Might over Morality: Social Values and the Perception of Other Players in Experimental Games

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1 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 22, (1986) Might over Morality: Social Values and the Perception of Other Players in Experimental Games WIM B. G. LIEBRAND, RONALD W. T. L. JANSEN, VICTOR M. RIJKEN, AND COR J. M. SUHRE University of Groningen Received January 23, 1985 Previous research on social values indicates that individuals' own choices as well as their expectations of others' choices in outcome-interdependent situations varies as a function of the weight they typically assign to their own and others' outcomes. The present study extends this research in that it investigates differences in individuals' interpretations of others' behavior as a function of their social values. Toward this end, subjects classified a priori as cooperative (N = 63), border line (N = 27), or individualistic (N = 41) in value orientation, first played a series of decomposed games with either an altruistic, cooperative, individualistic, or a competitive other. Next the subjects rated the behavior of the other person on the dimensions of evaluation and potency. On the basis of prior research findings, it was expected that cooperators attach more significance to the evaluative dimension, and individualists attach more significance to the potency dimension. The analyses strongly confirmed both hypotheses. An analysis of subjects' allocations of outcomes to self also revealed that only cooperators and border liners behaviorally assimilated to the others' behavior. Hence the subjects who tended to perceive the situation more as one in which "stroeg" or "weak" actions could be taken persisted in their choice behavior, whereas those who defined the situation more in terms of "good" and "bad" assimilated to individualistic choice behavior Academic Press, Inc. Social values, or preferences for alternative distributions of own and others' outcomes, play an important role in influencing an individual's social behavior in settings of outcome interdependence. It has been established that there are individual differences in preferences for expressing The research reported here was completed while the first author was a ZWO-Fellow (Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research) at the Department of Psychology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. We thank Charles G. McClintock, David M. Messick, and Nico G. Smid for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of this article. Requests for reprints should be sent to Wim B. G. Liebrand, Department of Psychology, University of Groningen, Grote Markt 31/32, 9712 HV Groningen, the Netherlands /86 $3.00 Copyright 1986 by Academie Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved,,

2 204 LIEBRAND ET AL. social values (e.g., Knight & Dubro, 1984; McClintock & Van Avermaet, 1982), that social values systematically affect choice behavior in twoperson (e.g., Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976) and in n-person experimental games (e.g., Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel, & Wolters, 1986), and that the observer' s own social value affects his or her prediction of an another's social value (e.g., Maki & McClintock, 1983). The present research extends the above research on social values in that it investigates the relation between individual' s social values and his or her interpretation of own and others' behavior. Social Values Kelley and Thibaut (1978) in their theory of behavior in outcomeinterdependent situations assume that the own/other outcomes externally provided to dyad members are transformed by them into an effective decision matrix. That is, the members reevaluate alternatives in a given matrix according to the personal value or weight they place on alternative own/other outcome distributions. An assessment of this outcome transformation or weighting process provides insight into the social values that underlie the social decision making of individuals in outcomeinterdependent situations. Social values can be defined as distinct sets of motivational or strategic preferences among various distributions of outcomes for self and others (McClintock & Van Avermaet, 1982). Traditionally the following social values derived from the conceptuil framework formulated by Griesinger and Livingston (1973), McClintock (1972), and Messick and McClintock (1968) are distinguished: altruism, cooperation, individualism, and competition. The distribution or weighting rule that defines altruism is maximizing another's outcome; for cooperation, maximizing joint outcomes; for individualism, maximizing one's own outcome; and for competition, maximizing one's outcome relative to other. In the between-subjects part of the present study we utilized only cooperative and individualistic subjects. This classification procedure was followed because previous research (Liebrand & Van Run, 1985) revealed that only a small number of subjects in the Dutch student population could be classified as "altruistic" (5%) or "competitive" (10%). Interpretation of the Interdependence The fundamental question that the present research addresses is whether or not cooperators differ from individualists not only in their use of matrix transformation rules, but also in terms of how they interpret the nature of the interdependency situations. Some indications of the potential importance of individuals' interpretations of own and others' behaviors in outcome interdependence is found in an international study conducted

