise out of the logical analysis of the thesis itself. Let us now deal with this thesis. Argument 1: The history of science. One of Merton's arguments for his strategy is that the development of t,he sciences proceeds from relatively special to more and more general theories. "Intervening centuries of research and systematic thought about the results of research were first needed to prepare the terrain" 9 Even if this proposition is true, it does not follow that the development of sociology must take the same direction to an "all embracing" theory. This follows only, if an empirical law is true which might read: If, and only if a science has a great number of theories of the middle range at its disposal, a general theory will arise. 7 Cf. HANS L. ZETTERBERG, On Theory and Verification in Sociology, 3rd ed. Totowa, Bedminster, 1965, pp See also Pitirim Sorokin's paper Sociology of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, "American Sociological Review", XXX (1965), pp s Merton 1967, p. 39 and p. 52 (note 17). 9 Merton 1957, p. 6. Merton 1967, pp

5 On the theories of the middle range 247 This hypothesis tells us that the goal- a general, true theory can only be realized if the development of a science follows a certain order of steps. Such a cumulative development of the sciences clearly contradicts the facts 10. Especially the history of the natural sciences demonstrates that there is no simple progress from special, empirically confirmed theories to a unified "scientific system". Thus, the empirical law mentioned must be refuted as empirically wrong. Argument 2: The seemingly undesired consequence o] the direct strategy. Merton believes that the direct strategy has an undesired effect: "To concentrate entirely on a master conceptual scheme for deriving all subsidiary theories is to risk producing twentieth century sociological equivalents of the large philosophical systems of the past, with all their varied suggestiveness, their architectonic splendor, and their scientific sterility" n As stated, sociologists use the expression "general sociological theory" for designating conceptual or "speculative" ("metaphysical") systems. If the goal to be reached is specified only in a vague manner for example, that a "general theory" is to be constructed --, the consequence mentioned by Merton will occur. But this consequence will certainly not occur, if the goal to be reached is defined precisely, i.e. that the theory should be empirically testable, that its terms should be precise, that it should not contradict the facts and that it should have high explanatory power. Presently sociologists observe certain rules, if they construct theories of the middle range; they agree, for example, that these theories should be testable. There is no reason to assume that sociologists would not accept these rules and that they would not obey them, if they work on constructing a unified theory. Thus, this argument seems hardly tenable. Argument 3: The modification of special theories and the discovery of a unified theory. Let us assume it would be possible to develop a true, general theory from a certain number of existing theories of the middle range -- which are true -- by means of some (explicitly or implicitly known) nonlogical procedure; this would mean that the existing theories of the middle range become theorems (without being changed) of the general theory which is the axiom system. 10 See, for example, HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, The Origins of Modern Science, New York, Free Press, AI, EXANDRE KOYR~, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, New York, Harper & Row, THOMAS KUHN, The Copernican Revolution, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957, and by the same author: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, n Merton 1967, p. 51.

6 248 Karl-Dieter Opp Further, let us assume for a moment, science would proceed in this way. Then -- on the basis of the existing theories of the middle range -- it would not be difficult to get some alternative general theories (axiom systems) which fulfill the condition that the existing theories of the middle range can be deduced. The alternative axiom systems could be tested and the most fruitful one would be selected and accepted. However, it would be impossible to "derive" (at least) one general theory from the existing theories of the middle range if a newly discovered general theory falsifies existing theories of the middle range. That just this occurs is shown by t.he development of the natural sciences. Karl R. Popper, for example, points out that Newton's theory contradicted certain laws of Kepler and Galileo 12. In the social sciences, too, special theories must be modified, if they are confronted with certain more general theories 13 According to these facts it seems very unplausible that wrong theories of the middle range lead to the discovery of a true general theory which in turn modifies the wrong theories of the middle range. If theories of the middle range have at all a heuristic value for the discovery of a general theory, it is more plausi,ble to assume that they stimulate the formulation of a wrong general theory. Thus, Merton's strategy may achieve the opposite of what it has beeen designed to achieve. If this is true, the strategy of concentrating on the formulation of theories of the middle range contradicts an accepted scientific norm: not to construct wrong theories. Studies in which existing theories of the middle range are confronted with more general theories show that the theories of the middle range must be modified. But it cannot be excluded that there are some special theories which are deducible from the true general theory, i.e. which are true. If this situation exists, we have two sets of special theories: the true ones and the (more or less) wrong ones. in This situation, too, it seems to be very unplausible that a true gen- 12 Cf. KARL R. POPPER, Die Zielsetzung der Erfahrungswissenscha/t, in: HANS ALBERT (ed.), Theorie und Realitlit, Tiibingen, Mohr, 1964, pp Examples can be found in the following writings: ANDRZEJ MALEWSKI, Verhalten und Interaktion, Tiibingen, Molar, 1967, ch. II. KARL-DIETER OPP, Kriminalitiit und Gesellschaflsstruktur. Eine kritische Analyse soziologischer Theorien ahweichenden Verhaltens, Neuwied and Berlin, Luchterhand, 1968, ch. 6. HANS J. HUMMELL and KARL-DIETER OPP, On the Relation between Theory and Research in Sociology. A Critique of Empirical Studies in Sociology, Demonstrated with "Union Democracy", "Quality and Quantity", III, 1969, pp A detailed logical analysis of the type of deduction employed by Malewski and the cited writings can be found in ch. vii, 21, of the following book: KARL-DIETER Ol'P, Methodologie der Sozialwissenschaflen. Einfiihrung in Probleme ihrer Theorienbildung, Reinbek, Rowohlt, 1970.

