Rational Choice oder Framing?
|
|
- Jonah Dennis
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Hartmut Esser Rational Choice oder Framing? RCT und MFS als Ansätze zur Erklärung der Befunde aus den Experimenten zu Cooperation and Punishment in the Contribution to Public Goods von Ernst Fehr und Simon Gächter (1999) University of Mannheim Fakulty for Social Sciences Mannheim Centre for European Social Konferenz Analytische Soziologie: Theorie und Empirische Anwendungen Venice International University, San Servolo
2 ... a dèjá vu!
3 Fehr and Gintis 2007 (in: Annual Review of SOCIOLOGY) RCT? social motives! with punishment no punishment MFS? wide RCT! GTA!
4 Fehr and Gintis 2007 (in: Annual Review of SOCIOLOGY) RCT? social motives! with punishment no punishment MFS? Ministerium für Staatssicherheit Modell der Frame-Selektion wide RCT! GTA!
5 Fehr and Gintis 2007 (in: Annual Review of SOCIOLOGY) RCT? social motives! with punishment MFS no punishment!!!!!! Ministerium für Staatssicherheit Modell der Frame-Selektion wide RCT! GTA!
6 Framing and Priming
7 Framing
8 The Wallstreet-Game (Liberman, Samuels & Ross 2004) Activation of an accessible mental model by understanding a (verbal) cue against preferences! % Cooperation First Round Community Game W all Street Game "Most Likely Cooperators" "Most Likely Defectors" cheap talk? Choice?
9 Priming
10 Keizer, Lindenberg and Linda Steg person sweeping the street prosocial cue helping to pick up dropped oranges Learning? Activation of an accessible behavioral program by observation of a meaningful symbol! Choice?
11 The full (and true) story by Fehr&Gächter 1999
12 1. Version: No Punishment first
13 Contributions steady rise up to ca 100% WiP NoP 1. ca. 50% at start 3. strong jump up steady decay Rounds
14 2. Version: With Punishment first
15 Contributions same pattern 15.0 WiP 6. but small(er) decrease NoP Rounds
16 Contributions same pattern 4. steady rise up to ca 100% WiP 15.0 WiP 6. but small(er) decrease 10.0 NoP 1. ca. 50% at start NoP 3. strong jump up steady decay Rounds
17 Contributions 20.0 WiP 15.0 WiP 6. but small(er) decrease NoP 10.0 NoP Rounds
18 Summary
19 Findings 1. ca. 50% contribution at start 2. steady decay of conribution 3. strong jump up after announcement P 4. steady rise up to ca. 100% 5. general pattern for sequences similar 6. smaller decrease than increase Explanation RCT Explanation MFS
20 RCT and MFS
21 Aspects RCT MFS Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation Opportunities Beliefs (p) Preferences (U) Emotions Symbols/cues Effect on: Utility-function Type of Rationality Unconditionality social situation Processes Changes: short-term long-term
22 Aspects RCT MFS as-modus (PBB) rc-modus (RCT*) Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation Choice p*u future necessary by axioms Categorization M = f(o*a*l*c) past desirable by measurement Opportunities yes yes Beliefs (p) yes yes Preferences (U) yes yes Emotions (no) yes Symbols/cues Effect on: cheap talk beliefs Definition beliefs&preferences Utility-function one for all situation-dependent Type of Rationality fixed variable Unconditionality no yes social situation strategic interaction symbolic interaction Processes Sequences Sequences Changes: short-term long-term (Bayesian) Learning Internalisation Priming/Re-Framing Internalisation
23 Aspects RCT MFS as-modus (PBB) rc-modus (RCT*) Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation Choice p*u future necessary by axioms Categorization M = f(o*a*l*c) past desirable by measurement Opportunities yes yes Beliefs (p) yes yes Preferences (U) yes yes Emotions (no) yes Symbols/cues Effect on: cheap talk beliefs Definition beliefs&preferences Utility-function one for all situation-dependent Type of Rationality fixed variable Unconditionality no yes social situation strategic interaction symbolic interaction Processes Sequences Sequences Changes: short-term long-term (Bayesian) Learning Internalisation Priming/Re-Framing Internalisation
24 Aspects RCT MFS as-modus (PBB) Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation CHOICE p*u future necessary by axioms MATCH M = f(o*a*l*c) past desirable by measurement Opportunities yes yes Beliefs (p) yes yes Preferences (U) yes yes Emotions (no) yes Symbols/cues Effect on: cheap talk beliefs Definition beliefs&preferences Utility-function one for all situation-dependent Type of Rationality fixed variable Unconditionality no yes social situation strategic interaction symbolic interaction Processes Sequences Sequences Changes: short-term long-term (Bayesian) Learning Internalisation Priming/Re-Framing Internalisation rc-modus (RCT*) Object Accessibility Link Clarity
25 Aspects RCT MFS as-modus (PBB) Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation CHOICE p*u future necessary by axioms MATCH M = f(o*a*l*c) past desirable by measurement Opportunities yes yes Beliefs (p) yes yes Preferences (U) yes yes Emotions (no) yes Symbols/cues Effect on: cheap talk beliefs Definition beliefs&preferences Utility-function one for all situation-dependent Type of Rationality fixed variable Unconditionality no yes social situation strategic interaction symbolic interaction Processes Sequences Sequences Changes: short-term long-term (Bayesian) Learning Internalisation Priming/Re-Framing Internalisation rc-modus (RCT*) Object Accessibility Link Clarity deliberated Definition
