A publication of MAF Biosecurity Authority. Biosecurity Authority begins work. biosecurity strategy for New Zealand. health surveillance

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1 biosecurity A publicatio of MAF Biosecurity Authority i s s u e 1 August Biosecurity FEATURES 2 New 4 Perspectives 6 Draft 7 Aimal 8 Grazig Biosecurity Authority begis work o the SPS agreemet biosecurity strategy for New Zealad health surveillace of livestock o Crater Block 9 Recogitio of South Africa s scrapie-free status 10 Leptospirosis safeguards durig imports of horses UPDATE DIRECTORY 12 Draft import health stadards for cosultatio New import health stadards issued Dog ad cat geeric risk aalysis MINDA idetificatio system approved RCD report Iteratioal aimal health regulatios How to cotact us South Africa s scrapie status: page 8 South Africa s scrapie status: page 8 is published by MAF Biosecurity Authority, ad covers biosecurity ad aimal health issues. It is of special iterest to all those with a stake i New Zealad s aimal productio idustries. Equiries: MAF Biosecurity Authority PO Box 2526, Welligto Ph: Fax: biosecurity@maf.govt.z Editor: Adrew Matheso ISSN:

2 New Biosecurity Authority begis work MAF Biosecurity Authority has bee established, to cotiue MAF s biosecurity fuctios ad carry out ew fuctios of biosecurity coordiatio. Barry O Neil, Group Director, Biosecurity Authority Director, Aimal Biosecurity The Biosecurity Authority, also called MAF Biosecurity, was established o 1 July 1999 with a ucleus of staff ad programmes carried over from the MAF Regulatory Authority. The move to set up a separate biosecurity agecy follows a govermet decisio that MAF should play a greater role i coordiatig the govermet s biosecurity fuctios. It was also a cosequece of the decisio to restructure food admiistratio i New Zealad. MAF will cotiue to maage biosecurity risks to primary productio sectors ad the eviromet through its admiistratio of the Biosecurity Act. The ew structure, of the Biosecurity Authority ad the Food Assurace Authority, is subject to further chage as the govermet has agreed i priciple to establish a sigle, separate miistry to hadle all food regulatory ad admiistratio issues from 1 July Miisters have asked for further policy work o the optios of a Miistry of Food or a Miistry of Food ad Biosecurity. I the meatime, by establishig the ew Food Assurace Authority ad the Biosecurity Authority, the govermet s objectives of givig greater emphasis to food safety ad biosecurity issues are beig delivered. Biosecurity Authority MAF Biosecurity is resposible for border cotrol, quaratie services, pest ad disease surveillace, emergecy respose capabilities ad other disease cotrol programmes. It is also resposible for promotig aimal welfare policies, providig aimal ad plat health assuraces to New Zealad s tradig parters, developig operatioal ad regulatory policy, ad risk maagemet. The authority s missio is To protect New Zealad s uique biodiversity ad facilitate exports by maagig risks to plat ad aimal health ad aimal welfare i New Zealad. The Biosecurity Authority is the largest provider of biosecurity services i govermet. It employs over 80 techical specialists ad operates well-established frameworks for settig a variety of stadards ad maagig associated risks. The authority s work is madated by New Zealad laws ad regulatios, icludig the Biosecurity Act 1993 ad the Aimal Welfare Act (likely to be passed durig 1999). 2 Key goals Protectio A vital goal for MAF Biosecurity is to protect New Zealad s uique biota by maagig biosecurity risks. This icludes developig effective risk maagemet programmes, icludig scietifically-soud import health stadards. MAF operates a border protectio service for all New Zealad s biosecurity eeds, applyig stadards based o sophisticated risk maagemet practices to exclude exotic pests ad diseases. There is also cotiuig surveillace of New Zealad s aimal, plat ad forest health status. MAF Biosecurity has resposibilities for disease ad pest cotrol. This icludes supportig the developmet of pest maagemet strategies (for edemic ad exotic diseases ad pests), ad providig the capacity to respod to icursios of exotic orgaisms. Coordiatio The authority is resposible for leadig ad coordiatig the New Zealad govermet s extesive biosecurity programme. MAF Biosecurity plays a key role i the Biosecurity Coucil, which brigs together the biosecurity resources ad expertise of a umber of govermet departmets ad agecies. It also provides the secretariat for both the Biosecurity Coucil ad the Biosecurity Techical Forum, two iteragecy bodies resposible for further coordiatig New Zealad s biosecurity programmes. Assuraces New Zealad s food ad fibre idustries deped o credible ad accurate govermet-togovermet assuraces, as a coditio of access to may world markets. MAF Biosecurity is resposible for aimal, forest ad plat assuraces. It also works closely with the MAF Food Assurace Authority o certificatio for edible aimal ad plat products. MAF Biosecurity plays a proactive role i market access, challegig ujustified techical barriers to trade that might exclude New Zealad goods from potetial overseas markets. Aimal welfare The Biosecurity Authority s goal of developig aimal welfare stadards has ecoomic ad ethical compoets. The authority is respodig

