MIND BODY Problem. distinction: body soul. Mind-Body Problem 1. Psychology of Religous. Beliefs

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1 MIND BODY Problem distinction: body soul Mind-Body Problem 1

2 SOUL already Aristotle ( BC) distinguishes: 1 soul as principle of life (animate, animer, beseelen): transforms dead matter into living matter 2 Soul as CONSCIOUSNESS (Descartes, ) The mental instance where we perceive, feel, think, imagine, argue with ourself, make decisions, etc. Mind-Body Problem 2

3 Question: Relation between body and soul? Main positions: Dualism Monism substance dualism substance physicalism There exists an immaterial soul independent from body, which can continue to exist when body dies There exists no immaterial soul independent from body, Mind-Body Problem 3

4 Introductory Literature Kim, J. (2005). Philosophy of mind. 2 nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview. Beckermann, A. (2008). Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Paderborn: Fink Mind-Body Problem 4

5 DUALISM (substance dualism) Relation between immaterial soul and material body? Interactionism - Non-Interactionism (Parallelism, Occasionalism, Epiphenomenalism) Interactionism (Interactionistic Dualism) Body and soul affect each other causally e.g., Descartes, John Eccles ( ), most modern (western) theologians Mind-Body Problem 5

6 Problem: How can material body and immaterial soul interact? No theory available Up to now never shown empirically Contradiction to laws of physics (Interaction would violate law of conservation of energy) If soul could affect body directly, why do we need complex brain? Mind-Body Problem 6

7 Non-Interactionism Body and soul do not affect each other causally Parallelism (G.W. Leibniz, ) processes of soul and body are independent, but run parallel, because god arranged it so: pre-stabilized harmony (like two synchronized clocks) Occasionalism (e.g., N. Malebranche, ) no pre-stabilized harmony god intervenes directly Both approaches based mainly on theological argument Mind-Body Problem 7

8 Dualism (substance dualism) Epiphenomenalism (e.g., T.H.Huxley, ; E. Haeckel, ) mental states are caused by physical states of body but never have influence on physical states Does not explain in more detail how physical states cause mental states Positions that consider consciousness as an epiphenomenon also in (some) monistic theories Mind-Body Problem 8

9 MONISM (substance monism, substance physicalism) no mind without matter most modern philosophers of mind, psychologists Reductionistic monism - Non-reductionistic monism ( different types of (Property dualism) materialism ) Mind-Body Problem 9

10 Reductionistic monism mental states are identical (Identity theory) or completely determined by neural (=material) states -- different variations of Materialism often in these theories: mental states are epiphenomenons of neural states Mind-Body Problem 10

11 Nonreductionistic Monism (Property dualism) There is solely one type of substance: physical objects Physical objects may have two types of properties: physical (material) properties mental properties For example: Person has physical properties (e.g., weight, physiological, neurological,..) mental properties (e.g., is hungry, perceives something, remembers something ) Mind-Body Problem 11

12 Two concepts important for relation mind-matter: supervenience, emergence Mental states are based on physical states but cannot be reduced to physical states: Supervenience: If mental properties of two objects differ, their physical properties have to differ also If two objects are equal in all physical properties, they have to be equal in all mental properties Possible: two physical states are different, but have the same mental properties. Mind-Body Problem 12

13 In other words: For each mental state M i there exists at least one physical state P ik, such that all objects that are in state P ik are necessarily in M i. M 1 M 2 causes P 1 P 2 P is base of M Supervenience does not tell whether P causes M or both correlate. Compatible with reductionism, parallelism, epiphenomalism Mind-Body Problem 13

14 Can properties of a system reduced to properties of the components of the system? Emergence A property of a system is emergent if it cannot be deducted from the properties of its components and their interactions. E.g.: Optical refraction properties of water cannot be deducted from the properties of the atoms Perception of traffic sign cannot be deducted from behavior of single neurons Mind-Body Problem 14

15 Properties of neuronal states and laws of neurology enable not the deduction of (all) mental states Possible, a specific (set of) neural state(s) causes emergent and non-emergent mental states Mind-Body Problem 15

16 M 1+ M 1 M i+ emergent mental states M 2+ M i non-emergent mental states M 2 causes P 1 P 2 P is base of M emergent mental state causal influence on other emergent mental state e.g. Westermann (2000)? how? Mind-Body Problem 16

17 Assumption of mental states as emergent properties of physical states may be falsified in future At present, Neuropsychology, Neurobiology cannot predict mental states completely from neuronal and physiological states Mind-Body Problem 17

18 Functionalism (H. Putnam, from 1960) Beckermann (2008): Mental states are functional states Functional states are states of a system which are characterized by their causal role; Are caused by events from outside the system (inputs) and cause behavior of the system (outputs); Have causal relations to other states within the system Mind-Body Problem 18

19 Example: pain caused by violation of body tissue causes behavior, e.g.: screaming, licking the wound causes changes in attention, intentions (mental states) Different types of Functionalism: - pain = causal role - pain = medium of causal role Mind-Body Problem 19

20 According to Beckermann (2008): Functionalism is ontologically neutral, compatible with Monism and Dualism important for analysis of mental properties Mind-Body Problem 20

21 FREE WILL Free Will - capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives for most philosophers: Free Will is related to moral responsibility also: connected to consciousness Mind-Body Problem 21

22 Libet (1985): Study on the timing of experience of willing. Subjects had to wiggle their finger within a short interval of time (thirty seconds or so). Were instructed to do so whenever they wish though spontaneously, not by deciding the moment in advance. Subjects had to watch a special clock and to note the precise moment at which they felt the urge or wish to move the finger. During the experiment, EEG measures Mind-Body Problem 22

23 Libet discovered a steady increase in brain activity (dubbed the readiness potential, or RP) preceding the time the subjects cited as when they experienced the will to move. Averaged over hundreds of trials, RP preceded the experience of will by some 500 msec. Libet concludes that conscious will is not the initiator of voluntary acting but instead a consequence of an unconscious physical process that triggers the action. Haggard & Eimer (1999): two alternatives same main result Mind-Body Problem 23

24 Wegner (2002): People experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of their action. Libet, Benjamin (1985). Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8, Wegner, Daniel (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Freedom with a Human Face. T. O Connor. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIX (2005) Mind-Body Problem 24

25 HOW FREE ARE OUR DECISIONS? decisions involve: evaluations probabilities (in some types of risky decisions) risk defusing actions (in some types of risky decisions) weights decision strategies or heuristic Mind-Body Problem 25

26 Evaluations Most often, preferences, evaluations,, are not conscious decisions, influenced by: learning, culture (e.g., food preferences), (partially) by genetic factors (sexually preferred properties of partner, e.g. relation waist-hips, youthful skin; favorite colors, smells; we do not like to be ridiculed; ; moral principles), affects (but emotions are usually result of unconscious appraisal processes) The stronger preferences are, the less leeway for free decision Mind-Body Problem 26

27 Probabilities / uncertainty often result of unconscious processes: frequencies (even in animals) Heuristics, e.g.: Availability-heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky) most people have problems with numerical probabilities (summing up to 1; small probabilities) Mind-Body Problem 27

28 Risk defusing actions Search for such actions dependent on local circumstances, mood, personality characteristics (e.g., general control beliefs) success expectations, attractiveness Mind-Body Problem 28

29 Decision strategies / heuristics are adapted (unconsciously) to our cognitive capacity, amount of information Mind-Body Problem 29

30 CONCLUSION Very restricted free will in decision making Mind-Body Problem 30