Oct. 28, Jaryong Jo, DVM

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1 Oct. 28, 2015 Jaryong Jo, DVM 1

Contents 1 2 3 4 5 National animal health preventive systems Prevention & Control

2 Contents National animal health preventive systems Prevention & Control Measures against HPAI HPAI Outbreaks Analysis HPAI Spread Causes Future Prospect 2

3 1 National animal health preventive systems Organizational Structure of National Animal Health <Governmental Prevention> Farm <Nongovernmental Prevention> Slaughterhouse Union of preventive control Veterinarians for public duty Veterinary Service Laboratory Headquarter of Do, branch offices Headquarter of Region, Association of Livestock farming 17 Provincial Government [ 8 Metro cities (Shi) / 9 Provinces (Do) ] Animal & Plant Quarantine Agency (QIA) Headquarter of Livestock Health Control Association National Agricultural Cooperative Federation Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) [animal health management division] 3

4 1 National animal health preventive systems National crisis & warning level (HPAI) Classification Standard criteria action Blue (Attention) Yellow (caution) Orange (Alert) Red) (critical] - Occurrence in Neighboring Countries - Migratory Birds Movement/Inflow Seasons (October to May] - Clinically Suspicious Animal Outbreak - Domestic Outbreak - Spread to Neighboring or Other Regions - Multiple Region Outbreak or Possible Spread to All Over the Country Occurrence Monitoring Cooperative system Activation confrontation attitude reinforcement Overall take action 4

2 Prevention & Control Measures against HPAI When HPAI Outbreak

around the place of origin Step 2 - Stamping-out & disinfection

surveillance on domestic fowls in the region of movement

5 2 Prevention & Control Measures against HPAI When HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowls Step 1 - Establishment of movement restriction around the place of origin Step 2 - Stamping-out & disinfection for removing the source of infection Step 3 - Performing surveillance on domestic fowls in the region of movement restriction Step 4 - Removal of movement restriction, Re-stocking & Compensation 5

6 2 Prevention & Control Measures against HPAI When HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowls Vaccination against HPAI has been banned. Stamping-out : all susceptible poultry in the infected and neighboring farms were selectively culled and buried. - Eggs : also buried - Feed and contaminated materials: incinerated - Pre-emptive slaughter of farms epidemiologically linked to the infected farm were performed. Thorough disinfection and biosecurity measures : encouraged at farm level 6

7 2 Prevention & Control Measures against HPAI When HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowls Management zone (area within 500m radius) Protection zone (area within 3km radius) Surveillance zone (area within 10km radius) * UK 2001 foot-and-mouth disease occurrence data analysis, after the first occurrence within a 3km radius caused 50%, 80% occurred in within 10km (Bessell et al., 2008) Lifted 30 days after the last reported case 7

8 2 Prevention & Control Measures against HPAI When HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowls Cleaning remnants of farms such as feces, and strengthen disinfection for infected premises, etc. Self-disinfecting for livestock facilities; Slaughterhouses, feed mills, feed depository, sewage plants, livestock farm, etc For intensive disinfecting, establish area disinfection facilities for transport vehicles entering the outbreak occurred city and county Direct costs for compensation for stamping-out Fund for farmer s living expenses Financial support for restocking, tax exemption, etc. 8

2 Prevention & Control Measures against HPAI When HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowls Intensive targeted Surveillance - the farm epidemiologically linked to the infected farm Border Quarantine - Increase

9 2 Prevention & Control Measures against HPAI When HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowls Intensive targeted Surveillance - the farm epidemiologically linked to the infected farm Border Quarantine - Increase the quarantine officers at airports/ports - Detector dogs at airports/ports : dogs for detection of illegal carry-in livestock products from countries at risk - Importation of live birds and poultry products from affected countries are prohibited 9

10 3 HPAI Outbreaks Analysis Past HPAI Occurence Classification 2006/ /2011 Duration ~ ~ ~ Administrative areas 3 Provinces (5 Si/Gun) 11 Metro cities/ Provinces (19 Si/Gun/Gu) 6 Provinces (25 Si/Gun/Gu) Period 104 days 42 days 139 days Outbreaks Affected poultry farms No. of poultry slaughtered Compensation cost (KRW) Declaration of HPAI Free (OIE report) Chicken 4, Duck 2, Quail 1 Chicken 24, Duck 8, Others 1 Chicken 18, Duck 33, Others 2 2,800 thousands 10,204 thousands 6,473 thousands 33.9 billion billion 80.7 billion