7 On the theories o[ the middle ran.qe 249 era1 theory will be discovered, because the wrong theories of the middle range would contribute also to the formulation of the true general theory. Argument 4: Infinite regress as a consequence o[ the indirect strategy. We saw that Merton divides sociological theories into two classes: Theories of the middle range and the un'ified theory; the latter class is -- according to Merton -- presently empty and can contain only one member. We could order the members of the class "theories of the middle range" according to their generality. We define a theory A as more general than a theory B, if, and only if A can explain the same singular facts as B and additional singular facts which B cannot explain. A theory A is as general as a theory B, if, and only if both can explain the same singu,lar facts. Thus, a theory which can explain all kinds of activities is more general than a theory which can only explain the activity "suicide". According to these definitions Merton's thesis can be reformulated in this way: "The most general theory should only be formulated, if a sufficient number of less general theories exists". If the discovery of a relatively general theory is furthered by the existance of less general theories it seems plausible to say: "A theory with a certain degree of generality should only be constructed, if there exists a certain number of less general theories". Thus, before formulating a theory which can explain all kinds of deviant behavior, it is useful first to formulate theories which can explain certain particular kinds of deviant behavior. This thesis seems to be more plausible than Merton's; for the more general the existing theories are (presupposed they are true), the easier it seems to be to discover the more general one. If, for instance, there are only theories which explain committing suicide by taking poison, buying a cigarette etc., it seems to be more difficult to find the general theory than if there exist relatively general theories which can explain learnable activities or attitude change. It seems that it is entirely arbitrary to say that sociologists should be most concerned with theories of some broad level of generality (theories of the middle range). If there would be any heuristic value of a given theory for the formulation of a more general one, it seems to be much more plausible that there is a "heuristic transfer" from a given theory to a theory which is a little more general than from a whole class of grossly different theories to one unified theory. Thus, Merton's original thesis seems to be "most" acceptable in its more general form. This thesis, however, leads to an infinite ;regress: If a sociologist wants to find even an extremely special theory, he has first to construct

8 250 Karl-Dieter Opp a more special one, because then it is easier to find the less special one. For example, a sociologist who wants to construct a theory of suicide must first construct a more special theory, say a theory of suicide by taking poison; but the formulation of this theory would be easier, if he first formulates a more special theory, for example a theory of suicide by taking arsenic etc. It would be possible to stop the regress at a certain level of generality. One could say that it is not necessary to begin with the construction of theories of a relatively low level -- for example committing suicide by taking arsenic -- because sociologists succeed in formulating true theories at a higher level of generality. If this were true, we should possess some theories of a certain generality the truth of which is beyond any doubt. Unfortunately this consequence does not hold: each sociological theory is problematic presently -- either there are facts or other theories which contradict it. Thus, the regress cannot be stopped anywhere. According to this result Merton's generalized thesis is not acceptable. But 'because we want to discuss 'Merton's original thesis and not a possible (better) modification of it, let us return to this original thesis. Argument 5: The indirect strategy as a blind alley. Let us assume we should obey Merton's strategy and we should have produced a sufficiently large stock of theories of the middle range so that Merton would say: "Go on, now you are ready to find the unified theory". But what should we do now? We saw that there are no logical rules for proceeding to the general theory. I1 we consider only argument 3, it seems very unplausible that some unknown psychic processes in the scientists lead to the formulation of the general theory. But are there other rules? Merton is silent on this matter. He stresses again and again that theories of the middle range must be "consolidated",4. But he lets us not know how this should happen. Thus, if a scientist applies Merton's strategy he.runs in a blind alley: He first tries to realize a partial goal (he constructs a certain number of theories of the middle range); if he,has reached this goal, he does not know how to proceed further. Sociologists not even ask what to do, if there are sufficient theories of the middle range. In everyday life such a strategy hardly would be applied. This may be illustrated by the following event. Mr. A asks Mr. B, how to reach the moon. B suggests A should go to Cape Kennedy. If A would behave like a sociologist who applies the strategy of theories of the middle range, he will go to Cape Kennedy without knowing how to reach the 14 Cf. Merton I967, p. 51, p. 52 (note 17), p. 53, p. 61.

