Cognitive Processes PSY 334. Chapter 5 Abstraction of Information into Memory

Transcription

1 Cognitive Processes PSY 334 Chapter 5 Abstraction of Information into Memory

2 Features of a Penny 1. Does the Lincoln on the penny face right or left? 2. Is anything above his head? What? 3. Is anything below his head? What? 4. Is anything to his left? What? 5. Is anything to his right? What?

3 Demos Features of a penny Eidetic imagery

4 Wanner s Experiment 1. When you score your results, do nothing to correct your answers but mark carefully those answers which are wrong. 2. When you score your results, do nothing to correct your answers but carefully mark those answers which are wrong. 3. When you score your results, do nothing to your correct answers but mark carefully those answers which are wrong. 4. When you score your results, do nothing to your correct answers but carefully mark those answers which are wrong.

5 Wanner s Experiment People do not remember exact wording. Wanner s experiment: Two sentences differ in style Two sentences differ in meaning Subjects warned or not warned to pay attention to style Memory is better for changes in wording that affect meaning. Warning only helps memory for style.

6 Wanner s Results

7 Memory for Visual Information Memory for pictures is very strong and better than for words. Mandler s study token vs type changes. Type = meaning Token = detail Type changes were easier to identify than token. Picture memory depends on meaning.

8 Mandler & Ritchey s Stimuli

9 Droodles Ship arriving too late to save a drowning witch Man playing trombone in phone booth

10 Droodles Bower, Karlin & Dueck presented droodles with or without their captions. Subjects given labels were able to redraw them with 70% accuracy. Subjects without labels were 51% accurate. Memory depended on meaningful interpretation.

11 Retention of Detail Perceptual detail is encoded but quickly forgotten. Gernsbacher s picture reversals: 10 sec delay = 79% accuracy 10 min delay = 57% accuracy. Anderson s story sentences: Immediate test = 99% correct 2 min delay = 56% correct Delay does not affect meaning accuracy.

12 Gernsbacher s Stimuli

13 Implications for Memory Memory is enhanced if people can attach meaning to material. Loud and fast rehearsal doesn t work. Meaningless words can be better remembered by adding meaning: DAX is like DAD GIB is first part of gibberish KA6PCG my ham radio call letters.

14 Propositional Representations Notation a method for describing the meaning that remains once details have been abstracted away. Propositional representation uses concepts from logic and linguistics to describe meaning. Proposition the smallest unit of knowledge that can be judged as true or false.

15 Propositional Analysis A complex sentence consists of smaller units of meaning (propositions). If any of the propositions are untrue, the entire sentence cannot be true. The meaning of primitive assertions is preserved, but not the exact wording.

16 Kintsch s Notation Each proposition is a list containing a relation plus arguments: (relation, arguments) Relation organizes the arguments. Verbs, adjectives, other relational terms. Arguments particular times, places, people, objects. Nouns Relations connect arguments.

17 Example Lincoln, who was president of the United States during a bitter war, freed the slaves. A. Lincoln was president of the United States during a war. B. The war was bitter. C. Lincoln freed the slaves.

18 Kintsch s Notation a. (president-of: Lincoln, United States, war) b. (bitter: war) c. (free: Lincoln, slaves) The slaves were freed by Lincoln. Lincoln freed the slaves.

19 Psychological Reality Psychological reality -- do propositions really exist mentally? Bransford & Franks: Presented 12 sentences with the same 2 sets of 4 propositions. Tested on 3 kinds of sentences. Old (previously viewed), new (containing same propositions), noncase (new and containing different propositions). Able to identify noncase, but not old/new

20 Bransford & Franks Stimuli 1. (eat: ants, jelly, past) 2. (sweet: jelly) 3. (on: jelly, table, past) 4. (in: ants, kitchen, past) 1. (roll down: rock, mountain, past) 2. (crush: rock, hut, past) 3. (beside: hut, woods, past) 4. (tiny: hut)

21 Propositional Networks Propositional network another way of representing propositions (the structure of meaning). Nodes the propositions, including relations and arguments. Links labeled arrows connecting the nodes. Spatial location of nodes is arbitrary. Can show hierarchies of meaning.

22 Sample Propositional Network

23 How to Draw a Network 1. Use Kintsch s notation to write the propositions contained in your sentence. 2. Draw a node for each proposition. a. It doesn t matter where you draw them. b. Nothing goes inside the nodes. c. Arguments & relations are the link labels. 3. Shared arguments connect nodes to each other.

24 Associations Between Ideas Weisberg demonstrated that ideas are associated in the ways shown in a propositional network. Subjects memorized sentences. Given a word from the sentence, subjects were asked to say the first word that came to mind. Subjects cued with slow said children and almost never bread.

