Formal Verification of Train Control with Air Pressure Brakes

Transcription

1 Formal Verification of Train Control with Air Pressure Brakes Stefan Mitsch 1 Marco Gario 2 Christof J. Budnik 2 Michael Golm 2 André Platzer 1 1 Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University 2 Siemens Corporate Technology, Princeton, NJ, USA Reliability, Safety and Security of Railway Systems November 15, 2017 S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 1 of 14

2 Railroad Safety: Train Separation and Train Control Interlocking S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 2 of 14

3 Railroad Safety: Train Separation and Train Control Interlocking S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 2 of 14

4 Railroad Safety: Train Separation and Train Control Movement authority Train separation Interlocking S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 2 of 14

5 Railroad Safety: Train Separation and Train Control Movement authority Train separation Interlocking S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 2 of 14

6 Railroad Safety: Train Separation and Train Control Train requires! Train control separation Interlocking S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 2 of 14

7 Railroad Safety: Train Separation and Train Control Train requires! Train control separation Interlocking Design provably safe train control considering physical train motion Federal Railroad Administration (FRA): motion and brake models No overshoot Limited undershoot S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 2 of 14

8 Railroad Safety: Train Separation and Train Control Train requires! Train control separation Interlocking Design provably safe train control considering physical train motion Federal Railroad Administration (FRA): motion and brake models No overshoot Limited undershoot But underspecified control conditions S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 2 of 14

9 Railroad Safety: Train Separation and Train Control Train requires! Train control separation Approach Interlocking Safe train separation requires verified train control and motion! Design provably safe train control considering physical train motion Federal Railroad Administration (FRA): motion and brake models No overshoot Limited undershoot But underspecified control conditions S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 2 of 14

10 Approach: Hybrid Systems Theorem Proving Analyze the physical effect of software Proof Control Hybrid System Model Sensors Actuators Discrete computation + continuous physics t t S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 3 of 14

11 Approach: Hybrid Systems Theorem Proving Proof Strategy Theorem proving ensures correct model Proof guarantees correct model KeYmaera X Proof Hybrid System Model Control Conditions Main results for Certification: Proofs System architecture and implementation: Models Control engineering and testing: Control conditions S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 3 of 14

12 Train Motion and Brake Model t Accelerate Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 4 of 14

13 Train Motion and Brake Model t Accelerate Instant brake Limited, but almost instant effect Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 4 of 14

14 Train Motion and Brake Model Accelerate Instant brake Air brake Brake effect increases, time depends on train length t Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 4 of 14

15 Train Motion and Brake Model t Accelerate Instant brake Air brake v = 1 ( m f a ), Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 4 of 14

16 Train Motion and Brake Model t F pb Accelerate Instant brake Air brake v = 1 ( m f a ), f a = j & F pb f a Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 4 of 14

17 Train Motion and Brake Model t F pb Accelerate Instant brake Air brake v = 1 m ( (Fg + F r + F c ) + f a ), f a = j & F pb f a Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 4 of 14

18 Train Motion and Brake Model t F pb Accelerate Instant brake Air brake x = v, v = 1 m ( (Fg + F r + F c ) + f a ), f a = j & F pb f a Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 4 of 14

19 Train Motion and Brake Model t F pb Accelerate Instant brake Air brake x = v, v = 1 m ( (Fg + F r + F c ) + f a ), f a = j & F pb f a Underspecified: What are safe control choices? How important is brake model fidelity? Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 4 of 14

20 Train Motion and Brake Model t F pb Approach Accelerate Instant Air Formalize brakeand verify control brake models Analyze their brake engage points x = v, v = 1 m ( (Fg + F r + F c ) + f a ), f a = j & F pb f a Underspecified: What are safe control choices? How important is brake model fidelity? Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 4 of 14

21 Control Model Track Control extend e, d S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 5 of 14

22 Control Model Track Control extend e, d e,d Driver Train Control a F pb S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 5 of 14

23 Control Model Track Control extend e, d e,d Train Control Driver a a F pb Actuators Delay vs. air brake S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 5 of 14

24 Control Model Track Control extend e, d e,d Train Control Driver a a F pb Actuators f a,j Delay vs. air brake Env. Motion S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 5 of 14

25 Formal Verification with dl: No Overshoot Correctness property: respect the speed limit safe (z e v 25) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 6 of 14

26 Formal Verification with dl: No Overshoot Correctness property: respect the speed limit safe (z e v d) d S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 6 of 14

27 Formal Verification with dl: No Overshoot Correctness property: respect the speed limit safe (z e v d) d []safe S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 6 of 14

28 Formal Verification with dl: No Overshoot Correctness property: respect the speed limit safe (z e v d) [ ( ; ; ) ] d safe S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 6 of 14

29 Formal Verification with dl: No Overshoot Correctness property: respect the speed limit safe (z e v d) [ ( d ; ; ) ] d safe S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 6 of 14