3 to a growig awareess of aimal welfare issues i the commuity by developig sciece-based welfare stadards. It promotes a aimal welfare, rather tha aimal rights, philosophy. A key challege is the implemetatio of the Aimal Welfare Act, likely to be passed durig This will require a extesive review of existig volutary welfare codes, ad workig with idustry to develop codes that meet ew legislative requiremets. The growig profile of aimal welfare issues i overseas markets is likely to see New Zealad s approach to aimal welfare makig a sigificat cotributio to success i iteratioal markets. The Biosecurity Authority is developig a cotract partership with the RNZSPCA ad other groups to deliver aimal welfare educatio ad eforcemet activities i a efficiet ad cost effective maer. Cosultatio MAF Biosecurity works closely with the wider atioal ad iteratioal commuity cocered with maitaiig biosecurity ad maagig risks to plat ad aimal health ad aimal welfare. We stay i touch with this commuity through direct cosultatio, publicatios (icludig Phytozoe, Biosecurity, Surveillace ad NAWAC ad NAEAC ewsletters), membership of the Biosecurity Coucil, idustry coucils ad iteratioal bodies, as well as through the policy framework provided by the New Zealad govermet. Examples of joit developmet groups iclude; Agricultural Security Cosultative Committees (aimals ad plats) Natioal Aimal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC) ad Natioal Aimal Ethics Advisory Committee (NAEAC) Forest Idustries Coucil Plats Market Access Cosultative Committee. Some of the world s leadig specialists i risk aalysis, stadard developmet, aimal welfare ad aimal ad plat health work for the authority. Staff participate i iteratioal forums such as the world orgaisatio for aimal health (OIE), the Iterim Commissio o Phytosaitary Measures (ICPM) ad the World Trade Orgaizatio (WTO), to esure the policies ad stadards are sciece-based ad recogise New Zealad s uique productio systems. The Miistry of Agriculture ad Forestry MAF Biosecurity is a key part of the Miistry of Agriculture ad Forestry (MAF), which has five frotlie busiess groups workig closely together. MAF Policy: develops policies for New Zealad s lad-based sectors; MAF Biosecurity: protects New Zealad s uique biodiversity ad facilitates exports by maagig risks to plat ad aimal health ad aimal welfare. MAF Food: assures much of New Zealad s exported food is safe ad fit for purpose ; MAF Operatios: provides a rage of core operatioal busiesses icludig the Quaratie Service, the Verificatio Agecy ad the New Zealad aimal health ad plat pest referece laboratories; MAF Forest Maagemet: maages ad admiisters East Coast forestry grats, Crow lease forests o Maori lad, idigeous forests ad forest health. Aimal Biosecurity Oe of the four pricipal groups i MAF Biosecurity is Aimal Biosecurity, which comprises the aimal health compoet of the former MAF Regulatory Authority Aimal Health ad Welfare group. Aimal Biosecurity is cocered with protectig the health of New Zealad s aimal populatios, ad assurig the aimal health status of exports. The group uses risk aalysis methodologies to develop techically-justifiable import health stadards, to allow the safe importatio of aimals ad aimal products. Market access coditios for New Zealad exports of these commodities are also egotiated. The busiess also esures MAF is able to ivestigate, cotai ad diagose ay suspected exotic aimal disease aywhere i the coutry 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Barry O Neil, Group Director, Biosecurity Authority; also Director, Aimal Biosecurity; phoe , oeilb@maf.govt.z Biosecurity Authority Executive Maager Melissa Wilso Executive Assistat to Group Director Aliso Aitke Group Director Biosecurity Authority Barry O Neil Director Aimal Biosecurity Barry O Neil Director Forest Biosecurity Ruth Frampto Director Plats Biosecurity Richard Ivess Director Aimal Welfare David Bayvel Biosecurity Policy Coordiatio Maager Sue Cotto Iteratioal Agreemets Maager Adrew Matheso Eforcemet Uit Maager * Jockey Jese Cotract Maager * Mark Murdoch *These groups provide iput to both the Food Assurace Authority ad Biosecurity Authority Aimal Biosecurity Group Director Biosecurity Authority Director Aimal Biosecurity Barry O Neil Natioal Maager Risk Maagemet Stuart MacDiarmid Natioal Maager Iteratioal Trade Jim Edwards Natioal Maager Import Maagemet Kevi Corri Natioal Maager Surveillace ad Disease Respose (desigate) Derek Belto 3

4 Perspectives o the SPS agreemet At MAF s semiar o the SPS agreemet, Dr Joa Aroldi of the US Departmet of Agriculture assessed the SPS agreemet from the stadpoit of a large importig coutry. We are ow ito the fifth year of the WTO agreemets. Today we are also o the verge of eterig ito a ew roud of egotiatios, scheduled for Jauary This ext roud may iclude some further egotiatio o SPS-related topics. This is a good a time to reflect o our experieces regardig implemetatio of the SPS agreemet. Roles of regulatory agecies Some of the more importat provisios i the SPS agreemet which have caused us sigificat chage i the way we coduct our regulatory affairs, at least i the aimal health area, are regioalisatio, risk assessmet, ad trasparecy. Noe of these cocepts is ew to biosecurity officials. They were cocepts that were well developed i a theoretical sese, but with limited ad ueve applicatio prior to the egotiatio of the SPS agreemet. The SPS agreemet was helpful i compellig coutries to expedite the adoptio ad practice of these cocepts. The Aimal ad Plat Health Ispectio Service (APHIS) of the US Departmet of Agriculture has bee at the cetre of US efforts to implemet these cocepts i a way that makes sese both from a regulatory ad trade perspective. The SPS agreemet, alog with our iterest i expadig our access to foreig markets, has forced us to thik hard about how to balace our safeguardig ad tradefacilitatio objectives. Our coclusio is that this balace is most likely to be attaied, i the log ru, by workig actively with our trade parters i promotig the developmet ad use of iteratioal stadards. I short, a sigificat effect of the SPS agreemet has bee to icrease the amout of iterest ad time we are dedicatig to workig with the stadard settig bodies, icludig the OIE. To this ed, I believe we have had a productive ad effective relatioship with New Zealad, Australia ad Caadia aimal health officials i discussig ad promotig commo positios with respective to iteratioal saitary stadards. Educatio ad techical assistace There has bee a huge learig curve domestically i terms of gettig the regulatory agecies, idustry ad other o-govermetal groups up to speed with the itet ad applicatio of the SPS agreemet. We have spet cosiderable resources i this educatioal effort coductig workshops, semiars, ad preparig ad deliverig other learig materials. This educatioal effort is ot limited to domestic groups. We also see a huge demad amog developig coutries for techical assistace i acquirig the practical uderstadig of, ad capacity to implemet, their SPS obligatios such as risk assessmet. We have