9 On the theories o[ the middle range 251 moon from there. But because Mr. A is not a sociologist he will ask Mr. B what he has to do in Cape Kennedy. If Mr. B is silent, Mr. A will certainly not follow the advice of Mr. A. Rules which specify how to formulate more general theories on the basis of special theories are also not formulated in the literature. Philosophers of science always stress that "intuition" creates scientific theories, i.e. the conditions relevant for the production of scientific theories are unknown to the actor and to the observer. Even in the writings of social scientists who did formulate a relatively general theory we do not find rules which could be intersubjectively applied. Leon Festinger, for example, writes that the first idea which led to the formulation of his theory of cognitive dissonance came when he read an empirical study. "From this start, and with the help of many discussions in which we attempted to pin the idea down and to formalize it somewhat, we arrived at the concept of dissonance and the hypotheses concerning dissonance reduction" is. George C. Homans writes that he has not applied any "rules of procedure" when he constructed his hypotheses 1~ Argument 6: The continuity of sociology. According to Merton "theories of the middle range are typical.ly in direct line of continuity with the work of classical theoretical formulations" 1~, for example with the writings of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. It is not clear, whether this fact is in Merton's opinion an argument for or against his strategy of theories of the middle range. However that may be: Let us ask how this argument has to be judged. If we apply the direct strategy in sociology, this implies -- as we saw -- that many theorems can be derived from the general sociological theory. These theorems are partly the existing theories of the middle range -- for example theories of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Thus, the direct strategy implies in no way that certain questions are eliminated or that certain theories are not further discussed. On the contrary, the direct strategy has the consequence that existing theories of the middle range are modified and that new theories are derived, as stated already. The last fact mentioned implies also that new questions are raised. It seems that just these consequences are identical with the intentions of social scientists like Max Weber and Emile Durkheim: To apply strategies which most probably increase our is L. FESTINGER, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957, p. VII. 16 GEORGE C. HOMANS, Social Behaviour. Ist Elementary Forms, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961, p ~ Merton 1967, p. 68, point 7.

10 252 Karl-Dieter Opp empirical-theoretical knowledge. Thus, establishing the continuity of sociology is an argument pro and not contra the direct strategy. Argument 7: The similarity o~ concept systems and theories. Some sociologists consider the construction of general concept systems as a legitimate goal of sociology, for example Talcott Parsons and Stuart C. Dodd. The processes of constructing theories and concept systems are very similar. First, concept systems as well as theories must fulfill certain criteria. Theories should, for example, be true; concept systems should be useful, i.e. they must have certain properties which are defined -- in most cases implicitly -- by the author of the system. Second, there are no rules which guarantee the success either of a theory or of a concept system. Third, concept systems as well as theories are seen by their authors as reversible and are revised. According to these similarities the following consequence seems plausible. If we recommend to construct theories of the middle range as an effective strategy for finding a general theory, then there is no reason not to recommend the same strategy in constructing a general concept system, i.e. first to construct a concept system of the middle range. Thus, before we classify all "social behavio", we shall first classify social conflicts, deviant behavior etc. To my knowledge this strategy has never been suggested or carried out. This fact should cast at least some doubt on the effectiveness of theories of the middle range as a strategy for the construction of a general sociological theory. 5. The alternative strategy Up to this point we reviewed some arguments which show that the strategy of theories of the middle range is rather problematic. Let us ask now whether these and other arguments are relevant for a positive or negative critique of the direct strategy. The fact that many special theories are modified, if a new general theory is discovered is a strong argument for the direct strategy. If we restrict our efforts primarily to the construction of theories of the middle range, we renounce to a possibility of eliminating errors, i.e. to improve our theories. We saw that general theories allow new theories which have been unknown to the scientists to be deduced. Thus, the direct strategy is a means not only to eliminate errors but also to increase our knowledge by finding new hypotheses.

11 On the theories o[ the middle range 253 Let us assume for a moment that the strategy of theories of the middle range would be accepted. Now the sociologist would like to know how many theories of the middle range must be constructed until he can turn his attention to the construction of a general theory. On this point Merton is silent. If we want to answer this question, it seems plausible to say that the stock of theories of the middle range must be only so great that the scientist can perceive them; for theories of the middle range are certain stimuli which are said to have a certain effect -- to contribute to the formulation of a general sociological theory. If they have an effect at all, they must at least be perceived by the sociologists. Presently the number of theories of the middle range in sociology is so great that it seems hardly possible for the sociologist to know all of them. There are not only theories for a great number of relatively special kinds of behavior -- for example the many theories of suicide but also many relatively general theories. Thus, if we accept the strategy of theories of the middle range as effective, the given number of these theories is so great that it seems advisable now to try the construction of a general sociological theory. We hope that the arguments for the direct strategy and against the indirect strategy which are presented in this paper will stimulate a discussion of Merton's thesis, i.e. will convert a sociological dogma to an object of discussion.