R. Haven Wiley The Evolution of Communication: Information and Manipulation (1983) SLANG - Seminar Amani Hussein

Transcription

1 R. Haven Wiley The Evolution of Communication: Information and Manipulation (1983) SLANG - Seminar Amani Hussein

2 1. Adaptation for efficient communication 2. Communication as manipulation 3. Withholding information 4. Evolution of simple honesty 5. Conclusion 6. Personal statement

3 1. Adaptation for efficient communication

4 What is communication?

5

6 Two forms of information: Transmitted information: the predictability of a receiver's behavior increases after a signal Broadcast information: the predictability of a sender s behavior increases after a signal

7 link between communication and evolution: communication is the process which allows us to evolve, due to this process we learn how to use our and the other's behavior for our benefit signal evaluation of response improvement behavior evolves

8 Decoding/Encoding Internal/ personal factors Signal: reflection of inner state Action: expression of inner state same applies to the receiver: signal changes its internal state resulting in a response Other factors influencing response: context of signal and history of receiver process called decoding (in terms of sender: encoding)

9 Causes of error in signal External factors: Noise Distance transmission/ reception: Receiver s threshold for detecting signals Missed detection: missing parts of the signal False alarms: reacting to factors which have nothing to do with the signal

10 How to improve the detection of signals? Sender uses easy-to-detect-signals sender can send signals that have certain features which increase the reliability of detection (= receiver misses fewer signals by reducing the detection of false alarms)

11 Redundancy signal (or part of it) is repeated or usage of stereotypical components results from predictability: when a signal or part of it is seen over and over again one can recognize it easily reduces errors in detection + good for long distance in a noisy environment

12 Conspicuousness It s easy to detect signals if they are conspicuous or set in a contrast, one has to make oneself visible and distinguishable

13 Small repertoires and typical intensity "the smaller the repertoire of signals that a receiver must identify, the better is its performance" (163) Combined with typical intensity = less ambiguity! Especially in a noisy environment, it is better to produce a few standardized signals which are easy and surely detectable

14 Alerting signals used in the beginning of a signal, it must be detectable and set in contrast to the background helps the receiver to figure out when to expect a signal must not contain any info at all

15 four features mostly go together producing ritualized signals the connection to evolution: nature selects responses that increases the receiver's fitness as well as the production of signals which increase the signaler's fitness!

16 2. Communication as manipulation Manipulation = signals are used not to provide information but to influence the receiver to behave in a way that benefits the signaler Deceit: depends on the rules of decoding the signal by the receiver or in other words: the receiver has to be willing to believe the deceit and the signaler takes advantage of that

17 To counter deceit as receiver: use the signal to increase its own fitness by gaining information which is not meant to be signaled to the specific receiver = eavesdropping Deceit is good for survival/ distinction between information and manipulation Receiver s don t bluff, they retaliate: change the rules of decoding so the signaler can not take advantage

18 Inflation or devaluation of signals Receiver counters bluffing by inflation/ devaluation more and greater bluffing ends in the escalation of signals and decoding = when bluffing becomes too costly leads to honest signals!

19 Increased discrimination by receivers Receiver tries to see through the bluffing and discover the true motives of a signaler, by investigating signals carefully honest signals: once signaler is exposed, the receiver will not be fooled by it again

20 So, what about the honest signalers who can be mistaken for bluffers, what should they do? They use unbluffable signals, a feature which will distinguish them from imitators!

21 3. Withholding information Protects the sender from revealing their true nature Makes eavesdropping complicated for rivals never useful to reveal important information (broadcast information) about the next move even with all collected information, one can still not predict the end of a fight

22 Contingent information Information about possible responses following a certain signal, like: an individual will retaliate if a rival attacks or withdraw when the rival withdraws

23 another possibility for the lack of information is bluffing as seen in the animal world it pays off to threaten with maximum intensity but once there is mutual bluffing (meaning the opponent was not scared away by initial bluffing) it is important to take time to judge rival thoroughly

24 once opponents learn more about each other the confrontation can come to a resolution the more the opponents resemble each other the more time a conflict takes sometimes fights don't obey any strategies uncorrelated asymmetry: one difference that has nothing to do with fighting abilities, totally random feature

25 Speckled wood butterfly have an "owners always win" rule

26 4. Evolution of simple honesty Deceit can evolve into honesty But: honesty coming from competition not mutuality To provide honest information, the exchange has to be based on mutuality: both sender and receiver exchange information and benefit from this exchange (even if deceit provides greater advantages for either sender or receiver)

27 Kin selection Definition: "results from the presence of the same genes in related individuals, by virtue of their descent from a common ancestor" (p182) Manipulation of a relative individual to one's advantage does not increase the survival and reproduction of the same genes in the relative manipulating own or related kind is not favored by nature!

28 What about unrelated individuals? evolution of mutuality is analyzed by game theory = the net benefits of an individual depends both on its own strategy and the strategy of the other individual Example: prisoner's dilemma Same applies to population of deceivers: they will not be invaded by others because but their net benefit is lower than a population of honest and cooperative people

29 5. Conclusion Communication applies to rules: rules for encoding, for decoding, rules for deceit and mutuality Communication does not occur independently, it is more interdependent: the interaction between individuals depends on their relationship to each other Rules of communication come from communication and interaction!

30 6. Personal statement As a Darwin fan, the text did make sense to me: not only does evolution involve the physical development by adaption to the environment we live in, but also they way we communicate with each other evolves Problem: text does not explain how the communication of individuals evolves when there are limited communication tools Due to the date of the text, the author couldn t include modern communication

31 Any questions?

32 Thank you!