tried to help meet these techical assistace eeds i our hemisphere. However, a great deal more assistace is eeded for coutries which are tryig to establish the biosecurity ifrastructure ecessary to meet importig coutries health cocers. While the SPS agreemet was successful i establishig a framework for establishig legitimate health barriers amog coutries, it has certaily become clear that the coutries with the resources to coduct risk assessmets, surveillace, ispectio, ad credible health certificatio for their products have a decided trade advatage. O the other had, the SPS agreemet provisio o regioalisatio has created a opportuity for developig coutries to focus their scarce quaratie resources o improvig the health coditios i targeted areas withi their coutry, rather tha udertake more costly efforts throughout their etire territory. Maagig risk Most sigificatly, the SPS agreemet has shifted us from a zero-risk paradigm to a policy of maaged risk. I doig so, we have had to grapple with the complex issue of how to determie the appropriate level of protectio for o-zero risks. As some of you kow, the SPS agreemet provides o clear guidace o how coutries should set their level of protectio for various kids of risk, except to say this is a sovereig decisio ad that coutries should avoid arbitrary risk maagemet decisios which result i discrimiatio or a disguised barrier to trade. APHIS s aimal health objective is to prevet the etry ad spread of aimal disease risks. However, we kow that all risks are ot equally 4

5 uacceptable. The questio is how to determie the acceptable level of risk i differet situatios, while maitaiig some level of cosistecy i our risk maagemet decisios. Our ability to be cosistet is complicated by the fact that the risk tolerace amog differet sectors of a idustry varies. The acceptable level of risk varies depedig o the value of agricultural resources that are put at risk, the availability of efficacious measures, ad other cosideratios. I practice, APHIS bases its risk maagemet decisios o iformatio provided by the risk assessmet, the availability of feasible ad efficacious measures, ad how similar or comparable risks have bee maaged i the past. As we develop our abilities to quatify risk, we will be challeged by a eed to be trasparet ad cosistet i how much risk we are willig to accept, bearig i mid both our goal to prevet disease itroductios ad our eed to avoid settig levels of protectio which become de facto stadards adopted by our trade parters. Our job i fidig the middle groud is ot easy. This is why the work of the OIE has become so importat i terms of establishig harmoised global stadards that will be sufficiet from a safeguardig ad tradefacilitatio stadpoit. Effects of trade liberalisatio I would like to ote a couple of cosequeces which have occurred as a result of the trade liberalisatio uder the WTO ad our regioal trade agreemet kow as the North America Free Trade Agreemet (NAFTA). First, the liberalisatio of trade, particularly the emergece of the SPS agreemet ad the visible expasio i trade, has give rise to food safety ad evirometal cocers. This should ot surprise us. The icreased volume of trade has itroduced ew risks. Also, the SPS agreemet ad the disciplies cotaied i it, which are iteded to prevet coutries from imposig ufouded ad ujustified health measures i trade, are perceived by some groups as havig reduced our ability to safeguard our resources. A umber of groups, who are geerally sceptical of our trade ageda, have argued ad will cotiue to argue that the SPS agreemet is flawed by a over-reliace o sciece ad risk assessmet as the tools for maagig risks i trade. They maitai that the SPS agreemet would allow a dispute pael to secod-guess a coutry s safeguardig decisios by rulig o the sufficiecy of scietific evidece used i a risk assessmet. While we do ot share this view, we must recogise that these are real issues ad cocers that exist about the role of risk assessmet. It certaily highlights the eed to stregthe our risk commuicatio efforts i order that the public ca have cofidece i the how we evaluate ad maage risks. I respose to these food safety ad evirometal cocers, the US admiistratio has udertake a Food Safety Iitiative aimed at ehacig the safety of both domestic ad foreig sources of food. Similarly, as a result of icreased trade, the evirometal commuity has dramatised the risks associated with the etry of o-ative species which may have harmful ecological or evirometal effects. Here we are talkig about species of pests which the existig regulatory agecies, such as APHIS, have ot traditioally focused o, give that APHIS has traditioally focussed o agricultural pests. The scope of our safeguardig missio may broade sigificatly i the comig years as a result of icreased iterest i guardig both aquatic ad terrestrial eviromet from these so called o-ative ivasive species. I retrospect, both the WTO ad our regioal trade agreemet kow as the NAFTA resulted, I believe, i perhaps oversellig these agreemets ad creatig some expectatios which have bee difficult to fulfil. Today, we see that the various trade agreemets do provide a valuable framework to level the playig field, but larger macro-ecoomic ad other global factors ultimately determie the terms of trade. These iclude ecoomic dowturs i Asia, Lati America, ad Russia ad the value of the dollar vis-a-vis other currecies. Certaily these ecoomic coditios have resulted i makig foreig products, icludig agricultural goods, affordable to Americas, hece icreasig the level of imports ito the Uited States ad makig our job of maagig disease risks more challegig. The bottom lie is that ay assessmet of our trade agreemets eeds to bear i mid that the agreemet itself eeds to be evaluated i the cotext of other complex global factors. We caot judge the value of the SPS agreemet simply by curret trade successes or lack thereof. Joa Aroldi, Associate Admiistrator, Aimal ad Plat Health Ispectio Service, US Departmet of Agriculture, Washigto DC, USA 5