26 Aspects RCT MFS as-modus (PBB) Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation CHOICE p*u future necessary by axioms MATCH M = f(o*a*l*c) past desirable by measurement Opportunities yes yes Beliefs (p) yes yes Preferences (U) yes yes Emotions (no) yes Symbols/cues Effect on: cheap talk beliefs Definition beliefs&preferences Utility-function one for all situation-dependent Type of Rationality fixed variable Unconditionality no yes social situation strategic interaction symbolic interaction Processes Sequences Sequences Changes: short-term long-term (Bayesian) Learning Internalisation Priming/Re-Framing Internalisation rc-modus (RCT*) Object Accessibility Link Clarity deliberated Definition
27 Aspects RCT MFS as-modus (PBB) Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation CHOICE p*u future necessary by axioms MATCH M = f(o*a*l*c) past desirable by measurement Opportunities yes yes Beliefs (p) yes yes Preferences (U) yes yes Emotions (no) yes Symbols/cues Effect on: cheap talk beliefs Definition beliefs&preferences Utility-function one for all situation-dependent Type of Rationality fixed variable Unconditionality no yes social situation strategic interaction symbolic interaction Processes Sequences Sequences Changes: short-term long-term (Bayesian) Learning Internalisation Priming/Re-Framing Internalisation rc-modus (RCT*) Object Accessibility Link Clarity deliberated Definition
28 Aspects RCT MFS as-modus (PBB) Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation CHOICE p*u future necessary by axioms MATCH M = f(o*a*l*c) past desirable by measurement Opportunities yes yes Beliefs (p) yes yes Preferences (U) yes yes Emotions (no) yes Symbols/cues Effect on: cheap talk beliefs Definition beliefs&preferences Utility-function one for all situation-dependent Type of Rationality fixed variable Unconditionality no yes social situation strategic interaction symbolic interaction Processes Sequences Sequences Changes: short-term long-term (Bayesian) Learning Internalisation Priming/Re-Framing Internalisation rc-modus (RCT*) Object Accessibility Link Clarity deliberated Definition
29 Aspects RCT MFS as-modus (PBB) Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation CHOICE p*u future necessary by axioms MATCH M = f(o*a*l*c) past desirable by measurement Opportunities yes yes Beliefs (p) yes yes Preferences (U) yes yes Emotions (no) yes Symbols/cues Effect on: cheap talk beliefs Definition beliefs&preferences Utility-function one for all situation-dependent Type of Rationality fixed variable Unconditionality no yes social situation strategic interaction symbolic interaction Processes Sequences Sequences Changes: short-term long-term (Bayesian) Learning Internalisation Priming/Re-Framing Internalisation rc-modus (RCT*) Object Accessibility Link Clarity deliberated Definition
30 Aspects RCT MFS as-modus (PBB) Mechanism formal axioms empirical interpretation CHOICE p*u future necessary by axioms MATCH M = f(o*a*l*c) past desirable by measurement Opportunities yes yes Beliefs (p) yes yes Preferences (U) yes yes Emotions (no) yes Symbols/cues Effect on: cheap talk beliefs Definition beliefs&preferences Utility-function one for all situation-dependent Type of Rationality fixed variable Unconditionality no yes social situation strategic interaction symbolic interaction Processes Sequences Sequences Changes: short-term long-term Updating beliefs Internalisation Activation frames Internalisation rc-modus (RCT*) Object Accessibility Link Clarity deliberated Definition
31 Theoretical reconstruction
32 ... remember
33 Contributions same pattern 4. steady rise up to ca 100% WiP 15.0 WiP 6. but small(er) decrease 10.0 NoP 1. ca. 50% at start NoP 3. strong jump up steady decay Rounds
34 Findings 1. ca. 50% contribution at start 2. steady decay of conribution 3. strong jump up after announcement P 4. steady rise up to ca. 100% 5. general pattern for sequences similar 6. smaller decrease than increase Explanation RCT Explanation MFS
35 Explanations
36 Finding 1. ca. 50% contribution at start 2. steady decay of conribution 3. strong jump up after announcement PUN 4. steady rise up to ca. 100% 5. general pattern for sequences similar 6. smaller decrease than increase Explanation RCT EP- and AP-Types conditional cooperation: updating beliefs (only) common knowledge of P with WiP-Option common knowledge of P with WiP-Option same (RCT-)effects in both versions Explanation MFS situation not defined and EF-/AF- Types Mis-Match of A-Frame for AF- Types Activation of R-Frame with announcement oft WiP-Option Increase of match for R-Frame strong match of R-Frame in both cases
37 Contributions WiP MFS Priming C-Frame increased match C-Frame! WiP 6. but small(er) decrease 10.0 NoP NoP... Explanation for down after WiP first and with annoncement NoP? RCT common knowledge NoP no priming down to round 1 with NoP(first) Rounds?
