Transboundary animal disease control and risk mitigation: ensuring food security in the conflict affected area of Eastern Ukraine

Transcription

1 1 Transboundary animal disease control and risk mitigation: ensuring food security in the conflict affected area of Eastern Ukraine

2 The virus Hosts Stable over a wide range of temperatures and ph, so it persists in excretions, carcasses and pig meat Domestic pigs of all ages Feral pigs and wild boar equally susceptible Humans are NOT susceptible African Swine Fever 2

3 3 Prevention: Awareness & Training Realistic biosecurity Prevent swill feeding Control at borders, seaports, airports, etc Control: No vaccine or treatment Stamping out (ONLY if compensation and infrastructure is in place) Movement control Awareness Socio-economic impact due to large mortality and morbidity in particular for rural poor families The culprit

4 Spread of ASF in Eastern Europe June Georgia August Armenia December Russia in wild boar and later in domestic pigs endemic in many regions January Azerbaijan (single intro in pigs) Dec 08-Jan Iran (detected in wild boar) July Ukraine (single intro in pigs) followed by re-introduction and massive spread in 2014 till now 2013 Belarus 2014 Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Estonia 2016 Moldova Currently ASF endemic in many regions of Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Virus is also detected in Podlaskie region of Poland. There is high risk of further spread to Romania, Hungary and Slovakia and further on

5 African Swine Fever in Ukraine, 2017

6 Assistance via FAO TCP completed FAO EMPRES mission Luhansk, Ukraine: July 2010 FAO Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) Technical guidance on immediate response -outbreak control measures Revise/update surveillance protocols Capacity development of state veterinary service 4 national workshops covering : contingency planning, early warning and early response, active and passive surveillance in domestic pigs and wild boars, outbreak management: stamping out, disinfection, zoning; biosecurity protocols for pig production Provision of lab reagents Laboratory diagnostics capacity development Decision support systems (GIS) - Ukraine Public awareness

7 Assistance via TCP completed FAO Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) Technical guidance on immediate response - outbreak control measures ASF web resource Decision support systems (GIS) Ukraine STOP ASF - Ukrainian on-line decision support GIS Google translate from Ukrainian!

8 Assistance via partnership projects US DTRA African Swine Fever Public Outreach Regional Project to improve understanding of the ecology and epidemiology of ASF in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine training in prevention and control measures public awareness EBRD/FAO African Swine Fever: Risk Awareness Raising and Risk Mitigation in Ukraine with support of Government of Japan in cooperation with Association of Pork Breeders improving contingency plans at national and 6 regions level ( Kyiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Volyn, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk) through simulation exercises improving the knowledge and awareness of local vets; and raising the awareness of smallholders, small and medium-sized pig farmers on ASF capacity development in laboratory diagnostics

9 Other assistance via capacity building workshops FAO national ASF epidemiology workshops: Ukraine: (May 2009): > 50 participants Belarus: (May 2009): > 20 participants FAO subregional lab training (Kyiv, March 2010) 16 diagnosticians from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine ELISA Ab & Ag detection, RT-PCR and immunoflourescence microscopy FAO regional workshop under GF-TADs Europe, Budapest, Hungary December FAO-OIE training course on ASF epidemiology and diagnosis, under GF-TADs Europe, supported by Government of Italy, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell Umbria e Marche (IZS-UM) National Reference Laboratory for CSF and ASF, November 2013 Perugia, Italy, Participation in EU TAIEX Workshops: Classical and African Swine Fever, 2-3 September 2013, Vilnius, Lithuania Biosecurity- fundament for animal health March 2015, Riga, Latvia

10 Early warnings and assessments Early warnings: ASF in Georgia - Georgia_Jun07.pdf ASF in the Caucasus - ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/aj214e/aj214e00.pdf ASF spread in the Russian Federation and the risk for the region ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/ak718e/ak718e00.pdf Assessments: FAO takes a close look at the threat of ASF introduction into Eastern Europe Periodic situation updates ASF recent developments - timely updates

11 FAO publications on ASF Пособие по подготовке чрезвычайных ситуаций на случай эпидемий африканской чумы свиней Good practices for biosecurity in the pig sector Recognizing African Swine Fever. A Field Manual ocuments/asf_manual2_recognising.pdf Африканская Чума Свиней в Российской Федерации ( )

12 Local authorities requested assistance Printing materials Quantity of required copies for Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts Covered by FAO Percentage ASF Manual % Vertical posters % Horizontal posters % Leaflets for population *** 1% * together with OCHA

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14 Major reasons for the ASF control failure Inadequate control program Movement of animal and products WITHOUT CONTROL. Swill feeding. Delayed and absence of fair compensation. Late detection. Contacts of wild boar with domestic pigs. Lack of collaboration among all parties involved.