3 MIGHT OVER MORALITY 205 by Kelley et al. (1970). It was observed that the dimension "cooperationcompetition" carried two different meanings. Some subjects, especially those from two of the three European cities, rated this dimension in evaluative terms as being good versus bad (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Other subjects, especially those from three of the five American cities, rated this dimension in dynamic terms as being weak versus strong (Osgood et al., 1957). An important finding in this study was that those who rated the cooperation competition dimension as primarily evaluative tended to interpret the experimental negotiation situation as one in which individuals make either good or bad decisions. In contrast, subjects who rated the dimension primarily as a potency dimension defined the negotiation situation as one in which either weak or strong decisions could be made. Regardless of nationality, the findings of the preceding study suggest that people vary in their interpretation of the nature of bargaining relationships. It seems likely that such differences might also be reflected in the values of individuals, in their behaviors in interdependence settings, as well as in their interpretation of others' behavior. More precisely, it would seem likely that persons taking an evaluative orientation toward cooperative and competitive interactions would attempt to establish relationships characterized by fairness, honesty, and trust. In effect, they would bring a cooperative orientation to an interaction, would behave so as to benefit both self and other, and would judge others' behaviors in the evaluative terms of "good" and "bad." On the other hand, those individuals who evaluate relationships in terms of power or potency would be most likely to attempt to establish relationships in which they could exercise dominance over others so as to meet their own self-interest. Further, they would be likely to bring an individualistic orientation to a relationship, would behave in a way so as to maximize their own absolute gains, and would evaluate others' behavior in terms of its potency. To investigate differences in the interpretation of others' behavior in interdependency situations, subjects in the present study first played a series of decomposed games with another person. In these decomposed games subjects believed that both they and another were making choices between alternative distributions of outcomes for self and for other. Next, the subjects judged the behavior of the other person using a sorting procedure to rate the applicability to other of 39 personality descriptive adjectives. A simulated other person systematically made choices consistent with an altruistic, cooperative, individualistic, or a competitive strategy. Thus while playing with an altruistic or a cooperative other, the subject encountered a prosocial other who assigned as least as high outcomes to the subject as they did to themselves. On the other hand, while playing with the two types of nonsocial others (individualistic and competitive),

4 206 LIEBRAND ET AL. the subject experienced others who ignored, or who even impaired subject's outcomes. Expectations We expected that in judging the other, cooperators would assign more weight to the evaluative dimension, and individualists would assign more to the potency dimension. Assigning weight to a dimension is defined here in terms of the differences between the subject's ratings of the other players. In contrast to the choices of the two nonsocial others, the choices of the two prosocial others had positive effects on the outcomes for the subject. Hence, we expected across subjects, relatively large rating differences between the prosocial and the nonsocial others, and relatively small differences within the ratings of the two prosocial types of others, altruistic and cooperative, and within those of the two nonsocial others, individualistic and competitive. In formulating our hypotheses, two rather than four types of other players are distinguished: the prosocial and the nonsocial others. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 stated that the absolute difference on the evaluative dimension between the ratings of the prosocial others and the ratings of the nonsocial others would be greater for cooperators than for individualists. An analogous interaction effect for the potency dimension was hypothesized (Hypothesis 2). In this case it was expected that the absolute difference between the potency ratings for the prosocial others and the ratings for the nonsocial others would be greater for individualists than for cooperators. Effect of Other's Strategy upon Choice Behavior In addition to subjects' ratings of others' behavior, the actual choices of the subjects were examined. A number of studies have examined the impact of others' strategy on subjects' choices in mixed-motive games (for reviews see Oskamp, 1971; Rubin & Brown, 1975). Of particular interest here are the studies considering social values as a moderator of those effects (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; McNeel, 1973; McNeel, Sweeney & Bohlin, 1974). These studies have found a clear difference in choice behavior between subjects with distinguishable motivational orientations. Moreover, in the Kelley and Stahelski study, and in the two Kuhlman studies, it was found that cooperative subjects assimilated to the behavior of competitive subjects. In these three studies, however, experimental games in matrix format were used. By using decomposed games, subjects' choice behavior is separated into two components, the outcomes the subject chooses for self and the outcomes that are chosen for the other player. This allows us to see if the assimilation effect obtains for both the outcomes given to self and the outcomes given to the other.