38 Contributions 20.0 RCT MFS WiP 15.0 WiP 6. but small(er) decrease 10.0 NoP? NoP!... Explanation for down after WiP first and with annoncement NoP? Rounds
39 Finding 1. ca. 50% contribution at start 2. steady decay of conribution 3. strong jump up after announcement PUN 4. steady rise up to ca. 100% 5. general pattern for sequences similar 6. smaller decrease than increase Explanation RCT EP- and AP-Types conditional cooperation: updating beliefs (only) common knowledge of P with WiP-Option common knowledge of P with WiP-Option same (RCT-)effects in both versions Explanation MFS situation not defined and EF-/AF- Types Mis-Match of A-Frame for AF- Types Activation of R-Frame with announcement oft WiP-Option Increase of match for R-Frame strong match of R-Frame in both cases
40 Finding 1. ca. 50% contribution at start 2. steady decay of conribution 3. strong jump up after announcement PUN 4. steady rise up to ca. 100% 5. general pattern for sequences similar 6. smaller decrease than increase Explanation RCT EP- and AP-Types conditional cooperation: updating beliefs (only) common knowledge of P with WiP-Option common knowledge of P with WiP-Option same (RCT-)effects in both versions no explanation Explanation MFS situation not defined and EF-/AF- Types Mis-Match of A-Frame for AF- Types Activation of R-Frame with announcement oft WiP-Option Increase of match for R-Frame strong match of R-Frame in both cases Priming of R-Frame with sequence of cooperation before
41 Finding 1. ca. 50% contribution at start 2. steady decay of conribution 3. strong jump up after announcement PUN 4. steady rise up to ca. 100% 5. general pattern for sequences similar 6. smaller decrease than increase Explanation RCT EP- and AP-Types conditional cooperation: updating beliefs (only) common knowledge of P with WiP-Option common knowledge of P with WiP-Option same (RCT-)effects in both versions Explanation MFS situation not defined and EF-/AF- Types Mis-Match of A-Frame for AF- Types Activation of R-Frame with announcement oft WiP-Option Increase of match for R-Frame strong match of R-Frame in both cases?!
42 A (separate) Test
43 ... remember
44 Contributions 20.0 WiP 15.0 WiP 6. but small(er) decrease NoP 10.0 NoP Rounds
45 Hypotheses RCT and MFS for changes WiP to NoP for E- and R-Types
46 Contributions RCT MFS 20.0 R-Type no priming Priming E-Type no priming no priming RCT Priming not in tool box Priming, but dependent of accessibility MFS Rounds
47 Measurement of Types: Contribution in first round!
48 Findings
49 Contributions 20.0 R-Type RCT MFS E-Type Rounds
50 Contributions 20.0 RCT MFS 15.0 R-Type! 10.0 E-Type MFS explains a (crucial) anomaly for any version of RCT... Activation of an internalized program by mere observation situational cues Rounds no change of preferences (by learning or choice)
51 the complete picture
52 Contributions R-Type R-Type E-Type E-Type WiP NoP Community... jump : not neccessarily by framing alone! Mechanical Solidarity WiP NoP Rounds
53 ... and also:
54 Zürich&St.Gallen pooled (Fehr&Gächter 1999 plus Hermann, Thöny and Gächter 2008)
55 EF- und RF-Typen Zürich&St. Gallen... and for WiP to NoP even stronger WiP1 RF WiP2 RF WiP2 EF... now: morethan-ever for R-Types! NoP1 RF NoP2 RF 100 WiP1 EF NoP1 EF NoP2 EF interaction-effect with accessibility also for NoP to WiP!
56 Why important? A really General Theory of (Inter-)Action!... last point: Integrated AS!
57
58
59 Appendix 1: F&G and Variants of RCT
60 theoretical predictions and empirical fit RCT MFS Finding RCT 1.0 (E only) 1 ca. 50% contribution at start 2 steady decay of contribution 3 strong jump up for WiP (2) 4 steady rise up to ca. 100% 5 similar for WiP(1) and WiP(2) 6 small(er) decrease for NoP(2)
61 theoretical predictions and empirical fit RCT MFS Finding RCT 1.0 (E only) 1 ca. 50% contribution at start refuted 2 steady decay of contribution refuted 3 strong jump up for WiP (2) refuted 4 steady rise up to ca. 100% refuted 5 similar for WiP(1) and WiP(2) refuted 6 small(er) decrease for NoP(2) refuted
62 theoretical predictions and empirical fit RCT MFS Finding RCT 1.0 (E only) RCT 2.0 (E and A) 1 ca. 50% contribution at start refuted 1 2 steady decay of contribution refuted 2 3 strong jump up for WiP (2) refuted refuted 4 steady rise up to ca. 100% refuted refuted 5 similar for WiP(1) and WiP(2) refuted 5 6 small(er) decrease for NoP(2) refuted refuted
63 theoretical predictions and empirical fit RCT MFS Finding RCT 1.0 (E only) RCT 2.0 (E and A) RCT 3.0 (E and R) 1 ca. 50% contribution at start refuted steady decay of contribution refuted strong jump up for WiP (2) refuted refuted 3 4 steady rise up to ca. 100% refuted refuted 4 5 similar for WiP(1) and WiP(2) refuted small(er) decrease for NoP(2) refuted refuted refuted
64 theoretical predictions and empirical fit RCT MFS Finding RCT 1.0 (E only) RCT 2.0 (E and A) RCT 3.0 (E and R) as-modus (PPB) 1 ca. 50% contribution at start refuted steady decay of contribution refuted strong jump up for WiP (2) refuted refuted steady rise up to ca. 100% refuted refuted similar for WiP(1) and WiP(2) refuted small(er) decrease for NoP(2) refuted refuted refuted 6
65 theoretical predictions and empirical fit RCT MFS Finding RCT 1.0 (E only) RCT 2.0 (E and A) RCT 3.0 (E and R) as-modus (PPB) rc-modus (RCT*) 1 ca. 50% contribution at start refuted (1) 2 steady decay of contribution refuted (2) 3 strong jump up for WiP (2) refuted refuted 3 3 (3) 4 steady rise up to ca. 100% refuted refuted 4 4 (4) 5 similar for WiP(1) and WiP(2) refuted (5) 6 small(er) decrease for NoP(2) refuted refuted refuted 6 (6)
66 Appendix 2: St. Gallen and Zürich
67 NoP STG 100 NoP ZUR
68 WiP STG 160 WiP ZUR
69 WiP STG 160 WiP ZUR NoP STG 100 NoP ZUR
70 Appendix 3: EF- vs. AF-Types Zürich&St.Gallen pooled
71 EF- und RF-Typen Zürich&St. Gallen WiP1 RF WiP2 RF NoP1 RF WiP1 EF NoP1 EF NoP2 RF NoP2 EF WiP2 EF
Lecture The Model of Frame-Selection
Hartmut Esser Lecture The Model of Frame-Selection 1. Schedule Monday, 11/05/15, 10:00-11:30, 13:30-15:00, G 302 Tuesday, 12/05/15, 8:15-9:45, 10:00-11:30, B 602 Wednesday, 13/05/15, 10:00-11:30, 11:45-13:15,