25 Weisberg s Stimuli Subjects cued with slow said children and never bread.

26 Amodal vs Perceptual Symbol Systems Amodal symbol systems the meaning is abstracted away from the visual or verbal modality. Example propositional networks Perceptual symbol systems Barsalou proposes that all information is represented perceptually and is modality-specific. Context is included as part of the memory.

27 Evidence (Barsalou) Stanfield & Zwaan read a sentence about a nail pounded into either the wall or the floor. Viewed a picture of a horizontal or vertical nail. Asked does this describe what you read about? Faster at saying horizontal nail with wall and vertical nail with floor.

28 Paivio s Dual-Code Compromise Paivio suggests that when we hear a sentence it evokes visual images that are stored in place of the words. Findings that people can and do pay attending to wording when warned to do so, support dual-code theory. Anderson considers Barsalou s theory too all-encompassing to be testable.

29 Evidence (Anderson) Faster to confirm 1. The lieutenant wrote his signature on the check. 2. The lieutenant forged a signature on the check. Slower to confirm 1. The lieutenant enraged his superior in the barracks. 2. The lieutenant infuriated a superior in the barracks.

30 Conceptual Knowledge Concept -- an abstraction formed from multiple experiences. Propositions eliminate perceptual details but keep relationships among elements. Categories eliminate perceptual details but keep general properties of a class of experiences. Used to make predictions. Two kinds: semantic networks, schemas

31 Freelisting Task (Demo) On a sheet of scratch paper, please write as many names of animals as you can think of.

32 Semantic Networks Quillian information about categories stored in a network hierarchy. Nodes are categories. Isa links related categories to each other. Nodes have properties associated with them. Properties of higher level nodes are also true of lower level nodes linked to them. Categories are used to make inferences.

33 Sample Category Hierarchy

34 Psychological Reality of Networks Collins & Quillian asked subjects to judge the truth value of sentences: Canaries can sing 1310 ms Canaries have feathers 1380 ms Canaries have skin 1470 ms Frequently used facts also verified faster, so stored with node: Apples are eaten Apples have dark seeds

35 Schemas Schema stores specific knowledge about a category, not just properties: Uses a slot structure mixing propositional and perceptual information. Slots specify default values for what is generally or typically true. Isa statement makes a schema part of a generalization hierarchy. Part hierarchy.

36 Sample Schema for House Houses are a type of building. Houses have rooms. Houses can be built of wood, brick or stone. Houses serve as human dwellings. Houses tend to have rectilinear and triangular shapes. Houses are usually larger than 100 sq ft and smaller than 10,000 sq ft.

37 Isa Statements for House Isa: building Parts: rooms Materials: woord, brick, stone Function: human dwelling Shape: rectilinear, triangular Size: ,000 square feet

38 Psychological Reality of Schemas Brewer & Treyens subjects left in a room for 35 sec, then asked to list what they saw there: Good recall for items in schema False recall for items typically in schema but missing from this room. 29/30 recalled chair, desk; 8 recalled skull 9 recalled books when there were none

39 Brewer & Treyans Room

40 Degrees of Category Membership Members of categories can vary depending on whether their features satisfy schema constraints: Gradation from least typical to most typical. Rosch rated typicality of birds from 1-7: Robin = 1.1 Chicken = 3.8. Faster judgments of pictures of typical items, higher sentence-frame ratings.

41 Disagreements at Category Boundaries McCloskey & Glucksberg subjects disagree about whether atypical items belong in a category: 30/30 apple is a fruit, chicken is not a fruit 16/30 pumpkin is a fruit Subjects change their minds when tested later. Labov boundaries for cups and bowls change with context.

42 Event Concepts (Scripts) Schank & Abelson stereotypic sequences of actions called scripts. Bower, Black & Turner script for going to a restaurant. Scripts affect memory for stories: Story elements included in script well remembered, atypical elements not recalled, false recognition of script items. Items out of order put back in typical order.

43 Schema for Restaurant Visit Scene 1: Entering Look for table, decide where to sit, go to table, sit down. Scene 2: Ordering Look at menu, decide on food, order food, cook prepares food, etc. Scene 3: Eating Scene 4: Exiting Server gives bill to cust., pay bill, leave

44 Two Theories What happens mentally when we categorize? Two theories are being debated. Abstraction theory -- we abstract and store the general properties of instances. Prototype theory. Instance theory -- we store the multiple instances themselves and then compare average distances among them.

45 Drawings of Artificial Animals

46 Evidence From Neuroscience People with temporal lobe deficits selectively impaired in recognizing natural categories but not artifacts (tools) People with frontoparietal lesions unaffected for biological categories but cannot recognize artifacts (tools). Artifacts may be organized by what we do with them whereas biological categories are identified by shape.

47 Two Patients with Impaired Knowledge of Living Things