6 Draft biosecurity strategy for New Zealad Commets are ivited o a draft strategy for the future directio of biosecurity i this coutry. A draft biosecurity strategy for New Zealad has bee prepared by the Biosecurity Coucil. This documet is iteded to outlie the future geeral directio ad visio for biosecurity i this coutry. It is the first step towards a more comprehesive framework to uderpi the biosecurity activities of the agecies represeted o the coucil. The coucil is seekig commet o this documet. The draft strategy proposes a defiitio of biosecurity, ad visio ad missio statemets to guide the directio of biosecurity i this coutry. It also outlies 11 priciples of what is ecessary to achieve New Zealad s missio for biosecurity. The documet is iteded as the first step i esurig a coordiated ad itegrated framework agaist which the agecies o the coucil ca develop their biosecurity policies ad programmes. The coucil iteds to develop specific actios agaist each of the priciples, settig out the meas for achievig those priciples. These actios may require work to be doe by either the coucil or idividual agecies. But before these actios are developed, the coucil wishes to cosult publicly o the draft strategy. It is iterested i receivig feedback o the statemets ad priciples i the documet, sice these are the corerstoe o which more comprehesive strategies ad actios will be developed. The Biosecurity Coucil was established i 1997 to provide a forum for the discussio of broad biosecurity policy issues amog the various departmets with biosecurity resposibilities. It also provides a mechaism for establishig the eed for, ad/or priorities of, programmes associated with maagig exotic pests (or recet icursios) (Biosecurity 10: 4). The coucil has a idepedet chair, ad is comprised of chief executives of the Departmet of Coservatio ad the Miistries of Agriculture ad Forestry, Health, Fisheries, Eviromet, ad Research, Sciece ad Techology, ad the Evirometal Risk Maagemet Authority; a represetative of regioal coucils, ad the Group Director of MAF Biosecurity Authority. Sue Cotto, Biosecurity Secretariat, Miistry of Agriculture ad Forestry, PO Box 2526, Welligto, phoe , cottos@maf.govt.z Commets are ivited by 15 September 1999 Itroductio This documet outlies a overarchig biosecurity strategy for New Zealad ad was drafted by the Biosecurity Coucil to reflect a New Zealad-wide perspective o biosecurity. Maitaiig New Zealad s biosecurity is of crucial importace for all our citizes ad for our ecoomic well-beig as a small islad atio. Our borders are costatly tested by orgaisms that have the potetial to cause severe damage to our ecoomy, eviromet ad quality of life. The growth i trade ad tourism, itesificatio withi productio systems based o exotic species, ad climatic ad evirometal chages, all icrease the risks of ivasio ad establishmet of ew destructive orgaisms. To miimise these threats New Zealad eeds biosecurity systems that are based o soud priciples of risk maagemet, good sciece ad cost-effectiveess. Defiitio of biosecurity Maagemet of risks posed by orgaisms to the ecoomy, eviromet ad people s health through exclusio, eradicatio ad cotrol Visio Pest-free New Zealad Missio Providig effective biosecurity systems to protect New Zealad s ecoomy, eviromet ad people s health Cotributio to govermet s goals Oe of the overarchig goals of the govermet as stated i Goals ad priorities 1999/2002 is: We treasure our clea, healthy ad uique eviromet ad will esure it cotiues to sustai ature ad people s eeds ad aspiratios. The life-supportig capacity of soil, air, water ad ecosystems will cotiue to be safeguarded ad the biological diversity ad spectacular sceery that make New Zealad a special place will cotiue to be able to be ejoyed by future geeratios. Priciples of the strategy The followig priciples are statemets of what is ecessary to achieve New Zealad s missio for biosecurity. A. Govermet ad public commitmet to biosecurity; B. Capacity ad capability to idetify, prevet ad respod to biosecurity risks ad threats; C. Govermet commitmet to specific fudig for rapid iitial respose to pest icursios; D. Cross-agecy cooperatio ad clear accoutabilities o biosecurity; E. A legislative framework that meets New Zealad s biosecurity eeds; F. Wherever possible, biosecurity risks are maaged offshore; G. Cosistet assessmet of biosecurity risks, ad cosistet ad cotiuig applicatio of risk-mitigatig measures across, ad withi, orgaisatios with resposibilities for biosecurity; H. Commuicatio programmes that educate the public about biosecurity; I. Biosecurity-related research that meets New Zealad s eeds; J. Relevat iteratioal biosecurity obligatios are met; K. Biosecurity activities udertake by the Crow are cosistet with the priciples of the Treaty of Waitagi. Biosecurity risks are defied as the risks posed by orgaisms to the ecoomy, the eviromet ad people s health. 21 July 1999 draft 6 6

7 Aimal health surveillace The fourth article i the series o MAF s Aimal Biosecurity busiess examies the collectio of aimal health surveillace iformatio, ad how it is used to assure tradig parters of New Zealad s freedom from particular aimal diseases. Whe New Zealad exporters sed their aimals ad aimal products overseas, our tradig parters demad assuraces that these are free of serious pests ad diseases ad do ot pose a risk to the health of aimals or humas. Aimal health surveillace iformatio collected by the Aimal Biosecurity busiess provides those assuraces. The primary fuctio of the Aimal Biosecurity busiess is to safeguard the health status of aimals i New Zealad from serious diseases. These diseases ca be broadly categorised as either exotic (those which do ot already exist i New Zealad) or edemic (those which are already established i some parts of this coutry). It is importat that New Zealad ca demostrate it does ot have certai diseases. If we caot satisfy our tradig parters of this, the i some cases, access to markets will ot be possible. I other cases exporters may icur additioal testig or treatmet costs. The Aimal Biosecurity busiess udertakes aimal health surveillace so that diseases which may affect iteratioal aimal trade ca be idetified early, addressed speedily ad have miimal impact o New Zealad s export trade. Aimal health surveillace is the ogoig collectio, aalysis, iterpretatio ad reportig of New Zealad s aimal disease data. There