More informationTrust and Testosterone: A Contribution to Neurosociology
Trust and Testosterone: A Contribution to Neurosociology Werner Raub, Vincent Buskens & Jack van Honk Rational Choice Sociology: Theory and Empirical Applications Workshop at Venice International University,
More informationSocial Norms and Reciprocity*
Social Norms and Reciprocity* Andreas Diekmann Institut für Soziologie Universität Bern Thomas Voss Institut für Soziologie Universität Leipzig [ March 2003 ] Paper presented on the session Solidarity
More informationStrong Reciprocity and Human Sociality
Notes on Behavioral Economics 1 Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality Human groups are highly social despite a low level of relatedness. There is an empirically identifiable form of prosocial behavior
More informationInstitutions and Cooperative Behavior
Institutions and Cooperative Behavior by Arild Vatn Department of International Environmental and Development Studies Norwegian University of Life Sciences Complexity Economics for Sustainability Seminar
More informationCooperation and Collective Action
Cooperation and Collective Action A basic design Determinants of voluntary cooperation Marginal private benefits Group size Communication Why do people cooperate? Strategic cooperation Cooperation as a
More informationTHE (NEURO-)BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT
THE (NEURO-)BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT A Philosophical Investigation of a Concept of Human Social Behavior Rebekka A. Klein University of Zurich University Research Priority Project: Foundations
More informationThe weak side of informal social control Paper prepared for Conference Game Theory and Society. ETH Zürich, July 27-30, 2011
The weak side of informal social control Paper prepared for Conference Game Theory and Society. ETH Zürich, July 27-30, 2011 Andreas Flache Department of Sociology ICS University of Groningen Collective
More informationA Foundation for Behavioral Economics
A Foundation for Behavioral Economics Jessica L. Cohen and William T. Dickens The Brookings Institution Paper Presented at the Meetings of the American Economics Association December 2001 Later Published
More informationBeliefs about lying and spreading of dishonesty
Beliefs about lying and spreading of dishonesty Further experimental evidence on the preventive effect of ignorance on normative compliance Heiko Rauhut 1,2,* 1 University of Zurich, Institute of Sociology
More informationAltruistic Behavior: Lessons from Neuroeconomics. Kei Yoshida Postdoctoral Research Fellow University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy (UTCP)
Altruistic Behavior: Lessons from Neuroeconomics Kei Yoshida Postdoctoral Research Fellow University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy (UTCP) Table of Contents 1. The Emergence of Neuroeconomics, or the Decline
More informationBargaining about Time: Evidence from Dictator and Ultimatum Games. Roger Berger & Sandra Prade
Bargaining about Time: Evidence from Dictator and Ultimatum Games Roger Berger & Sandra Prade Collaboration and funding: ETH Zurich, Dirk Helbing, Heiko Rauhut. Experimental work: LMU Munich (Chair Braun),
More informationMini-Course in Behavioral Economics Leeat Yariv. Behavioral Economics - Course Outline
Mini-Course in Behavioral Economics Leeat Yariv The goal of this mini-course is to give an overview of the state of the art of behavioral economics. I hope to trigger some research in the field and will
More informationThe Game Prisoners Really Play: Preference Elicitation and the Impact of Communication
The Game Prisoners Really Play: Preference Elicitation and the Impact of Communication Michael Kosfeld University of Zurich Ernst Fehr University of Zurich October 10, 2003 Unfinished version: Please do
More informationReply to Binmore: Social Norms or Social Preferences? Herbert Gintis
Reply to Binmore: Social Norms or Social Preferences? Herbert Gintis May 25, 2011 I am in agreement with many of Ken Binmore s remarks in Social Norms and Social Preferences (2010). Like Binmore, I welcome
More informationThe Neural Basis of Economic Decision- Making in The Ultimatum Game
The Neural Basis of Economic Decision- Making in The Ultimatum Game Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen (2003), The neural basis of economic decisionmaking in the Ultimatum game, Science 300, 1755-1758
More informationSupporting Information
Supporting Information Burton-Chellew and West 10.1073/pnas.1210960110 SI Results Fig. S4 A and B shows the percentage of free riders and cooperators over time for each treatment. Although Fig. S4A shows
More informationReviewer: Prof. Encho Gerganov, PhD
REVIEW of the dissertation RATIONAL AND EMOTIONAL INFLUENCES ON THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS OF MEDIATION, submitted by Yael Sne, Israel, a dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
More informationThe Limits of Artificial Intelligence
The Limits of Artificial Intelligence The Limits of Artificial Intelligence What does it mean to think or to feel? What is mind? Does mind really exist? To what extent are minds functionally dependent
More informationBehavioral Game Theory
Outline (September 3, 2007) Outline (September 3, 2007) Introduction Outline (September 3, 2007) Introduction Examples of laboratory experiments Outline (September 3, 2007) Introduction Examples of laboratory
More informationThe Foundations of Behavioral. Economic Analysis SANJIT DHAMI
The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis SANJIT DHAMI OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS CONTENTS List offigures ListofTables %xi xxxi Introduction 1 1 The antecedents of behavioral economics 3 2 On methodology
More informationEncouraging norm conforming behaviour
Date 18-11-2013 1 Encouraging norm conforming behaviour Linda Steg University of Groningen, Department of Psychology Steg & De Groot (2012); Steg, Perlaviciute, Van der Werff & Lurvink (2014) faculty of
More informationAltruism. Why Are Organisms Ever Altruistic? Kin Selection. Reciprocal Altruism. Costly Signaling. Group Selection?