30 Formal Verification with dl: No Overshoot Correctness property: respect the speed limit safe (z e v d) [ ( init d ; ; ) ] d safe S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 6 of 14

31 Formal Verification with dl: No Overshoot Correctness property: respect the speed limit safe (z e v d) [ ( ) ( ) ] init d ; ; safe }{{} d S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 6 of 14

32 Formal Verification with dl: No Overshoot Correctness property: respect the speed limit safe (z e v d) [ ( ) ( ) ] init d ; ; safe }{{} d ( ( ) ( ) f a := ;? F sb f a A;? e z (v 2 d 2 )m A A F sb F sb 2m ε2 + vε ) slow slow + fast fast + (1) (2) slow isfast(v) f a 0 e z vε + mslow(v) (3) ( ) slow + [u := v+ faε m ] isfast(u) f a 0 e z vε + faε2 2m + mslow(u) fast isfast(v) f a 0 e z vε + mfast(v) (5) ( ) fast + isfast(v) f a 0 e z vε + faε2 2m + mfast v + faε (6) m F 2 pb isfast(v) v 2mJ mslow(v) = 2 2mv/J 3 v mfast(v) mfast(v) = mv 2 + vf pb 2F pb 2J (4) F 3 pb 24mJ 2 (7) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 6 of 14

33 Formal Verification with dl: No Overshoot Correctness property: respect the speed limit safe (z e v d) [ ( ) ( ) ] init d ; ; safe }{{} Result ( ( ) ( ) Driving f a := ; with? F sb verified f a A;? control e z (v 2 conditions d 2 )m A + + ensures A 1 2F sb F sb 2m ε2 + safety vε How to find conditions: Proofs! d ) slow slow + fast fast + (1) (2) slow isfast(v) f a 0 e z vε + mslow(v) (3) ( ) slow + [u := v+ faε m ] isfast(u) f a 0 e z vε + faε2 2m + mslow(u) fast isfast(v) f a 0 e z vε + mfast(v) (5) ( ) fast + isfast(v) f a 0 e z vε + faε2 2m + mfast v + faε (6) m F 2 pb isfast(v) v 2mJ mslow(v) = 2 2mv/J 3 v mfast(v) mfast(v) = mv 2 + vf pb 2F pb 2J (4) F 3 pb 24mJ 2 (7) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 6 of 14

34 Systematically Derive Safe Control Conditions in dl Partial [ model, unknown ] condition?true ;?true ; safe S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 7 of 14

35 Systematically Derive Safe Control Conditions in dl Partial [ model, unknown ] condition?true ;?true ; safe Run [ and observe parallel ] universe ;?[ ]safe ; safe }{{} test for desired outcome copy&paste S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 7 of 14

36 Systematically Derive Safe Control Conditions in dl Partial [ model, unknown ] condition?true ;?true ; safe Run [ and observe parallel ] universe ;?[ ]safe ; safe }{{} test for desired outcome Obviously [ ]( true but not helpful ) for implementation [ ]safe [ ]safe copy&paste S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 7 of 14

37 Systematically Derive Safe Control Conditions in dl Partial [ model, unknown ] condition?true ;?true ; safe Run [ and observe parallel ] universe ;?[ ]safe ; safe }{{} test for desired outcome Obviously [ ]( true but not helpful ) for implementation [ ]safe [ ]safe Symbolically [ ]( execute program with dl ) safe(z + vt + fa 2m t2, v + fa m t) [ ]safe copy&paste S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 7 of 14

38 Systematically Derive Safe Control Conditions in dl Partial [ model, unknown ] condition?true ;?true ; safe Run [ and observe parallel ] universe ;?[ ]safe ; safe }{{} test for desired outcome Obviously [ ]( true but not helpful ) for implementation [ ]safe [ ]safe copy&paste Symbolically [ ]( execute program with dl ) safe(z + vt + fa 2m t2, v + fa m t) [ ]safe Use program effects as control conditions [ ;?safe(z + vt + fa 2m t2, v + fa m t) ; ] safe Implementable S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 7 of 14

39 Systematically Derive Safe Control Conditions in dl Partial [ model, unknown ] condition?true ;?true ; safe Run [ and observe parallel ] universe ;?[ ]safe ; safe }{{} test for desired outcome Result Obviously [ ]( true but not helpful for implementation Augment) partial model [ ]safe with implementable [ ]safe control conditions Symbolically [ ]( execute program derived by with proof dl ) safe(z + vt + fa 2m t2, v + fa m t) [ ]safe copy&paste Use program effects as control conditions [ ;?safe(z + vt + fa 2m t2, v + fa m t) ; ] safe Implementable S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 7 of 14

40 Proof Strategy Hybrid System Model Proof guarantees correct model KeYmaera X Proof Control Conditions No overshoot Verified models: safely control brake delay and air brakes Symbolic control conditions to select between free driving and braking S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 8 of 14