5 Subjects MIGHT OVER MORALITY 207 METHOD 146 individuals responding to an advertisement in a local university newspaper served as subjects. They were paid 25 Dutch guilders, about 10 U.S. dollars, for participating. Most subjects fulfilled their task within the requested 2 h. Two subjects did not succeed in finishing their task within 3 h, and are therefore omitted from the analysis. Another subject could not finish the task because of equipment problems. This left a total of 143 subjects, 72 males and 71 females, whose average age was 22.5 years. Apparatus and Procedure Subjects worked two at a time. They were provided about 2 h to complete tasks introduced by written experimental instructions. Subjects were initially told that the study was concerned with decision making, and that they would complete a series of tasks. The first task involved sorting each of 39 personality descriptive adjectives in terms of the degree to which each was applicable to the subjects' own behavior in their daily life. A seven-column sorting map and 39 cards with a personality descriptive term on each was used. The task involved placing each card in one of the Beven columns. The sorting map used a 7-point rating scale: definitely not applicable, not applicable, almost not applicable, neither applicable nor inapplicable, a little applicable, applicable, fully applicable. The 39 adjectives represented the evaluation and potency categories. They were selected from Brokken (1978) and Peabody (1967). The Decomposed Games and the Social Value Classification As a second task, a computerized version of a decomposed games measure of social values was administered. Decomposed game choices were displayed on the screen of an Apple II personal computer. In the instructions, the structure of the decomposed games and the way of using the Apple II were explained by means of an example, but no advice was given regarding what self/other allocation rule should be used to select the outcomes. Subjects were initially told that the other person in each decomposed game was a randomly chosen other person whose responses were not shown to the subject, so as to avoid considerations of strategy. The decomposed games measure employed is described in more detail in Liebrand (1984). It consists of subjects making 16 choices between two own/other outcome combinations. The 16 pairs of outcomes are laid on a circle in the own/other outcome plane defined by the outcomes to self and by the outcomes to the other. Specific own/other outcomes are defined as points in the plane. The center of the circle coincides with the origin of the outcome plane. In the present instance the origin denotes fl. 0. for self and fl. 0. for the other, and the radius for the circle is fl. 50. (1 U.S. dollar is about 2.5 Dutch guilders (fl.)) Each pair consists of two adjacent own/other outcome combinations. An example of such a pair is the choice between either (a) fl for me and fl for the other or (b) fl for me and fl for the other. In each of the 16 pairs of outcomes, subjects are instructed to choose that member of the pair they most prefer. Subjects were classified as cooperators or as individualists if the percentage of their choices consistent with either a cooperative or an individualistic choice rule exceeded 60%. Of the 143 subjects, 131 could be classified. Their average level of consistency was 81%. In earlier research employing this social value classification procedure (Liebrand, 1984), we used a social value vector of 22.5 as the distinction between cooperators and individualists. In the present study this procedure appeared to be problematic because 13 subjects had a social value vector of exactly For this reason we classified three groups of subjects: (a) cooperators with value vectors between 30 and 67.5 (N = 63);