Altruism Nepotism Common-Pool Resource (CPR) Tragedy of the Commons Public Good Free-riders Competitive Altruism A 1987 Florida news story reported that 22 blood donors who had false positives on an HIV
More informationConditional behavior affects the level of evolved cooperation in public good games
Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity CSID Working Paper Series #CSID-2013-007 Conditional behavior affects the level of evolved cooperation in public good games Marco A. Janssen Arizona State
More informationCONSUMER INSIGHT. Contact: Etienne Bressoud, BVA Nudge Unit
CONSUMER INSIGHT Contact: Etienne Bressoud, BVA Nudge Unit Etienne.bressoud@bva.fr 1 2. THE 5 IMPLICIT FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR BEHAVIOUR We are pawns in a game whose forces we largely fail to comprehend.
More informationC.VI Research Group Mechanisms of Normative Change
C.VI Research Group Mechanisms of Normative Change Head: Dr Fabian Winter Post-Doctoral Fellows Dr Adrian Hillenbrand Dr Nan Zhang Doctoral Students Amalia Alvarez Benjumea Current Student Research Assistants
More informationAn Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt
An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt Dirk Engelmann y and Martin Strobel z Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin January 29, 2000 Abstract In this
More informationFeldexperimente in der Soziologie
Feldexperimente in der Soziologie Einführungsveranstaltung 04.02.2016 Seite 1 Content 1. Field Experiments 2. What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal about the Real World? Lab
More informationEpistemic Game Theory
Epistemic Game Theory Adam Brandenburger J.P. Valles Professor, NYU Stern School of Business Distinguished Professor, NYU Tandon School of Engineering Faculty Director, NYU Shanghai Program on Creativity
More informationErving Goffman: Self, interactionism, dramaturgy & frame analysis
Erving Goffman: Self, interactionism, dramaturgy & frame analysis Visual Ethnography Linda C.H. LAI SELF Dualistic view of self: Socialized self Unsocialized self Impression management SOCIAL SELF Vs UNSOCIAL
More informationUnlike standard economics, BE is (most of the time) not based on rst principles, but on observed behavior of real people.
Behavioral Economics Lecture 1. Introduction and the Methodology of Experimental Economics 1. Introduction Characteristica of Behavioral Economics (BE) Unlike standard economics, BE is (most of the time)
More informationPARADIGMS, THEORY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH
PARADIGMS, THEORY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH Workshop 3 Masaryk University Faculty of Social Studies Research methods in sociology 5.3.2006 Nina Tomov 1 1. Introduction This chapter explains some specific ways
More informationCooperation in a Prisoners Dilemma with Losses. Results from an Experimental Study.
Cooperation in a Prisoners Dilemma with Losses. Results from an Experimental Study. Roger Berger Institute for Sociology, University of Leipzig and SNF Venice International University 2006 Rational Choice
More informationgood reputation, and less chance to be chosen as potential partners. Fourth, not everyone values a good reputation to the same extent.
English Summary 128 English summary English Summary S ocial dilemmas emerge when people experience a conflict between their immediate personal interest and the long-term collective interest of the group
More informationChapter 11 Nonexperimental Quantitative Research Steps in Nonexperimental Research
Chapter 11 Nonexperimental Quantitative Research (Reminder: Don t forget to utilize the concept maps and study questions as you study this and the other chapters.) Nonexperimental research is needed because
More informationINTERVIEWS II: THEORIES AND TECHNIQUES 5. CLINICAL APPROACH TO INTERVIEWING PART 1
INTERVIEWS II: THEORIES AND TECHNIQUES 5. CLINICAL APPROACH TO INTERVIEWING PART 1 5.1 Clinical Interviews: Background Information The clinical interview is a technique pioneered by Jean Piaget, in 1975,
More informationHOW TO IDENTIFY A RESEARCH QUESTION? How to Extract a Question from a Topic that Interests You?
Stefan Götze, M.A., M.Sc. LMU HOW TO IDENTIFY A RESEARCH QUESTION? I How to Extract a Question from a Topic that Interests You? I assume you currently have only a vague notion about the content of your
More informationHomo economicus is dead! How do we know how the mind works? How the mind works
Some facts about social preferences, or why we're sometimes nice and sometimes not Karthik Panchanathan buddha@ucla.edu Homo economicus is dead! It was a mistake to believe that individuals and institutions
More informationImproving Individual and Team Decisions Using Iconic Abstractions of Subjective Knowledge
2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium Improving Individual and Team Decisions Using Iconic Abstractions of Subjective Knowledge Robert A. Fleming SPAWAR Systems Center Code 24402 53560
More informationThe Scientific Method
Course "Empirical Evaluation in Informatics" The Scientific Method Prof. Dr. Lutz Prechelt Freie Universität Berlin, Institut für Informatik http://www.inf.fu-berlin.de/inst/ag-se/ Science and insight
More informationRational Choice Theory I: The Foundations of the Theory
Rational Choice Theory I: The Foundations of the Theory Benjamin Ferguson Administrative Keep in mind that your second papers are due this coming Friday at midnight. They should be emailed to me, roughly
More informationMaster Thesis The Influence of the Social Network Site Facebook on the Users Educational Participation Marc Graupner, M.A.*
Master Thesis The Influence of the Social Network Site Facebook on the Users Educational Participation Marc Graupner, M.A.* *ChairofMethodsofEmpiricalSocialResearch, Germany 1. Motivation and Theory Nowadays,
More informationSlide 1. Psychology 386b Fundamentals of Cognitive Science. Slide 2 Cognitive Science?