11 3 HPAI Outbreaks Analysis HPAI Outbreak and Damage Class / Period : ' ' (195 days) Period: ' ' (260 days) Period: ' Present Outbreak 29 cases (highly suspected animals) (11 for chicken, 17 for duck, and 1 for goose) Positive farm: 212 cases 9 cases (highly suspected animals) (5 for chicken and 4 for duck) Positive farm:160 cases 0 case (highly suspected animals) (10 for duck) Positive farm:10 cases Prevention measures Stamping-out: 548 farms, 13,961 thousand poultry Stamping-out: 234 farms, 5,110 thousand poultry Stamping-out: 11 farms, 54 thousand poultry Financial expenditure billion won (expected) : compensation for stamping-out and others Currently being counted 11

3 HPAI Outbreaks Analysis Diagram of HPAI Outbreak (2014.1.16.~2014.7.29) Occurrence History The first occurred in '14.1.16. Go Chang (H5N8 type) and then, suspected farm was tested.

* Jeonllabuk-do 7, Jeonllanam-do 6, Chungcheongnam-do 5, Chungcheongbuk-do 5, Gyeonggi-do 4, Gyeonsangnam-do 1, Sejong city 1 Total 259 positive : Pre-emptive emptive slaughter, epidemiological farm,

12 3 HPAI Outbreaks Analysis Diagram of HPAI Outbreak ( ~ ) Occurrence History The first occurred in ' Go Chang (H5N8 type) and then, suspected farm was tested. A report 34 cases of 29 cases (7 Cities Province, 18 Si Gun) came back positive. * Jeonllabuk-do 7, Jeonllanam-do 6, Chungcheongnam-do 5, Chungcheongbuk-do 5, Gyeonggi-do 4, Gyeonsangnam-do 1, Sejong city 1 Total 259 positive : Pre-emptive emptive slaughter, epidemiological farm, disease judgement, forecast. (positive farm 212, wild birds 38) Situation of The Whole Country 야생조류 HPAI 검출지역 (38) 1. 동림저수지 (9) 3. 삽교호 (1) 5. 암태도 (1) 7. 영암호 (1) 9. 풍세천 (5, 분변 3) 11. 미호천 (1, 분변 ) 13. 해미하수처리장 (3) 15. 전주송천동 (1) 17. 청계산 (1) 19. 제주구좌읍 (1, 분변 ) 2. 금강하구 (5) 4. 시화호 (1, 분변 ) 6. 서호 (1), 신대저수지 (1) 8. 영흥도 (1) 10. 원주천 (1, 분변 ) 12. 봉선저수지 (1) 14. 금마저수지 (1, 분변 ) 16. 축산과학원 (1, 분변 ) 18. 복하천 (1, 분변 ) 19 12

3 HPAI Outbreaks Analysis HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowl(2014.9.24.~2015.6.

13 3 HPAI Outbreaks Analysis HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowl( ~ ) 160 cases in 9 Metro Si/Do and 34 Si/Gun/Gu (147 in farms and 13 traditional markets) BUSAN (1) Gangseo-gu 1 Jeollabuk-do(24) Gyeonggi-do(26) Anseong-si 13 Yeohu-si 3 Icheon-si 2 Gimje-si 14 Pocheon-si 4 Jeongup-si 6 Gimpo-si 1 Buan-gun 2 Uijeongbu-si 1 Gunsan -si 1 Yangju-si 2 I ksan-si 1 Chungcheongbuk-do(35) Traditional Market (13) <Poultry Store> Gokseong-gun 2 Muan-gun 2 Seongnam-si 4 Ulsan City 2 <Poultry Aagent Facilities> Damyang-gun 2 Seongnam-si 1 Jeollanam-do(52) Yeongam-gun 21 Naju-si 12 Jangheung-gun 1 Hwasun-gun 1 Muan-gun 5 Gokseong-gun 1 Gurye-gun 9 Boseong-gun 1 Gangjin-gun 1 Eumseong-gun 33 Jincheon-gun 2 Chungcheongbuk-do(6) Cheonan-si 3 Hongseong-gun 1 Cheongyang-gun 1 Asan1 Gyeongsangbuk-do (1) Gyeongju-si1 Gyeongsangnam-do(2) Yangsan-si 1 Goseong-gun 1 13