15 Lessons learnt Reduction number of staff, annual budget, decentralization of state veterinary service in many ex USSR countries weakened capacities of veterinary services to address emerging transboundary diseases like ASF. Lack of trust and cooperation, hiding cases of disease resulted in spread of the disease. Due to absence of vaccine the only preventive measure is high biosecurity which difficult to ensure in traditional backyard pig breeding farms with very low biosecurity conditions in majority of Eastern European Countries. ASF control is based on timely efficient massive culling of infected or at risk of infection pigs and quarantine which requires fair and timely compensation to pig owners and it is problematic in many ex USSR countries. Public-private partnership and cooperation involving state veterinary services, private veterinary practitioners, private commercial farmers, farmers/rural population, hunters/foresters/wild life experts researches/academia is crucial the disease prevention and control.

16 Urgent needs Capacity development of local veterinary services of State Service for Consumer Protection and Food Safety for outbreak management via training of staff and provision of equipment for culling and disposal of carcasses ensuring environmental and biosecurity requirements, provision of disinfectants and disinfection equipment Programme for replacement of backyard pig production for other species: small ruminants, poultry, rabbits, and bee keeping Assistance in improving biosecurity in backyard farms focusing on prevention of African swine fever, Lumpy skin disease, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza and other TADs Awareness raising on ASF risk management pig breeders, among rural people, hunters, traders/processors

17 Lumpy skin disease : a new challenge

18 Lumpy skin disease : a new challenge Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is caused by a Capripox virus (LSD virus; LSDV) The disease is characterized by the appearance of nodules on the skin of cattle. Other findings may include fever, oedema, lymph node enlargement, and pox lesions on mucous membranes and internal organs. Production losses are associated with loss of milk and body condition, damage to hides, abortion and infertility. A study estimated that milk production losses in infected Turkish herds ranged from 10% to 85% (mean = 45%), with a 30 day average duration of milk production loss. Transmission of LSDV is mainly associated with mechanical transfer of virus by an incompletely characterised range of biting arthropods, such as mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti), stable flies (Stomoxys calcitrans) and possibly ticks, feeding on live infected hosts

19 Lumpy skin disease : geographical spread not yet in Ukraine but very close to its border Period when disease first Country reported Zambia (1929) Botswana (1943) South Africa (1944) Zimbabwe (1945) Kenya (1957) Madagascar (1969) Sudan (1972) Nigeria (1974) Ethiopia (1983) Somalia (1983) Egypt (1988) Israel (1989) Oman (2010) Lebanon (2012) Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine (2013) Iran, Kuwait, Cyprus, Azerbaijan (2014) Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Armenia, Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Greece (2015) Bulgaria, FYROM, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo, Georgia (2016) Taking into consideration the speed of LSD spread and characteristic jumps over big distances ( km) observed previously in Balkans and Russia, incursion into Ukrainian cattle population could likely lead to an explosive spread over wide territory in particular area with poor displaced rural families.

20 Lumpy skin disease : prevention Prophylactic vaccination of the whole cattle population in areas at-risk carried out well in advance provides the best protection. Movement of cattle inside the country and across borders should be strictly controlled or totally banned. If allowed animals moved should be accompanied by veterinary certificate giving all data for origin of animals and animal health guarantees. In affected villages, cattle herds should be kept separated from other herds by avoiding communal grazing if possible without animal welfare issues. Movement of vaccinated animals can be allowed within the restricted region after it has been established that full immunity has been provided by the vaccinate (three weeks after vaccination). Cattle should be treated regularly by insect repellents to minimise the risk for vector transmission of the disease. This measure cannot fully prevent transmission but may reduce the risk.

21 Lumpy skin disease : vaccination Only live vaccines are currently available against LSDV. No Differentiation of Infected from Vaccinated Animals (DIVA) vaccines have been developed against LSD. Currently, there are two vaccine producers manufacturing attenuated LSDV vaccines against LSDV. Live attenuated LSDV containing vaccines provide good protection in cattle if 80% vaccination coverage is attained. In practise, all animals need to be vaccinated, including small calves and pregnant cows. Regional vaccination campaigns should be preferred over ring-vaccinations

22 Lumpy skin disease :control In many affected countries either total or partial stamping-out policies have been implemented. The efficacy of these methods is widely discussed by experts and decision makers. According to the EFSA Urgent advise on lumpy skin disease, vaccination has a greater impact in reducing LSDV spread than any stamping-out policy. The most important challenge arising from stamping-out is that cattle owners will object to having their animals killed in the absence of a timely and adequate form of compensation. This will likely translate to reduced reporting and the dissemination of the disease through the illegal movement of infected animals. Therefore, stampingout should always be combined with a sound compensation programme which could be problematic currently in Ukraine. Total stamping-out has the best chance to be successful and practical if the first incursion of the disease to a country or defined region is detected and notified without delay and the threat of repeated incursions is low. Regardless of selected stamping-out policy, severely affected animals should always be removed from the herd because they serve as a source of virus for vectors, recovery of these animals is usually several months and they are not likely to re-gain the pre-infection level of production.

23 Thank you for attention For more details please contact Mr Andriy Rozstalnyy, FAO Animal Production and Health Officer via