Slide 1 Psychology 386b Fundamentals of Cognitive Science Instructor: Kevin D. Johnston Office: Rm. 6254 SSC E-Mail: kjohnsto@uwo.ca Slide 2 Cognitive Science? This course deals with the field of Cognitive
More informationSeeing is Behaving : Using Revealed-Strategy Approach to Understand Cooperation in Social Dilemma. February 04, Tao Chen. Sining Wang.
Seeing is Behaving : Using Revealed-Strategy Approach to Understand Cooperation in Social Dilemma February 04, 2019 Tao Chen Wan Wang Sining Wang Lei Chen University of Waterloo University of Waterloo
More informationIntroduction to Social Psychology p. 1 Introduction p. 2 What Is Social Psychology? p. 3 A Formal Definition p. 3 Core Concerns of Social Psychology
Preface p. xv Introduction to Social Psychology p. 1 Introduction p. 2 What Is Social Psychology? p. 3 A Formal Definition p. 3 Core Concerns of Social Psychology p. 3 Sociology, Psychology, or Both? p.
More informationIntroduction to Motivational Interviewing in NAS Interventions
Introduction to Motivational Interviewing in NAS Interventions Daniel Raymond Tanagra M. Melgarejo Workshop Overview 1 Training Objectives By the end of this session you will be able to: Describe the fundamental
More informationRevisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 4107 Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation Ernesto Reuben Sigrid Suetens April 2009 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study
More informationThe reversal effect of prohibition signs
Article Group Processes & Intergroup Relations G P I R The reversal effect of prohibition signs Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 14(5) 681 688 The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub.
More informationThe Evolutionary Foundations of Strong Reciprocity
Analyse & Kritik 29/2005 ( c Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart) p. xxx xxx J. McKenzie Alexander The Evolutionary Foundations of Strong Reciprocity To say that people cooperate, trust, offer more than is logically
More informationNegotiation Frames. Michael Rovatsos. February 5, 2004
Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Informatik und Grundlagen der Künstlichen Intelligenz Fakultät für Informatik, Technische Universität München February 5, 2004 main in m 2 inffra Motivation Motivation in m 2
More informationThe Role of Personal and Social Resources and Coping For Finding Meaning in Cancer: A Longitudinal Study
Fachbereich Erziehungswissenschaft und Psychologie Der Freien Universität Berlin The Role of Personal and Social Resources and Coping For Finding Meaning in Cancer: A Longitudinal Study Dissertation zur
More informationCHAPTER IV CONSTRUCTION OF MORAL JUDGEMENT TEST, VALIDATION, DESCRIPTION AND ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER IV CONSTRUCTION OF MORAL JUDGEMENT TEST, VALIDATION, DESCRIPTION AND ADMINISTRATION 4.1 INTRODUCTION The present study is aimed at assessing the moral judgment among secondary school teachers of
More informationCooperative Choice. Cooperative and non-cooperative motives and their consequences.
Cooperative Choice Cooperative and non-cooperative motives and their consequences Lívia Markóczy Livia.Markoczy@ucr.edu Gary A. Anderson Graduate School of Management University of California, Riverside
More informationGroups in Organizations. Overview of topics
Groups in Organizations Overview of topics 1 Plan of today s lecture Groups general aspects Links with individual behavior Cohesion & conformity Decision making in groups 2 Characteristics of Groups Groups
More informationDSM-V. Causes. No causal relationship with vaccinations. Overview of Students with Behavioral, Emotional and Social Development Needs
The Hong Kong Institute of Education DSM-V Overview of Students with Behavioral, Emotional and Social Development Needs (Autism & Asperger Syndrome) social communication & interaction impairments Ryan
More informationExpEc I. Preliminaries
ExpEc I. Preliminaries Giovanni Ponti Università di Ferrara Facoltà di Giurisprudenza LUISS Guido Carli LAboratory for Theoretical and EXperimental Economics Universidad de Alicante Roma, 7/6/2010 h t
More informationDEVELOPING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK Dr. Noly M. Mascariñas
DEVELOPING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK Dr. Noly M. Mascariñas Director, BU-CHED Zonal Research Center Bicol University Research and Development Center Legazpi City Research Proposal Preparation Seminar-Writeshop
More informationCeDEx Discussion Paper Series ISSN
Discussion Paper No. 2009 10 Klaus Abbink and Benedikt Herrmann June 2009 The Moral Costs of Nastiness CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ISSN 1749 3293 The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics
More informationScoring Adults Secure Base Use And Support
This document is not a complete scoring manual. It provides additional rationale and description of the scales used in Crowell, J.A., Treboux, D. Gao, Y. Fyffe, C., Pan, H. & Waters, E. (2002) Assessing
More informationProgramme Conference on Decision Sciences. Tuesday 25/09/18 16:00 R 511. Cognitive Models I
Tuesday 25/09/18 16:00 R 511 Cognitive Models I Tjaša Omerzu University of Konstanz Graduate School of Decision Sciences Department of Psychology Establishing judgment policies in the absence of feedback
More informationStories. For C h a n g e
FRAMING Stories For C h a n g e Stories By Nat Kendall-Taylor / Chief Executive Officer at Frameworks Institute spring & summer 2017 33/74 29/80 S T O R Y T E L L I N G is all the rage in nonprofit communications.