are three categories of aimal health surveillace activities. Passive surveillace Iformatio is collected from aimal samples provided by farmers ad veteriarias ad processed by aimal health laboratories i New Zealad. This gives a picture of the diseases that aimal owers ad veteriarias are ecouterig i the field. Ehaced passive surveillace Test results are reviewed as they pass through the aimal health laboratory. Samples or cases that look uusual or abormal are subjected to additioal tests. Ehaced passive surveillace may also ivolve askig veteriarias to look out for particular problems MAF wishes to collect iformatio o, such as abortio i sheep. Active surveillace Part of a aimal populatio is selected, sampled ad tested for a specific disease to assess its occurrece. This costitutes a survey of the health of a particular aimal populatio. Active surveillace gives more statistically accurate results tha other methods because the surveys are scietifically desiged, but it is more expesive tha passive surveillace. A combiatio of all three activities is eeded to achieve Aimal Biosecurity s surveillace objectives. The Aimal Biosecurity group develops cotracts with approved aimal health laboratories throughout New Zealad to provide passive surveillace ad ehaced passive surveillace. Specialised diagostic testig i virology, bacteriology, molecular biology, immuology, ad fish diseases is usually performed by the New Zealad Aimal Health Referece Laboratory (NZAHRL). The NZAHRL also performs the followig fuctios: referrals of samples to experts withi New Zealad ad overseas, whe the diagostic capability is ot available or a secod opiio is required; desigig ad carryig out aimal disease surveys; overviewig ad providig techical iput to the audit of laboratories which supply surveillace iformatio to Aimal Biosecurity. The results of routie surveillace activities are reported to Aimal Biosecurity o a quarterly basis. Ay provisioal diagoses of otifiable orgaisms are otified to the Director of Aimal Biosecurity immediately. Notifiable orgaisms are pricipally those which are ot established i New Zealad ad would have a adverse impact o aimal productio or market access. Foot ad mouth disease is a example of a otifiable orgaism. The surveillace iformatio collected by Aimal Biosecurity is used to: facilitate New Zealad s exports of aimals ad aimal products by certifyig the coutry s disease status, thus miimisig the requiremets these exports must meet; eable the prompt detectio of exotic diseases i New Zealad; fulfil iteratioal treaty obligatios, icludig the timely reportig of aimal health evets to iteratioal orgaisatios ad tradig parters; develop ad establish techicallyjustifiable import requiremets for aimals ad aimal products eterig New Zealad; support the developmet of pest maagemet strategies to cotrol aimal diseases; provide iput to public health policies for the cotrol of aimal diseases that ca affect huma health. Case study - active surveillace MAF recetly udertook a 20-moth survey of farmed salmo ad trout for the four viruses of greatest iteratioal trade sigificace. The survey ivolved 18 South Islad salmo farms, three North Islad trout hatcheries ad seve retur locatios for sea-ru quiat salmo. Brai, kidey, splee ad ovaria fluid samples were collected ad tested. The results of the testig for the viruses were egative apart from detectio of a aquatic biravirus i sea-ru salmo from oe river ad oe sea-ru retur site. The results of this survey cofirm earlier surveys that the New Zealad farmed trout ad salmo populatio is free from these four viruses ad provides curret iformatio to back up New Zealad s export assuraces. Roger Polad, Actig Natioal Maager (Surveillace), Aimal Biosecurity, phoe , poladr@maf.govt.z 7

8 Grazig of livestock o Crater Block Cocer about cattle grazig o Crater Block, ear Rotorua, has prompted a explaatio of New Zealad s scrapie status. Recetly a member of the public reportig the presece of cattle grazig at Crater Block, i the Rotorua area. The perso reportig the grazig was cocered because, like may other people, she was uder the impressio that, followig a outbreak of the sheep disease scrapie i the late 1970s, Crater Block was to remai free from livestock i perpetuity With the passage of time, a umber of miscoceptios have grow up aroud Crater Block ad the evets associated with the scrapie cases i I 1978 scrapie was diagosed i sheep of British origi beig held i quaratie o Maa Islad, ear Welligto. Offsprig of some of the British origi sheep had bee moved to Crater Block i mid No case of scrapie was ever diagosed amogst sheep o Crater Block. Whe scrapie was detected o Maa Islad MAF brought a British expert o the disease, Dr Joh Stamp, to New Zealad to advise o how best to hadle the situatio. Dr Stamp advised immediate slaughter of all the imported sheep ad their progey. This was carried out immediately, with all the sheep o Crater Block beig destroyed withi three days. Dr Stamp also advised restrictio of the use of the lad o which the sheep had bee grazig. He recommeded that the lad use be restricted to grazig by cattle or deer, or the lad should be plated i trees. O Crater Block platig of trees was uder way by late August Platig could ot be completed that year ad so cattle grazed the lad util the followig year whe the remaider of the lad was plated i trees. Crater Block is still plated i pie trees, with cattle grazig amogst them. Maa Islad, where cases of scrapie actually did occur, was replated i ative trees ad is ow a scietific reserve maaged by the Departmet of Coservatio. There are o livestock o Maa Islad as this would be icompatible with the islad s use as a scietific reserve for ative species. Cattle were ever baed from Crater Block. May people have come to believe that there is a permaet ba o the grazig of livestock there, but this was ot the origial recommedatio. There is also o legal basis for baig the grazig of Crater Block. After the passage of more tha 20 years, there certaily is o scietific basis for ay ba of grazig livestock o Crater Block. There was ever ay case of scrapie o that lad. The sheep there were killed as a precautio, because they origiated from Maa Islad. Apart from the cases which occurred i imported sheep quaratied o Maa Islad i the 1970s, scrapie occurred i imported sheep o two Southlad farms i 1952 ad However, ogoig surveillace, itesified sice 1989, cotiues to cofirm that New Zealad is free from scrapie. MAF is strogly committed to preservig New Zealad s scrapie-free status. That status is ot jeopardised, however, by permittig cattle to graze o Crater Block. After reviewig the history of the Maa Islad scrapie cases ad curret kowledge of the disease, ad discussig the issue with the Agricultural Security Cosultative Committee, MAF does ot cosider that there is ay justificatio for imposig restrictios o the grazig of Crater Block by ay livestock. Stuart MacDiarmid, Natioal Maager (Risk Maagemet), Aimal Biosecurity, phoe , macdiarmids@maf.govt.z 8