41 Proof Strategy Hybrid System Model Proof guarantees correct model KeYmaera X Proof Control Conditions No overshoot + Limited undershoot Verified models: safely control brake delay and air brakes Symbolic control conditions to select between free driving and braking S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 8 of 14

42 Formal Verification with dl: Limited Undershoot Correctness: when done braking, train is after undershoot limit efficient (brakesengaged v d) (z e u) u d S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 9 of 14

43 Formal Verification with dl: Limited Undershoot Correctness: when done braking, train is after undershoot limit efficient (brakesengaged v d) (z e u) Needs change in control priority No overshoot: braking allowed but spoils efficiency u d init [ (( ) ; ; ) ] efficient S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 9 of 14

44 Formal Verification with dl: Limited Undershoot Correctness: when done braking, train is after undershoot limit efficient (brakesengaged v d) (z e u) u d Needs change in control priority No overshoot: braking allowed but spoils efficiency Limited undershoot: only brake if necessary for safety [ ((if ) ) ] init (mustbrake) else ; ; efficient S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 9 of 14

45 Proof Strategy Hybrid System Model Proof guarantees correct model KeYmaera X Proof Control Conditions No overshoot + Limited undershoot Verified models: safely control brake delay and air brakes Symbolic control conditions to select between free driving and braking Control favors free driving for efficiency S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 10 of 14

46 Experiments Compare brake engage distance to endpoint control assuming delayed brakes control assuming air brakes Instantiate symbolic models with concrete parameters from FRA Parameter Value vs. l z Length Medium = 2 345ft (40 cars) short,long m Mass Loaded = klb (263 klb car ) empty v Speed Fast = 60mph slow F pb Emergency brake Loaded = 1 430klbf ( lbf car ) empty,unknown t appl Time 50 s length-dependent A Acceleration 5 mph =391.91klbf min f a Brake force 1.75 mph = klbf min ε Control cycle 100ms Brossaeu, J., Ede, B.M.: Development of an adaptive predictive braking enforcement algorithm. FRA/DOT/ORD-9/13 (2009) S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 11 of 14

47 Experimental Results: Brake Engage Points Slow Fast Loaded Empty Loaded Empty Cars Brake force for unknown load F pb = car lbf Delay brakes 726 1,110 1, ,662 15,436 17,742 22,730 5,369 7,676 12,664 Air brakes , ,364 15,494 17,880 4,278 5,334 7,383 Difference ,161 1,072 2,248 4,850 1,091 2,342 5,281 Brake force for known load, loaded: F pb = car lbf F pb = car lbf Delay brakes , ,771 10,817 13,123 18,111 9,277 11,583 16,571 Air brakes ,743 10,859 13,188 8,200 9,309 11,602 Difference ,025 1,074 2,264 4,923 1,077 2,274 4,969 S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 12 of 14

48 Experimental Results: Brake Engage Points Slow Fast Loaded Empty Loaded Empty Cars Brake force for unknown load F pb = car lbf Delay brakes 726 1,110 1, ,662 15,436 17,742 22,730 5,369 7,676 12,664 Air brakes , ,364 15,494 17,880 4,278 5,334 7,383 Difference ,161 1,072 2,248 4,850 1,091 2,342 5,281 Brake force for known load, loaded: F pb = car lbf F pb = car lbf Delay brakes , ,771 10,817 13,123 18,111 9,277 11,583 16,571 Air brakes ,743 10,859 13,188 8,200 9,309 11,602 Difference ,025 1,074 2,264 4,923 1,077 2,274 4,969 S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 12 of 14

49 Experimental Results: Brake Engage Points Fast trains Air brake control conditions engage brakes considerably later Loaded Empty Cars Brake force for known load, loaded: F pb = lbf car, empty: F pb = lbf car Delay brakes 10,817 13,123 18,111 9,277 11,583 16,571 Air brakes 9,743 10,859 13,188 8,200 9,309 11,602 Difference 1,074 2,264 4,923 1,077 2,274 4,969 Difference exceeds FRA requirement of at most 1000ft undershoot! S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 12 of 14

50 Summary Proof Strategy Theorem proving ensures correct model Proof guarantees correct model KeYmaera X Proof Hybrid System Model Control Conditions Code No overshoot + Limited undershoot Proofs for certification Models and code for system architecture and implementation Control conditions for runtime monitoring and testing S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 13 of 14

51 Summary Transfer safety of model to controller implementation roof guarantees correct model KeYmaera X Control Proof Control Conditions Code Sensors Monitor Actuators Monitor desired effect + safe environment ModelPlex synthesizes and proves monitors for model compliance Runtime: ensure safety and detect anomalies Testing: generate and analyze test cases Mitsch, S., Platzer, A.: ModelPlex: Verified runtime validation of verified cyber-physical system models. Formal Methods in System Design, 49(1), S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 13 of 14

52 Stefan Mitsch Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Train Control 14 of 14