More informationKoji Kotani International University of Japan. Abstract
Further investigations of framing effects on cooperative choices in a provision point mechanism Koji Kotani International University of Japan Shunsuke Managi Yokohama National University Kenta Tanaka Yokohama
More informationeconstor Make Your Publications Visible.
econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of Wirtschaft Centre zbwleibniz-informationszentrum Economics Desmet, Pieter; Engel, Christoph Working Paper People are conditional rule followers Preprints
More informationSelling Your Design:
Selling Your Design: Curb Appeal Is Not Enough Marketing & Sales in the Social & Health Care Environments Irving Stackpole, RRT, MEd Personalized = Choice Self-Directed & Personalized Choice - Selecting
More informationDancing at Gunpoint: A Review of Herbert Gintis Bounds of Reason
Dancing at Gunpoint: A Review of Herbert Gintis Bounds of Reason The Bounds of Reason seeks to accomplish many things. It introduces epistemic game theory, discusses other-regarding preferences in games
More informationMACHIAVELLIANISM, DISCUSSION TIME, AND GROUP SHIFT. HELMUT LAMM Universitat Mannheim. DAVID G. MYERS Hope College
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY, 1976, 4(1), 41-48 Society for Personality Research Inc. DOI 10.2224/sbp.1976.4.1.41 MACHIAVELLIANISM, DISCUSSION TIME, AND GROUP SHIFT HELMUT LAMM Universitat Mannheim
More informationSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Supplementary Statistics and Results This file contains supplementary statistical information and a discussion of the interpretation of the belief effect on the basis of additional data. We also present
More informationeconstor Make Your Publications Visible.
econstor Make Your Publications Visible. A Service of Wirtschaft Centre zbwleibniz-informationszentrum Economics Gächter, Simon Working Paper (Dis)advantages of student subjects: What is your research
More informationCommunication and ASD: Key Concepts for Educational Teams
Communication and ASD: Key Concepts for Educational Teams Marci Laurel, MA, CCC-SLP mlaurel@salud.unm.edu and Services (UCEDD) 1 Training Objectives Participants will: 1. Name at least three communication
More informationSocial framing and cooperation: The roles and interaction of preferences and beliefs
Social framing and cooperation: The roles and interaction of preferences and beliefs Elizabeth Bernold Elisabeth Gsottbauer Kurt A. Ackermann Ryan O. Murphy October 23, 214 Abstract Evidence suggests that
More informationAre Experimental Economists Prone to Framing Effects? A Natural Field Experiment
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics Discussion Paper Series ISSN 1749-3293 CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2007 01 Are Experimental Economists Prone to Framing Effects? A Natural Field Experiment
More informationCritical Conversations
Critical Conversations TIPS FOR TALKING WHEN STAKES ARE HIGH Agenda 1. Basics of Communication 2. Crucial Conversations defined 3. Before the conversation: setting the stage 4. During the conversation:
More informationArtificial Intelligence
Politecnico di Milano Artificial Intelligence Artificial Intelligence From intelligence to rationality? Viola Schiaffonati viola.schiaffonati@polimi.it Can machine think? 2 The birth of Artificial Intelligence
More informationAbstracts. An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research. From Mentalizing Folk to Social Epistemology
Proto Sociology s An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 3 Vol. 16, 2002 Understanding the Social: New Perspectives from Epistemology Contents From Mentalizing Folk to Social Epistemology
More informationLecture 3. QIAO Zhilin ( 乔志林 ) School of Economics & Finance Xi an Jiaotong University
Lecture 3 QIAO Zhilin ( 乔志林 ).co School of Economics & Finance Xi an Jiaotong University October, 2015 Introduction Ultimatum Game Traditional Economics Fairness is simply a rhetorical term Self-interest
More informationColor Cues and Viscosity in. Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma
Color Cues and Viscosity in Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma Michael Joya University of British Columbia Abstract The presence of color tag cues and a viscous environment have each been shown to foster conditional
More informationCAT - Negative Feedback
CAT - Negative Feedback Cinnamon St John, NYU Wagner 1. Background The idea behind performance appraisals, and feedback in general, is that employees will better understand both their strengths and the
More informationCommunication, Advice and Beliefs in an Experimental Public Goods Game
Communication, Advice and Beliefs in an Experimental Public Goods Game Ananish Chaudhuri Department of Economics University of Auckland a.chaudhuri@auckland.ac.nz Pushkar Maitra Department of Economics
More informationCopyright 2001 Scientific American, Inc.
Why do we value fairness and cooperation over seemingly more rational selfishness? How can Darwinian generosity arise? Biologists and economists explain THE ECONOMICS OF FAIR PLAY By Karl Sigmund, Ernst
More informationAgenda. Communicative Intent: The Challenges Faced by the Student with Deafblindness and Motor Problems
Communicative Intent: The Challenges Faced by the Student with and Motor Problems Dr. Linda Mamer Program for Students with, Deafblind Specialist 10300 Seacote Road, Richmond, BC, V7A 4B2 Linda.mamer@shaw.ca
More informationAgreement Coefficients and Statistical Inference
CHAPTER Agreement Coefficients and Statistical Inference OBJECTIVE This chapter describes several approaches for evaluating the precision associated with the inter-rater reliability coefficients of the
More informationCooperation and Public Goods Provision
Cooperation and Public Goods Provision A basic design Determinants of voluntary cooperation Marginal private benefits Group size Communication Why do people cooperate? Strategic cooperation Cooperation
More informationQualitative Attitude Research To Determine the Employee Opinion of a Business Hotel in Istanbul - Turkey. Ahmet Ferda Seymen 1
Qualitative Attitude Research To Determine the Employee Opinion of a Business Hotel in Istanbul - Turkey Ahmet Ferda Seymen 1 INRTODUCTION Qualitative research is concerned with qualitative phenomenon,
More informationScience and the scientific method. Mr. Banks 7 th and 8 TH grade science
Science and the scientific method Mr. Banks 7 th and 8 TH grade science What is science? Science is the study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural universe, to find explanations to
More informationMindset For Optimal Performance: Essential Mental Skills DR. RICK MCGUIRE DIRECTOR OF SPORT PSYCHOLOGY ANNE SHADLE M.ED.