6 208 LIEBRAND ET AL. (b) border liners with value vectors between 30 and 15 (N = 27); (c) individualists with value vectors between 15 and (N = 41). Preprogrammed Strategies After completing the decomposed games social value assessment, in which they received no information about the choices of the other person, subjects completed four more test sessions of decomposed games. In each test session they made 16 binary choices between own/other outcome combinations lying on a circle with a radius of fl. 50. In these test sessions they were told that they were playing with a different person in each session. They were led to believe that these other persons had in fact, played the same decomposed games a year ago. By means of an example, the subjects were initially informed about what outcomes they would receive as a result of both their own and the others' choices. Subjects were also told that they would play for imaginary monetary rewards. Each simulated other person played systematically either altruistically, cooperatively, individualistically or competitively. Because all the own/other outcome combinations in these decomposed games are evenly distributed on a circle, unique choice patterns exist for each of the four distinct type of other players. These four preprogrammed other person strategies were administered in a random order. A post hoc analysis indicated that each strategy occurred about equally often in each position. In this experiment, it was important that subjects recognize the strategies of the simulated other persons. It was for this reason that practice trials were inciuded before each of the four test sessions so that subjects could get acquainted with the other person's strategy. Moreover, we provided feedback on the other person's choices after each of the 16 test trials, to emphasize that the behavior of the simulated other was consistent. After each session subjects were asked to rate the other player using 39 personality descriptive adjectives. The rating was done using the same sorting map as was employed in the first sorting task. Practice trials. Each of the four test sessions was preceded by practice trials. The subject's task was to choose an own/other outcome alternative and to also predict which alternative the other person would choose. After each practice trial the actual (preprogrammed) choice of the other person was displayed. Upon completion of five practice trials, subjects had to answer one multiple choice item. Only one of the four alternatives described the strategy of the other person perfectly, and subjects were subsequently informed whether their response was correct or incorrect. The actual test session was started only if two of three predictions on the final three practice trials, and the multiple choice answer were correct. If the subjects did not meet this criterion, three more practice trials and the same multiple choice item were administered. In the very few cases in which a subject did not meet the criterion the second time, the experimenter told them which of the four alternatives of the multiple choice item was the correct one, that is, what other's choice strategy was. Finally, subjects received a series of postexperimental questions after the four test sessions were completed. They were asked to describe the choice behaviors of the four other players, to name or describe the other whose behavior best resembled their own choice behavior, and to describe what they believed to be the purpose of this experiment. RESULTS The Construction of the Evaluation and the Potency Scale Four principal component analyses were conducted using the total list of 39 adjectives, one for each type of other player. A distinct break in the size of the eigenvalues was observed after two factors. Furthermore, in each of the four analyses, the highest absolute factor loadings for the

7 MIGHT OVER MORALITY 209 first factor were found for adjectives like "good" and "bad," and for the second factor, for adjectives like "vigorous" and "weak." We therefore decided to construct, for each of the four other players, an "evalution" and a "potency" scale. High scores on the scales correspond with "good" and "strong" ratings, respectively. Each scale consists of those 6 adjectives that on the average had a high loading on only one of the above two factors. Constructed in this way, one can expect that subjects' evaluation of other will be almost independent from their scores on the potency scale. In fact, the pooled within-groups correlations between the two scales are all nonsignificant:.15 for the altruistic,.04 for the cooperative,.14 for the individualistic, and.14 for the competitive other. The loadings of the selected adjectives in a second series of four principal component analyses on the limited set of 12 adjectives are shown in Table 1. Social Values and the Interpretation of Others' Behavior The evaluation and potency ratings of the prosocial other were constructed by averaging the ratings of the altruistic and the cooperative other. In a similar way the ratings for the nonsocial other were constructed from the ratings of the individualistic and the competitive other. Fig. 1 displays these ratings. TABLE 1 FACTOR LOADINGS AFTER VARIMAX ROTATION OF THE SIX ADJECTIVES PER SCALE, SEPARATELY FOR EACH OF THE FOUR TYPES OF OTHER PLAYERS Type of other player Altruistic Cooperative Individualistic Competitive Factor: E P E P E P E P Evaluation Incorruptible Sincere Just Fair Mean Dishonest Potency Weak Self-assured Purposeful Vigorous Goody-goody Naive Note. Only factor loadings greater than I.291 are shown.

8 210 LIEBRAND ET AL. In order to test our hypotheses, we first computed for each subject the difference between their ratings of the prosocial and the nonsocial other on both evaluation and potency. The pooled within-groups correlation between the evaluation and the potency difference scores is.02. Next we analyzed whether there is a trend in these difference scores. In the analysis of variance on the difference scores for evaluation, in which polynomial contrasts for the three between-subjects groups were used, we obtained a large constant effect, F(l, 128) = , p <.001, and as predicted a significant effect for the linear contrast, F(l, 128) = 7.91, p <.006. The effect of the quadratic contrast was almost absent, F(l, 128) = 0.33, n.s. These results clearly support Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 was also strongly confirmed. We found a significant constant effect for ratings on the potency scale, F(1, 128) = , p <.001, a significant effect for the linear contrast, F(l, 128) = 16.24, p <.001, and again the quadratic contrast was nonsignificant, F(l, 128) = 0.21, n.s. More detailed information on the ratings of the four different others can be found in Table 2. The general finding is that the ratings for the altruistic other resembie those for the cooperative other. The same hoids with respect to the ratings for the two nonsocial others. The one big exception is that, irrespective of own social value, the altruistic other is rated l.3 units lower on the potency scale than the cooperative other. Apparently, altruistic behavior is perceived as a rather weak, perhaps submissive, type of behavior. On one of the postexperimental questions, subjects were asked to name or describe that other person whose behavior resembled their own choice behavior the best. It turned out that out of the four possibilities they had, 56 of the 63 cooperators (89%) chose the cooperative other and that 28 of the 41 individualists (68%) chose the individualistic other as the one whose behavior resembied their own behavior the best. > a CTD.< 4.0 (_.) > I- 4.5 CO.< Q PRO SOCIAL NON SOCIAL COOPERATOR INDIVIDUALIST OWN SOCIAL VALUE 2.0 COOPERATOR INDIVIDUALIST OWN SOCIAL VALUE FIG. 1. Mean ratings for the prosocial and the nonsocial other players on evaluation (a) and potency (b) applicability scale.