9 Recogitio of South Africa s scrapie-free status MAF has studied the scrapie status of South Africa, which is relevat to New Zealad s policy o importatio of sheep ad goats from both South Africa ad Australia. This assessmet is available for cosultatio. Scrapie i Australia ad New Zealad I the 1950s New Zealad ad Australia both experieced cases of the disease scrapie i sheep imported from the UK. I both coutries the agricultural authorities moved swiftly to stamp out the disease, ad implemeted restrictive importatio policies desiged to prevet similar itroductios. I the mid-1980s Australia ad New Zealad both set up programmes to permit the safe importatio of ew sheep bloodlies, ivolvig extesive safeguards agaist scrapie. However, because of differeces i the safeguards imposed, the Australias placed restrictios o the importatio of sheep from New Zealad. To avoid a repetitio of this problem, i the late 1980s a joit workig party o sheep ad goat imports formulated a scrapie freedom assurace programme. MAF ad the Australia Quaratie ad Ispectio Service (AQIS) agreed that all importatios of small rumiat bloodlies from outside Australasia would be subject to the programme. I 1997 AQIS permitted the importatio of sheep ad goat germplasm from South Africa without imposig ay safeguards agaist scrapie. AQIS was ot able to provide MAF with a adequate assessmet of South Africa s scrapie status ad so MAF was faced with the eed to coduct its ow assessmet. The history of scrapie i South Africa The history of scrapie i South Africa is remarkably similar to the history of the disease i New Zealad ad Australia, though i South Africa the disease occurred much later. I South Africa, the first case of scrapie was detected i Natal i Subsequetly, the disease was diagosed i 11 sheep o ie farms i differet regios. All cases were first or secod geeratio progey of Hampshire Dow sheep which had bee imported from the UK. I each case, whe a case of scrapie was cofirmed, all i-cotact sheep were slaughtered ad the flock was placed uder a four-year quaratie. Sheep o quaratied farms were ispected mothly by govermet veteriarias. As i New Zealad ad Australia, this stampigout ad quaratie policy appears to have bee successful. Followig the detectio of the first case of scrapie, all sheep which had bee imported ito South Africa sice 1961 were traced ad the farms placed uder quaratie for four years. All movemets from ifected flocks, or flocks cotaiig imported sheep, were traced. The flocks receivig these aimals were also quaratied ad subject to mothly ispectio. Aimals from quaratied flocks were permitted to be moved oly directly to slaughter. Scrapie i South Africa I April 1999 a MAF veteriaria, Dr Stuart MacDiarmid, the Natioal Maager (Agricultural Security), travelled to South Africa to meet with veteriarias, scietists, officials ad others to attempt to assess the basis for that coutry s claim to be free from scrapie. Dr MacDiarmid has had a log ivolvemet with New Zealad s scrapie freedom assurace programmes, MAF s surveillace programmes for scrapie ad related diseases, ad is a expert i risk aalysis. There have bee more cases of scrapie cofirmed i South Africa tha i New Zealad (11 cases o ie farms compared with (perhaps) seve cases o two farms) but surveillace for scrapie i South Africa is at least as good as, ad perhaps better tha, that i New Zealad. While ot all the brais examied histologically i South Africa laboratories ca be cosidered as comig from aimals likely to be suspected of havig scrapie (based o age ad/or cliical sigs), more sheep brais are examied tha i New Zealad. For example, betwee Jauary 1994 ad the ed of 1997, 448 sheep brais were examied i New Zealad, from a sheep populatio of aroud 48 millio. I South Africa aroud 440 sheep brais are examied per year, from a populatio of approximately 30 millio sheep. Sice 1965 South Africa has prohibited importatio of sheep from coutries reportig scrapie. Prior to that, importatio required official certificatio that the flock of origi had bee scrapie-free for 10 years ad had bee closed for four years. While oe might questio the value of these assuraces, the farms importig the aimals (or embryos or seme) were subject to a four-year post-arrival quaratie. Sice 1990 imports of small rumiats have bee permitted oly from Australia ad New Zealad. O the basis of this evidece, it is clear that South Africa s claim to be scrapie-free is at least as good as New Zealad s ad Australia s. What ow? MAF is faced with a choice: either we recogise South Africa s claim to be free from scrapie or we impose restrictios o the importatio of sheep ad goats from Australia, which has already recogised South Africa s scrapie freedom. Acceptace that South Africa is scrapie-free would ot immediately lead to the importatio of sheep or goats directly from that coutry. There are other diseases of importace which would eed to be cosidered i a formal risk aalysis. However, acceptace of South Africa s claim to be scrapiefree would mea that importatio of sheep ad goats from Australia could cotiue uder the same coditios as have bee applied util recetly. Rejectio of South Africa s claim meas that restrictios must be imposed o the importatio from Australia of sheep ad goats ad their germplasm. O the basis of the evidece, MAF favours recogitio of South Africa as a coutry free from scrapie. Marti Va Gikel, Techical Adviser (Risk Maagemet), Aimal Biosecurity, phoe x8502, vagikelm@maf.govt.z Stuart MacDiarmid, Natioal Maager (Risk Maagemet), Aimal Biosecurity, phoe , macdiarmids@maf.govt.z The deadlie for submissios is 15 September