3 HPAI Outbreaks Analysis HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowl (2014.9.14.~As of 2015. 10.18) (5) 9.22 김진용농가 (3) 9.16 박서운전통시장 (6) 9.20 허삼철전통시장 Detected 7 HPAI antigen positives only in Jeollanam-do (4) 9.

14 3 HPAI Outbreaks Analysis HPAI Outbreak of Domestic Fowl ( ~As of ) (5) 9.22 김진용농가 (3) 9.16 박서운전통시장 (6) 9.20 허삼철전통시장 Detected 7 HPAI antigen positives only in Jeollanam-do (4) 9.16 심미경전통시장 No. Date of outbreak Regions Farms (1) 9.15 김형수농가 Naju Kim Gangjin Lee Damyang Park (8) 농가 Gwangju Buk-Gu Shim Gwangju Gwangsan -Gu Kim (7) 9.21 문성례계류장 (2) 9.15 이재복농가 Damyang Hur Gangjin Moon Youngam

15 4 HPAI Spread Causes Cause of HPAI in January 2014 First Outbreak came from Migratory Birds AI Epidemiology Committee intermediate survey, estimated that H5N8 came from the influx of migratory birds. The main reason is estimated to - Past domestic generation was the highly pathogenic H5N1 AI-type, H5N8 type did not exist in KOREA(South) - Normally last three years, AI surveillance test results, H5N8 viruses have never been detected on 211 millions samples - Initial outbreak farm is located in the habitat for migratory birds nearby, the area is also being concentrated on the west coast caused a winter migratory birds wintering mainly - The same type of highly pathogenic AI (H5N8 type) separated from outbreak farm is detected from several the habitat for migratory birds samples (Dongrim reservoir, the Geumgang Estuary, Sapgyoho, Sihwaho, etc.). 15

16 4 HPAI Spread Causes HPAI causes reoccurring September 2014 HPAI (H5N8 type) Outbreak Causes 1 After ' , The cause of Jeonllanam-do recurrence can be assume that in the last Jan.~Jul. month virus which shed in the part of the farm or traditional markets spread through such as livestock transport vehicles. Inadequate disposal of remainder in existing farm or contacted transmission with contaminated wild bird s feces are mainly suspicious (lack of follow-up). 2 occurs due to wild birds - Busan Gangseo-gu (goose, chicken, ' ), Gyeonggi-do Anseong-si (duck, ' ), Gyeong-gi Yeoju (laying hens, ' ), etc. occurrence * After winter of 2014, the same virus detected in migratory birds coming into the country 16

17 4 HPAI Spread Causes HAPI Re-outbreak after September 2015 What are causes to occur the 3th HPAI (H5N8 type) in 2015? (Outbreak causes) This AI occurred by residual viruses (H5N8 type) that have been spread over Jeonnam regions. (Spread causes) This disease is considered to spread over while 1 in process of poultry middlemen to buy or sell birds in traditional markets; 2 In process of farmers to supply birds; 3 in movement of contaminated birds. 17

18 5 Future Prospect Major Tasks Undertaken and Initiatives < Primary Directions > 1. Residue prevention Intensively and selectively implement prevention measures to block the circulation of residual viruses. 2. Blocking of spread links Develop an intensive management system that can monitor minor industries with a type of point organization including small farms and middlemen. 3. Inflow prevention Implement preemptive prevention measures to block the introduction of new AI viruses in a migratory bird inflow season. 18

Rapid and Accuracy Diagnosis of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N8) Virus used for the Control of the Outbreak in the Republic of Korea

Rapid and Accuracy Diagnosis of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N8) Virus used for the Control of the Outbreak in the Republic of Korea Third Global Conference of OIE Reference Centres Incheon(Seoul),