Dwight Holland, MD, PhD SFTE/SETP Oct, 2013

Transcription

1 The Mir-Progress 233 Near-Miss, and 234 Collision a Case Study in Human Factors and Why Most Off-Nominal Space Activities Have Flight Test Components (Or The First RP SpaceCraft Mishap!) Dwight Holland, MD, PhD SFTE/SETP Oct,

2 Background/Overview US Antarctic Program remote geophysics and flight test/gps work in remote field sites Antarctic experience is good long-duration space analog (author insight) Crew on Mir/Issues for 233 Progress Near-Miss Long-Duration Spaceflight Issues New Crew for Progress 234 Reenactment, plus actual film Issues/Analyses Conclusions in part from Breaking the Mishap Chain 2

3 Human Systems Integration- HSI the new USAF/DoD thrust HSI is the process model for human performance 3

4 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 4

5 Human System Integration Concerns for Evaluating New Ops in Space Human Factors Engineering for Space Flight Test; or, the insidious let s give it a try How well do the human and the aircraft/spacecraft interact in the flight test/space ops world? Different! What problems exist within this interaction that are unique to spaceflight (Dexterity, EVA, Suits, Cabin Noise, Displays, Environmental Issue, etc ) How are humans changing during long duration flights: Physically, Mentally, Fatigue, Training Can these factors be mitigated in order to optimize total system performance when trying 5

6 Overview of Information Processing and SA (Mica Endsley, 1995; Human Factors) 6

7 Systems/HSI Design Issues for Long Duration Spaceflight: Critical!! Appropriate Words/Symbology Effective, Clear Visual Displays Responsive, Predictable Controls Personal-Machine Communication 7

8 HSI Applies to Space Ops as Well! Human-System Integration Evaluation Areas for Flight Test! - Display Information Readability -Display Information Interpretability -Display Usability - Environment - Ergonomics - Controls Operability; C/D Usability - System Communications (In/Out) - Situation Awareness Enhancement/Reduction? -Workload -Spatial Disorientation? 8

9 CREW MEMBERS Vasili Tsibliyev (Commander) Sasha Lazutkin (Flight Engr) Jerry Linenger M.D., Ph.D. Left May 1997; Nervous about Ops practices! Michael Foale Ph.D. May-August 9

10 Systems Theory Layers International Partners Pressures/Interfacing National Political, Social, Economic Environment Space Agency Goals/Rewards Mission Control Decisions Spacecraft Environment/Systems Group Dynamics Human-Machine Interface Human Performance 10

11 Human Performance Problems-- LDS Anthropometry/Displays Neurovestibular insult ( SAS ) Musculoskeletal Radiation Cardiovascular deconditioning Psychosocial factors Deterioration of skilled performance Organizational pressure/tasking How to hit a moving systems requirements target as people change! 11

12 NEUROVESTIBULAR ISSUES Human nervous control system evolved in a 1G field huge implications Otoliths tell us where the effective force field (gravity) vector is Semicircular canals Visual-vestibular Spatial Disorientation Changing Force Fields Troublesome (ex planetary) 12

13 Musculoskletal Cardiovascular heart is a muscle Generalized muscle weakness/loss of coordination (NV effects as well) BONE RESORPTION (multicausal) Osteoporotic/penic syndrome (aged astronauts bones) Kidney Stones Dr Linenger very irritated by reduction! 13

14 PSYCHOSOCIAL The big wild card Generally not good based upon - Past experience - Mountaineering - Antarctic Expeditions - Biosphere Crews seem to start having difficulty at around 3-4 months: What to do? suggestions (Crew Resource Allocation/Adaptability Training) Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Rewards 14

15 CORE MISHAP BACKGROUND-RPS OPS Previous near-miss with Linenger on board KURS range/vel radar caused camera to fail for 233?; Turned off for the 234 docking attempt No reliable range/velocity info MIR Commander, Vasili unpracticed, new crew member for 2 nd attempt, Michael Foale Progress out-of-sight approach Collision/Decompression Cables in Spektr delay isolation 15

16 Action/Interviews/M. Foale 16

17 MIR OPS History Jan 97: Linenger arrives for 4-month stay on MIR Feb 97: Oxygen Canister Fire (smoke in cabin) Feb 97: Poor sleep due to masks being used Feb-Mar 97: Comms with ground control difficult Mar 97: First failed attempt to dock Progress 233: Possible evacuation (KURS radar/range/camera failure) Mar 97: MIR Commander frustrated with ground control MAR 97: Another oxygen system fails canister lit APR 97: Cooling system fails; high temp/humidity APR 97: Late night repairs on MIR wearing crew out May 97: Michael Foale arrives to replace Linenger Handoff Poor, and NASA largely unaware of 233 issue 17

18 OPS HISTORY-2 June 97: MIR Commander flies into Ethylene glycol blob feels sick for days June 12+: Sleep Study begins crew sleep poor Increasing tension with ground control and MIR Commander Late June 97: Sleep quality has been poor for 3-4 months; hectic pace of operations/experiments/station Late June 97: MIR Commander is very concerned about Progress 234 docking attempt; ground debates, then overrules rewards (?) June 25 97: Mishap occurs Commander blamed by President Yeltsin; heart issue starts 18

19 HF: Controls/Displays Bias against using Progress thrusters (fuel constraints) due to later fly around asked for by ground. TORU system used to dock. Progress 234 assigned an approach target 400 m out of MIR orbital plane (orbital mechanics are notoriously counterintuitive) KURS Radar shut OFF (previous TV problem source [?]) -- continued 19

20 HF: Control/Displays Because the KURS Radar was shut off accurate Range/Velocity information unavailable Progress 234 was out-of-sight for much of the approach but moving in faster than thought Progress 234 velocity at 6.5 m/s vs. a safe 5.0 m/s approach speed Camera on Progress looking down on MIR poor contrast; display approach grid ineffective Vasili could be expected to detect 5 % V changes 20

21 Systems/HF Overview Systems Engineering Poor Human Factors Design Potential for Accident Occurrence Chance/Organizational or Systems Issues Mishap Occurs Medical Emotional Systems 21

22 Thanks Questions? D2 or Probe 22

23 Human Information Processing and Attention (C. Wickens/Hollands; Human Info Processing, 2000) 23

24 Anthropometry 24