9 MIGHT OVER MORALITY 211 TABLE 2 MEAN RATINGS OF THE FOUR PREPROGRAMMED OTHERS ON EVALUATION AND POTENCY Type of other player Prosocial Nonsocial Own value: Altruistic Cooperative Individualistic Competitive Mean Evaluation Cooperator Border liner Individualist Mean Potency Cooperator Border liner Individualist Mean Note. 1 = Definitely not applicable; 7 = fully applicable. Subject's Self-Ratings Finally, we analyzed subject's self-ratings. The self-ratings of cooperators and individualists on the evaluation scale were about the same (M = 6.02 vs M = 6.15). On the potency scale, however, the self-ratings of the individualists are significantly higher than those of the cooperators (M = 5.34 vs M = 4.91, respectively), t(102) = 2.20, p <.03. For neither scale did we observe gender main effects, or gender x social value interaction effects. A discriminant analysis on all 39 adjectives indicated that the following adjectives were responsible for the highest contrast in self-ratings between individualists and cooperators. Individualists more than cooperators described themselves as "stabie" and "unscrupulous," and cooperators more than individualists described themselves as "sympathizing," "cooperative," "naive," and "ignorant." Subjects' Actual Choice Behavior First the total amount of money chosen for self with a prosocial other, and the amount chosen for self with a nonsocial other served as a repeated measure in a 2 (type of other player) x 2 (gender) x 3 (social value) analysis of variance. The analysis revealed a significant effect for gender in the amount of money chosen for self, F(1, 125) = 5.77, p <.05. Across type of other player, males chose more for self than did females (M = vs M = 67.94). No significant interaction effects involving gender were observed. In addition, both social value, F(2, 125) = 19.82, p <.001, and others' strategy, F(1, 125) = 26.68, p <.001, yielded a

10 212 LIEBRAND ET AL. significant effect (see Fig. 2). An interaction between social value and others' strategy also emerged, F(2, 125) = 9.40, p <.001. Next we carried out a 2 x 2 x 3 analysis of variance in which the amount of money chosen for the prosocial vs nonsocial other served as a repeated measure. Again we found a main effect for gender, F(1, 125) = 5.33, p <.05; males chose less for the other players than females (M = vs M = 33.13). Also significant main effects for social value, F(2, 125) = 20.21, p <.001, as well as for others' strategy, F(1, 125) = 93.88, p <.001, were obtained. None of the interactions yielded significant results. As can be seen in Fig. 2, the pattern of choice behavior for individualists is different from that of the two other social value classes. When they allocate money to themselves, individualists appear to be comparatively insensitive to others' choice behavior. On the average they chose fl for self where the maximum is fl Cooperators and border liners show behavioral assimilation to the strategy of the nonsocial other when they allocate resources to self. In allocating resources to others, the three classes of social values respond in a similar way. That is, on the average nonsocial others receive fl less than prosocial others. DISCUSSION The major purpose of the present study was to investigate whether social values are related to a differential interpretation of own and others' behavior. The main conclusion is that cooperators and individualists do differ in their interpretation of the evaluative and potency dimension of social behavior. Cooperators tend to view the cooperative competitive dimension as evaluative, while individualists tend to view it in terms of power. 90 a 60 b N 0, O g COOPERATORS BORDER LINERS INDIVIDUALISTS PRO NON SOCIAL OTHER PLAYER PRO-- NON SOCIAL OTHER PLAYER FIG. 2. Total amounts of money chosen for self (a), and for the prosocial and nonsocial other players (b); actual choices.