10 Leptospirosis safeguards durig imports of horses Equie leptospirosis is oe of the challegig issues beig examied by MAF i its aalysis of the health risks associated with imports of horses ad horse seme. Safeguards agaist leptospirosis are ot curretly icluded i ay New Zealad import health stadard for horses or seme, but are i stadards for importig other livestock. Do horses ad seme preset a risk of itroducig exotic serovars of leptospirosis? What would be the cosequece of ay such itroductio? What is the most appropriate ad least restrictive meas of maagig the risk? These questios are of relevace to the equie ad other livestock idustries, ad for public health. The disease ad its cause Leptospirosis is caused by ifectio with the bacterium Leptospira, of which there are over 200 serovars (types). A wide rage of aimals, ad humas, are susceptible, ad ifectio causes kidey disease or abortio. Serovars iteract with aimal hosts i differet ways; they are maitaied i certai aimal species (maiteace hosts) but also ifect others (icidetal hosts). Ifectio i maiteace hosts leads to chroic kidey ifectios ad log periods of sheddig orgaisms i the urie, whereas ifectio i icidetal hosts typically leads to more acute ad severe disease but quicker elimiatio of ifectio. The eviromet also affects the iteractio betwee serovars ad aimals, ad patters of ifectio may differ i differet locatios. Wildlife species, such as rodets ad possums, act as maiteace hosts for some serovars. Leptospirosis is a importat disease i the cattle, pig ad deer idustries i this coutry, ad is a sigificat health risk for humas exposed to ifected aimals i their occupatios (e.g. farmers, veteriarias, meat workers). New Zealad s import health policy Oly a few Leptospira serovars are kow to occur i New Zealad. Serovars ot already preset here (exotic serovars) are cosidered to be uwated orgaisms uder the Biosecurity Act This is because adverse cosequeces to aimal or huma health might result from their itroductio. These cosequeces are difficult to predict, but some serovars which cause serious problems for aimal ad/or huma health overseas might have similar effects here if they became established. To reduce the risk of itroducig exotic serovars, all livestock species (with the exceptio of horses) are either tested or treated for leptospirosis prior to importatio. The bacteria may also be foud i the seme of ifected aimals, so seme doors are subject to similar measures or seme may be treated with atibiotics. 10 Risks associated with horses ad seme Overseas evidece cofirms horses may be icidetal hosts to exotic serovars of leptospirosis. Such ifectios are probably ucommo, associated with acute illess ad short-lived. The likelihood of healthy horses beig ifected with a exotic serovar at the time of importatio is probably very low, ad this has bee bore out to date by the lack of evidece that imports have lead to itroductios. However, imports of ifected horses have led to leptospirosis outbreaks here (ivolvig serovars which were already preset), suggestig that imports of horses do preset a potetial pathway for itroductio. There is o iformatio specific for horses to demostrate the effectiveess of the testig or treatmet safeguards, so extrapolatio from other species is required. The atibody test used for leptospirosis lacks the accuracy to eable it to be used to determie the serovar ifectig a aimal. The efficacy of atibiotic treatmets i removig chroic kidey ifectios i horses is also ucertai. There are other issues associated with drug availability i some coutries ad side effects of treatmet, particularly ijectio-site muscular reactios which may affect the shortterm performace of competitio horses. Cosultatio The risk maagemet optios iclude doig othig (i.e. the status quo for horses), testig for atibodies, or treatig with atibiotics. MAF has recommeded brigig horses ito lie with other livestock by requirig that every aimal either be egative to a atibody test or receive treatmet prior to import. MAF asked five experts to review the leptospirosis chapter of its risk aalysis o horses ad horse seme (Biosecurity 3: 6). While this provided useful iformatio, the experts views did ot provide a cosesus o the appropriate way forward. The draft chapter o leptospirosis ad the experts reviews is available for commet. MAF wats iput from the livestock idustries, public health sector ad other stakeholders prior to fialisig leptospirosis risk maagemet measures for the importatio of horses ad seme. Matthew Stoe, Natioal Adviser (Iteratioal Trade), Aimal Biosecurity, phoe , stoem@maf.govt.z The deadlie for submissios is 15 September 1999

11 update Draft import health stadards for cosultatio The followig draft import health stadards (IHSs) have bee developed by MAF Biosecurity Authority ad are available for public cosultatio. Zoo otters (geera Lutra, Lutrogale ad Aoyx) from Australia Zoo crested porcupies (Hystrix cristata) from the Uited Kigdom These ew stadards have bee developed followig requests to import from Hamilto Zoo ad Oraa Park. Bovie seme from Hugary This stadard was developed followig a request from a New Zealad importer. It icludes the same safeguards that have bee implemeted for other Europea coutries ad is based o curret import policy. Jea-Marie Derouet, Techical Adviser (Iteratioal Trade), Aimal Biosecurity, phoe , derouetj@maf.govt.z The deadlie for submissios is 15 September 1999 New import health stadards issued The followig ew import health stadards (IHSs) have bee issued by the Director of Aimal Biosecurity ad are available for use. Ay previous IHSs coverig these combiatios of coutry of origi ad commodity/species have bee revoked. Orgaic based fertilisers from the Uited States of America The defiitio of orgaic-based fertilisers uder this ew import health stadard has bee altered from all fertilisers to all prepackaged fertilisers. This is to esure that imports of bulk, ulabelled fertiliser cotaiig meat ad boe meal caot be imported ad therefore fid its way ito New Zealad stockfeed. Specified pathoge free chicke (Gallus gallus) eggs for laboratory use This stadard, advised as curret i Biosecurity 11: 7, has received further modificatio to icrease the testig regime optios for Newcastle disease ad avia ifectious larygotracheitis. Specified products for huma cosumptio cotaiig dairy products, eggs or meat This stadard, advised as curret i Biosecurity 5: 9, has bee modified with the term meat products i clauses 8.4, 8.5 ad 8.6 beig expaded to iclude meat ad meat products. I additio, the term bread has bee added to clause Salmoids for huma cosumptio from specified coutries This stadard recogises, i sectio 11.1, the Norwegia Directorate of Fisheries Quality Cotrol Service saitary certificate coverig salmoids for huma cosumptio imported ito New Zealad (Referece: Suhetsattest, laksefisk, New Zealad, egelsk. 