Mindset For Optimal Performance: Essential Mental Skills DR. RICK MCGUIRE DIRECTOR OF SPORT PSYCHOLOGY ANNE SHADLE M.ED. THINKING RIGHT IN SPORT It s all about FOCUS! Outline For Today: 1. Thinking Right
More informationLetting Go of the Past: EMDR from The Body Keeps the Score Part of the Lunch with Lois Series Lois A. Pessolano Ehrmann PhD, LPC, NCC Certified EMDR
Letting Go of the Past: EMDR from The Body Keeps the Score Part of the Lunch with Lois Series Lois A. Pessolano Ehrmann PhD, LPC, NCC Certified EMDR Clinician and Approved Consultant Executive Director
More informationCognitive Modeling. Lecture 9: Intro to Probabilistic Modeling: Rational Analysis. Sharon Goldwater
Cognitive Modeling Lecture 9: Intro to Probabilistic Modeling: Sharon Goldwater School of Informatics University of Edinburgh sgwater@inf.ed.ac.uk February 8, 2010 Sharon Goldwater Cognitive Modeling 1
More informationWhat is effective communication?
Communication What is effective communication? - Communication: Any connection between humans - Both verbal & non-verbal. - You cannot not communicate. * We are ALWAYS communicating. What are the five
More informationCogSysIII Lecture 4/5: Empirical Evaluation of Software-Systems
CogSysIII Lecture 4/5: Empirical Evaluation of Software-Systems Human Computer Interaction Ute Schmid Applied Computer Science, Bamberg University last change May 8, 2007 CogSysIII Lecture 4/5: Empirical
More informationThe Coevolution of Punishment and Prosociality Among Learning Agents
The Coevolution of Punishment and Prosociality Among Learning Agents Fiery Cushman (cushman@wjh.harvard.edu) Department of Psychology, 484 William James Hall, 33 Kirkland St., Cambridge, MA 238 USA Owen
More informationJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC RESEARCH FOR MULTIDISCIPLINARY Impact Factor 1.393, ISSN: , Volume 2, Issue 2, March 2014
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL TRAIT ANXIETY BETWEEN INTERVARSITY AND NATIONAL LEVEL HANDBALL PLAYERS OF MADHYA PRADESH MOHIT SINGH* KUNAL KUMAR** *Assistant Professor, MGKM Sahi Sports College
More informationCognitive Modeling. Mechanistic Modeling. Mechanistic Modeling. Mechanistic Modeling Rational Analysis
Lecture 9: Intro to Probabilistic Modeling: School of Informatics University of Edinburgh sgwater@inf.ed.ac.uk February 8, 2010 1 1 2 3 4 Reading: Anderson (2002). 2 Traditional mechanistic approach to
More informationCritical Thinking and Reading Lecture 15
Critical Thinking and Reading Lecture 5 Critical thinking is the ability and willingness to assess claims and make objective judgments on the basis of well-supported reasons. (Wade and Tavris, pp.4-5)
More informationWhat is Science 2009 What is science?
What is science? The question we want to address is seemingly simple, but turns out to be quite difficult to answer: what is science? It is reasonable to ask such a question since this is a book/course
More informationExplanations in Psychology Attachment Theory Attribution Theory Availability Heuristic Bystander Effect Classical Conditioning Cognitive Dissonance Th
Toward a Unified Evolutionary Psychology Many sciences develop for a time as exercises in description and empirical generalization. Only later do they acquire reasoned connections within themselves and
More informationHow rational are your decisions? Neuroeconomics
How rational are your decisions? Neuroeconomics Hecke CNS Seminar WS 2006/07 Motivation Motivation Ferdinand Porsche "Wir wollen Autos bauen, die keiner braucht aber jeder haben will." Outline 1 Introduction
More informationLecture 9. Control and Personality. Professor Ian Robertson
Lecture 9 Control and Personality Professor Ian Robertson SEE KELTNER ET AL PSYCH REVIEW (FROM LECTURE 8) Why does Power increase behavioural activation? Power is correlated with increased resources. Powerful
More informationReview Sheet Learning (7-9%)
Name Ms. Gabriel/Mr. McManus Date Period AP Psychology Review Sheet Learning (7-9%) 1) learning 2) associative learning Classical Conditioning 3) Ivan Pavlov 4) classical conditioning 5) John Watson 6)
More informationMany studies have investigated the effect of waking
DREAMS and DREAMING The Effect of Dreams on Waking Life Michael Schredl, Ph.D. Although many studies have investigated the effects of waking experience on dream content, research on the effects of dreams
More informationSocial Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing Conditional Cooperation in a Field Experiment
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing Conditional Cooperation in a Field Experiment By BRUNO S. FREY AND STEPHAN MEIER* Many important activities, such as charitable giving, voting, and paying
More information