11 MIGHT OVER MORALITY 213 The present findings provide a basis for understanding why Kelley et al. (1970) observed significant site variations in the meanings which were given to cooperation versus competition. It seems likely that these observed differences were a function of intersite differences in the value orientations of subjects. This would suggest that the subjects in a majority of the European sites were more likely to be cooperative in their value orientations, whereas those from the United States were more likely to be individualistic. Interactionism King and Sorrentino (1983) in their study of the psychological meaning of interpersonal situations of a cooperative or a competitive nature reported a substantial variability in the perceptions across individuals. They observed that a weighted model, in which individual differences were represented by weights applied to the common judgment dimensions, provided a much better fit of their data than an unweighted model. This finding indicates that certain dimensions are differentially salient to different perceivers. As King and Sorrentino point out, this finding is consistent with an interactionist viewpoint (e.g., Endler & Magnusson, 1976), because this interindividual variability in perception helps to explain why individuals behave differently in the same situation. The interactionist viewpoint would appear to be even more strongly supported by the findings of the present study. We predicted and found an interaction between social values and their interpretation of others' behavior. Moreover, the analysis of the postexperimental question asking which of the four other players' behaviors resembied their own behavior best, revealed that most subjects recognized their own type of behavior. Therefore, we conclude that cooperators and individualists differ in the significance they attach to the evaluative vs potency aspects of behavior in situations of interdependence. Consistent with an interactionist point of view, we have to acknowledge that the above differential interpretation of behavior has only been demonstrated for the particular decision-making situation used in the present study. It remains possibie that cooperators and individualists will not differ in the importance they attach to the evaluative and potency dimensions in other situations. Extending prior research on social values The present findings add to the construct validity of social values. First, the finding that social values affect choice behavior in experimental games is replicated once again. Second, in terms of Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) interdependence theory, we may state that in the present interdependence situations, the evaluative aspects of the setting affect, at

12 214 LIEBRAND ET AL. least in part, the effective decision matrix of cooperators, whereas the potency aspects of the setting influence the effective matrix of individualists. There has been some debate on the question of causal direction between, on the one hand, people's choices in an n-person prisoner's dilemma and, on the other hand, their expectations of what others will do (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Messé & Sivacek, 1979). The present findings seem to complicate this issue even further. After all, it is possibie that our beliefs about what ought to be done in situations of interdependence, affect both our own decisions in that situation as weil as our beliefs about the other people involved. Hence, we have one more question to be answered in future research. Are people cooperating because they see things as moral issues, or do they see things as moral issues because they cooperate? Third, when subjects had to assign money to themselves, both cooperators and border liners assimilated to individualistic choice behavior of others. This type of behavioral assimilation has been found and discussed by Kelley and Stahelski (1970). They conclude that the behavioral assimilation of the cooperators to others is a temporary behavioral change in reaction to the other player' s strategy. The present study replicates this finding in a decomposed game rather than a matrix setting. The question again arises as to why cooperators accommodate to a behavior that is inconsistent with their goals. As Kelley and Stahelski (1970) suggest, cooperators may react noncooperatively because they are frustrated by others in their attempt to achieve a cooperative relationship. Or in other words, cooperators and border liners are unwilling to continue to show concern for others' outcomes when others are not reciprocating in any way. REFERENCES Brokken, F. B. (1978). The language of personality. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Groningen. Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a common dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, Endler, N. S., & Magnusson, D. (1976). Toward an interactional psychology of personality. Psychological Bulletin, 83, Griesinger, D. W., & Livingston, J. W., Jr. (1973). Toward a model of interpersonal motivation in experimental games. Behavioral Science, 18, Kelley, H. H., Shure, G. H., Deutsch, M., Faucheux, C., Lanzetta, J. T., Moscovici, S., Nuttin, J. M., Jr., Rabbie, J. M., & Thibaut, J. W. (1970). A comparative experimental study of negotiation behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators' and competitors' beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.

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