99/04) as beig equivalet to the requiremets of Part D. Zoosaitary Certificatio. Marie fisheries products for huma cosumptio from all coutries This stadard replaces the previously refereced (marie fish for huma cosumptio) ad (marie foods for huma cosumptio), both dated July White rhioceroses from the Republic of South Africa This stadard was developed followig requests from various zoological gardes i New Zealad ad was otified for public cosultatio i Biosecurity 11: 7. Kerry Mulquee, Natioal Adviser (Import Maagemet), Aimal Biosecurity, phoe , fax , mulqueek@maf.govt.z Dog ad cat geeric risk aalysis A aalysis of the risks ivolved i importig dogs ad cats ito New Zealad is beig carried out by MAF. At this stage, a copy of the list of exotic orgaisms uder cosideratio is available for commet. MAF Biosecurity Authority is lookig for feedback o the list ad suggestios for ay additioal orgaisms that should also be cosidered. Sarah Peters, Techical Adviser (Iteratioal Trade), Aimal Biosecurity, phoe , fax , peterss@maf.govt.z The deadlie for submissios is 15 September 1999 MINDA idetificatio system approved MAF has approved the Livestock Improvemet Corporatio s MINDA idetificatio system for use with cattle, deer ad goats. The approval uder sectio 50 of the Biosecurity Act 1993 meas that MINDA may be used as oe of the compulsory idetificatio systems i support of the bovie TB pest maagemet strategy. The compulsory idetificatio of cattle ad deer before they are first moved from their herd is beig phased i durig the ext two years. The approval of MINDA for use o goats meas that, subject to edorsemet by the Departmet of Coservatio, goats so idetified will be recogised legally as farmed aimals. The same situatio applies to deer idetified uder a approved ID system. MINDA, together with the Aimal Health Board idetificatio system (Biosecurity 12: 11), was formally gazetted i Jue for the 1 July commecemet of the Biosecurity (Aimal Idetificatio Systems) Regulatios The ew regulatios support the bovie TB strategy by implemetig a atioal lifetime idetificatio programme for cattle ad farmed deer. By recostructig the lifetime movemets of ifected aimals, TB spread ca be ivestigated ad cotrolled. MINDA system, phoe ; AHB system, phoe Ashley Edge, Policy Adviser, Biosecurity Policy Coordiatio, phoe , edgea@maf.govt.z 11

12 RCD report A report o the lessos leared from the rabbit calicivirus experiece i New Zealad has bee released by the Miister for Food, Fibre, Biosecurity ad Border Cotrol. The report examies the backgroud leadig up to the decisio ot to allow the virus to be itroduced ito New Zealad, its subsequet illegal itroductio, ad the decisio to legalise its use. The report idetifies a umber of lessos to be leared from the experiece ad makes recommedatios to avoid similar situatios i the future. It also otes that the establishmet of ERMA New Zealad ad the eactmet of the Hazardous Substaces ad New Orgaisms Act should reduce the likelihood of some of these problems recurrig i future situatios. The report was prepared by a workig party for the Biosecurity Coucil, ad copies are available from the world wide web address give or for $15 each from the followig. Suzae Mai, Biosecurity Secretariat, Miistry of Agriculture ad Forestry, PO Box 2526, Welligto, phoe , mais@maf.govt.z Photo credit: Jim Edwards, p10 DIRECTORY Iteratioal aimal health regulatios These aimal health regulatios have bee either proposed or implemeted by members of the World Trade Orgaizatio, ad have bee otified uder the SPS agreemet (the WTO agreemet o the applicatio of saitary ad phytosaitary measures) betwee 28 May ad 7 July Coutry Referece Date otified Summary of cotet How to cotact us Adrew Matheso, SPS Notificatio Authority coordiator, Iteratioal Agreemets group, phoe , sps@maf.govt.z Argetia 47 corr.1 7/7/99 Amedmet to the address for supply of texts Australia 97 4/6/99 Coditios for ovie ad caprie geetic material from Caada, USA ad EC to protect agaist scrapie Australia 98 4/6/99 Crocodilias ad their eggs Australia 99 4/6/99 Bovie seme ad embryos from Argetia ad Brazil EEC 72 add.1 2/7/99 Extesio of commet date to 30 July 1999 Netherlads 41 14/6/99 Idetificatio ad registratio of Walters (cursorial birds) to prevet outbreak of ifectious diseases Peru 10 10/6/99 Health certificate requiremet for plat, vegetable products, aimals ad products ad by-products of aimal origi Sigapore 5 4/6/99 Import licece for horses to protect agaist Hedra ad Africa horse sickess ew Everyoe listed at the ed of a article as a cotact poit, uless otherwise idicated, is part of the Miistry of Agriculture ad Forestry Biosecurity Authority. The group withi the authority to which they belog is also idetified. All MAF staff ca be cotacted by e.mail, ad the stadard format for all addresses is surameiitial@maf.govt.z For example, Ralph Hopcroft would be hopcroftr@maf.govt.z (There are slight exceptios for people with similar ames, but these addresses are give where ecessary.) PO Box 2526, Welligto, New Zealad (+64) (switchboard) most staff have direct-dial lies, which are listed where available (+64) Aimal Biosecurity group, except Director Iteratioal Agreemets group Biosecurity Policy Coordiatio group (+64) Group Director ad Executive Maager, Biosecurity Authority Director, Aimal Biosecurity ASB Bak House, 101 The Terrace, Welligto 12